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A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF
CHRISTIAN LITERATURE AND DOCTRINE
FROM THE DEATH OF THE APOSTLES
TO THE NICENE COUNCIL.



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CHRISTIAN LITERATURE
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THE NICENE COUNCIL.

BY
JAMES DONALDSON, M.A.

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BOOK II.

THE APOLOGISTS.

VOL. II.

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THE APOLOGISTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE era embraced in our second division extends from the reign of Antoninus Pius to that of Commodus. One of the writers included in the previous group, Polycarp, lived far on into this period. But his style and mode of thought, as well as the most active part of his life, belong to the earlier period. The writer of the Pastor of Hermas may also have lived in the time of the Antonines, but here again in the lack of external evidence we are led by the character of his work to place him in the earliest group of Christian writers. On the other hand, some of the writers included in the second group flourished in the reign of Hadrian. The first Apologists presented their apologies to that emperor. But as their writings are lost, and consequently a thorough study of their mode of thought is impossible, we class them along with those who carried out the special work which they had commenced.

This era is justly called the Apologetic. There were many other writers besides the Apologists, and the Apologists wrote other works besides the apologies. Some wrote exhortatory letters, like Dionysius; some wrote against heretics; some discussed the Passover controversy; one recorded his recollections

of earlier times ; and some, like Melito, spread their investigations over a wide range of interesting subjects. Unfortunately, of these works we know only the names, or, at the best, but a few fragments are all that remain. The literature which lies before us for study is apologetic. The Apologists are Quadratus, Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Hermias, and Melito. We have but fragments of the apologies of Quadratus, Aristides, Hermias, and Melito. The apologies of the others are nearly complete. That of Theophilus was addressed to a private individual, Tatian's was an appeal to the Greeks, while the other two were presented to the emperors. Yet the difference caused by this circumstance is not so great as might at first sight be supposed.

These apologies are not apologies for Christianity. In fact, Christianity had not as yet been attacked in writing. Celsus wrote his work against the Christian religion towards the middle of this period, and his work remained unanswered for upwards of fifty years. These apologies are genuine apologies ; that is, defences of persons who have been accused. The Christians at this time were generally condemned to death without any trial, simply because they confessed that they were Christians, and these apologies are appeals from the subordinate judges who thus treated them to the supreme administrators of the law, the emperors. Their great aim, therefore, is to show that it is unjust to condemn a person without a hearing, and on the ground merely of a name, and to prove that the accusations commonly made against the Christians were utterly unfounded. They were written to avert persecutions which threatened the Christians on every hand.

The apologies themselves are proof that these persecutions did not proceed from the supreme authorities. They were not sanctioned by laws enacted expressly for the purpose, nor were they the result of temporary decrees issued by the emperors. Historians of the church who flourished long subsequent to the times of persecution, arbitrarily reckoned

the persecutions as ten, and assigned each to a particular emperor. But this reckoning is one of those generalizations which have no real basis in fact. From the very first dawn of Christianity Christians were persecuted, and this persecution continued without intermission, but with more or less ferocity according as local circumstances stimulated the populace. A considerable time elapsed before Christianity drew upon it the notice and interference of the lawgivers. The violence of Nero against the Christians was a savage outburst of cruelty, not against Christianity, but against men who had become objects of hatred and ridicule to the people, and for whom he expected that nobody would care. It is doubtful, moreover, whether he did not confound Christians with Jews. The persecution of Domitian was of a similar nature, but was not more violent against Christians than it was against philosophers. The first genuine notice which the government took of Christians, as far as history has informed us, is made in Pliny's famous letter to the emperor Trajan. From that letter it appears that Pliny had never been present at the trials of the Christians before his appointment to office, and was therefore in doubt whether to punish those who simply professed the name of Christ, or whether he should not farther inquire as to whether they had committed some crime in addition to bearing the odious name. As preliminary to the settlement of his procedure he had inquired into the nature of their meetings, and had tortured two maidservants for the purpose of ascertaining the truth. But he had found nothing criminal—nothing but a depraved and immoderate superstition. As a Roman governor, however, he claimed the right of regulating the religion of subjects, and he therefore regarded the obstinacy of the Christians as fit cause for punishment in the meantime. As to the future, he writes for more precise directions from his master. The answer of Trajan is conclusive that as yet the law had taken no notice of Christians. No fixed mode of procedure, he says, was possible for all circumstances. The governors must act according to the necessities of the case.

If Christians were brought up for trial and would not yield obedience to the Roman governor by worshipping the gods and the image of the emperor, then they must be punished. But no search was to be made for Christians, and informers were to be discountenanced.

The same course of conduct was pursued in the following reigns. We hear nothing of laws made or carried into force against the Christians, and the only emperor who is supposed to have interfered unfavourably is Marcus Aurelius. I think that there is not good reason for the charge made against this emperor. Persecution never ceased. It raged, in the time of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Commodus, as well as in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. But the generalizing tendency of the later historians led them to fix on one point of time, and the most prominent point was unquestionably the time of the persecution of the Gallic Christians, towards the end of the reign of Marcus Aurelius. They, in consequence, set down Marcus Aurelius as instigating a persecution. Most modern writers have given credence to this view, all the more readily that it seems to be supported by a probable theory of the action of the human heart in the circumstances. Marcus Aurelius is regarded as having been very pious, but piety towards the gods would produce intolerance towards the Christians, and the greater the piety the more likely that the intolerance would be shown. Now, that Marcus Aurelius was pious there cannot be a doubt. His own work abundantly proves this. But his piety was of a peculiar sort. It was stoical. He could not and did not believe in the common gods. He resolved them into principles. He kept up their worship because he did not know how the religious instinct could be preserved without it. But he stood in relation to these gods in a state of utter unbelief, and he must have regarded the worship of them as an extremely difficult problem. He could not be intolerant in behalf of gods as such. In fact, there would be more reason to expect the superstitious wavering Hadrian or the pious unphilosophical Antoninus Pius to stand up in defence of the gods than such a sceptic

as Marcus Aurelius. And when we examine the evidence on which the guilt is imputed to Aurelius, we shall find it to be utterly unsatisfactory. We shall find that it resolves itself into this, that persecutions took place in his reign, that these persecutions were especially violent in France, and that it is difficult to suppose that they took place without his sanction. But persecutions were not unknown in the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius. Quadratus and Aristides presented their apologies to Hadrian, Justin Martyr presented his to Antoninus Pius, and yet these emperors are not accused. In fact, an emperor could not be expected to interfere. There were, no doubt, thousands of cases of judicial injustice throughout the empire. Many of these never came to the emperor's ears, and many of them came too late. There is this strong proof of the innocence of Marcus Aurelius, that the Christians never blame him, but, on the contrary, appeal to him as either protecting them, or as likely to protect them. The language of Athenagoras prevents us from supposing that he knew anything of the emperor's too great zeal for the gods. Tatian does not accuse him. Tertullian praises him. The one single statement against him occurs in the letter of the Church at Lyons, and the words used no more prove his guilt than the official use of the name of William in any document connected with the Glencoe massacre would prove that that monarch knowingly lent his sanction to that monstrous crime. On the contrary, there is good reason for doubting whether he knew anything at all of the sanction given to the persecution, for the persecution took place at the very time at which the emperor must have been overwhelmed with preparations for his war against the Marcomanni. Moreover, at the worst, it was not a persecution of Christians as Christians. Even on the supposition that he did give his sanction personally, he merely sanctioned the decisions of his subordinates, and these decisions, it must be remembered, as presented to him, were no doubt based on the most satisfactory evidence of guilt wrenched by torture and the most blinded prejudice. He could not, even if he had wished, inquire personally into

the innocence or guilt of the Christians accused, and he could not help believing his own regularly-appointed officers in preference to Christians, so long as he remained outside the Christian Church.

The emperors, then, had nothing to do with the persecution of Christians. On the contrary, the whole tendency of the government during the reigns of Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, was eminently favourable to the spread of the new religion. The empire was a vast advance on the republic in a political point of view, as Congreve^a has well shown. In the times of the republic the government was conducted solely for the interests of the Romans, and this narrow policy continued during the reigns of the family of Cæsar. But the circumstances of imperial government necessitated attention to the interests of a much wider class. And when a provincial, as Trajan was, received the purple, his feelings led him to identify the interests of the great masses of men throughout the Roman empire with his own. Henceforward the policy of the rulers was no longer to flatter the senate, but to ingratiate themselves with the people. And so strikingly was this policy carried out in the reign of Antoninus Pius, that the senate on his death were for refusing him the honours which were paid to deceased emperors. The imperial government was, therefore, government for the people; for the many, and not for the few. This very extension of the aim of the governors had a humanizing influence on them. And accordingly we find that the general tendency of their policy was much superior to that of the days of the Roman Republic. Many of the barbarous practices which had been then legalized were now abolished; the ferocity of some institutions was mitigated, and new institutions were formed of a noble and benevolent character. Thus slaves were treated with much greater kindness by the law. Hadrian prohibited masters from killing their slaves, on penalty of being tried for the

^a In his *Roman Empire of the West. Four Lectures*, by Richard Congreve, M. A.

crime; and Antoninus went further, and gave instructions that in the case of slaves who took refuge at altars or the statues of the emperors their masters should be compelled to sell them if their cruelty was proved to be intolerable^b. The same humanity was seen in the attempts to moderate the ferocity of the gladiatorial fights, Marcus Aurelius having made a law that the combatants were to fight with blunt weapons^c.

Many arrangements were made for the sake of morality, such as the establishment of separate baths for the sexes. And benevolent institutions now for the first time make their appearance. Trajan maintained five thousand children of the free-born at his own expense, and Hadrian continued the work, spending still more money on it, while he also helped to support destitute women. These arrangements, there is reason to believe, were kept up by their immediate successors. Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius farther turned their bounty into memorials of women to whom they were attached; for we are told that Antoninus Pius supported a number of girls, whom he called *Faustinianæ*, in honour of *Faustina*; and *Capitolinus* says that Marcus Aurelius instituted new *Faustinian* girls in honour of his deceased wife^d. Both these emperors, moreover, seem to have felt it their duty to provide for the instruction of the people, at least to a certain extent, for they paid handsome salaries to the rhetors and philosophers.

All these arrangements are in evident harmony with the spirit of Christianity; and some of them, such as the institution of what we may call orphan asylums, have often been set down as the peculiar fruits of Christ's religion. It seems absurd to attribute them to attempts to revive the old Roman spirit, or to revive and give lustre to the old Roman polytheism^e. There is, in the first place, no proof that any of

^b Gaii Inst. i. 53.

^c Epit. Dion Cass. l. lxxi. c. 29.

^d c. 26.

^e Thiersch has done this in an interesting lecture called *Politik und Philosophie*, in ihrem Verhältniss zur Religion unter Trajanus, Hadrianus, und den beiden Antoninen. Marburg 1853.

the emperors attempted either the one or the other ; and in the second place, their mode of procedure would have been totally different if these had been their aims. Moreover, we know that the emperors were particularly tolerant of all national religions. Their earnest endeavours to gain the goodwill of the provincials made them look on the religions of all nations with favour, and they allowed Rome to become the receptacle of all forms of worship. As philosophers, likewise, they could not prefer one system of gods to another. All that they demanded was, that there should be some system ; believing, as they did, that a religion was the most powerful restraint possible on the great masses of the uneducated people. If there was a religious system, it was a matter of no consequence to them whether it was Roman, Greek, or Persian ; and as to one of them, Hadrian, we know that he had a greater liking for what he found abroad than for what he found at home. The explanation of the humanizing spirit that pervades many of the imperial regulations is to be sought in the circumstances of the case : the necessities of imperial government ; the moral feeling produced by the various philosophies, especially the Stoic ; the unconscious influence of Christianity, and the general good character of the emperors.

The persecutions, then, of the Christians were for a long time private and not public. They had their origin in the disturbances of the social system which the new religion was calculated to produce. At first, indeed, the Christians were confounded in many quarters with the Jews, and the hatred which that obstinate race brought upon themselves followed those who were supposed to belong to them. But this mistake must have been soon dissipated. And by the time to which our present writers belong the Jews had come to be utterly despised as a headstrong, narrow-minded set of fanatics, who would fight to the death for the privilege of circumcising themselves. Before we can realize fully the causes which roused the great masses throughout the Roman empire, we must transport ourselves into the occurrences of daily life, and see how Christians frowned continually upon the habitual

actions of polytheists. If there was any interesting occasion on which friends assembled, Christianity interfered to prevent its adherent from being present, because some heathen rite was to be performed. The Christian was absent when the assembled friends danced round the cradle of the infant and gave it its name. The Christian could not be present when the young Roman donned the manly robe and his friends offered sacrifices in his behalf. The Christian absented himself from the marriage festivals of his most intimate friends and relatives, because the celebration took place at the altars of gods whom he looked on as demons. The Christian could not attend the banquets to which his heathen friends invited him, because libations were poured out to beings whom he deemed infamous. As he walked along the street he was never seen lifting his hand to his mouth as he passed the august statues of the gods. He never found his way into a temple or a theatre. He refused to make idols, or the decorations of idols. He refused to swear by the emperor as by a god. He doubted the propriety of acting as a soldier in the army, or of taking upon him any public office. If he were a slave, there were thousands of services from the performance of which he shrank. And if he were the master of a house, his house was destitute of a lararium, of household gods, of garlanded statues, and of every outward symbol of worship. In fact, a man by becoming a Christian proclaimed war against all the dearest and most hallowed practices of his neighbours, and the natural consequence was that he was expelled from society, he became an outcast and a reproach, and he was regarded as having no claim upon the protection of those whose most cherished sentiments he had outraged, nor could he appeal to a law to which he could not duly swear obedience. The Christian's presence in a community was felt to be a cause, and a sufficient cause, to bring down the wrath of the gods. Accordingly the most violent outbursts of persecution against the hated sect took place when some external calamity had drawn men's minds to the realization of a superior power which might be incensed against

tribes and nations. Whenever an earthquake occurred, the heathens believed that the gods were expressing their anger against the toleration of such men as the Christians. And the greater outbursts of heathen zeal which distinguished the reign of Marcus Aurelius are most likely to be attributed to the earthquakes and famines^f, the pestilences, floods, and ravaging wars which mark that period.

The hatred which was thus evoked by private circumstances against Christians grew in intensity as Christianity extended its power, and at length found reasons for itself in three great accusations with which Christians were everywhere assailed. The first of these made the other two possible ; in fact, made any accusation probable. It was that of atheism. The Christians were not restrained by any fear of the gods. They were men who had shaken themselves loose from all religious restraint whatsoever. It may seem strange that the Christians should at any time have been so far misunderstood as to be believed to be atheists. But if we for a moment remember how completely polytheists are bound by the material, how essential it is to them that the supernal powers be represented by material representations, we shall see how natural their mistake was. The Christians were never seen to bow before the image of a god. They had no priests. They brought no offerings, and sacrificed no victims. They had no temples, no consecrated buildings of any kind. When they met it was in the open air or in common private houses. They had not the slightest vestige of a material image or symbol of the Divine Being. The inference to a heathen mind from this absolute negation of outward worship was inevitable, that the Christians had no gods, that they did not believe in divine beings or a superior power. As soon as the notion prevailed that Christians were atheists, any amount of persecution became justifiable in the eyes of a heathen. In all ages an atheist was a man on whom the populace had demanded the infliction of the heaviest penalties of the law. He was always looked on as by necessity a most vile and dangerous man.

^f Cap. Vit. M. Anton. cc. viii. xiii. xvii. xxi.

And so firmly was this idea fixed in men's minds, that Justin allows that if Christians were proved to be atheists they would deserve the severest punishment. It is to this widely-prevalent belief in the atheism of the Christians to which we must attribute their treatment by the judges before whom they were often dragged. An atheist's word was worth nothing. He might profess innocence, he might claim the rights of a citizen, he might beseech and implore; but what could all this avail, if no trust can be placed in his word, if he will not take the oath which guarantees his obedience to the law, and refuses to worship any god whatever? Hence it came to pass that no sooner had a Christian declared that he was such, than he was set down as a criminal. No special charge against him was required. He was known to be an atheist. He was recognised as an enemy to the human race, and the judge entertained no doubt that he must have committed crimes which would deserve the extreme sentence of the law.

Against this accusation of atheism the apologists of our era have to labour with all their power. Once overcome this fundamental obstacle to fair treatment and they know that the other accusations will vanish. And they struggle to show how false the prejudice is, and how real is their worship of the one living and true God.

The belief that Christians were atheists prepared the minds of heathens for giving full credence to the other two charges which were laid against the whole sect. These two charges were unlimited licentiousness and the eating of human flesh. The Christians, it was supposed, must have some reason for combining and spreading their influence. What could this reason be? It seemed absurd and fantastic to imagine that they had combined for any good purpose. Atheists could not have a good purpose; and so the heathen mind rushed to the conclusion that they were a society especially devoted to the indulgence of licentious habits. Many circumstances seemed to favour this notion. The only trace of a worship which they seemed to have was the worship of a man who

had died by the most ignominious of deaths, as a public criminal, in a land besotted with the most blind fanaticism. Then, were not the majority of Christians wretched, contemptible men, belonging to the lowest classes? And did they not admit the most abandoned criminals, the basest scoundrels and prostitutes into their ranks? Even the very signs of brotherly love were set down as borrowings from the brothel—the holy kiss, the endearing terms of ‘brother’ and ‘sister.’ And then what could bring a mixed congregation of men and women, free and bond, to assemble before dawn, if it were not wild licentious passion? The meetings must be for indiscriminate intercourse, and stories were told how dogs were turned designedly into the place of meeting to overturn the candles and leave the assembly to their works of darkness. But the heathen mind would proceed to ask, how would villains who combined for such a detestable purpose cement their union? Catiline we know made his companions drink human blood. The Christians, it was known, spoke also of drinking blood in one of their ceremonies. From this circumstance arose the fiction that the Christians at their meetings slaughtered innocent babes and drank their blood while it was yet warm §.

It seems marvellous how such stories could possibly arise, and still more marvellous that they should be set down as unquestionable facts by the greater portion of the civilized communities of the time. But our wonder will be moderated when we reflect that Christianity was an altogether strange and startling phenomenon, and that it attempted to awaken religious feeling by the destruction of all the cherished ideas with which religious feeling had in the heathen mind been connected. At the same time, too, it has to be remembered that all the Gnostic sects as well as the true Christians bore the name of Christian, and that many vile practices were established by those who professed to follow the teachings of

§ See on all these accusations the Dissertation by G. G. S. Koepke, *De Statu et Condicione Christianorum sub imperatoribus Romanis alterius post Christum seculi*. Berolini 1828. 4to.

Christ. So extraordinary however did the prepossessions of the heathens against the Christians seem to the Apologists, that they accounted for them by supposing them the result of deep plots which the demons had contrived and had been working out for long ages to prevent mankind from believing the truths of Christianity.

In repelling these accusations, the Apologists could merely assert that they were not true. They demanded of the emperors that the judges should determine each case on its own merit, and they showed how utterly opposed the practice of any kind of vice was to the pure maxims which they had received from their heavenly teacher.

Though the apologies were thus primarily defences against false accusations, they could not fail to attempt something more. It was scarcely possible for a man who had become a Christian to vindicate his character without defending the change which had taken place in him, and without contrasting his old faith with his new. These apologies thus contain at once attacks on heathenism and expositions and defences of the Christian religion.

The modern reader will find himself greatly disappointed at the mode in which the Apologists attack heathenism and defend Christianity. Their eyes seem shut to many aids which they might have found in heathenism. They are utterly unconscious of the beauty of the Greek mythology. They sometimes use the weakest arguments in defence of Christianity, and they show themselves defective in true historical criticism. There is, no doubt, much truth in the blame which has been attached to the Apologists; but the blame does not belong to the Apologists as not having done their best, but to them as not having lived in the nineteenth century. There is not a single glaring fault in their modes of thought which might not be paralleled in Plutarch or any of their earlier contemporaries. In fact, the same main faults pervade all the writings of that age to a degree which the difference of a belief in Christianity and in heathenism or philosophy, though it at first tends to conceal, only in the

end makes the more striking. It is allowed, indeed, that the Apologists were not men of great powers of mind ; but it seems doubtful if more learned, more thoughtful, more able men would have done anything else than elaborate and polish up the arguments which are now found in the Apologetic writings.

In dealing with heathenism the Apologists had not to handle a fine series of poetic imaginings which were morally inoperative, but they had to struggle with beliefs that were in their day working potently among large masses for great evil. They could not be expected to form a true theory of the Greek or Roman mythology. This is one of the tasks of the present day, not yet by any means fully accomplished. They listened simply to the stories of the gods that were related ; they weighed their effect on the moral nature of man ; they saw their workings in the worship and life of heathens, and they held up the results to detestation. In doing this they did what almost all the wisest and best of the heathen philosophers had done already. In fact, the Greek mythology had outraged the feelings of the best of the Greeks, and it could not help doing so, for it was the creation of the Greek nation while yet in a comparatively barbarous and uneducated state. There may have been always a tradition of one god among the Greeks, but whether this was the case or not, the Greek mythology bears large traces of the activity of that early state of man's mind when imagination is tyrannical^b. The Greeks then saw majestic serpents in the sky, conceived thunders and lightnings as the bellowings of mighty bulls and the flashing of golden swords, and pictured the rush of clouds, the fall of rain, and the various phenomena of the sky in endless living forms. It is not likely that in this stage of the Greek mind the gods were fixed. One grand appearance impressed the imagination one day and was worshipped, another succeeded and obliterated the recollection of the former. In those early days there seems no trace

^b See *Der Ursprung der Mythologie dargelegt an Griechischer und Deutscher Sage* von Dr. F. L. W. Schwartz. Berlin 1860.

of a moral nature in the Greeks. Brothers and sisters freely mix in sexual intercourse; fathers kill sons, and sons dethrone fathers; lies and thefts pass as quite common occurrences. If the Greeks had believed these things to be wrong, would they at first have attributed them to the gods? In fact, it required a long period before the moral sense was roused, and the Greek mind became aware that there were certain moral laws binding men to men. Even in Homer we find few, if any, traces of moral laws¹. Yet before his time a vast change had come over the Greek mythology. It had passed from the unbridled efforts of imagination to a regular explanation of results. It had become crystallized to a certain extent in a mass of traditions instead of being the momentary expression of the strongly-awakened feelings. Even then, however, the gods were not moral beings. The Greek of Homer's time found his explanation of all events in the existence of gods. If he loved, it was Aphrodite that stirred him, whether the love were pure or impure. If he gained honour and dignity, they came from Zeus, whether the means he had employed to gain them were honourable or dishonourable. And yet a discrepancy did begin to be felt in the human mind. Man began to feel that he himself was the cause of calamity sometimes and not the gods. And this disturbance makes itself perceptible on various occasions in the Homeric poems. Moreover, though it would be scarcely fair to say that the gods have an ethical character, yet there are attached to Jupiter functions which are helpful to the maintenance of social life. He protects beggars and strangers, he loves the hospitable; in fact, that which we can liken to morality shows itself in a knowledge of what is or is not beneficial to a man not merely as an individual but as a social being. The highest quality (a quality approaching to an ethical one)

¹ I think that in Homer there is no consciousness of right as such. After examining all the passages in which moral feelings might be exhibited, this is the conclusion to which I have come: *dikaos* never means 'just' or 'right,' and the man who is *dikaos* is such in consequence of knowledge. See the passages quoted in Nägelsbach's *Homerische Theologie*, second ed. p. 317, note. There is the same absence of a moral sense in Hesiod.

in a man is that he knows a right thing in its proper season, and this peculiar quality is also in an eminent degree attributed to the gods, and attracts the love of Zeus in particular. It is from Zeus that proceed the special determinations of cases in which two courses seem open, a beneficial and a detrimental. From him come the *themistes*.¹ But at the same time it is Zeus that takes away from a man the intelligence which, if he retained it, would have prevented him from falling into the perpetration of what is detrimental. The gods are superior to men, therefore, not in morality properly so called, but in knowledge—a knowledge which is not inconsistent, as far as Homer's mind sees, with lying and cunning. They also are superior in what we might call physical qualities. They live for ever, and eat ambrosia, drink nectar, and far surpass men in might and strength.

As the Greek mind advanced from perceptions of what in individual cases was advantageous to the individual as an individual and a social being, to general ideas in regard to the advantageous, the notions of the gods necessarily changed. And when the Greeks at length reached the power of forming abstract ideas, the gods were left without a function. The attention of Greek thinkers was called to this point by the speculations of philosophers, but most of all by the special exertions of Socrates. He stood at the middle point of a great era in Greek thought—the time when the Greeks had come to generalize and arrange their particular observations under general terms. Socrates saw that the function of the gods was stated more precisely by abstract terms; that, to adduce an instance, it was more correct to call love the impelling principle in a man's mind than to speak of a goddess Aphrodite or a god Eros who drove the man into frenzy. He did not carry his work to its completion. Such a mighty change can take place only in the course of centuries, and accordingly he spoke, or rather Plato spoke, of half-divine beings, demons as he called them, whose conduct was not

¹ On the nature of these *themistes* there are some admirable remarks in Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 4.

irreproachable as that of the gods. But he spent the most of his life in examining the nature of the good, the just, the pious, and in urging men to form clear apprehensions of what was really meant by these words taken as abstract words; that is, as including a class of things or actions. From the time of Socrates an earnest belief in the gods of the Greek mythology became an impossibility to a philosophic mind. And no sect of philosophers did pretend to give credence to the popular tales. Some rejected the tales altogether as false, or true only of the *δαίμονες*; some, as Euhemerus, said that all the popular gods were originally men; some made physical allegories out of the stories; but none believed them, none defended them. And for a very obvious reason. The Greek mythology had been forming through the course of many ages, during which the Greek mind had been advancing from absolute ignorance of all moral distinctions to a consciousness of the moral laws which bind the intercourse of man with man. The traditions of the gods had taken their colour from the ages in which they were formed or recast; and now, when the mind no longer explained either the physical or spiritual phenomena by personal forces but by abstract terms, and therefore no longer added to mythology, the previous traditions were felt to be at variance with the moral feelings that had been aroused. They were unworthy of the gods, and the more unworthy they were felt to be, the higher became the notion of the divine being or of the perfection of man. The impiety of some of the traditions had been felt at an early stage by men who were not necessarily philosophers. Pindar has given expression to his dissatisfaction. Æschylus, though he could not and probably did not wish to venture to decry the popular faith, yet brings out the tyrannic character of Zeus so strongly in his *Prometheus Vincetus*, that, whatever vindication of Zeus he may have given in the concluding play of the *Trilogy*, doubts must have arisen. His play of the *Eumenides* has the same effect; for the contest of two higher powers, determined at last only by a casting vote, naturally awakens the mind to serious reflections. By the time at which

the plays of Euripides were placed on the stage philosophy had done its work, and he could speak out his disapprobation of the popular notions in decided language. And this disregard of the prevalent stories continued down to the time of our Apologists, so that the work that lay before them in attacking the popular heathenism had, to a certain extent, been accomplished by ante-Christian heathen writers. And many of the heathen writers who flourished in the first two centuries of the Christian era speak as strongly against the licentious stories of the deities as any of the Christian writers. Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, and Apuleius may be mentioned as instances. In fact, almost the only writer of the period who seems to have unhesitating faith in the popular gods is Pausanias, who has, however, not the slightest claim to be looked on as a philosopher in any sense of the term^k.

Not only had the philosophers abandoned the popular creed, but the poets had also given up all earnest faith in the common gods. And this is a very striking fact; for the poets were really the only teachers that heathenism had. Their priests, Lobeck^l has proved, never taught morality, nor indeed had they any public function as teachers. And in the earliest days the poets were not merely the narrators of the traditions of the gods, but often they acted as the creators of these traditions. Mythology being the result and expression of man's thoughts and observations while his imagination is absolutely predominant, it is plain that the poets, as being able to give expression to their imaginations, would be the persons principally engaged in forming the popular traditions. So that the statement of Herodotus^m, "that Homer and Hesiod formed the Greek mythology," though not true of them absolutely, yet is true of them in the main, as the representatives of poets. Philosophy produced a complete change, however,

^k The opinions of the various heathen writers mentioned here are given at length in Tzschirner's *Fall des Heidenthums*, buch i. kap. i., and there is a clever sketch by M. Villemain prefixed to his *Tableau de L'Eloquence Chrétienne au iv. Siècle* of Polytheism in the First Century.

^l *Aglaophamus*, p. 10.

^m ii. 53.

on the poets, as it did on almost all cultivated men. And the consequence was, that most of the poets of the middle comedy held up the stories of the gods as ridiculous. These opinions passed to the Romans. Ennius translated the work of Euhemerus, and maintained his theory. Plautus ridicules the common stories. Neither Virgil nor Horace believed them.

What then was it that the Apologists had to oppose? It was the popular belief. Though the stories about the gods had long been discredited by the intelligent, yet the masses of the people still believed them. The legends were still powerful in forming the manners of the people. The pagan debauchee defended his conduct by the example of Jove; he got drunk in honour of Bacchus; he prayed to Venus for possession of the person whom he loved, by foul or fair means. The rites were still observed. The ceremonies connected with the conceptions and traditions of the gods were inwoven with everyday life. And occasionally there were solemn mysteries in which, by means of strange appearances, exquisite works of art, the power of hoar antiquity, and other such influences, the mind of the spectator was worked up to a deep feeling of the grandeur of the divine power and glory. The popular mind was indoctrinated into the absolute necessity of these rites. The stories were impressed on them by every tie that association could create. And perhaps they were believed with all the greater force that there had been no exercise of the reason in ascertaining their truth, and that there was a secret occasional feeling that if reason were to interfere the only result would be infinite doubt. Moreover, though the attacks of philosophers might weaken confidence in some tales, yet they could not and did not weaken to any great extent the tendency in unthinking minds to superstition, but merely gave it another direction. And the age of which we write was remarkable for the erratic forms of superstition which it displays. The *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius show how prevalent witchcraft was. Lucian's account of the prophet Alexander, an arrant knave who was adored by thousands, gives us a glimpse into the heathen longing for something

supernatural. And though most of the oracles were nearly dumb, some of them, such as those of Amphilochus and Trophonius, had a thriving trade. The prevalence of the Mithras-worship and the frequency of religious riots testify to the great power which paganism had over the minds of the masses.

The Apologists, therefore, were under the strongest obligations to set forth the degrading nature of the pagan gods and of the pagan worship. And they differed from most of those who had already thrown discredit on the stories of the gods, in that they felt it to be a solemn duty to disabuse the popular mind. Plato had spoken earnestly against the prevalent tales, and had expelled Homer from his republic because he gave currency to them. He had felt how impossible it was for the Greeks to worship the divine being worthily as long as these tales were believed. But the majority of philosophers did not deem it worth while to interfere with popular belief. They had no missionary zeal. They were content with stating their own opinions, but they had no wish to indoctrinate men who were not philosophers with disparaging ideas of their national religions. The Apologists are, therefore, far more earnest, far more vigorous, and far more thorough in their exposure of the licentiousness and immorality of the gods. They dwell more on details, and bring the matter more directly home to the hearts of men.

They have frequently been blamed for not having entered with more sympathy into the heathen mythology; but the blame is, in all cases but that of Tatian, undeserved; and some of them, as Justin, are remarkable for their extreme liberality. There was nothing in Greek mythology of a moral nature with which they could sympathize. They could not be expected at that time to look upon the mythology as a phase of the human mind, a stage of its progress from expression by figurative language into expression by abstract ideas. They were open to the adoption of theories which were possible in their day, and the theory which they did adopt was that most favourable to man. There were, as I have said, three great theories as to the nature of the Greek mythology.

prevalent among philosophers. One of these was, that the myths were allegories of physical phenomena. The Apologists unhesitatingly rejected this explanation, and deemed the Stoics unfair in maintaining that they were thus able to reconcile their philosophic ideas with reverence for the popular gods. The second was that of Euhemerus, that all the popular gods were originally men. The Apologists adopt this theory only to a certain extent, drawing indeed many illustrations of the mortal nature of the gods from the work of the Epicurean, but at the same time showing that they were conscious that the theory did not cover all the facts. The third theory was the one which had been adopted by many of the most famous philosophers in all schools, and which is expounded fully by Plutarch in several of his treatises. It maintained that there were beings intermediate between the gods and men, a kind of mediators between the divine and the human. These were called *δαίμονες* or *δαμόνια*. Their actions were not perfectly holy, as those of the gods. They shared the frailties of man; and the mythological stories were real facts in the histories of these demones. Plutarch^a attributes this opinion to Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus, as well as to Plato, who has left a clear exposition of his sentiments on the subject in the Symposium^o. The Apologists adopted this theory, adding to it the notion that the demones were the evil angels who had been begotten from the intercourse of the sons of God with the daughters of men mentioned in the sixth chapter of Genesis. They believed that these demons were real beings, anxiously labouring to enslave men for their own vile purposes; and they thus represented polytheism as a fearful delusion contrived by cunning beings superior in knowledge to man, by which the happiness of the race was marred and destroyed. They could, therefore, have no sympathy with polytheism, since it was the direct offspring of evil agents, but they had much sympathy with those who had been ensnared by it, and who were continually led astray by demonic agency.

^a Isis and Osir. c. 25; 360 Xyl.

^o c. xxiii. p. 202 E.

At the same time, most of the Apologists show a ready desire to recognise an agreement on the part of heathen poets and philosophers with their own beliefs. Throughout the whole of Greek literature, from the earliest times, the cultivated minds struggle to retain fresh and uncontaminated the idea of one supreme God, one ruler of gods and men, far surpassing all in the highest elements of character. This struggle settled down into an earnest conviction in the course of time, and most of the best minds after the days of Socrates recognised a divine being supereminently good and great. The Apologists adduce many proofs of this fact. Their proofs now, however, strike us as singularly defective. They had the whole of the Greek literature before them, and consequently a much wider range to draw from than we have; and yet they omit many passages which present themselves to us as striking and conclusive, while they appeal to many which are either forgeries or were misunderstood by them^p. They appeal to the writings of poets and philosophers in regard to other doctrines besides that of the unity of God. Their uncritical modes of interpretation betray themselves strongly in these appeals; and their explanation of the agreement is equally unsatisfactory. They suppose that the knowledge of these truths came to the poets and philosophers, not from investigation, but from reading the books of Moses.

The Apologists attacked polytheism, not because they found it supported by strong arguments or by arguments at all, but because it was powerful among the masses for evil. That which entered into a rational conflict with Christianity on the side of heathenism was philosophy. This conflict, however, had not as yet found expressions for itself in words, nor did either party know exactly in what relation it stood to the other. In the next century we shall have to deal with it definitely when we treat of the Alexandrian school. In the age which we now discuss philosophy and Christianity stand opposed to each other as rival methods of doing the

^p Most of them are given by Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Harrison's edition, vol. i. p. 621.

same thing. Philosophy sought to save the soul of man, so did Christianity. In this aim the philosophy of the ancient world differed much from that of modern times. Aristotle, indeed, regarded philosophy as the pursuit of truth simply for the sake of the knowledge. But other philosophers looked on the simple knowledge as a means to the attainment of the best mode of living. They sought to solve the problem of the destiny of man, and to carry him up to perfection. And this is the peculiarity and distinction of all the ancient philosophies that attained renown, that it was through knowledge, through an acquaintance with the laws of man's nature that they sought to purify his life, and to enable him to attain the end of his being. It was through his intellect that his heart and will were to be directed aright. Philosophers could not conceive of any other method, and they therefore looked on Christianity as utterly foolish. Christians, on the other hand, asserted that men were saved by Christ's power, and that therefore their mode of piety was itself the only true philosophy. The method might seem absurd, but there could be no doubt of the reality of the effects produced by it, and on that account it laid claim to be reckoned the genuine philosophy.

The contest that thus arose was, as has been said already, not well defined. The Christian Apologists did not exactly perceive wherein the main dispute lay, nor did they answer the objections which philosophers would have made in anything like a satisfactory manner. But they saw clearly this much, that philosophy failed to save men, not because it was absolutely wrong in itself, but because it was defective. Many philosophers had somewhat of the *logos* or reason in them to direct their conduct, and therefore to this extent they were real Christians themselves. But Christians alone had the privilege of knowing and having the *Logos* perfectly and living with Him; and therefore it seemed to them absurd and irrational, now that the *Logos* had appeared in human form, to prefer the dim and uncertain leading of philosophy to the certain and sure guidance of incarnated Reason. Even between the ancient prophets and the Greek philosophers they

drew a mighty distinction. The prophets spoke as they were moved by God; their utterances were authoritative; they spoke without attempting to demonstrate; their assertions were superior in credibility to any philosophic deliverance, because the fulfilment of their predictions was guarantee that they spoke with the authority of God. And their writings had this immeasurable advantage over the works of philosophers, that no contradictions made their appearance in them. Though written at various periods, and by men of various temperaments, they held one uniform language in regard to God and his dealings with man, in regard to the creation, the government of the world, and a future state. The productions of philosophers betray a totally different phenomenon. One philosopher destroys what another has built up; one doubts where the other believes; one school is set up as antagonist to another. There is no certainty. There are the most manifest inconsistencies and oppositions. How could any human being put his trust in philosophy when its light was so flickering, and the paths it pointed out led in so many different directions? This is the great argument of the Apologists against confidence in philosophy as a director of man towards salvation.

The position of the Apologists was therefore not that of direct opposition to all the claims of philosophy, but to that special claim which set it up as a rival to Christianity in its power of re-modelling man's life. With some of the philosophic schools the Christians had strong sympathies, and even when they found themselves compelled to maintain a decided warfare against the chief doctrines of others, they were ready to bring forward any doctrines with which they agreed.

The philosophic teaching with which they felt most sympathy was that of Socrates and Plato. It was not because Plato's metaphysical system pleased them; on the contrary, they did not as a rule believe in the natural immortality of soul, and they say little or nothing of his doctrine of ideas, Athenagoras excepted. But the morality of Socrates was healthy and sound. The earnestness with which he

turned man's attention to himself and his own state was in harmony with the Christian feeling ; and his noble, unselfish conduct excited their warmest admiration. Plato's doctrine of God as the good was felt to be an approach to Christianity. His frequent affirmation that the soul could be injured only by its own evil-doing harmonized with the Christian teaching in regard to life. Many of his statements in regard to the creation of the world struck them as similar to the accounts of Moses ; and his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments differed from the Christian mainly in that he did not set down Christ as the judge. It was, however, especially in the peculiar way in which he defined the aim of philosophy that Platonism resembled Christianity. With him the business of philosophy was to make man like God, to bring him into greater resemblance to God. Besides these express doctrines there were many beautiful passages in his writings which gave utterance to longings and desires akin to those awakened by Christianity, and in some instances his descriptions seemed almost prophetic, as when he pictures the just man impaled and dying a death of ignominy, yet blessed in his lonely holiness.

Plato had no real successor. It is scarcely fair to say that he had even a fully developed system ; and consequently none of those who regarded themselves as his followers obtain much attention from the Apologists. The Academics in their attempt to carry out Plato's dialectics came to the natural conclusion that they could not reach absolute certainty ; in other words, that salvation through intellect was not possible for them. The value of this conclusion, however, the Apologists did not see. Nor did they occupy their minds at all with Aristotle and his followers. Aristotle himself had not devoted much of his energy to the investigation, or at least exposition, of theology ; and his followers, the Peripatetics, had been far from distinguishing themselves by religious earnestness. In these early Christian apologies, therefore, the influence of Aristotle is almost unknown.

The philosophies prevalent in the days of the Apologists which exerted most power were the Stoic and the Epicurean.

The Epicurean philosophy was purely materialistic. But it was not its materialism that brought it into collision with Christianity, but its restriction of enjoyment to material pleasures and of man's aspirations to the present life only. Whatever, also, may have been the character of Epicurus, and however pure his philosophy in its aim and form may have been, as propounded and held by himself, there is no doubt that a very general motive for its adoption was the supposed licence it gave to the indulgence of human passions and desires. At the time of the Apologists Epicureanism presented itself as defiant of all religious principles, and a pande to every form of vice. And, consequently, the Christian writers condemn it almost without argument. They reckon Epicurus among the corrupters of mankind, and they stigmatize him and his philosophy in the strongest terms.

Stoicism had, on the other hand, many things to recommend it to Christians; and the Christian Apologists do not hesitate to praise some of the Stoics in the highest terms. But the living principle of Stoicism was in deadly opposition to the Christian faith; and the more earnest and exalted Stoicism was, the more profound was the feeling of the Apologists that its fundamental principles ought to be overthrown. Stoicism was not altogether materialistic. Plato had explained the perceptibility of the material world by stating that all material things partook of ideas; that there was, as it were, a mixture of matter and the immaterial in every external thing, and that the matter became intelligible through the immaterial that resided in it. With Plato the immaterial was separable from the matter; and Plato had consequently to deal with a principle which was anterior to the present material universe, and different from it. The Stoics saw this difficulty, and solved the problem by supposing that matter and soul or reason were essentially distinct; but, as they are never found apart in this world, so they concluded that they never could exist apart: that the material and the immaterial were always more or less worked up together¹. The imma-

¹ See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Dritter Theil. Erste Hälfte,

terial, or reason and mind, or by whatever other name it might be called, they asserted to be God. But by this very assertion they deprived God of a separate existence. Their language, moreover, is not fixed; for, as the spiritual always is combined with the material, they applied the term 'god' to the whole material universe. But whichever use of the word was adopted, the god of the Stoics was not a personal god. Not that the Stoics did not sometimes conceive of the Logos or Nous personally; but, when they did so, they did it out of the irresistible impulse of the age to conceive principles personally. Systematically they looked on the divine being as an all-pervasive principle, as active everywhere; in stones, in rivers, in brutes, in man. The Deity, therefore, had merely an eternal activity, not a will. He could not interfere for the salvation of man. He did not, and could not love. It was not a person at all, but a principle which acted. It acted indeed with benevolence, its arrangements were good; but it had no personal interest in any one being or thing. It was this impersonal character of the Stoic divinity which closed up the Stoic heart against Christianity. The Stoic had no belief in a god of the heart, if I may so speak: he believed only in a god of the head. He did not wish to be saved by faith and love: he wished to reach perfection through a knowledge of the laws of the universe, and by stern obedience to them. Moreover, he had within himself somewhat of the divine principle; and it was his business to act the god. Some things were in his power, some were not. Those which were not, were ordered well by the pervading spirit of the universe. He had to receive them thankfully. The conquest of those which were in his power he owed to himself. If he mastered them, he actually became a god; he was admitted into the number of the celestial beings: he was not inferior to Jove himself. Stoicism thus

p. 70, notes. There is no satisfactory account of the Stoic philosophy either in German or English, as far as I know. The student must search for the truth in the monographs, especially of the Dutch school, on the individual Stoics. Zeller's account is by far the best. Grant's in the *Oxford Essays* is based on it.

roused all the powers of a man both to act and endure ; but, at the same time, it cut off all sense of dependence on superior beings. Hence the antipathy of Christianity to Stoicism. Yet Stoicism had many points in common with Christianity ; so many points, indeed, that, as we shall find, Stoicism insensibly forced many of its modes of looking at things into the minds of the Christian Apologists. It spoke of the providence of God. It spoke of the burning up of the world ; though all Stoics did not agree in this doctrine. It held out the hand of brotherhood to all who accepted its dogmas, of whatever nation or grade they might be. Its morality especially was noble. It proclaimed the virtuous man a king ; it made virtue the one essential thing ; and in some of its doctrines it approximated to a school of theology which afterwards arose in the Christian Church ; it insisted on the necessity of conversion, if we may use the Christian term ; it maintained that there were no great or small sins, but that all were equally bad ; it maintained that if a man be once converted he will never turn again to evil courses ; and it assigned to the true Stoics a place in heaven after their death, though with them this meant nothing more than absorption into the divine being.

In the Apologists there is no elaborate attempt to refute the teachings of the Stoics ; but there are continual references to them, principally in the shape of statements that what the Stoics believed to take place through natural law they believed to happen in consequence of the will of God.

As yet Neo-Platonism had not made its appearance ; nor can we distinctly trace in the Apologists any acquaintance with the writings of such men as Plutarch. As we have noticed already, the Christian theory of demonic agency in the heathen divinities has its counterpart in that writer ; but the Christian writers evidently did not borrow the theory from Plutarch : it came down from a much earlier period. Athenagoras, too, was a Platonist ; but his philosophy was taken directly from Plato, and indicates no tendency to Neo-Platonism.

Taking, then, a general survey of the aggressive position of the Apologists of this age, we remark that their work was far from complete, that their attacks on the popular mythology were only a more earnest repetition of opinions which the wisest and best of the heathens had uttered, and that their exposition of what was compatible with Christianity in the various philosophies, and what was erroneous in them, is extremely defective. But it cannot be too frequently repeated that the Christian Apologists did not directly aim at overthrowing philosophy, and that even if they had, they could not have done this part of their work satisfactorily until philosophy had expressed itself in regard to Christianity, and the points of agreement and disagreement had been brought more fully to light by frequent and deliberate discussion.

The Christian Apologists cannot be said to be more successful in their statement of the evidences of Christianity, and for very much the same reasons; namely, that their main aim was not to defend Christianity, and that their faculties were not stirred to the utmost by acute observations of powerful opponents. In attempting to measure their merits in the defence of Christianity, it has also to be remembered that they believed the doctrines of Christianity to be fully and entirely revealed in the Old Testament. Christ came to teach them these doctrines, to explain them, to imprint them on the heart, and to remodel the life. But he taught nothing new. Such an assertion as this does not occur in actual words, but it is implied in the whole course of their reasonings. And hence the main argument on which they laid stress. This argument was that derived from prophecy. The power of prediction belongs to God alone. Demons and other agencies might work miracles, or at least work apparent miracles, but a prediction can come from God alone. Now the Old Testament is full of predictions which have been fulfilled; it contains predictions which are now fulfilling, and, consequently, the Old Testament was written by men who were inspired by God. This is the certain and irrefragable argument of the Apologists. Their defective treat-

ment of the whole question we shall have to discuss more minutely when we examine it as given by Justin.

On account of a belief in apparent and false miracles, the Apologists of the second century did not bring the argument from miracles prominently forward. Nor did they make the slightest attempt to define it philosophically, and to fence it against possible objections.

They did not bring forward the argument from the great change effected in the conduct of men by Christ's doctrines in a formal systematic manner to any great extent. But it comes up continually in the necessary contrast between the results of heathenism and Christianity, and between the words and arguments of sophists and the deeds of Christians.

The Apologists also appeal to the teaching of Christ, as if it contained evidence in itself that it was true. But the appeals made to the history and character of Christ by way of evidence derive their force from their being fulfilments of prophecies delivered by the writers of the Old Testament. Still, both the exhibition of the character and teaching of Christ, and of the character and beliefs of the Christians, must have had a powerful effect on some heathen readers, whatever may have been the reasons which the Apologists had for making it; and perhaps all the more powerful because there was no direct argument based on it. Yet it may be doubted whether the Apologies would do much towards bringing men to Christ. During the age of the Apologists Christianity made great progress. The language in which some of them speak of its spread will be quoted hereafter. No land, according to them, was without its Christians*. And during this period the Christians seem to have abstained from large public meetings. They had no churches, they had no regular preachers, they were not wealthy, they were not very learned, they were not powerful. How did they succeed in leading such vast multitudes to adopt the same mode of life as their own? Are we not bound to accept the Christian

* See Graul's summary of the various references to the spread of the Gospel in this age, p. 15; and Pressensé, vol. i. of Second Series, p. 27.

explanation of this most extraordinary phenomenon, that God was exercising his power to save men through Christ? And the agency which God employed in acting on men was the earnest personal influence of the Christians, whose lives were shaped after God's laws, who were ready to die for the sake of Christ, or to wander away from their homes among savage tribes, to tell them about the good news that had come to men, trusting to God for food and clothing. Of these noble men the literature of the Christians says almost nothing. A vast and mighty change took place on the earth during these years; but almost all that remains to testify of the agency are a few works written to deprecate injustice. These works bear testimony that it was the deeds of the Christians that attracted some of the cultivated men to Christianity. The patience of Christians under suffering, and the great simplicity of the Old Testament, are oftener than once referred to as leading the mind of the writer to the new course of life^a.

The early Christian writers had other contests besides those with heathenism and philosophy. Many of them felt a deep interest in the Jews, and were eager to prove to them that Jesus was indeed the Christ. The productions which the Christians composed for this object are, unfortunately, all lost except the Dialogue with Trypho by Justin. This is much to be deplored, because, however valueless the works might have been in regard to argument, they would have brought out distinctly the effect which Jewish opposition had in influencing the Christian mind. From the work of Justin we see that, as in the time of Paul so in his time, the great obstacle which kept the Jews back from Christ was the total abolition of the Jewish ceremonial in the Christian religion. To obviate this difficulty, Justin has to show that all ceremonial is in itself of no importance, that God judges only according to the conduct and the character of the man. In justification of this proposition Justin appeals to the prophets, who, he maintains, continually speak of a spiritual

^a See Graul, p. 51.

circumcision, of a spiritual sabbath, of spiritual offerings and sacrifices. He also maintains that the law was laid on the Jews on account of the hardness of their hearts, and he therefore deems it utterly absurd that it should be supposed that Christians should have to submit to it. I need not enter more fully into his mode of argument; but I simply remark here that, as long as this contest with the Jews was prominently before the Christian mind, and carried on as Justin carries it on, there could not be any efficacy assigned to the mere observance of baptism or the eucharist. Christians could not well suppose that circumcision was replaced by baptism, or that the Sunday was to be kept sacred instead of the Saturday, for they affirmed that circumcision was a mark set by God on the Jews for their destruction; and that the observance of the Sabbath was laid on the Jews because of extraordinary wickedness.

Besides having to show the vanity of ceremonial, the Christian writers had to prove that Jesus was the Christ. In attempting this proof the Christians were led to peculiar results. They had to base their arguments on the Old Testament. They had to appeal to many passages, the interpretation of which was disputed, and accordingly they had to expound fully the Christian method of interpretation. This interpretation was based on the idea of Christ as the Logos. Christ was the manifestation of God. It was Christ, therefore, who appeared on the numerous occasions on which God is said to have appeared. The invisible God could not himself become visible and perceptible to men, but his Logos or Son could and did become visible. And hence the Christian writers applied numerous passages in which God is spoken of as Christ. In this way the doctrine of the divinity of Christ became familiar to the Christian mind, and the Christians welcomed that doctrine all the more readily, that it seemed the only possible explanation of many mysterious passages in the Old Testament. We draw attention to this point now, simply to notice the effect which the contest with the Jews would have on Christian opinion. The Jews

maintained that the Messiah was a man, born of men. The Christians perceived that such an opinion left large portions of the Old Testament unexplained and unevangelical.

The Christians had also to do battle against heresies. Here, again, we have to deplore the loss of many valuable treatises. For it would have been of immense consequence to know what the writers contemporary with the founders of the heresies thought of them. We should not have expected a fully-developed philosophical refutation of their opinions, but we should certainly have found a good deal of plain common sense and sound Christian feeling. From the few remarks which Justin makes on the leaders of heresies, we should also be inclined to think that he would have been honest and trustworthy in his statements with regard to their character. And these would have been of immense use in determining the position of the heretics in the development of truth. The heresies arose within the Church, and most of the founders continued in fellowship with the Church for a considerable time. They, no doubt, had been attracted to Christianity by its practical goodness; but, in the course of time, had become discontented with the simply practical character of the religion. They wished to advance farther. They wished to place Christ somewhere in a system of the universe; and after much speculation, they at last generally ended in regarding their speculations as more essential to salvation than their practice. They wished to be saved by knowledge, not by faith. Their hold on Christian sympathies was loosened. They looked down on their weaker practical brethren; and frequently they left the Church altogether to set up a school of the more enlightened. The speculations of these Gnostics, as they were called, are extremely interesting, as they are the result of the passage of the Eastern mind from a Semitic mode of thought into an Indo-European. The Semitic mind firmly adheres to the idea of one God. It looks on nature as his work. Accordingly, it personifies but does not hypos-tatize. The Indo-European in its early stages, on the other hand, throws life into everything. Now the Gnostics were

almost all orientals. They came in contact with Christianity and philosophy nearly at the same time. They became tired of the principle of Christianity, mere practical faith in an unexplained Son of God, and they passed on to the principle of philosophy, salvation by knowledge. But their mode of philosophizing is new. Their ideas are philosophic, but their mode of conceiving them and expressing them is mythological. They speak of their notions as existences, and their doctrines assume the form of history or of legend. It was, therefore, extremely difficult for the early Christian writers to get at the bottom of these speculations; but they knew that most of them were carried on in defiance of many of the Christian practical beliefs. The knowledge of the Gnostics must penetrate into the mysteries; therefore Christ was not what most plain Christians would take Him to be. There was much that was delusive in his appearances. It was not sufficient to state what Christ's work was, but the mode in which his work was to be accomplished, and how He came to accomplish it must be explained. And, in the course of these explanations, Christ's real work often vanishes entirely; his precepts are explained in a non-natural sense, and the common morality is undermined. All that the Christians could reply to these explanations and new theories of morals was, that they had not been so taught by Christ and his apostles. The answer which the Gnostics made to such an assertion is curious and important. They asserted that they based their opinions on the writings of the apostles of Christ. They appealed continually to one or other of the books of the New Testament. Most of them could not appeal to the Old Testament, because they rejected it as the work of an inferior god. But there was nothing to hinder them from founding the true revelation on the writings of some one or other of the apostles of Christ. Accordingly, the Gnostics are before the Christians in appealing to the books of the New Testament as authorities. They are the first who employ the New Testament in the same way as the early Christians use the Old. And far more evidence of the existence of the books of the New Testament

is to be got from the fragments of these heretical writers, few though they be, than from all the Christian writings of the Apologetic age¹. The reply which the Christian writers made to these appeals we shall have to discuss in a subsequent chapter. It was in the main this: Your interpretation of the writing of the apostles is wrong. We have among us those who heard the apostles when alive. We have disciples of their disciples. And they never heard the apostles say such things as you affirm they said. They could ask the apostles what they meant. They could not be in a mistake; but you, misled by your speculative zeal, twist the written words, which can no longer reply, into meanings abhorrent to the minds of the apostles.

The Gnostics, then, were the founders of speculative theology; and hence they have sometimes been called the Protestants of the early Church—very falsely, as I think. For, so far from asserting the liberty of thought, each man seems to have claimed for himself the sole possession of the truth, and to have condemned all others. There is no proof that Christians objected to any amount of speculative theology; but they felt, and felt rightly, that if speculation attempted to overturn the main facts of Christianity, and to give new moral laws to men, and if the speculators refused in consequence obedience to Christ and fellowship with his simple-minded followers, the speculators were no longer Christians. So wide, indeed, of Christianity were the speculations of the Gnostics, that their systems have now become very unintelligible. And their systems never found their way into the Christian Church; but they were nevertheless precursors of many tendencies and opinions which made their appearance afterwards, when the Christian Church itself laboured at a systematic explanation of the fundamental facts and laws of Christianity. The Gnostics, even in the age of the Apologists, must have exercised a powerful influence on the Christians; for the tendency of the human mind is not to rest satisfied with simple faith, but to seek explanations. And the Gnostics preceded the

¹ See Westcott's section on this subject in his *History of the Canon*.

Christians in the one speculative attempt which characterizes the Apologetic age—the explanation of the person of Christ.

We pass now from the external relations of the Church to a short review of what took place within it. It has ever to be remembered that here our means of information are scanty. Only a few fragments remain to us of the works to which the internal necessities of the Church gave rise. And it could not be expected that the Apologies would give complete and satisfactory accounts of the difficulties which Christians felt in the apprehension of the mysteries of Christianity, or in the management of their associations. The insufficiency of these documents, however, to satisfy us with regard to the doctrines of the Apologists has often been pressed too far. The Apologists did not shrink from a full exposition of their faith. There is not the slightest proof that any of them deemed it a matter of duty to hold back from the heathen either an explanation of a doctrine, or information with regard to a practice. Justin Martyr lays before the emperors his opinions with regard to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and he gives a detailed account of the proceedings of Christians on the Sunday, narrating among other things the administration of baptism and of the eucharist. Moreover, the Apologists would be led by a regard to the welfare of pagans to give a fair account of Christ's teaching and doctrines, though they would naturally discuss only those doctrines which were directly opposed to the prevalent belief among the heathen. Hence the Apologetic treatises are occupied largely in urging the unity of the divine being, in opposition to polytheism. They bring prominently forward the doctrine of creation, and God as the almighty creator; and they labour hard to reply to the heathen objections against the doctrine of the resurrection, and write special treatises on the subject. For the same reason also the Apologists of this age insist on the freedom of man's will very strongly. They had to resist the fatalism of the Stoics; they had to deal with the apathy of the Epicureans. And therefore they bring out fully man's

power to judge and act for himself. In consequence of this they have been blamed as Pelagianizing. But the blame is totally misplaced. The Apologists do not speak of the doctrine of original sin, and they speak sometimes in language apparently opposed to it, because as yet the Church had no theory on the matter. Circumstances had not yet arisen to call the attention of Christians to the explanation of the universal depravity of man. The Apologists contented themselves with affirming that man was absolutely free, but that, on the other hand, the training of men was such as to make them vicious. Whether they would have adopted the doctrine of original sin, if it had been presented to them as it was held in the time of Augustine, is a problem that cannot and need not be solved. All that has now to be remarked is, that they did not give their attention to the matter, and did not even discover the terms on which the question was to be settled. The same observation has to be made in regard to many other doctrines, such as those relating to the death of Christ. The Apologetic writings contain no theory on this subject. There is no indication that they supposed that Christ saved simply by example, no indication that they looked on his death as a satisfaction to God as moral governor for sin. There is one step, however, which deserves to be noted. Justin and some others regularly mention, in describing the future state, the salvation of men as being a salvation not merely from sin but a deliverance from pain. The idea of personal happiness becomes more prominent in some of these writings than it is in the earlier. The idea, indeed, of personal holiness is still uppermost, but it is conjoined with that of personal happiness; and thus the way was opened up for the two questions,—how, on the one hand, Christ's life and death wrought holiness; and, on the other hand, how his life and death procured happiness. Attempted solutions of the first question will appear in the next age. The Church had to go through many phases of feeling and life before it was led to attempt a full solution of the

last. The same generality pervades their treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. They mention the Spirit in conjunction with the Father and Son as being third in rank. But they seem scarcely to know what to make of the Spirit. Theophilus, and even Justin, speak as if they confounded Him with the Logos. They all recognise his personality in one set of passages and in express assertions, and in another they make Him belong to the Father and to the Son, very much as if He were an attribute. They never speak of Him as God, nor as possessed of the divine nature; and Justin asserts that God gives his glory only to his Son, as if the Spirit were not in existence, or could not and did not receive God's glory. They do not discuss the mode of his existence at all.

The doctrine which the Apologists discuss fully is that of the Logos, and the relation of the Son to the Father. The writers of the synoptical gospels and the apostolic letters speak of Jesus as the Son of God. They do not go farther into the nature of Christ. So do the apostolical fathers. They feel content with the assertion that He was in a peculiar sense the Son of God, the bearer of the Divine message to men, the revelation of the Divine Being to men. They make various assertions with regard to Him: such as that all power was given Him in heaven and earth; that to Him every knee should bow; that through Him the world was created; that He was the firstborn of all creation; and that the Father had given up all things into his hands. But in none of them occur express and unmistakeable assertions of the divinity of Christ. The first verse of the gospel of John is the first statement which we have in regard to this subject. This statement, however, is so difficult to understand that there seems to me no possibility of ever attaining certainty as to its real meaning. An exact translation of it into English, so as to represent the difficulties which it suggests, is impossible. This arises mainly from the two words in it: λόγος, word, and Θεός, God. The word λόγος signifies either the expression of an idea, word, or it may mean reason, the originator of ideas,

or it may mean the combination of idea and expression, for which in English there is now no term, though once the term 'discourse' conveyed the meaning. Now, in which sense does John use the term; or does he use it with different meanings? "In the beginning was the Reason, or the Expression of thought, and this Reason or Expression was to God, or in relation to God^u, and the Reason or Expression was God." Adopting the meaning of 'Expression' we might obtain the following sense. In the beginning there was a being who expressed the Divine mind. This being addressed his revelation to God, for there was none else in existence; and the object to which he gave expression was God himself. A serious objection to this translation is, that we should have expected $\delta \Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, if it were meant that *the* Divine Being was the object-matter of the revelation. Yet this is not a fatal objection. For the apostle may have meant to contrast the Divine nature of the revelation with the material nature of the subsequent revelation of God in the creation of the world. The verse, according to this meaning, would state that before the world was created there was a manifestation of the Divine Being in the person of his Son, the object and subject of which were God. If this translation were correct, then John in the commencement of his gospel would state nothing else than what he states frequently in other words in other portions of the same book. But the difficulty is, to rest satisfied with the translation of the last clause. And it is more probable that its real meaning is, "And the Logos was God." But what did John mean by 'God?' That John does not assert that the Logos was one, or of the same nature with *the* God, is plain from his use of $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ without the article. The unity of the Divine nature in God and Christ may be a satisfactory explanation of John's statement, but it is not what John states. The word $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, as we shall see in treating of Justin Martyr's use of the term, and in many other cases, was very widely applied. It was some-

^u I have given $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ its usual meaning. It is used to signify 'with' in the First Epistle of John, and may have the same meaning here.

times applied to man when perfected. It was applicable to any being possessed of supernatural powers: especially was it applicable to a being who was worshipped. And perhaps what John meant to do, and certainly what he seems to do here, is to make a very wide general statement that the Logos was divine. He does not obviate any of the difficulties which might arise from the assertion. As far as John's statement goes, we are bound to believe that the Logos is a divine being; but we go beyond John's statement when we either assert that there are two Gods of equal glory and of the same substance, or that there is but one Divine Being, but two persons.

John's assertion is of the vaguest and most general nature, in consequence, as I have said, of the uncertainty attaching to the terms λόγος and Θεός. It becomes more definite, or at least more intelligible, if we consider it alongside of the philosophy of Philo. Philo held that there was a being called the Logos, who was the manifestation or revealer of God; the mediator between God and man. He is therefore called by him the image^u and glory of God. By him God made the world^v, and governs it^x; he is the chief messenger of God; he is himself a second God^y, and especially would be the God of men, for they are imperfect beings^z, and are thus unfit for the worship and communion of the great God. This is Philo's doctrine stated broadly. Many parts of it are still matters of keen discussion, and scholars are still divided as to whether Philo's logos was a person or not. The preponderance of the evidence seems to me strongly in favour of the personality, and the history of the opinion also tends in that direction. The whole doctrine seems to have arisen from the combination of circumstances which I have already noticed in speaking of Gnosticism. It was the result of the Semitic mind going through the philo-

^u De Mundi Opif. vol. i. p. 6, l. 42.

^v De Leg. Alleg. vol. i. p. 106, l. 29; De Cherubim, p. 162, l. 15; De Somn. p. 656, l. 50.

^x De Somniis, vol. i. p. 656, l. 48; De Prof. vol. i. p. 562, l. 34.

^y Frag. vol. ii. p. 625.

^z De Leg. Alleg. vol. i. p. 128, l. 43.

sophical and myth-creative phases at the same time. Almost all intelligent nations have felt the necessity of some kind of intervening agent between them and the supreme being. This being is often called the word or the voice. Among Aryan nations this word or voice is hypostatized, and sometimes, as in Greek mythology, divided into numerous personages. With the Hebrews it was a mere personification or circumlocution. The 'voice of God' seems with them to have been simply a periphrasis to avoid the repetition of the name Jehovah, but in speaking of Wisdom as the helper of God in the creation of the world they personify. This personification makes its appearance in the book of Job and in the Proverbs. It reappears again in later times in the apocryphal book of Sirach the son of Jesus, where it is difficult to say whether the personification has not vanished and wisdom become a real person; or whether, as some have maintained, she is not a pure ethereal substance, something between a personification and a real existence. The step which Philo takes in advance of this is to convert the Wisdom into Logos, and to make that Logos a person, the first-begotten of God^a.

It seems scarcely possible not to identify the statement in John's introduction with Philo's doctrine. But we are not bound on that account to suppose that John accepted the whole of Philo's doctrine. His words, "And the Word was a God," do not state that the Logos was a second God. They might mean that; but they may well harmonize with quite different theories of the divine existence of the Logos. And when we proceed farther into inquiries into Philo's doctrine, we soon perceive that it diverges widely from John's and all Christian teaching. Philo makes his logos in some measure correspond to the intelligible world of Plato. John's words are, "And the Logos became flesh;" John takes the main idea of the Logos, that he is the manifestor of the Divine Being, that in creation, in theophanies, in all divine dealings the Logos is the agent.

^a De Confus. Linguarum, vol. i. p. 414, line 29.

And he asserts that Jesus was and is this Logos. He finds the term 'logos' in this sense to be of great use; for it combines into one the various phases and activities of Christ. The Apologists adopted the phraseology; they moreover identify the Logos, the revealer of God, with logos, reason; and therefore wherever reason makes its appearance, there they maintain is proof of the activity and indwelling of Christ. He is the light that is in every man.

They also, in more decided language than John, assert the divinity of the Logos, and apply to him all those passages in the Old Testament in which visible manifestations of God are spoken of. They regard him, indeed, as inferior to the Father; as deriving his divinity from the Father; as second in rank; as subject in all things to the Father; but they do not hesitate to pronounce him God in the most clear positive manner. There are indications in the work of Justin, and still more decidedly in the Clementine Recognitions, that there was a party that refused to proceed beyond the statement that Jesus was the Son of God; and such a party held fellowship with the other Christians. But it is far from likely that the party was large. The tendency of the human mind to make inferences is irresistible; and the inference that if Jesus was the Son of God he was God, is also one of the clearest that could well be made.

The divinity of the Logos could not be long before the Christian mind without causing difficulties. If the Logos was God, how could there be only one God? To answer this question it was not enough to say that there was one supreme God, and that the Logos was a being on whom godhead was conferred by the other. Some explanation more than this is required; and the Apologists attempted it. Their attempt is a complete and most manifest failure. As will be noticed hereafter on several occasions, the materialistic philosophy of the day had a powerful effect on Christian speculation, because it was really the atmosphere which they unconsciously breathed. The explanation of the divinities of Father and Son is based on this materialistic philosophy.

The Divine nature is like fire. Fire may be taken from fire, and the original fire is not diminished. So the Divine substance of the Son is taken from the Divine substance of the Father; but there is no diminution of the original Divine substance. Perhaps it is too much to say that this is an explanation; but whatever it be, it was by material analogies such as these that the Apologists bridged over the mysteries of the two divinities. The Divine substance was conceived of as incapable of diminution, while other beings might partake of it. To Christ alone, however, had the Father given his glory. The difficulties which the doctrine of the divinity of the Holy Spirit would have caused are, of course, not as yet felt, because no one spoke of the Holy Spirit as divine. When Theophilus speaks of the triad, the point of view which he assumes is, that the Logos and Spirit belong to the Father just as a man's mind belongs to the man. In reply to such an explanation a modern thinker would say to Theophilus that he had denied the personality of the Logos and Spirit; but this objection would very likely never have occurred to any ancient theologian at that time, and if it had, it would have been thought a weak one.

It deserves to be noticed that the Apologists do not speak of the Divine nature; and when they make declarations with regard to Christ, they never divide his personality. It was the Logos that became man. They have not yet analysed the phenomena of Christ's activity, and therefore know nothing of a celestial and Divine nature and a human nature. It was the Divine Logos that was born, that died, that rose again. No difficulty is felt by them in making such statements as these.

There is still another point in regard to the Logos which demands observation. This is the teaching of the Apologists in regard to the eternity of the Logos. The word 'logos' means, as has been remarked, a manifestation. But the taking place of a manifestation implies a previous concealment, or at least seems to do so; and, if so, then there must have been a time when the Logos was not manifesting.

Was the Logos, then, existent before the first manifestation? In regard to this point the language of the Apologists is generally vague, simply because their minds had not been led to consider the subject in all its bearings. They felt that manifestation necessarily carried along with it the idea of time, and therefore they gave to the Logos the epithets 'first-begotten of God,' 'offspring of God,' and applied to him all the passages in the Old Testament in which God speaks of begetting his Son. The earlier amongst them, therefore, seem to countenance the idea that they looked on the generation of the Son as an act accomplished in time, though anterior to the creation of the world. The later of the Apologists adopted a distinct theory of the matter; namely, that the *Λόγος* was eternally with God as his reason; but when utterance was given to his reason, then the Logos was begotten. This theory does not deny the personality of the Logos from eternity, for, as we have seen, though such language in regard to the Logos would compel modern thinkers to regard it as a faculty, yet these early writers would not feel themselves so influenced.

It has been a question much and keenly discussed, what influence the heathen philosophy had on the religious opinions of the Apologists. At one time a set of writers eagerly maintained that Christianity derived almost all its beliefs from Platonism. But there are few now who would go so far. There cannot be a question that Platonism and other heathen philosophies had an influence on the Apologetic writers, because they were trained in the midst of these philosophies, and their speculative opinions had to be based on them, consciously or unconsciously. Far too much power has been attributed to Platonism, however, in moulding their minds. They sympathized with many of Plato's noble sentiments and thoughts, but Athenagoras is the only one that is a Platonist. The others were far more influenced by the prevailing materialistic tendencies—a fact that will come prominently out in our minute discussion of particular cases. It will be also seen from such a discussion that Plato had

nothing to do with the doctrine of the Christian Trinity, and, as we have noticed already, the part of the logos-doctrine which Philo derived from Plato was the part which Christians did not accept.

In regard to the constitution of the Christian churches during the Apologetic period, not much information has come down to us. The most probable conclusion from the evidence is, that the churches had not yet any fixed organization. They had presidents, but there is no proof that there was any distinction into clergy and laity. From Justin's account it is plain that any one might baptize. Nor is there any sign that peculiar efficacy was attached to what were afterwards called the sacraments. Justin on one occasion uses language that is peculiar, but he does so out of simplicity, and without the consciousness that his words might be taken to mean something very different from the common beliefs.

There seems not the slightest reason for the opinion that the Church was divided into a Pauline and a Petrine party. The reasons which have been assigned for this opinion will be discussed as they come up in treating of the various writers. The Christians acted towards each other with charity. They permitted differences of opinion in regard to the divinity of Christ. They permitted differences of opinion in regard to the observance of the Passover. But towards the end of our period a mighty change came over the Church; and we shall find the most violent passions, the keenest bigotry, and the most absurd dogmatism play very prominent parts. And this is what we might expect. The Church was liberal during the Apologetic days, because, from ignorant simplicity and childlike love, it was indifferent to outward observances and to speculative opinions. As soon as Christians come to attach any value to outward observances and to dogmas, a spirit of intolerance will show itself.

The opinions of the Apologists in regard to morals deserve careful examination. Christ laid down only general principles, and left the working out of these to his followers. And accordingly we find that the Christians of this age,

starting from a peculiar view of these principles, come to peculiar conclusions. This is especially the case with regard to sexual intercourse. Over the New Testament there are scattered various general precepts in regard to this matter, but there is no attempt to give reasons for these precepts. The Apologists found themselves compelled by the circumstances of their case, and especially by the universal prevalence of licentiousness, to come to definite conclusions on the matter, though it can scarcely be said that they examined the whole *rationale* of their conclusions. Thus, for instance, they do not define wherein the essential principle of marriage lies, but they unquestionably hold that permission by law was not absolutely necessary. They would never have been married at all if they had been required to appear before a public official, for death would have been frequently the consequence of such an act. When once a man and a woman had cohabited, some of the Christians thought that by this act they became one flesh, and that, consequently, another marriage of either the widower or widow would be something approaching to adultery. Then, again, all of them looking on the act of cohabitation as simply a means to an end, looked on cohabitation for mere pleasure as a sin. Accordingly they regarded cohabitation with a pregnant woman as sinful. Finding, moreover, a passage in the New Testament which spoke in praise of men who had made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, they did not deem it wrong to mutilate themselves. A remarkable instance of this is given in the Apology of Justin. Barbeyrac and others have found great fault with the fathers for such opinions as these; but if we remember the prevalence of vice in their days, and the corruption of women through it, we shall easily allow that they erred on the right side, and we shall not have much to boast over them until we be able to define wherein lie the rightness and wrongness of the various acts connected with the relations of the sexes. It may be noticed here that Justin condemns polygamy; and, perhaps, he is the first Christian writer who did so.

In regard to evils in the social system, Christ did not interfere, but left his principles to work silently. Accordingly, the Christians did not, like the Therapeuts, forbid the possession of slaves; nor do they ever bring forward arguments against slavery. But they treated the slave as a brother, welcomed him as equal in the Lord, and did everything to help him when in distress.

The works which relate to the various subjects noticed in this chapter are exceedingly numerous. Books which discuss the history of Apologetics generally commence with a survey of the Apologies produced in this age. Those which I have used are the following:—

1. Jo. Alberti Fabricii SS. T. D. et Prof. Publ. *Delectus Argumentorum et Syllabus Scriptorum qui veritatem Religionis Christianæ adversus Atheos, Epicureos, Deistas seu Naturalistas, Idololatrias, Judæos et Muhammedanos lucubrationibus suis asseruerunt.* Hamburgi 1725, 4to. A book of vast erudition, but too sketchy to be of much use.

2. *Geschichte der Apologetik*, von Heinrich Gottlieb Tzschirner. Leipzig 1805, 8vo.; and

3. *Der Fall des Heidenthums*, by the same writer. Leipzig 1829, 8vo. These are both remarkably able and thorough books.

4. *Die Christliche Kirche an der Schwelle des Irenæischen Zeitalters*, von K. Graul. Leipzig 1860, 8vo. This is a very readable and scholarly introduction to a full account of the life and activity of Irenæus, in which Graul reviews the state of the Christians and their relations to heathenism, Judaism, Gnosticism, and Montanism in the period immediately preceding that of Irenæus.

5. *Les Apologistes Chrétiens au II^e Siècle: Cours d'Eloquence sacrée fait à la Sorbonne 1858–60.* Par M. L'Abbé Freppel. 2 vols. 8vo., Paris 1860.

In our own language two works which deal with our subject deserve especial notice.

6. *Paganism and Christianity compared*, by John Ireland, D.D. London 1807, 8vo. These lectures treat partly of the

accusations brought against the Christians. They show considerable knowledge of the early writers.

7. History of the Christian Church in the Second and Third Centuries, by James Amiraux Jeremie, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. 1852. First published in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*. The writer passes over his subject rapidly, but in a masterly manner. He gives a short account of those writers of the second and third centuries whose works still remain, always appealing to authorities, and exhibiting a very wide knowledge of the French literature on the subject.

The list of works that discuss the Platonism of the Fathers is very large. The works that seem to me the most satisfactory are,—

1. Cæsar Morgan's Investigation of the Trinity of Plato and of Philo. Cambridge 1853, 8vo.; and

2. Baur, *Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus*. Tübingen 1837, 8vo. This was originally a review of Ackermann's glowing but unsatisfactory work on the same subject.

3. Ueber das Verhältniss der Hellenischen Ethik zur Christlichen, by Neander, p. 140 of *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen von Dr. August Neander*, edited by Jacobi, Berlin 1851, 8vo.; and Neander's *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik*, Berlin 1864.

The early treatises which attempt to prove that Christianity derived its Trinity from Platonism are exceedingly defective both in their representations of Christianity and Platonism. The book which gave rise to the keen discussions on this subject which prevailed in the eighteenth century affords little help to the modern student in his attempts to arrive at the truth. It is styled, *Le Platonisme dévoilé ou Essai touchant le Verbe Platonicien*. Divisé en deux Parties. A Cologne chez Pierre Marreau, 1700. It was published anonymously. Its author's name was Souverain. The French work is rare. It was translated into German by Löffler, who in the second edition (1792) added a short history of the doctrine of the Trinity.

CHAPTER II.

QUADRATUS.

ALL the satisfactory information which we have with regard to Quadratus comes from Eusebius^a. He flourished in the reign of Hadrian; and, as far as we know, was the first Apologist of the Christians. He was induced to compose his Apology and present it to the emperor, "because some wicked men were attempting to disturb the Christians." Eusebius, who had the Apology before him, says that there were in it brilliant proofs of the man's understanding and of apostolic soundness^b. He also adduces a passage from the work which is interesting in itself, and gives conclusive evidence with regard to the early age of the writer: "The deeds of our Saviour were always present, for they were real; those who were cured, those who rose from the dead, who were not merely seen while in the process of being cured and of rising, but during a continual presence, and who not only while the Saviour dwelt on earth, but also when He was removed, were alive for a considerable time, so that some of them even lived to our times^c."

Eusebius in another place^d mentions a Quadratus who lived in the time of Trajan; who, he says, had the gift of prophecy, and who with others succeeding to the work of the Apostles,

^a Eccl. Hist. iv. 3.

^b *ὁρθοτομία*: rightness in dividing the word of truth, as is inferred from a comparison of 2 Tim. ii. 15.

^c Euseb. Hist. Eccl. iv. 3.

^d Ibid. iii. 37.

gave up their property, and moving from land to land, preached the gospel and set up churches. This same Quadratus seems to be mentioned by an anonymous writer against the Montanists^e. Whether he is the Apologist or not we cannot say, but as the period at which he flourished is the same, and as Eusebius draws no distinction, the probable inference is that Eusebius regarded them as the same.

Eusebius makes mention of another Quadratus in his account of one of the letters of Dionysius, overseer of the Corinthian Church. The letter was addressed to the Athenians, and was intended to stir up their faith. "He reproves them as having paid too little heed to living according to the gospel, as having almost apostatized from the truth (*ἀλήθειαν*) ever since it came to pass that Publius, their president, bore his testimony in the persecutions then prevalent. And he has made mention of Quadratus as having been appointed their overseer after the martyrdom of Publius, bearing witness that they had been collected through his zeal, and had received a rekindling of faith^f." The circumstance that Dionysius writes to rouse the dead faith of the Athenians, the praise which he assigns to Quadratus for having already done so much in this work, and indeed the whole tone of the reference, imply that Quadratus was overseer of the Athenian Church at the time when Dionysius wrote. Notwithstanding this, some have identified the Quadratus of the reign of Hadrian with this one of the reign of Marcus Aurelius. It is indeed possible that the Quadratus who wrote the Apology might have lived to the age of Marcus Aurelius. There is nothing which we know for certain that would prevent such a possibility; for the words of Eusebius, "He himself proves to us his own antiquity," (*τὴν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρχαιότητα*), mean, not that he was an old man, but that he belonged to a very early age of the Church's history. It must be admitted also that the words of Dionysius do not compel us to regard Quadratus as a contemporary. But either possibility is in a high degree improbable.

^e Euseb. Hist. Eccl. v. 17.

^f Ibid. iv. 23.

Jerome's account of Quadratus is a patchwork of all that Eusebius has said about Quadrati, with a few additions of his own. "Quadratus," he says, "a disciple of apostles, after Publius bishop of Athens had been crowned with martyrdom on account of his faith in Christ, is elected in his room, and through his faith and diligence brings together the Church, which had been scattered in great terror. When Hadrian spent the winter at Athens, and when by visiting Eleusis and by being initiated into almost all the sacred rites of Greece, he gave an opportunity to all who hated the Christians to trouble them,—for they believed that they might do so without an order from the emperor,—he presented a book to him, composed in defence of our religion, which is very useful, full of reason and faith, and worthy of the apostolic teaching; in which, showing the antiquity of his age, he says that he had seen very many who, when oppressed by various calamities in Judea, had been healed by the Lord, and who had risen from the dead." Jerome elsewhere^b repeats his statement that Quadratus presented his Apology to Hadrian at the time of his initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries, and asserts, moreover, that the work had the effect of showing the violence of the persecution. Jerome's information in regard to these particulars seems to have been derived solely from the *Chronicon* of Eusebius. There, under the eighth or tenth year of the reign of Hadrian, it is said that "Quadratus, the disciple of apostles, and Aristides an Athenian, our philosopher, gave books (to Hadrian) composed on behalf of our religionⁱ." Then it is added that Serenus Granianus sent a letter to the emperor, and that the favourable rescript of the emperor to Minucius Fundanus was the result. Jerome evidently thought, as Syncellus did, that the rescript was the result of the double efforts of Quadratus and Aristides on the one hand, and Granianus on the other. But the words of Eusebius mean no such thing, and the rescript itself, as given at the end of Justin's first Apology, is decidedly

^s De Vir. Illustr. c. 19.

^b Ep. 70. n. 4.

ⁱ This is Jerome's own version; it is somewhat different in Syncellus.

against the supposition. There is therefore no good reason for connecting Quadratus with Athens. There is no good authority for assigning any remarkable effect to the Apology of Quadratus; and it may be added that Jerome is wrong in saying that Quadratus saw those who had been healed by Christ: he states merely that they survived to his day.

Nothing is known of the death of Quadratus, though much has been fabled.

The fragment of Quadratus is given in Routh, *Reliq. Sacr.* vol. i. p. 75, and in the fifth volume of the Greek series of J. P. Migne's *Patrologiæ Cursus Completus*, p. 1265. The work of Quadratus must have been extant at a late period, if the information of Photius be correct, that a bishop of the name of Eusebius (supposed to belong to the sixth century) made extracts from it in a letter addressed to Andrew, a monk^l.

ARISTIDES.

Aristides was a contemporary of Quadratus, and, like him, addressed an Apology for the Christians to the emperor Hadrian^k. This is all that Eusebius relates of him. He mentions that the work was extant in his day, but he does not inform us whether he read it or not. Jerome adds to this information. He tells us that Aristides was an Athenian philosopher^l, and that after he became a Christian he still retained the philosophic garb, and that he presented his Apology to Hadrian at the same time as Quadratus^m: all which statements are unquestionably to be discarded. Perhaps more reliance may be placed on his information with regard to the work which was extant also in his day, and the merits of the author. He says that the Apology was made up of the opinions of the philosophersⁿ (*contextum philosophorum sententiis*), and he describes the author as a most eloquent

^l Phot. Bibl. Cod 162.

^k Euseb. Hist. Eccl. iv. 3.

^l Both in Syncellus and in Jerome's version of the Chronicon of Eusebius, Aristides is said to be an Athenian philosopher.

^m De Vir. Illustr. c. 20.

ⁿ Ep. 8; ad Magnum.

philosopher. A French traveller, De la Guilletiere, in a work, *Athenes Anciennes et Nouvelles*, Paris 1672, p. 146, relates that a manuscript of the Apology of Aristides was preserved in a monastery six miles from Athens; but Spon could not find any trace of it^o. Reithmayr appeals to Usuardus and Ado as witnesses to the existence of the manuscript in the ninth century^p; but from what these writers say, it might be questioned whether the copy was genuine, for they assert that Quadratus defended the divinity of Christ before Hadrian not only in his writings, but in a most elegant speech delivered before him^q.

AGRIPPA CASTOR.

Agrippa Castor is the first writer who is mentioned as having written against heresy. This information, which Eusebius gives us, is all that we really know with regard to him. After mentioning the rise of heresies, he says, "While very many men belonging to the Church at that time [the time of Hadrian] contended for the truth, and fought reasonably for the opinion of the Apostles and the Church, some of them already by writings supplied to posterity the means of warding off the heresies mentioned. Of which writings there has come down to us a most satisfactory work directed against Basilides by Agrippa Castor, a writer who was among the best known of his day. This work uncovers the cleverness of the man's jugglery. Laying open, then, his secret mysteries, he says that he composed twenty-four books on the gospels; that he named his prophets Barcabbas and Barcoph, contriving for himself some other unreal beings, and that he gave them barbarous names to dazzle those who are amazed at such things; that he taught that the tasting of things offered to idols, and the reckless abjuration of the faith during times of persecution, were matters of indifference, and

^o Villosion, *Anecdotes*, tom. ii. p. 264; Spon, *Itinerary*; Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* vol. i. pp. 74, 80.

^p Moehler's *Patrologie*, p. 310.

^q Lumper, vol. i. p. 383.

that he inculcated on those who came to him a silence of five years, like Pythagoras. And the person mentioned relating other things like to these in regard to Basilides, not ignobly brought to light the deceit of the heresy mentioned^r." The account of Jerome is in the main a repetition of what Eusebius says. He has, however, carelessly asserted, as Fabricius pointed out in his notes on Jerome's words^s, that Agrippa's work was directed against the twenty-four books of Basilides on the gospel, while Eusebius says merely that he mentioned these books. Jerome also says that he stated that the greatest god of Basilides "was Abraxas, which as it were contains the year if it be reckoned according to the Greek calculation^t." Some have supposed that in the work Agrippa Castor refuted Isidorus the son of Basilides as well as Basilides himself. The opinion rests on a statement of Theodoret that "Agrippas surnamed Castor, and Irenæus, and Clemens of Alexandria, and Origen, fighting for the truth, contended against these [Basilides and Isidorus]^u." Theodoret, however, may not have intended to say that Agrippa Castor contended against Isidorus, his language being often inaccurate: and, even if he did, his authority is worthless. These words are utterly unable to support the mere conjecture of Ceillier^v, that Castor wrote another work besides the one mentioned by Eusebius.

The fragments of Agrippa are given in Gallandi, Routh, and Migne.

ARISTO PELLÆUS.

The name of Aristo Pellæus, or Aristo of Pella, occurs in three ancient writers. The first is Eusebius. He says: "When the war had reached its height in the eighteenth year of the reign of Adrian, at the city of Biththera, a very strong place not very far from Jerusalem, and the siege from without had continued long, and the revolutionists had through hunger and thirst been driven to the last extremities, and the author

^r Hist. Eccl. iv. 7. ^s See also Fabricii Bibl. Græc. vol. vii. p. 155, note v.

^t De Vir. Illustr. c. 21. ^u Hæret. Fabul. lib. i. c. 4. ^v tom. i. p. 692.

of their madness [Barchochebas] had been punished according to his desert, the whole nation [of the Jews] is prevented from that time even from treading at all on the land round about Jerusalem, for Adrian gave command by the appointment of a law and by injunctions, so that they should not behold their native soil even from a distance. Aristo of Pella relates^x." Eusebius here mentions no work of Aristo of Pella, and it is impossible to determine whether Eusebius adduces the authority of Aristo for the truth of the preceding clause only, or for that of the whole of the preceding sentences, or indeed for how much. The curt and unconnected way in which the clause containing Aristo's name is introduced, might lead us to suspect an interpolation, but the words are not omitted in any manuscript. If one might hazard a conjecture on the nature of Aristo's work from the words employed, we should be inclined to regard it as historical. But such a conjecture would be, after all, nothing but the purest conjecture.

The second writer who mentions Aristo is Moses Chorenensis, author of an Armenian history, edited by two sons of Whiston. An examination of Moses's method of dealing with early church history has led Routh to believe that Moses knew nothing more of Aristo of Pella than what he saw in Eusebius^y, and so this testimony is merely a distorted repetition of the first.

The third writer who mentions Aristo of Pella is Maximus, in his notes on the works of Dionysius the Areopagite. His information is to the following effect: "I read this 'seven heavens' also in the Dialogue of Papiscus and Jason, written by Aristo of Pella, which Clemens of Alexandria in the sixth book of his Hypotyposes says was written by the holy Luke^z." The Dialogue of Papiscus and Jason is mentioned by Origen and Jerome, but neither of these writers say a word of the writer of it. Moreover, a translation of the work was made by one of the name of Celsus. The translation is lost, but

^x Hist. Eccl. iv. 6.

^y Routh, Reliq. Sacr. i. p. 103.

^z tom. ii. cap. i. p. 17. ed. Corderii; Routh, Reliq. Sacr. p. 96.

the preface to it remains, and in it nothing is said of the writer. How then did Maximus know that Aristo of Pella was the writer? And whether are we to accept his opinion, or the opinion which he states Clemens Alexandrinus maintained? We have no means of coming to a conclusion. The authority of Maximus on such a point is null. The probability is rather that he would be wrong than right. And we cannot even judge of the opinion of Clemens Alexandrinus, for we have not his reasons for believing Luke to be the author; we do not know that Maximus interpreted Clemens aright; and most have been inclined to think that his statement that Clemens attributed the work to Luke is altogether a mistake. If this portion of his statement is not to be believed, what possible reason can we have to attach the slightest importance to his own opinion that Aristo of Pella was the writer of the Dialogue?

Mention seems to be made of Aristo in a fourth writer, the author of the Alexandrian Chronicle. Under the year A.D. 134 he says^a: "This year Apelles and Aristo, which men (ὧν) Eusebius the son of Pamphilus has mentioned in his Ecclesiastical History, gives (ἐπιδίδωσιν) Apologies to the emperor Adrian in regard to our piety." The grammar of this sentence is bad, and the statement is unquestionably incorrect. Fabricius proposed to change the names Ἀπέλλης καὶ Ἀρίστων, ὧν into ὁ Πελλαῖος Ἀρίστων οὗ, 'Aristo of Pella, which man;' and we should then have the assertion that Aristo of Pella presented an Apology to Hadrian. As no such Apology is mentioned by any other writer, it would be hard to believe in its existence simply on the faith of an emendation, especially when the whole passage is omitted in one of the manuscripts.

The result of our investigation is that almost nothing is really known of Aristo of Pella, and that especially the works which have been ascribed to him have been ascribed to him on insufficient testimony. The Dialogue of Papius and Jason, however, belongs to the history of early Christian

^a p. 477, ed. Dindorf.

literature ; and as it has been in modern times associated with the name of Aristo, we may set down what is known with regard to it. Mention of it first occurs in the treatise of Origen against Celsus^b. Celsus had adduced the work as a specimen of those Christian writings which were so crammed with allegories and simple narratives as to offend the feelings of the cultivated heathen. He describes the work as "worthy not of laughter, but of pity and hatred rather." "It is not my business," Celsus adds, "to confute such works, for their nature is evident to all, especially if any one could have the patience and perseverance to study the writings themselves." Origen replies to this accusation, that, if any one did take the book into his hands, he would find nothing in it worthy of hatred, or even of laughter ; and then he goes on to describe its contents. "In it," he says, "a Christian is described as disputing with a Jew from the Jewish Scriptures, and showing that the prophecies about the Christ suit Jesus. The other replies to the argument vigorously, and in a way not unbecoming to the Jewish character which he assumes." The disputation is more minutely described in the Preface of Celsus^c. We cannot determine at what time his translation was made, for there is no allusion in the Preface which can settle the point. Its tone, however, is certainly that of the Cyprianic age, especially in the mode of speaking of martyrdom. "For I trust," he says, "that it is the privilege of martyrdom that the sinner should deserve to be saved through the prayer of the just martyr, when you yourself are freed by the merits of the martyr, a thing which you could not succeed in simply by your prayers. Thus just Job is shown to us when going to ask and obtain pardon from God for the sins of his three friends, and the approbation of his fear and faith is sealed by the voice of the Lord. When, therefore, in the day of thy deliverance, dearest, thou beginnest to present thyself to the countenance of Christ, when thou goest by fortunate lot to eternal life

^b Contra Celsum, lib. iv. c. 52 ; p. 544 Delarue.

^c This Preface is given at the end of Fell's edition of the works of Cyprian, p. 30 of the last appendix *Ad Vigilium de Judaica Incredulitate*.

to reign with Christ, in the mercy of the Lord, hold thy child (puerum) Celsus in thy mind, O most holy friend." This passage is the only authority for asserting that Celsus is the author of the Preface. Mention is nowhere made of the translation, and nothing is known of this Celsus. It may even be doubted whether Celsus is the correct reading. Fell, at least, has proposed Cæcilius, and the incorrectness of the text of the Preface may lead us to place little certainty in any name that occurs in it. The Preface is addressed to Vigilus, with regard to whom nothing is known; though, as usual, there has been much conjecture. Though the writer calls himself the *puer* or child of Vigilus in the passage already quoted, he states in another place that he had reached old age. "In my desire to see you," he says, "I was not terrified by the distance of the journey, nor was I kept back by old age (senium), and the difficulty of a wearied and worn-out body."

The description given in the Preface of the Disputation of Jason and Papiscus is as follows. After stating that he will not mention the conversion of the Jewish people through the Apostles, he goes on, "That illustrious, memorable, and glorious result of a discussion between Jason a Hebrew Christian, and Papiscus an Alexandrian Jew, comes into my mind. There we have the obstinate hardness of the Jewish heart softened by Jewish warning and gentle chiding, and the teaching of Jason on the outpouring of the Holy Spirit victorious in the heart of Papiscus. When Papiscus was brought by this teaching to an understanding of the truth, and was fashioned into a fear of the Lord through the mercy of the Lord himself, he put his trust in Jesus Christ the Son of God, and asked of Jason that he might receive the sign (signaculum, the sign of baptism). This is proved by the written account of the Discussion in Greek, in which Papiscus and Jason come to close quarters with each other, Papiscus opposing the truth, and Jason asserting and vindicating the disposition [*oikonomia*?] and fulness of Christ. To the translation of this work I have set myself."

We get still further a glimpse into the nature of the Discussion from two references to the work in Jerome. From the one^d we know that Jason had found it necessary to grapple with the text "Cursed is every one that hangs upon a tree." From the second^e we learn that he interpreted the words "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," as meaning "In the Son God created the heavens and the earth." Some indeed have supposed that the writer of the Disputation appealed to a peculiar reading in the Jewish scriptures; but there is little probability in the conjecture, and no need for it. The same interpretation of ἀρχή as applicable to Christ is made in Theophilus; and, as Jerome remarks, also in Tertullian and Hilarius.

It is impossible to fix the date of the Disputation between Jason and Papiscus. It must have been written before the work of Celsus, that is, sometime before the middle of the second century. It may have been written much earlier. There is no reason to suppose that the extract made from Aristo Pellæus by Eusebius occurred in the Disputation; and therefore nothing can be based on such a supposition. If the information of Maximus in regard to Clemens Alexandrinus had been reliable, we should have had good reason for assigning an early date, even if we had not agreed with him in ascribing it to Luke. At any rate, it seems to have been among the first works that employed the Old Testament to convert the Jews to Christianity. Its exposition of the Old Testament must have found Christ everywhere, and its exposition of ἀρχή as the Son of God is pretty conclusive proof that the writer used the doctrine of the λόγος to explain some of the difficulties of the Jews.

^d Comm. ad Galat. lib. ii. cap. 3. comm. 13.

^e Quæst. Hebr. in Genes. tom. ii. p. 507. Both passages are given in Routh and Migne.

CHAPTER III.

JUSTIN MARTYR.

I. HIS LIFE.

THE best part of the information which we have with regard to Justin Martyr is derived from his own writings. The few particulars which we gather from others relate almost exclusively to his death.

He was born in Flavia Neapolis^a, a city of Samaria which had been built near the ancient Sichem. It was the scene of many of the displays of Simon Magus. He was the son of Priscus and grandson of Bacchius. The name of his father and grandfather would lead us to infer that they were of Latin origin, and this supposition is in some respects confirmed by various passages in which he speaks of himself as "not circumcised^b," and identifies himself with the heathens^c. We know nothing of his early life. The notices which we have of his conversion are contained in two passages. In one he tells us how his attention was attracted to Christianity by the endurance of the Christians. "For I myself," he says^d, "while rejoicing in the Platonic doctrines, heard the Christians spoken evil of; but when I saw them fearless in regard to death and everything else that is reckoned fearful, I began to think that it was impossible that they could be wicked and voluptuous. For what man who is voluptuous or incontinent, or who regards the eating of human flesh as an enjoyment, could welcome death with the certainty of being deprived of his enjoyments? Would he not rather

^a Apol. i. 1. ^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 28. ^c Apol. i. 53. ^d Ibid. ii. 12.

by every means try to continue for ever the mode of life which is here, and escape the notice of rulers, instead of giving information against himself which would lead to his death?" The other passage in which Justin speaks of his conversion occurs in the Dialogue with Trypho, at the commencement. We cannot rely with absolute certainty on its historical nature. Everything depends on the view taken of the Dialogue itself. If the composition be a genuine report of a real dialogue, the statements made in it will then be true. But if the Dialogue be fictitious, then there would be no good reason for receiving as historically true of Justin what he has made the narrator of the Dialogue say of himself. We give elsewhere our reasons for thinking that Justin has given us a report of a real dialogue; and therefore we should be inclined to take the statements made in it as true of Justin himself.

In the introduction to the Dialogue with Trypho Justin makes some remarks on the variety of the heathen philosophies, and then gives his own experience of them. "Having a desire," he says, "at the beginning to converse with one of these philosophers, I gave myself up to a Stoic, and having spent a considerable time with him, when I found that I was not a whit the wiser with regard to God (for he himself had not this knowledge, and maintained that such learning was unnecessary), I left him and went to another, called a Peripatetic, a sharp fellow in his own opinion. He bore my presence for the first few days, and then requested me to fix the fee, that our intercourse might not be profitless. But I for this reason left him, for I concluded that he was not at all a philosopher. My soul still continued to long to hear what was peculiar and excellent in philosophy, and so I went to a very celebrated Pythagorean, a man who had a very high idea of his own wisdom. When I conversed with him, with the intention of becoming one of his regular hearers, he said to me, Have you studied music, and astronomy, and geometry? Or do you fancy that you will clearly see any of those things that contribute to happiness, without first

being taught those things which will draw the soul away from the sensible world, and make it fit for the intelligible, so that it shall clearly see the beautiful and the good in their essence? After praising these studies highly, and telling me they were necessary, he sent me away, since I confessed that I was ignorant of them. I was then greatly troubled, as you may well suppose, at this disappointment of my hopes, especially as I thought he really had some knowledge; but, on the other hand, taking into consideration the time which I should have to spend on these studies, I could not bear putting off so long. While in this perplexity it occurred to me that I might try the Platonic philosophers, for they were also held in high esteem. And luckily there had just come to our town an intelligent man who held a high place among the Platonic philosophers. I had long and frequent conversations with him, and made exceedingly great progress, increasing my knowledge every day. For I was vastly taken with the perception of bodiless things, and the contemplation of ideas winged my mind, and within a short time I thought that I had become wise, and, in my stupidity, I hoped to see God forthwith; for this is the end of the Platonic philosophy^e." Justin then goes on to relate how, when he was in this state, he happened one time, for the sake of quiet, to take a walk to a district not far from the sea. There he fell in with an old man, of mild and venerable aspect, who accosted him. Justin confesses to him that he is a φιλόλογος, lover of reason. The old man asks him, playing on the word φιλόλογος, which may mean also a lover of words, "Are you then a lover of words, and not at all of deeds or of truth, and do you not try to be practical (πρακτικός) rather than a sophist?" Justin replies that he regarded it as a *deed* of the greatest importance to exhibit reason as the guide of all. The pursuit of philosophy was the most honourable work of man, and it alone could bring happiness. The old man asks what philosophy is, and what the happiness is which it brings. Justin replies, "Philosophy is the science

• Dial. c. Tryph. c. 2.

of being, and the thorough knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of the true, and happiness is the reward of this science and wisdom." The old man identifies being (τὸ ὄν) with God, and asks for a definition of God. When this has been given, he discusses how God can be known. By the mind, says the Platonic Justin. But why by the mind? On account, says Justin, of its kinship to God, and the desire it has to see God. Do all souls, then, contain this kindred element, or only some? All, says Justin, souls of beasts as well as of men. Do the souls of beasts see God then? No; nor do those of many men. Why? Because they are not righteous. Do animals then injure any one? No; they do no injustice. They, then, will see God? No; their bodies prevent them. The old man says that the beasts might bring the same objection to the bodies of men, but he will let the answer pass, since it suggests another question, Does the soul see God in the body, or removed from it? It can see God in the body, but especially when removed from it. But will it remember what it has seen in the body? This is rendered unlikely by the circumstance that the soul does not remember what happened to it in a former state¹. Then there is no use of its seeing God. What becomes of those who are unworthy of the sight of God? They are punished by being bound up in the bodies of animals. Are they conscious of their punishment? No. Then their punishment is no real punishment, for they do not feel it to be such. And then the old man sums up by saying that souls do not see God, and are not punished by being sent into other bodies. And these philosophers do not know anything about them, not even what soul is. For the soul, says the old man, ought not to be spoken of as incapable of death, for if it were, then it would be unbegotten. Justin replies that some Platonic philosophers look on the soul as both incapable of death and unbegotten. Is the world then unbegotten? Justin says some think so, but I do not. You are right, says the old man; and, consequently, souls which existed for the sake of men are also not unbegotten. The

¹ The Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence is here alluded to.

we have learned that he was at Ephesus; and there is the most conclusive testimony that he lived at Rome. The events mentioned in the second Apology happened at Rome, and Justin seems to speak from personal knowledge. He mentions there the Cynic philosopher Crescens as plotting against him, and we know from Tatian that Crescens lived in Rome. And Tatian himself was a scholar of Justin's in Rome^o. Eusebius states also that he held his conversations in Rome^p.

Some have supposed that Justin was a presbyter in the church. The inference is based on the passage given afterwards, in which he relates the conduct of the Christians in their meetings. "They are led by us to the water^q," he says: and in another place, "after we have bathed him." The inference is utterly unwarrantable; for the "we" of Justin simply designates Christians; and moreover, even if he did baptize, he would not necessarily be a presbyter in a church, for there is not the slightest proof that presbyters alone baptized, but much proof that any Christian might baptize, if he deemed the circumstances of the case required that he should.

Justin fell a victim to persecution. This fact is well attested. Irenæus, speaking of Tatian, says that he was a scholar of Justin's, and gave out no heretical opinion so long as Justin was alive; "but after his testimony^r (*μαρτυρίαν*) he left the church." Hippolytus calls him "the martyr^s." Tertullian names him "philosopher and martyr." Eusebius, Jerome, Epiphanius, and Photius also affirm the fact. The circumstances of his death, however, are involved in doubt. Justin in his second Apology expresses his expectation of persecution from Crescens the Cynic philosopher. "I also expect," he says, "to be plotted against by some one of those named, or at least by Crescens, and to be impaled^t." Tatian asserts that Crescens actually did make the attempt. In irony he says, "He, who thus despises death, feared death

^o See the Life of Tatian. ^p Hist. Eccl. iv. 11. ^q See Apol. i. 61, 65.

^r Iren. adv. Hær. I. xxviii. 1.

^s Refutat. Omn. Hær. viii. 16.

^t Apol. ii. 3.

itself, so that he made an effort to involve Justin as well as me in death as being an evil, because proclaiming the truth he accused philosophers of gluttony and deceit^u." Justin was probably dead at the time Tatian wrote, though the point is by no means certain. If he were, the assertion of his disciple would be ground for inference that Crescens had failed in his attempt. However this may be, there is not the slightest ground in it for asserting that Justin fell a victim to the machinations of the Cynic. Yet this passage is the only proof adduced by Eusebius for his statement to this effect^v. Jerome repeats the statement of Eusebius^w, and so does Photius^z.

There exists a *Martyrion* of one Justin and some others, which many believe to be a narrative of the martyrdom of Justin Martyr. The document has been handed down to us by Simeon Metaphrastes. The name of the author is not given, and the writer does not say how he got his information. The only points to be ascertained therefore are, whether the Justin referred to is our Justin, and whether the narrative is true. In regard to the first, there is extreme probability that our Justin is the person meant. The time suits; and Justin's mode of speech and his opinions in the *Martyrion* are strikingly like those in the *Apology* and *Dialogue*. In regard to the second point, it is at once plain that there is no historical evidence for its truth. But, at the same time, the simplicity of the narrative, and its utter artlessness of expression and circumstance, strongly claim for it credence. Objections indeed have been urged against it. In early times Papebroch attacked it, but his attack was satisfactorily repelled by Ruinart^a, and the arguments on both sides are not worth repeating. In modern times Bunsen has attacked it. He says, "We are now sufficiently acquainted with the forms

^u *Orat. ad Græcos*. c. 19.

^x *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 16.

^v *De Viris Illustr.* c. 23.

^w *Biblioth.* c. 125.

^z See *Acta Martyrum P. Theodorici Ruinart opera ac studio collecta, Augustæ Vindelicorum* 1802, *Pars Prima*, p. 122. I believe this is not the common edition of Ruinart. I quote it because it is the only one I happen to have.

of Roman trial and with Roman topography to see that it is the wretched lucubration of some monk^b." The objections here brought against the document might be brought against many accounts of trials in London given by persons not lawyers. Suppose that the writer did not know the exact forms of the Roman law courts, he would be exactly in the same position as thousands in our own country in regard to our own courts. And suppose he had made some mistake in regard to the localities in Rome, he would have done no more than thousands of people would do if they were to describe minutely many a place in London. Bunsen, moreover, has not intimated what he deems the mistakes of the writer to be. On the other hand, it is almost morally impossible that a monk could have written it. There is not one trace of monkery in it, unless these said local and legal mistakes be monkish. There is not the slightest introduction of anything miraculous. There is not one opinion mentioned which was not held in Justin's time in the exact mode in which it is set down in the Martyrion. Altogether, it is the most credible document of the kind I know of, and contains several curious glimpses into the state of the Christian Church, which only a man of the second or the beginning of the third century would ever dream of giving; such, for instance, as his mention of the place where Justin taught.

We proceed, then, to give an account of this document, believing that it is trustworthy, though entirely devoid of historical testimony. The few introductory words with which it commences are evidently the work of some editor who lived after the time of Constantine. They give the exact day and month of the martyrdom, and state that the saints when taken were brought to Rusticus the prefect of Rome. The date given is worthless. The document itself, then, properly begins thus: "Rusticus the prefect said to Justin, 'First obey the gods and submit to the kings^c.' Justin said,

^b Christianity and Mankind, vol. i. p. 217, note.

^c Themistius mentions Rusticus as prefect of the city under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, 'the kings.'

‘No one can blame and condemn me for obeying the commandments given by our Saviour Jesus Christ.’ Rusticus the prefect said, ‘What are the doctrines (λόγοι) which you profess?’ Justin said, ‘I tried indeed to learn all doctrines, but I agreed to the true doctrines of the Christians, though they do not please those who hold false opinions.’ Rusticus the prefect said, ‘Are those the doctrines that please you, you utterly wretched being?’ Justin said, ‘Yea, since I follow them with right dogma’ [settled belief]. Rusticus the prefect said, ‘What sort is the dogma?’ Justin said, ‘That according to which we are pious to the God of the Christians whom we reckon to be one, in the beginning the maker and fashioner of the whole creation, seen and unseen, and to the Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, who also was proclaimed beforehand by the prophets as about to appear the herald of salvation to the race of men, and the teacher of good disciples. And I, being a man, think that what I can say is insignificant in comparison with his boundless divinity, for I believe that prophetic power is necessary for this purpose, since such proclamation was made beforehand with regard to Him of whom I now said that He was the Son of God. For I know that of old the prophets foretold his appearance among men.’ Rusticus the prefect said, ‘Where do you meet?’ Justin said, ‘Where each one chooses and is able; for do you suppose that we all meet together in one place? Not so; because the God of the Christians is not circumscribed by place, but, being invisible, fills the heavens and the earth, and is everywhere worshipped and glorified by the faithful.’ Rusticus the prefect said, ‘Tell me where do you meet, or in what sort of place do you assemble your disciples?’ Justin said, ‘I stay above one Martinus, near the Timotinian bath^d; and all the time I have been in Rome (and this is the second time that I have come to the city of the Romans) I have had no other place of meeting. And

^d The exact rendering of this passage is a matter of considerable doubt, as usually happens in names of localities not well known. See Otto's note on it.

if any wished to come to me, I communicated to him the truth.' Rusticus said, 'Are you not, then, a Christian? Justin said, 'Yea, I am a Christian.'"

The writer goes on to relate the examination of some other Christians, whose answers are characterized by great simplicity and adherence to the truth. From one of the questions of Rusticus to four of them, 'Did Justin make you Christians?' and from the statement of another, 'I willingly heard the words of Justin,' we may gather that the six martyrs had been frequenters of the rooms above Martin at the Timotinian bath. After their examination, Rusticus addresses Justin, evidently as ringleader: 'Hear, you who are called learned and think that you know the truth, do you believe that if you are scourged and beheaded you will ascend into heaven?' Justin said, 'I hope that I shall have his [Christ's] gifts^f if I endure these things; for I know that to all who have thus lived there abides the divine favour until the completion of the whole world.' Rusticus the prefect said, 'Do you suppose, then, that you will ascend into the skies to receive some recompense?' Justin said, 'I do not suppose it, but I know it, and am fully assured of it.' Rusticus the prefect said, 'At length, then, let us come to the urgent matter in hand. Come together, and unanimously sacrifice to the gods.' Justin said, 'No one of a sound mind lapses from piety into impiety.' Rusticus the prefect said, 'If ye do not obey, ye will be mercilessly punished.' Justin said, 'Through prayer we can be saved, even when punished, on account of our Lord Jesus Christ, because we shall have salvation and confidence at the more fearful and universal judgment-seat of our Lord and Saviour.' In like manner, the other martyrs said, 'Do as you wish, for we are Christians, and do not sacrifice to idols.'

"Rusticus the prefect pronounced their sentence, saying,

^e This is the first mention of 'going to heaven' which we have had; and it is remarkable that it is a heathen, and probably a Stoic, who uses the words.

^f I have adopted Maranus's emendation of *δόγματα* into *δόματα*.

‘Let those who have refused to sacrifice to the gods, and to yield to the command of the emperor, be scourged and led away, suffering the penalty of decapitation according to the laws.’

“The holy martyrs went forth to the usual place glorifying God, and were beheaded, and they perfected their testimony in the confession of the Saviour. And some of the faithful, secretly taking their bodies, laid them in a suitable place, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ working along with them, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.” Thus ends this interesting document. It is probable that the last paragraph is the addition of some editor; yet how different from the additions in the Martyrion of Polycarp.

There is no clue to exact dates in the history of Justin. We know from Eusebius that he addressed his first Apology to Antoninus Pius, and his second to Marcus Aurelius. He mentions in the first that the Jewish war of Barchochebas had taken place in his time (A.D. 131–136). The *Chronicon Paschale* places his martyrdom in A.D. 165, a probable date; but there is no reason to suppose that it is anything more than a guess. Epiphanius^s informs us that Justin was “thought worthy of the perfect crown in the city of the Romans when Rusticus was ruler (*ἡγεμών*), and Adrian king, being thirty years old, in the vigour of his life,” (*ἐν καθεστῶσῃ ἡλικίᾳ*, in ipso flore juventutis.—Petav.). This absurd statement has been made the basis of infinite conjectures, and many have attempted to settle the exact years of Justin’s birth, conversion, and death. Some have based arguments on the identification of the Rusticus mentioned in the Acts with some or other of the Rustici referred to by heathen writers^h. And Hort has recently appealed to Epiphanius and Cedrenus in behalf of the year 148 or thereaboutsⁱ. But if we cannot trust Eusebius, our only authority for placing Justin’s martyrdom in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, we know nothing in

^s Hær. xlv. c. 1.

^h Thus B. Aube, in his *Saint Justin Philosophe et Martyr*, places his martyrdom in A.D. 163.

ⁱ On the Date of Justin Martyr, in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, June 1856. A very able article, well worth perusal.

regard to the date of Justin's death. The value of Eusebius's opinion is not great, but it is infinitely to be preferred to the utterly uncritical statements of Epiphanius or Cedrenus.

II. THE WRITINGS OF JUSTIN MARTYR.

Justin Martyr is the first writer among the Christians whose works are of considerable extent. Of the extant works ascribed to him, a division has been made into those which are unquestionably genuine, those which are questionably genuine, and those which are unquestionably spurious. Critics, however, have doubted with regard to those generally reckoned among the unquestionably genuine; and indeed the most various opinions have been expressed with regard to them.

The writings ascribed to Justin Martyr by the ancients are the following: 1. Two Apologies for the Christians^k; 2. A Dialogue with Trypho, addressed to the Jews^l; 3. A discourse addressed to the Greeks—described by Eusebius as being of considerable extent, as discussing most subjects examined by Greek philosophers, but especially expounding the nature of the demons (gods)^m; 4. Another discourse addressed to the Greeks, called 'A Refutation' (ἐλεγχος)ⁿ; 5. A discourse on the Unity (sole government) of God (μοναρχίας), with proofs not only from the Scriptures but from the Greek writers^o; 6. A work against all heresies, mentioned by himself as well as by Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius^p; 7. A work against Marcion^q, noticed by Irenæus as well as those previously mentioned; 8. A work on the Soul (σχολικὸν περὶ ψυχῆς): in the first book of this he expounded the opinions of philosophers with regard to the soul, and promised to explain his own in the second: but whether he ever wrote the second is not stated by any one: Photius does not mention the work at all; 9. A work entitled *Ψάλτης*^r, of which we know nothing

^k Euseb. Hist. Eccl. iv. 18. ^l Ibid. ^m Ibid. ⁿ Ibid. ^o Ibid.

^p Ibid.; Jerome, De Vir. Illustr. c. 23; Photius, c. 125.

^q Iren. Adv. Hær. iv. 6. 2. ^r In Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius, as above.

except what the name may be supposed to indicate. Some have also inferred, from an expression in Jerome, that Justin wrote a commentary or notes on the Apocalypse. Jerome's words are, "Scripsit [Joannes] Apocalypsim quam interpretantur Justinus Martyr et Irenæus^{*}." As Jerome himself does not mention such a commentary in the appropriate place, and as no mention is made of such a work by any other writer, the words of Jerome must mean that Justin explained some parts of the Apocalypse incidentally in some of his writings. Halloix has imagined that Justin wrote an account of his conversation with the philosopher Crescens, but the supposition is based on a misinterpretation of a passage in the second Apology[†].

We have not a complete list of the works of Justin in any ancient writer. The most complete is that of Eusebius, who expressly informs us that "there were very many other works of Justin current among many brethren[‡]." Of the works which are now extant, and which have been ascribed to Justin, the following is a list: 1. The two Apologies; 2. The Dialogue with the Jew Trypho; 3. A speech to the Greeks; 4. An address to the Greeks; 5. On the Sole Government of God; 6. An Epistle to Diognetus; 7. Fragments from a work on the Resurrection; 8. Various other fragments; 9. An Exposition of the True Faith; 10. Epistle to Zenas and Serenus; 11. A Refutation of certain doctrines of Aristotle; 12. Questions and Answers to the Orthodox; 13. Questions of Christians to Heathens; 14. Questions of Heathens to Christians.

III. THE APOLOGIES.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the two Apologies which have come down to us bearing the name of Justin are the productions of that writer. They are attested by Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius[‡], and extracts from both are

^{*} De Vir. Illustr. c. 9.

[†] c. 3.

[‡] Eccl. Hist. iv. 18.

[‡] In the passages above referred to.

given by Eusebius. The whole style of them is perfectly accordant with that of the other writers of the same period, and the thoughts are so alike that Semisch thinks he can trace quotations from Justin in the writings of Tatian, Irenæus, Minucius Felix, and Tertullian, perhaps also in Athenagoras and Theophilus.

Though this matter may therefore be regarded as settled, there are several circumstances which seem to render doubtful the so-called second Apology's claim to be the second Apology mentioned by Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius. These circumstances are external and internal. The external circumstances are that Eusebius, in quoting from this Apology, never expressly calls it the second, but on one occasion calls it expressly the first. Eusebius quotes three times from the so-called second Apology. The first quotation occurs in chapter viii. of Book IV. of his Ecclesiastical History. He states that Justin lived about the time of Antinous, and quotes a passage from the first Apology, in which mention is made of Antinous, (*Ἀντινόου τοῦ νῦν γενομένου*). Eusebius opens the quotation with the words, "Writing in the Apology to Antoninus," (*ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον ἀπολογίᾳ*). He then extracts from the same a passage relating to the Jewish war. Then he adds, "In the same (*ἐν ταύτῃ*), showing that his own conversion from Greek philosophy to piety was not an irrational act, but the result of deliberate judgment, he writes these things;" and then follows an extract from our second Apology. Immediately after Eusebius goes on to quote again from the first Apology. Now there can scarcely be a doubt that by the words "in the same" Eusebius meant in the Apology previously quoted, namely, that addressed to Antoninus Pius; and if any confirmation of this were required, it is to be found in the circumstance that all the extracts previous and subsequent are made from the first Apology. The second extract made by Eusebius is thus prefaced: "Justin, formerly mentioned, having delivered a second book on behalf of our opinions to the fore-

² Eccl. Hist. iv. 16.

mentioned rulers [Marcus Antoninus and Lucius Verus], is adorned with divine martyrdom, the philosopher Crescens having succeeded in the plot which he had formed against him. . . . Justin himself anticipated clearly that this would happen, as it very soon did happen, and in his fore-mentioned Apology (*ἐν τῇ δεδηλωμένῃ ἀπολογίᾳ*) points it out in these very words." Then follows the extract from our second Apology ². In looking at this passage one would certainly be inclined to think that the Apology referred to is the second book mentioned by Eusebius ^a. But this is by no means a certainty; for from the way in which Eusebius mentions the second book, one would be inclined to believe that Justin wrote it after he had been condemned, and that his martyrdom took place immediately after his handing the book to the emperors. If such were the case, he could not make mention of Crescens as likely to succeed in procuring his death, as Crescens had already been successful; and he then must refer to the first Apology, which had been, as we have seen already, frequently referred to and quoted by Eusebius ^b. The third extract mentions expressly the first Apology, and quotes from it a passage now found in our second. All the manuscripts and Rufinus, the translator, agree. Editors think that "second" ought to be written instead of "first," or that Eusebius made a slip, or that some passages of the second Apology had been transferred to the first in some transcripts. Another external circumstance, certainly not of much importance, is that in the two manuscripts of the Apologies the lesser, or second Apology, is placed first.

There is still another circumstance in the testimony of Eusebius which deserves consideration. In mentioning the second Apology, he states in one place that it was addressed to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus ^c, and

^a c. 3, p. 46.

^b And the author of the *Chronicon Paschale*, in redacting the passage, shows that he so understood it (p. 258 C.).

^b *Ecl. Hist.* iv. 17.

^c *Ibid.* iv. 16.

in another he says simply that it was addressed to Antoninus Verus, the successor of Antoninus Pius^d. Now in our second Apology no address to Marcus Aurelius or to Lucius Verus is to be found. On the contrary, it is addressed to the Senate. To overcome this difficulty, those who maintain that our second Apology is the second Apology of Eusebius, appeal to a passage in the Ecclesiastical History, Book IV. chap. xi. It runs thus: "Now this same Justin, after having laboured most satisfactorily in writing to the Greeks, also addresses other discourses (λόγους), containing a defence of our faith, to the emperor Antoninus, surnamed Pius, and to the Roman senate; for at that time he was staying at Rome." Stress is laid on the word *λόγους*. As the word is plural, it is set down as certain that Eusebius speaks of more than one treatise, that indeed the two Apologies are mentioned, and that, as the one is addressed to Antoninus Pius, the other, addressed to the senate, must be that stated elsewhere to be addressed to Marcus Aurelius. This interpretation of the passage seems to me wrong. The word *λόγοι* does not necessarily imply more than one treatise, since it means 'arguments,' 'parts of a discourse,' 'words,' and every Apology contains many *λόγοι*. But even if it did, that is not only not a reason for identifying the second *λόγος* with the really second Apology, but a good reason for believing that Eusebius had the first Apology in two parts or discourses, one of which was addressed to Antoninus Pius and the other to the senate. For we gather with considerable certainty from Eusebius's chronological mode of narrative, and also from the context, that he is now relating what happened in the time of Antoninus Pius. We may also affirm from the context that Eusebius believed Justin to have written the *ἑτεροι λόγοι*, if he understood more than one treatise by it, in the same period of his life. And, in fact, it is likely that we have here an express allusion to the two parts of Justin's first Apology, as they have come down to us, and therefore good reason for believing

^d Eccl. Hist. iv. 18.

that the so-called second Apology is the latter half of the first.

The internal circumstances deserve as much notice as the external. Three times reference is made to statements in the first Apology by the words *ὡς προέφημεν*, 'as we said before^e.' Perhaps in one of the passages these words may be corrupt; in the two others there is no reason to doubt their genuineness. Now it is scarcely possible that Justin would have used these words to refer to a production that had been written several years before,—according to the common opinion, between thirty and forty years before. Justin would then have said, 'in my previous Apology,' or some such thing. For, supposing that the emperors had read Justin's previous Apology, it could scarcely be expected that they would remember its sentences minutely; and as for Justin's general readers, what a wide meaning must the words have had, when Justin had written so many works as those mentioned by Eusebius. The only satisfactory explanation of the words is, that they formed a continuous part of that to which they refer. The same formula occurs several times in the first Apology, referring back to statements made in some previous portion^f.

Then, again, Eusebius informs us that the second Apology was addressed to Marcus Antoninus and Lucius Verus. But the part which is now called the second Apology contains no address. It opens with an appeal to the Romans, in harmony with one part of the address of the first Apology, "to the whole people of the Romans." The only passage in which the rulers are mentioned can be made to agree with the statement of Eusebius only by rather violent processes. It runs thus: "You pronounce judgments, O Urbicus, not becoming the emperor Pius, nor the philosophic son of Cæsar, nor the holy senate^g." Unfortunately, there is a various reading in the passage which gives rise to doubt. The

^e Apol. ii. 4, p. 43 D refers to Apol. i. 10, p. 58 B; Apol. ii. 6, p. 45 A refers to Apol. i. c. 23, p. 68 C, and c. 63, p. 96 A D. The third and doubtful passage is Apol. ii. 8. See Otto's note.

^f cc. 56, 58.

^g c. 2.

manuscripts of Justin read φιλοσόφου Καίσαρος παιδί, but all the MSS. of Eusebius, except three, read φιλοσόφῳ, which is confirmed by the Syriac translation and that of Rufinus. Efforts have been made to show that the epithet 'Pius' was added to the name of Marcus Aurelius, and that Lucius Verus was called 'philosopher.' Admitting the possibility of this, though the evidence on both points is not satisfactory, one would still be far more inclined to regard the reference as made to the emperor whose regular surname was Pius, and to his adopted son, known for the interest he took in philosophy. Nor need we be surprised at the terms Καίσαρος παιδί, by which Justin designates Marcus Aurelius. Justin probably knew very little in regard to the real father of Marcus Aurelius. On the present occasion he had to think of him as the son of the emperor, and, in consequence of his sonship, the colleague in the administration of justice. Nor do we feel much difficulty because he calls Antoninus Pius Cæsar. Cæsar he was, and Justin may have had his own reasons for preferring that to σεβαστῶ, or any other epithet which might have been more satisfactory to us. The application of the words to Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius is confirmed by the closing words of the second Apology: "May it happen that you shall judge just judgments in our behalf, worthily of piety and philosophy^h!" In the first Apology it is remarkable that the same terms are applied to the princes, and in the same order. Thus in c. 2 they are spoken of as pious and philosophic. In c. 12 it is said, "Ye desire piety and philosophy." We may add that Lucius Verus and the Roman people are both wisely omitted in the passage of the second Apology which we are discussing, as their credit would not be so directly involved in the wrong judgments of those appointed by the emperor, his colleague, or the senateⁱ.

^h c. 15.

ⁱ Valesius so amends the passage, that it is applicable to Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Verus; but the emendation is unnecessary, and has too much of conjecture in it to be satisfactory.

Moreover, the second Apology invariably speaks of one emperor. "She gave the petition to the emperor^k." And there is but one emperor mentioned in the passage quoted above. Now, if the Apology had been addressed to the conjunct emperors Aurelius and Lucius, Justin in the first passage, and most probably in the second, would have used the plural. 'Emperor' is suitable only to Antoninus Pius.

The last circumstance that has to be noted is the date of Urbicus. Justin mentions in his second Apology Urbicus as the magistrate in Rome before whom Christians were brought. This Urbicus, it is likely, was the Lollius Urbicus who in the reign of Antoninus Pius vanquished the Britons, and subsequently acted as prefect of the city. He may indeed have lived till the days of Marcus Aurelius, but we have no historical authority for believing so. However, this argument cannot count for much; for the identification of the one Urbicus with the other is a matter of pure conjecture.

Putting all these circumstances together, there is a strong presumption that we have in the so-called second Apology only a portion of the first. Some, indeed, have regarded it as an appendix; but the circumstances adduced tend rather to prove that it was an integral part, and its commencement, *καὶ τὰ χθὲς δὲ καὶ πρῶην*, is also in favour of this supposition.

The only circumstance that seems opposed to the supposition is, that some of the statements made with regard to persecutions of Christians appear more suited to the times of Marcus Antoninus^l: but the answer to this is obvious; namely, that the statements made in the first Apology with regard to the ill treatment of Christians are as strong as any in the second^m.

Most of the earliest of the modern critics, among them Valesius, Pearson, Fell, and Dodwell, solved the problem which the two Apologies present, by attempting to prove that Eusebius was wrong in assigning the second Apology to the

^k Apol. ii. c. 2, p. 42 C.

^l See Neander's Church History, vol. ii. p. 416.

^m See cc. 1 and 45.

time of Marcus Aurelius, and that it must have been written in the time of Antoninus Pius. Their arguments were canvassed by Dupin, Pagi, and Tentzel^m. In more recent times the opinion has been maintained again by Neander, who supposes that the true relation of the two Apologies to each other had in the time of Eusebius already become confusedⁿ.

Scaliger, in his *Animadversions* on the *Chronicle* of Eusebius^o, maintained, as I have done, that the second Apology mentioned by Eusebius is now lost; but he incorrectly regarded the so-called second Apology as an introduction to the first. Papebroch agreed with him. Almost all recent critics have regarded this opinion as completely refuted. They take their stand on their interpretation of Eusebius, and especially on his quotation from the second Apology in *Eccl. Hist.* iv. 16. Aubé, however, maintains that the second Apology was addressed to Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, and tries to prove, principally from conjectures with regard to Lollius Urbicus and Junius Rusticus, that it was written towards the end of 160 or the beginning of 161^p. Thirlby seems to affirm the opinion which I have maintained. In a note on the passage in which the pious emperor is mentioned, he says, "*Pagium aliosque viros doctissimos vehementer errare puto qui Marcum hic designari arbitrantur. Nam ut alia multa mittam, et concedam Marcum in nummis et veteribus inscriptionibus Pium vocari (quod tamen ad dubito an ita sit) hanc apologiam continuo post alteram iisdemque imperantibus scriptam esse, tota ipsa apologia clamat^q.*"

Justin, then, wrote two Apologies; one of which was addressed to Antoninus Pius, and the other to Marcus Aurelius. The latter has been lost. We have now to ascertain the date of the former. We know for certain that it was written in the reign of Antoninus Pius. More minute information can be got only from an examination of the work itself. The

^m See Grabe, *Spicileg.* ii. p. 144, who gives a résumé of arguments and replies.

ⁿ Church History, vol. ii. p. 417.

^o p. 219.

^p pp. 65-76.

^q p. 110, note 22.

various parts of the work that afford, or are supposed to afford data, are the following :—

1. The address, which runs thus : “To the emperor Titus Ælius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Cæsar, and to Verissimus his son, philosopher, and to Lucius, the son by nature of a Cæsar, a philosopher and the adopted son of Pius, a lover of instruction, and to the holy senate, and to the whole people of the Romans.” The inference from this passage with regard to the date is based on the supposition that Justin would be very particular in giving to the persons addressed all their titles. Now Justin does not call Marcus Antoninus Cæsar; and therefore the Apology must have been written before Marcus was made Cæsar, that is, before 139. So strong has this argument been felt to be, that the only possible way that has been devised to evade it is to change the text, and by hook or crook to attach the title Cæsar to Verissimus. The objections are worthless which are urged against the mode of address, on the supposition that the Apology was written in 138 or 139. Lucius, it is said, could not be called philosopher, for he would be only in his eighth or ninth year. But then the Christians, and even the heathens, used the word ‘lover of wisdom’ (φιλόσοφος) in a wide sense. We shall have abundant instances from Christian writers, in which they speak of even the most ignorant becoming philosophers when they embrace Christianity. Capitolinus also, in his Life of Marcus Aurelius^r, says of him, that he was when a boy a great student of philosophy; and consequently there is nothing incongruous in the application of the term to Lucius. There is, moreover, a mode of escape from the difficulty; for several manuscripts of Eusebius read φιλοσόφου Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ, ‘son of the philosophic Cæsar.’ The other reading, however, is unquestionably to be preferred^s.

Moreover, the epithet ‘fond of instruction,’ or ‘fond of learning,’ as the words ἐπαιδείας παιδείας in this connection

^r c. 2.

^s See Justinī Apologiæ, edidit Jo. Braunius, Bonnæ 1860, p. 77.

are perhaps more properly translated, is very applicable to the tender years of Lucius.

Still the argument is not a satisfactory one. Justin mentions none of the honorary titles which had been conferred on Marcus Aurelius, though, long before he had received the title of Cæsar, he had been exalted to the highest dignities. And, moreover, the Apology seems to intimate that there was more than one responsible power in the state, for it is addressed to kings and rulers of men. "We serve you gladly," he says, "in other matters, acknowledging that you are kings and rulers of men, and praying that you may be found to possess sound reason in connection with your kingly power^t." Again he says, "Let it be your part, as powerful kings, to examine if we have been taught, and now teach, these things truly^u." It is difficult to imagine that Justin would thus have applied the title of king to Marcus Aurelius, if that prince had not been joined with Antoninus in the exercise of regal power. And, as we have seen, in the second Apology the philosophic son of Cæsar is coupled with the pious emperor, when a judgment that would bring disgrace on the government is referred to^x.

2. Justin mentions Marcion as being still alive, and says of him that, "through the help of demons, he has made many throughout every race of men (*κατὰ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων*) speak blasphemies^y." Justin refers to him again in c. 58, and there also affirms that many followed him. We thus know that Marcion before this Apology was written had already considerable success in propagating his opinions. Unfortunately, however, we are at a loss to fix the date of Marcion, our information being either too indefinite or contradictory. Irenæus says^z that he succeeded Cerdo, who is supposed to have come to Rome in A.D. 138, and that he flourished under Anicetus. This is the only satisfactory information which we have with regard to the date of Marcion, the statements of Tertullian and Clemens being either manifest errors, or the text of them corrupt. Clemens seems to intimate that

^t Apol. i. c. 17. ^u Ibid. c. 14. ^x Ibid. ii. c. 2. ^y c. 26. ^z III. iv. 3.

Marcion lived at Rome in the time of Antoninus Pius, but his statement can be admitted as probable only after several emendations. Even those of Irenæus are satisfactory on the supposition that there is something like correctness in the dates usually assigned to Cerdo and Anicetus.

3. The third circumstance that affords a clue to the date is the mention of the Jewish war, conducted by Barchochebas, as having now taken place (*ἐν τῷ νῦν γεγενημένῳ πολέμῳ*^a). This is an indefinite statement, and it has to be taken into account that he uses similar language in the Dialogue with Trypho^b, (*τὸν νῦν γινόμενον πόλεμον*). Equally indefinite is the allusion to the deification of Antinous^c.

4. The fourth clue to a date runs thus: "That none may say that we assert that the Christ was born 150 years before, in the time of Cyrenius, &c., and hence object that all the men born before this time were not responsible, let us first solve the difficulty^d." All that we learn from this is, that Justin, according to his method of estimating, supposed about 150 years in round numbers to have elapsed from the birth of Christ. Particular stress cannot be laid on such a statement.

These are the principal circumstances which throw light on the date. Unfortunately the light is very small. The first points to the year 138 or 139 A.D., an auspicious time for the presentation of an Apology, as Antoninus had just attained to the imperial dignity. This date has, moreover, the Chronicle of Eusebius in its favour, for this work sets down the Apology as written in the third year of the reign of Antoninus Pius, A.D. 140. Still, as we have seen, the inference drawn from the inscription is more than nullified by statements in the Apology itself, and a later date is more suitable to the expression 'philosopher' applied to Lucius, though far from necessary. The second points to a later date than 139; and the fourth is favourable to such a supposition. The two circumstances mentioned in the third, on the other hand, suit better the earlier date, though not incompatible with the later. On the whole, then, the evidence may be

^a c. 31.^b c. 1.^c c. 29.^d c. 46.

taken to point to somewhere about the middle of the reign of Antoninus Pius^e.

Eusebius states that Justin wrote his first Apology at Rome^f. The statement, as we have seen, probably applies to both the documents which have come down to us.

With regard to the real second Apology we know nothing but what Eusebius informs us. As we have said already, Justin appears to have written it immediately before he suffered martyrdom in the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

IV. THE DIALOGUE WITH TRYPHO.

The genuineness of the Dialogue with Trypho has been attested in the most satisfactory manner by Eusebius. That historian not merely mentions the work, but he mentions various parts of the work, which are all found in the Dialogue now extant. He tells us that Justin showed in what manner the divine favour had urged him on to the word of faith^g; how the Jews plotted against the Christians^h; that prophetic gifts lasted till his timeⁱ; that he made mention of the Apocalypse of John^k; and that he stated that certain passages of Scripture had been erased from their copies by the Jews^l. The testimony of Eusebius is repeated by Jerome and confirmed by Photius. In addition to this, the work bears the strongest marks of being a production of the second century. We have seen already that it agrees with Barnabas and Tertullian in some peculiar representations of Jewish ceremonies. Semisch has collected several remarkable coincidences with this Dialogue in the writings of Irenæus and Tertullian, some of which are rather to be taken as

* Volkmar, in an article on the date of Justin, has come to the conclusion that both Apologies of Justin were written under Antoninus Pius, about the year 150. This I learn from Baur, *Das Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrh.* p. 440, note 2. Volkmar's article and his arguments are unknown to me, except what I gather from Hort's article. Grabe states the arguments for the later date ably. Dupin and Papebroch were of the same opinion. Grabe, *Spicil.* vol. ii. p. 151.

^f Hist. Eccl. iv. 11.

^g c. 2.

^h c. 17.

ⁱ c. 39.

^k c. 81.

^l c. 71.

quotations than coincidences. Its whole turn of thought, its explanations of Scripture, and its views of heathenism, are peculiarly of the second century. Besides this, there is a very great similarity between its style and that of the Apologies. The writer, indeed, has to look at matters from a different point of view; as in the Apologies he attempted to convince the Greeks, in the Dialogue he tries to win over the Jews. But the opinions expressed are substantially the same, and some of the expressions, such as the use of τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων for the gospels, occur in the longer Apology and in the Dialogue, and in no other writer whatsoever. The quotations from the Old Testament, moreover, occasionally agree in readings that are either peculiar or found nowhere else. Especially as far as Justin himself is concerned, everything is harmonious. He is represented in the one and the other as of the race of the Samaritans; as a heathen originally, and as especially delighting in the Platonic doctrines before his conversion. The writer also, as we have seen already, alludes to his having addressed the emperor in writing. In fact, the more thorough the examination of the Dialogue has been, the more numerous are the tokens of Justin's authorship. Notwithstanding this, there have been several who have disputed the genuineness of the Dialogue^m, but all on such grounds as are utterly flimsy and unsubstantial, with the exception of those of Wetstein. That great scholar in the Prolegomena to his edition of the Greek Testament stated that he had observed that Justin's quotations from the Old Testament agree more nearly with the Hexaplar edition of Origen than with the Septuagint, and that Justin used some other version of Daniel, perhaps that of Symmachus. Wetstein draws no inference from this *fact*, as he believed it to be, but hoped learned men would see to it. Supposing that it were a fact, it would by no means impair the genuineness of the Dialogue. We should simply

^m The objections of Koch and Lange are refuted by Otto in his work, *De Justinii Martyris Scriptis et Doctrina*, scripsit Joann. Carol. Theod. Otto, Jenæ 1841.

learn that transcribers had taken the liberty of altering the quotations of Scripture, as they were rather apt to do; and there is no doubt that some of the quotations as they now stand have been altered by transcribersⁿ. The genuineness of the Dialogue rests on too strong a basis to be so easily overwhelmed. But the fact has been very much disputed. There is not such a complete agreement of Justin's quotations with the Hexapla as Wetstein represented. We have not a sure guarantee for the text of the Septuagint until the time of Origen, and it is possible that Justin's quotations may have harmonized with the ante-Origenian text more than they do with the post-Origenian text. We know that Justin frequently quoted from memory. We know also that Justin was very suspicious of the Jews and their dealings with the Bible, and this suspicion does not seem to have been confined to him. The early Christians would therefore take every means to get the right translation and a true copy of the Scriptures, and, consequently, there would be many emendations and corrections of the current copies, of which Justin would become aware in his intercourse with Christian men. These oral corrections, no doubt, Theodotion and Symmachus would be also aware of, and would adopt in their new version^o.

A very important question in connection with the Dialogue is, whether we are to regard its form as real or fictitious. It unquestionably looks like an imitation of a dialogue of Plato or of Cicero, as has been remarked^p, and hence some have regarded the whole clothing of the work as purely fictitious. This procedure at once destroys its historical value with regard to Justin's own history. But, whatever look it may at first sight have, a nearer inspection of the work leads to a belief in the reality of the narrative. The exact agreement, already mentioned, between the statements with regard to Justin's history in the Apologies and the Dialogue, must be taken into consideration. There are

ⁿ Semisch, vol. i. p. 87.

^o See Semisch, vol. i. p. 83, and Kaye, p. 20, note.

^p Kaye, p. 19.

several very unartistic references to the conversations held the previous day, the dialogue extending over two days. For no reason that can be given, several come alongside Trypho, to meet Justin on the second day, and Justin gives the name of only one of them, Mnaseas. Besides this, the whole looks like a report of a dialogue, for Justin in narrating it forgets parts of it, and then when he comes to some other part that is connected with them by some association, he speaks as if he had written them fully out. To gratify his new-come friends on the second day, he needlessly rehearses some things already discussed. These and suchlike slight circumstances, combined with the utterly unartistic setting of the work, scarcely permit us to doubt that Justin relates a real conversation.

Eusebius speaks of Trypho as being a very illustrious Jew. According to the Dialogue^a, he fled from his country on account of a war which had just taken place, and spent a great deal of his time in listening to Greek philosophers. This is all we know of him, though modern scholars have been very busy in conjecturing who he was. Grabe identified him with a renowned rabbi; but, unfortunately, every reference to him in the Dialogue shows that he was not a teacher, but one of the taught^r. The Dialogue was addressed to one Marcus Pompeius^s, of whom also we know nothing. Conjecture has been also rife about him, and has even been employed in changing his name, and making him into two persons.

It is impossible to fix the date of the composition of the Dialogue. The only indication of a date is that already mentioned, that it was posterior to the longer Apology^t. The Dialogue itself took place shortly after the conclusion of a Jewish war^u, which most scholars have taken to be the war of Barchochebas, but a considerable interval may have

^a c. 1, p. 217 D.

^r Dial. c. Trypho, c. 9, p. 226 C; c. 38, p. 256 B; c. 62, p. 285 B.

^s c. 8, p. 225 D, and c. 141, p. 371 B.

^t Some suppose a reference also to the shorter Apology, c. 15 in c. 120, but this is doubtful.

^u c. 1, p. 217 D.

elapsed between the holding of the conversation and the narrating of it.

The Dialogue, as it has come down to us, seems to be defective in some parts. The writer mentions that the conversation lasted for two days, yet he nowhere tells us where the first day's conversation ends and the second day's begins. Some have supposed that the part of the Dialogue which did this has been lost. Some suppose that the part lost is considerable, others that it is very small. It is possible that Justin gave a very confused account of the accessories, and that we have the Dialogue just as he wrote it, with the exception of two or three lines, where there is an evident gap. Against this notion, however, we have to take into account that Photius says that the Dialogue was divided into two parts, and that in John of Damascus's *Parallels*, p. 754, a passage from c. 82 is said to be taken from the second book to Trypho^x. Maranus supposes a gap somewhere between cc. 70 and 78; and mentions cc. 78, 84, 92, 118, as repetitions of discussions in the previous part. Maranus's opinion is that the work is on the whole as Justin wrote it; that the gap at c. 74 is very slight (*verba desunt paucissima*); and that we have similar instances of conversations going on as one, while it is mentioned that they continued for several days, in Plato's *Republic*, and especially in *Dialogus de Vita S. Joannis Chrysostomi inter Palladium Episcopum et Theodoretum Diaconum*^y.

The objections which may be urged against the genuineness of cc. 80 and 81 will be presented in the discussion of Justin's opinions in regard to the Millennium.

V. THE DISCOURSE TO THE GREEKS.

A small tractate has come down to us, under the title *Λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας*, bearing the name of Justin. Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius, as we have seen, mention such a discourse, but

^x β' λόγου. This, however, may be a mistake for *διαλόγου*.

^y In *Præf.* xc., xci.

the two characteristic traits which Eusebius gives of the work are not found in that now extant. Eusebius says that in the treatise Justin had "a long discussion on matters which occupied the minds of Christians and Greek philosophers." Now the discussion in the extant work is not long, and it does not meddle with most matters about which the Greek philosophers showed anxiety. Eusebius farther remarks, that it discussed the nature of the demons (*τῶν δαιμόνων*), and in this representation Jerome and Photius agree. The extant work is certainly entirely occupied with the character of the Greek deities, which the Christian writers very often styled *οἱ δαίμονες*, and so far it corresponds with the description. But it seems very unlikely that a mere exhibition of the character of the Greek gods would be described by any such terms as *περὶ φύσεως τῶν δαιμόνων*; that the word *φύσις* would be chosen for such an exhibition; and that the word *δαίμονες* would be selected without some qualification, especially when the word does not once occur in the work itself. There seems, therefore, to us to be no external evidence for the genuineness of the extant work.

The internal evidence amounts to almost nothing. None of the few ideas of the work are inconsistent with its being a production of the second century, and there is nothing to attach it especially to Justin. The few points which have been adduced to show that the work is not Justin's are far from satisfactory; but, on the whole, the probability rests on that side. Thus it has been objected, that the writer of the extant work traces his acceptance of Christianity to his abhorrence of the character of the gods. But the writer makes no such assertion as is attributed to him. His words are: "Do not suppose that my separation from your customs is unreasonable and unthinking, for I found in them nothing that was holy or acceptable to God^z." Here the writer simply states, as a reason for the Greeks not looking on his conduct as irrational, that when his mind was led to examine Greek customs, he perceived that they were not holy. This would

^z c. 1.

not prevent him from having had his attention brought to the subject by an old man, or having the power of Christianity demonstrated to him by the patience of Christians. There is therefore no force in this objection.

Nor is there any force in the objection, that in the Dialogue with Trypho Justin represents Christianity as the only true philosophy; while in the *Λόγος*, Christianity is said not to make philosophers^b. Both statements are strictly true and harmonious. Christianity did not make philosophers, "or poets, or clever orators." Its function was not intellectual, but it made "mortals immortal," as the *Λόγος* goes on to say, "and men gods." Yet, at the same time, the writer of the *Λόγος* would not have hesitated to say that in making mortals immortals it showed itself a truer philosophy than the cleverest inventions of Greek wisdom.

Nor, again, is there any contradiction in the writer's belief with regard to a future state and that of Justin. Justin unquestionably believed in an intermediate state; but when the writer of the *Λόγος* says that the soul at death goes to Him that made it, he uses language which Justin himself would no doubt have used, for it occurs in the New Testament, and was common with Christians. Justin himself uses similar language in *Apol.* ii. c. 2, for he tells us that Lucius knew that by his death "he was freed from such wicked rulers, and was going to the Father and King of Heaven."

The only considerations that are of any weight are that the style is somewhat different, not in mere words only but in character, and that there is an absence of many phrases and turns of thought which we should have expected Justin to use in treating of such a subject. The difference of the character of the style, however, may be accounted for mainly by the close contact into which the writer comes with poets, and the absence of Justinian modes of thought is easily explained by the shortness of the work and the fewness of the thoughts in it. Even if this were not the case, we have

^b c. 5.

already remarked how unsatisfactory inferences from style and thought generally are.

Cureton publishes in his *Spicilegium Syriacum* a Syriac translation of the Discourse. It is not exactly the same. The Syriac omits some parts of the Greek, and introduces small portions not found there. The inscription in the Syriac is: "Hypomnemata, which Ambrose, a chief man of Greece, wrote: who became a Christian: and all his fellow-senators raised a clamour against him: and he fled from them, and wrote and showed them all their folly: and at the beginning of his discourse he answered and said^c." Cureton thinks that the Ambrose here mentioned "can hardly be understood to be any other than the friend and disciple of Origen, whom Epiphanius designates as one of those illustrious in the palaces of kings^d." But neither Eusebius, nor Jerome, nor Epiphanius, all of whom mention Ambrose, say one word with regard to Ambrose's being in Greece. On the contrary, they could not have heard such a story as that given in the Syriac, for they say that he was a Marcionite or Sabellian, and that Origen convinced him of his error in Alexandria^e.

The inscription in the Syriac, therefore, merely gives a name of which we know nothing; and it may be questioned how far any reliance could be placed on the Syriac, if the name had told us more.

The Discourse commences with the statement that the speaker's departure from the customs of the Greeks was not unreasonable; for the writings of their poets were monuments of madness and impurity. A woman is the beginning and end of both Iliad and Odyssey^f; Hesiod's "Works and Days" and his "Theogony" contain vile stories, and the characters of the heroes and gods in them, as also in the dramatised histories, are full of inconsistencies and fearful moral blemishes^g. Any one who imitated the conduct of the gods now, would be condemned by every one^h. The Greeks

^c p. 61.

^d Preface, p. xii.

^e See Eus. Hist. Eccl. vi. 18; Hieronym. De Illustr. Vir. c. 56; Epiph. Pan. Hær. 64. 3.

^f c. 1.

^g cc. 2, 3.

^h c. 4.

should therefore come and be instructed by divine truth. The *Λόγος* concludes with the following beautiful passage, which has been translated by Neander: "The power of the Logos does not produce poets; it does not create philosophers, nor able orators; but by instructing us it makes of mortal men immortal beings, and converts mortals into gods. It transports us from the earth beyond the limits of Olympus. Come and submit yourselves to its influence. Become as I am, for I too was as you are. This has conquered me—the divinity of the doctrine, the power of the Logos; for as a master serpent-charmer lures and frightens the hideous reptile from his den, so the Word expels the fearful passions of our sensual nature from the most secret recesses of the soul. And the cravings of lust having once been banished, the soul becomes calm and serene, and, delivered from the evil which had cleaved to it, returns to its Creator."

VI. ON THE MONARCHY OR UNITY OF GOD.

We have already seen that Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius mention a treatise by Justin with this name. The only characteristic of the work which Eusebius gives us is in these words: *Ἦν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν γραφῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν συνίστησι βιβλίων.* These words have been supposed to admit of a double translation; either, 'The unity of God, which he proves not only from the writings which we (Christians) have, but also from Greek books,' or 'The unity of God, which he not only does not prove from the writings which we have, but proves it even from Greek writings.' The latter translation is unquestionably wrong, and would not have been devised but under the pressure of necessity. There can be no doubt that Eusebius never uses *οὐ μόνον*—ἀλλὰ καὶ as equal to 'not only not—but even!'

¹ Prud. Mar. Præf. p. lxxii., adduces some passages from Justin, one from Athenagoras (Leg. i), and one from Tatian (c. 36). Those from Justin are unsatisfactory—the others are all doubtful—and, at all events, he makes no attempt to prove that such was the usage of Eusebius.

There remains therefore for us only the former, which leaves us the following alternative,—either the work now extant is not the work of Justin, or it is not complete; for it does not contain a single reference to the “Scriptures used by us.” It appeals to the Greek writings alone, and very frequently to forgeries among the Greek writings. As there is not the slightest token that the work is incomplete, the most likely alternative is that this is not the work of Justin. Some indeed have supposed a reference to a previous part in which testimonies would be quoted from the Old Testament—but the supposition is purely gratuitous: The sentence appealed to runs as follows: “I, as I promised a little before, having used a god-loving state of mind will use a man-loving voice.” The god-loving mind (ἡ φιλόθεος γνώμη) is absurdly supposed to imply that the writer had appealed to Scripture, while the man-loving voice (ἡ φιλόανθρωπος φωνή) is taken to be the appeal to the Greek poets. The portion, “as I promised before,” refers to a sentence occurring a few lines above^k.

Critics used to lay stress on the circumstance that the text of Eusebius called the work *περὶ Θεοῦ μοναρχίας*, while the inscriptions of the Codd. called it simply *περὶ μοναρχίας*. But no stress can be laid on this circumstance, for, in the first place, it is not improbable that Eusebius wrote simply *περὶ μοναρχίας*, since Rufinus does not translate the *θεοῦ*; and in the second place, the Codex of Weimar designates the work “De monarchia Dei^l.”

The internal evidence furnishes us little help. The phraseology is somewhat different, and the author is supposed to express his belief that all the gods were originally men^m. He does not, however, give full expression to this theory. He makes no mention of the origin of the gods through the demons as in the longer Apology, but he speaks of “forgetfulness transferring to mortals the name which is fit only for the one true Godⁿ.” And he also speaks of the idolatrous rites as arising from the great honours paid to mortals of

^k See Otto, in loc.; Semisch, vol. i. p. 189. ^l Otto, Prolegomena, p. 20.

^m Semisch, vol. i. p. 192.

ⁿ c. i.

supereminent merit°. Both of these statements are in harmony with the Euhemeran theory, but they are not absolutely inconsistent with the dæmonic.

The tractate consists mainly of extracts from the Greek poets. He introduces the subject in chapter first. In chapter second he quotes from Æschylus, Sophocles, Philemon, Orpheus, and Pythagoras, to show that they recognised but one God; but all the verses have generally been considered spurious. In the third chapter he quotes Sophocles, Philemon, and Euripides, to prove that they believed that God would judge men. In the fourth he quotes Philemon, to prove that he thought that libations would not remove the punishment. In the fifth he quotes Menander, Euripides, and others, to show that they did not believe in the common gods; and the last chapter concludes with some observations on the immorality that would accompany an imitation of the gods.

VII. HORTATORY ADDRESS TO THE GREEKS.

A treatise has come down to us bearing the name of Justin styled *Λόγος παραινετικός πρὸς Ἕλληνας*—"A hortatory address to the Greeks." As both external and internal evidence is incapable of settling the authorship satisfactorily, the opinion of critics has been divided, some regarding it as a genuine work of Justin's, while others have rejected it as spurious. In the course of the discussions on this subject many arguments have been adduced both for and against the genuineness which are either misunderstandings of the text or false assertions, or at the best have no weight. We shall adduce those which seem to be of some moment. We think that the internal evidence preponderates against the genuineness, but that its force depends considerably on the accumulation of slight indications which would be of no great consequence if external evidence were in any way decided in its tone.

The first mention of the Hortatory Discourse by name occurs in the Claremont MS. of the "Parallels of John of

Damascus^p." The treatise must therefore have passed by this name in the eighth century.

Those critics who regard the work as Justin's believe that they can find notices of it much earlier. In his *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 18, Eusebius states that "another work of Justin's has also come down to us, addressed to the Greeks, which he inscribed *ἐλεγχος*, confutation." Jerome copies this notice; and Photius includes among the works of Justin one also with the name *ἐλεγχος*: "There is a fourth treatise of his, composed in like manner against the nations, which bears the title *ἐλεγχος*^q." Now it is asserted that the title "Confutation" would exactly suit the work which we are discussing, while the title "Hortatory Address" is not so appropriate. We think that this is not a correct statement of the case. There is, properly speaking, no refutation of heathenism in the treatise. It does not exhibit the absurdities and contradictions of the Greek religion; it does not bring to light the hideous practices of the gods, and the immorality of their rites. The address to the Greeks would be far more appropriately entitled the Confutation than the Hortatory Address. On the contrary, it is an exhortation from beginning to end to the Greeks to give up the error (*πλάνη*) of their ancestors, to read the Scriptures, and to learn from them the true piety. This exhortation is indeed based on a peculiar line of argument. The writer asserts that only inspired men could teach true piety. He maintains this by showing in the first place that the Greek poets and philosophers contradicted themselves and spoke unworthily of the true God; and, in the second place, by showing that the best of the Greek poets and philosophers had learned part of the wisdom of Moses while in Egypt, and that thus what was true in them was not their own. He urges them therefore to give heed to the books from which Orpheus and Homer, Pythagoras and Plato, borrowed their wisdom. Especially does he urge them to give heed to the words of the Sibyl, who was inspired to foretell the coming of Christ. Such a work can in no proper

^p See Grabe, *Spicileg.* vol. ii. p. 149.

^q Cod. 125.

sense be called a confutation, though it is easy enough to suppose that an inaccurate author might have called it by this name. As, however, the name "Hortatory Address" is really more appropriate than "Confutation," no argument can be derived from the name in Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius as to the identity of the treatise.

The only other point of external evidence in regard to the treatise is somewhat more important. Photius, in his notice of the work of Stephanus Gobarus, adduces as one of the contradictions mentioned by that writer, "that everything created is destructible and mortal, but by the will of God remains indissoluble and indestructible; and, on the contrary, that what is destructible by nature cannot be indestructible by the will of God." Then Photius adds that it was from Justin Martyr that Stephanus had borrowed this opinion, for Justin had had a contest against the Greek opinion, and had refuted the opinion of Plato in *Timæus*, 41 B. Then Photius gives the refutation, partly in the words of the Hortatory Address^r. Now there can be no doubt from this passage that Photius had our Hortatory Address before him. It is extremely probable that Stephanus Gobarus, who lived in the sixth century, also had it. By what name was it known? Photius does not mention a "Hortatory Address." It is likely, therefore, that he knew it under some other name. But here the matter rests. We have no clue to its identification under any title. No extract is made from it anywhere under the title of *ἑλεγχος*. Photius may not have mentioned all the works of Justin which he knew. And Photius's belief in its genuineness is not satisfactory evidence to us of that fact, especially when he believed some of the undoubtedly spurious works to be genuine.

The external evidence is therefore next to nothing. If it leans on any side, it is on the side of the identity of the *ἑλεγχος* with the Hortatory Address, and the evidence for its genuineness contained in that supposition.

The indications of the author in the work itself are such

^r Cod. 232, p. 290, a. 20, Bekker.

as to lead us to suppose that Justin did not write it. They are not so strong as to warrant the rejection of Justin's authorship, if that were based on trustworthy historical evidence, since strong historical testimony would enable us to credit many seeming contradictions and real inconsistencies in an author. But when historical testimony fails us, and we are left to the simple impression which the style and thoughts make on us, every divergence weighs in the scale against the sameness of authorship.

The circumstances that tell in favour of Justin's authorship are few. The writer of the Hortatory Address was a heathen, and so was Justin. Curiously enough, the passage which proves that he was not a Jew was frequently adduced to show that he was one. It runs thus: "On account of the judgment which is to take place after the end of this life, which judgment is proclaimed beforehand not only by our ancestors according to God, both prophets and lawgivers, but even by those who are reckoned wise among you, not poets only but also philosophers^s;" (*ἦν οὐ μόνον οἱ ἡμέτεροι κατὰ θεὸν προκηρύττουσι πρόγονοι*). The writer calls prophets and lawgivers his ancestors, and hence it has been inferred that he was a Jew. But we have seen already in many cases how fallacious such an inference is, and we shall have occasion oftener than once to note subsequently that Christians of every nation recognised their forefathers in Old Testament saints. The writer, however, does not on the present occasion leave us in any ambiguity, for he expressly says, "our ancestors according to God," (*κατὰ θεὸν πρόγονοι*). The necessity of joining *κατὰ θεὸν* with *πρόγονοι* is apparent from the absurdity of the only other possible construction, *κατὰ θεὸν προκηρύττειν*. And farther on we have the expression *τῶν κατὰ θεὸν προγόνων*, where no alternative is admissible. The mode of expression is so precise that the writer would scarcely have used it had the prophets been his progenitors according to the flesh. In another passage he seems also to hint his Gentile up-bringing. "I deem it proper," he says, "to

^s c. 1, p. 1 C.

tell you at present what I formerly heard people among you saying with regard to them, [oracles] ^t."

There is a striking similarity between a passage in the *Cohortatio*^u and the so-called second *Apology*^v on the impossibility of giving a proper name to God. The argument adduced by both is that there must be some one older than the person to bestow the proper name on him. But no one is older than God. This coincidence favours Justin's authorship, but it can count only for very little. The author of the *Hortatory Address* may have hit on the same idea without any knowledge of Justin's work; or he may have borrowed it directly from Justin.

The third point that might be adduced in favour of Justin's authorship is a supposed reference in the *Hortatory Address* to the *Apology*. The writer remarks, in continuation of the subject noticed above, the namelessness of God. "On this account, therefore, as I said before, God mentions no name when he sends Moses to the Hebrews^w." Otto refers the words "as I said before" to the second *Apology*. But if we can find a passage in the work itself to which we may refer the words, there is no need of going beyond it. And such a passage does occur in the end of the twentieth chapter^x, where he quotes the words "I am that I am," and says that Plato understood that God did not speak his own proper name to Moses in so calling Himself.

Another consideration, which would be of some consequence were the external evidence good, is that there is nothing in the treatise which is opposed to the notion of its being written in the second century; and its whole style of thought and reasoning belongs more especially to the second or third century. This circumstance, however, counts for nothing if historical testimony fails us.

We shall now state the indications contained in the treatise that Justin was not the author.

The first point is, that the phraseology is considerably different from that employed either in the *Apologies* or in the

^t c. 11, p. 12 A. ^u c. 21. ^v c. 6. ^w c. 21, p. 19 C. ^x p. 19 B.

Dialogue with Trypho. The Hortatory Address runs on much more smoothly. It is altogether more polished; there is little of the tortuosity which distinguishes both the Apologies and the Dialogues. There is, moreover, a constant repetition of set phrases rarely or never used in the undoubtedly genuine works. The most striking of the peculiarities of language are the following: the frequent use of substantives in *οτης*, the use of *θησκεία*, *θεοσέβεια*, and *ἀληθῆς* or *ὀρθῇ εὐσέβεια* for the Christian religion; the designation of the heathen by *οἱ ἔξωθεν τῆς ἡμετέρας θεοσεβείας* or *θησκείας*; the frequent combinations *ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομνήσαι*, *ἀκόλουθον ὑπομνήσαι*, &c.; the constant conjunction of *σαφῶς* and *φανερῶς*; and the frequent recurrence of the particle *τοίνυν*. The uncertainty of building any definite conclusion on such a foundation is generally recognised by critics. A writer's style, especially his use of certain words and phrases, depends very much on his mood, on the books he has last read, and a thousand other circumstances which change with the lapse of time. Still, in the absence of external evidence, it will have some weight, however slight.

The sources to which the writer applied for information, if we knew more about them, might help us to a conclusion. What we do know amounts to the following.

In his account of the opinions of ancient philosophers, the writer has extracted largely, and often word for word, from the treatise *De Placitis Philosophorum*². This treatise has come down to us under the name of Plutarch, but the absence of all allusion to it by Plutarch when he might have referred to it, contradictions between its statements and those of his genuine works, with similar circumstances, have led most critics to believe that it is not the production of the Chæronean Plutarch, but of some later and less cultivated man³. Now were we to suppose the writer to be the son of

¹ These and others are given very fully by Semisch, vol. i. p. 128, from whom I have taken them.

² Coh. ad Græc. c. 3.

³ See Vossius, *De Hist. Græc. lib. ii. c. 10*, and Jonsius, *De Script. Hist. Phil. lib. iii. c. 6*.

Plutarch, as some have done, we should deem it extremely unlikely that the work of a contemporary of Justin should obtain such currency as to be used by him. But the probability is, that it was the work of a Plutarch who flourished some time after the son of Plutarch.

In the Hortatory Address occur sentences nearly word for word the same as some found in a passage extracted from the Chronicon of Africanus by Eusebius^b. The resemblance between the passages is so great, that there is no avoiding the conclusion that either Africanus borrowed from the Hortatory Address, or the writer of the Hortatory Address had before him the work of Africanus. It is a very delicate problem indeed to settle which was the borrower. To me the evidence, such as it is, seems to lie on the side of the Chronicon of Africanus being the original, and the sentences of the Hortatory Address being borrowed from it. The reasons for this supposition are several. In the first place, the writer expressly draws attention to the fact that Greek chronology proved that Moses was older than the oldest of the Greek poets or wise men. Justin believed this fact, but he did not attempt to demonstrate it. If he had done so, he would have been the first. And no doubt if he had been the first, many of the Christian chronologists would have assigned him the honour, and Africanus would in all probability have mentioned the circumstance, and in no place would he have done it more appropriately than where he was quoting his exact words. On the other hand, the Hortatory Address is a mere speech. No one expects in it the precision of an inquiry like that of Africanus, and therefore the writer might well enough omit all mention of the works from which he was borrowing. In the second place, the identical portions form a necessary and essential portion of the work of Africanus, while in the Hortatory Address they might easily have been omitted or altered to any extent. In the third place, a minute examination of the passages leads to the suspicion that the writer of the Hortatory Address had adapted the words of Africanus

^b Præp. Evang. lib. x. c. 10 ; Routh, Reliq. vol. ii. p. 269.

to his own purpose. We shall present the reader with most of the passages, that he may judge for himself.

The first we adduce contains an opinion on chronological affairs which it is likely only a chronologer would adopt, or one who had the results of chronological investigations before him :—

COHORT. c. xii.

ἄλλως τε οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν ὑμᾶς
προσθήκει ὅτι οὐδὲν Ἑλληνισι πρὸ τῶν
ὀλυμπιάδων ἀκριβὲς ἰστόρηται, οὐδ' ἔστι
τι σύγγραμμα παλαιόν, Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρ-
βάρων σημαῖνον πρᾶξιν.

AFRICANUS.

μέχρι μὲν τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων οὐδὲν
ἀκριβὲς ἰστόρηται τοῖς Ἑλλήσι, πάντων
συγκεχυμένων καὶ κατὰ μὴδὲν αὐτοῖς
τῶν προτοῦ συμφωνούντων.

That there is a verbal copy of the one writer by the other in this passage can scarcely be doubted; for the opinion given is a remarkable one, and the exact coincidence in the use of ἀκριβὲς and the dative Ἑλληνισι is striking. The reasons for regarding Africanus as the original are several. The words have a more appropriate meaning in his work. They are employed to state that in regard to the period before the Olympiads it is impossible to settle the chronology *accurately*, for all is confusion; and the writer goes on to show how accuracy was introduced into chronology by the Olympiads. The writer of the Hortatory Address adduces the words in the course of an argument in which he maintains that the Greeks had no history so old as that of Moses. The accuracy of the historical details of the later Greek historians was not a matter of consequence to him as it was to Africanus. His argument rests far more on the latter clause of his sentence, that there was no writing which detailed the exploits of Greeks or barbarians before the Olympiads. Whether the writer of the Hortatory Address would reckon the poems of Homer among συγγράμματα, or whether he would confine the term to purely historical works, we cannot decide. But even were we to suppose that Homer was reckoned among the historical writers, the author of the Hortatory Address might have placed him after the Olympiads. At all events, he

places him after the time of Isaiah^c, by the supposition that Homer borrowed from Isaiah. And thus the statement which he makes he would regard as strictly true and conclusive proof that there was no history so old as that of Moses.

The second sentence which we quote is a clearer proof that the writer of the Hortatory Address borrowed from Africanus. The writer of the Hortatory Address wishes to prove that Moses was older than any Greek writer whatever. In proof of this assertion, he states that the Greek histories make mention of Moses as the leader of the Jews in the time of Ogyges and Inachus. He proceeds^d, "For thus *Polemon in the first book of his Hellenic histories mentions, and Apion the son of Posidonius in his book against the Jews, and in the fourth of his histories, says, that in the time of Inachus king of Argos, while Amasis was king of Egypt, the Jews revolted, whose leader was Moses. And Ptolemæus the Mendesian, who relates the history of the Egyptians, agrees with all these.*" The words in italics are the same with those in Africanus. This part of the passage might fairly enough occur in the Hortatory Address before its appearance in the Chronicon of Africanus; but it is surprising that Africanus, who knew these matters very profoundly, should find himself minutely anticipated in his investigations. It is a curious circumstance, too, that the writer of the Hortatory Address does not introduce the name of Herodotus, to whom Africanus appeals in a sentence placed between the two sentences quoted above. This is all the more curious that, in regard to Herodotus, Africanus was in a mistake. Moreover, the writer of the Hortatory Address seems to assume as a fact that the historians whom he quotes made actual mention of Moses as the leader of the Jews. His argument requires this. The argument of Africanus throws discredit on this supposition; for his object is to show, by summing up the years as given in the Greek chronologies, and as given in the Hebrew, that the time of Ogyges and Moses coincided. In the present section he asserts that some of the Greek writers relate that Moses

^c c. 28, p. 28 C.

^d c. 9.

lived at the same time as Ogyges, and he sets about proving this by showing that they narrated the revolt of the Jews against the Egyptians as taking place in the time of Inachus. His argument is, Moses was leader of the Jews at that time, and therefore he must have lived in the time of Inachus. The sentence corresponding to that of Africanus in the Hortatory Address is consistent with this argument. The concluding words of Africanus are somewhat more precise: "Ptolemæus the Mendesian, relating the history of the Egyptians, agrees with all these, so that there is not to any extent an important difference in the periods." It is far from likely that Ptolemy mentioned Moses in his narrative. The writer of the Hortatory Address therefore would seem to have mistaken the exact force of the words of Africanus, and to have supposed that the writers whom he mentions made use of the name of Moses, while they merely afforded data by which the time of Moses could be determined. It is not, however, to this passage in the Hortatory Address, but to the one which immediately follows, that special attention should be directed. It runs as follows, allowances being made for a somewhat corrupt text: "Moreover those who relate the history of the Athenians, Hellanicus and Philochorus, the latter of whom wrote the deeds of Attica, and Castor and Thallus, and Alexander Polyhistor, and also wise Philo, and Josephus, who wrote the history of the Jews, make mention of Moses as an exceedingly ancient leader of the Jews." The striking point about this quotation is that there is not the slightest reason to suppose that Hellanicus and Philochorus mentioned either Moses or the Jews, and it is not likely that Castor and Thallus mentioned the name of Moses. It may be well doubted whether Alexander Polyhistor did. How then did the writer of the Hortatory Address drag in names which as they occur in his writing are not the slightest authorities for the statements he makes? The explanation of this is the supposition that he had been misled by some book which he had read before. Now, on turning to Africanus, we can at once see how he was misled.

Africanus sets out with saying that he will prove by a comparison of periods that Moses flourished in the time of Ogyges. To lay a sure foundation he inquires into Greek chronology, and tries to get a date agreed on by all classes of historians. This date is that of Ogyges, who, he says, flourished 1200 years before the first Olympiad. "This is asserted," Africanus goes on, "by those who relate the history of the Athenians, Hellanicus and Philochorus, who wrote the work called *Atthides*, by the historians of Syria, Castor and Thallus, and by the general historians, Diodorus who wrote '*The Libraries*,' and Alexander Polyhistor, and by some in our day who have recorded things more accurately than all the Attic writers put together." Here every name mentioned has a special force. The writer of the Hortatory Address finding these names in a work which professed to prove the very point which he wished to prove, quoted carelessly the names which struck his eye or his mind. The omission by the writer of the Hortatory Address of the name of Diodorus is also striking. The writer omits him expressly, that in a few subsequent sentences he might quote him more fully. Even this is an indication that the writer of the Hortatory Address borrowed from Africanus; for it is far more likely that the writer of the Hortatory Address would copy from Africanus, and lug in a quotation from Diodorus which he had found suitable, than that Africanus would quote from the writer of the Hortatory Address, and insert a name which would appear afterwards in his argument more appropriately.

From these quotations, then, the most probable inference is that the writer of the Hortatory Address borrowed from Africanus, and consequently that the Hortatory Address was written later than the work of Africanus, who flourished in the beginning of the third century.

The next quotation which might help to throw light on the date of the Hortatory Address is one which is made from the Orphic Hymns^d. It consists of a considerable number of lines. Clemens Alexandrinus quotes part of the

^d c. 15.

same hymn. So does Cyril of Alexandria. And Eusebius, in his *Præparatio Evangelica*, extracts the whole hymn as given by the Peripatetic Aristobulus. Lobeck, in his *Aglaophamus*^e, has compared the different versions given by these writers, and comes to the conclusion that the fragment in Justin was the original form, at least as it appeared in the time of Justin; that Clemens presents it in a somewhat interpolated state; and that the extended copy given by Eusebius was the result of very serious interpolations which were made by an Aristobulus who lived subsequently to the time of Clemens^f. If this conclusion of Lobeck's were a well-founded one, it would be a decided argument in favour of the Address having appeared some time in the second century. But Lobeck's reason for his opinion is far from satisfactory. It is that there are two passages in the version of Aristobulus which Justin would have found suitable for his purpose, and which therefore he would have used had he found them in his text. But these two passages have nothing to do with the doctrine which the writer of the Hortatory Address undertakes to prove, and they are, moreover, exceedingly obscure. It is only learned scholars who could discover in the words sure references to Abraham^g and Moses. In fact, Lobeck assumed that the Hortatory Address was Justin's. That circumstance fixed his canons of criticism. The shortest form must be older than any of the longer; the shorter it is, the older is its form. But there are considerations which might make one hesitate to agree with Lobeck. There is, first, the question of the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to Aristobulus. Most critics have now agreed to

^e pp. 438-447.

^f "In universum igitur sic contendo, Justiniano fragmento omnium brevissimo primigeniam carminis Orphici, qualis quidem illis temporibus fuit, formam representari; novæ interpolationis specimen præbere exemplum Clementis, quod Justiniano copiosius est, Aristobuleo adstrictius; novissimæ ac gravissimæ auctorem esse Aristobulum illum quem Eusebius introduxit, hominem sive Judæum sive Christianum, Clementis certe temporibus posteriorem." p. 447.

^g Clemens Alexandrinus supposes the passage to refer to Abraham or his son.

regard these fragments as genuine^b. Of course Eusebius might alter the form of the quotation to that prevalent in his own day. But this is not likely. Now Lobeck's whole hypothesis falls to the ground if there is good evidence that Aristobulus did not flourish after but before the time of Clemens Alexandrinus. Moreover, it is remarkable that the lines omitted by Clemens Alexandrinus, and by the author of the Hortatory Address, are just the lines which create difficulty. The poem as it appears in the Hortatory Address is more intelligible than the form that appears in Clemens Alexandrinus, and that in Clemens is more intelligible than that in Aristobulus. It is, moreover, a singular fact, that Cyril of Alexandria should have adopted the readings of the Hortatory Address in preference to what is supposed to be the improved version of the later Aristobulus. Then we must remember that the poem was evidently a favourite one with Christian apologists, and that therefore it would pass through the memories of many, receiving alterations as it passed. Such writers never hesitate about omitting lines, if they forget them. And lastly, we may notice the prevalent opinion that the expansion of the Orphic poem into its longer shape is assigned by several, Gfroerer and Dähne among them, to Aristobulus (150 B.C.), the references to Abraham and Moses being regarded by them as requiring Jewish authorship.

It will be seen from this examination that almost no light can be got from this quarter in regard to the authorship of the Hortatory Address; but that inasmuch as the probability is that the form of the poem given by Aristobulus is the earliest known to us, that given by Clemens Alexandrinus will be the next, and that given in the Hortatory Address and the part given by Cyril of Alexandria will be the latest form.

The last quotation that may throw light on the authorship of the Hortatory Address is one from Hermes Trismegistus. "If any one should imagine," he says, "that he has learned the truth about God from those philosophers who are named the eldest among them, let him hear Ammon and Hermes;

^b See Gfroerer, *Philo*, vol. ii. p. 71; Dähne, vol. ii. p. 73.

Ammon who calls God the 'absolutely hid' in his discourses on Him, and Hermes who clearly and plainly says, 'It is difficult to understand God, but it is impossible even for him who can understand Him to declare Himⁱ.''' The date of the writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus is unfortunately not ascertained, but most scholars believe that they were forged by neo-Platonists. If this were the case, then the Hortatory Address could scarcely be written by Justin Martyr, as Plotinus belongs to the third century. The quotation itself, too, deserves observation. It is said to be made from Hermes. But Justin Martyr knew well that the substance of it, and nearly the words, were to be found in the *Timæus* of Plato. He does not seem to have known anything of Hermes' having used them. Some indeed imagine that the writer of the Hortatory Address alludes to the words of Plato when he says, "Plato did not regard it as safe to mention to the Athenians the name of Moses, because he taught that there was one only God; for he feared the Areopagus^k." And they have gone so far as to regard this passage as a proof that Justin was the author of the Hortatory Address; for Justin in quoting the passage from the *Timæus* reads ἀσφαλές instead of ἀδύνατον^l. A moment's consideration will show how utterly absurd it is to suppose that an allusion is made here to the words of the *Timæus*. The writer of the Hortatory Address is not thinking of the proclamation of God at all, but he wishes to account for the circumstance that Plato makes no mention of Moses—a very surprising circumstance indeed, if, as the writer maintains, Plato borrowed his great truths from him.

It has to be noticed also, that there is a very striking resemblance between passages in the Hortatory Address and some in Cyril's Treatise against Julian. The probability in this case is that Cyril made use of the Hortatory Address. There is nothing in the quotations which can throw light on the priority of authorship. It is singular, however, that Cyril does not indicate the source from which he borrows.

ⁱ c. 38, p. 37 B.

^k c. 22, p. 20 C.

^l Apol. ii. c. 10.

In a speech like that of the Hortatory Address the authorities may be passed over in silence. But the case is different with a book, especially when the writer introduces peculiar statements, such as that of Cyril's that Plato was afraid of hemlock, and therefore did not speak openly of the true God.

The next feature of internal evidence is the opinions contained in the Hortatory Address. Some have discovered endless differences. We shall state the principal of them. There is an unquestionable difference between the writer of the Hortatory Address and the writer of the Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho on the fundamental argument of the Hortatory Address. Justin maintained that the Greek philosophers, like Socrates and Plato, obtained some insight into the truth, because they possessed some measure of the spermatic Logos or Reason. The writer of the Hortatory Address traces the knowledge which the philosophers had of the truth entirely to their stay in Egypt, and their acquaintance with the books of Moses. It is allowable to suppose that, if Justin were anxious to prove the point which the writer of the Hortatory Address undertakes to prove, he might forget his former ideas, and concentrate all his attention on the direct borrowings of the Greek writers from Moses. For Justin expressly says that Plato did read the writings of Moses, and misunderstood some expressions in them^m. He does not mention, however, Plato's fear of the Areopagus or of the populace, which is an essential element in the theory of the writer of the Hortatory Address. Altogether, it is unlikely that Justin should so change his opinion as to say nothing of the Logos in the philosophers, and to trace all their knowledge to direct borrowings from Moses and the prophets.

There is likewise an important difference between Justin and the writer of the Hortatory Address in respect to the origin of polytheism. Justin says that the gods were real demons, the offspring of the women and evil angels mentioned in Gen. vi.ⁿ The writer of the Hortatory Address supposes

^m Apol. i. 60.

ⁿ Apol. ii. 5.

that our first parents inferred from the words of the devil, "Ye shall be as gods," that there really were other gods besides the true one. They not only believed this, but handed it down to their descendants; and Moses was the first who really knew the true God. "Being cast forth from Paradise," he says, "and thinking that they were cast forth solely on account of disobedience, and being ignorant that they had been cast out also because they believed that those were gods which were not, they handed down the name of 'gods' to those men who were born of them after this. This, then, was the first false idea with regard to gods, which had its origin with the lying father. God therefore knowing that the opinion of polytheism, as not being true, disturbed the soul of men like a disease, wishing to destroy and overturn it, appearing first to Moses, said 'I am that I am.' For it was right, as I think, that the ruler and general of the nation of the Jews should be the first of all to know the God that exists^o." The writer entirely forgets what Moses says of Enoch, and Noah, and Abraham. It is scarcely possible to suppose that the writer of the Dialogue with Trypho could ever have fallen into such a theory as that which we have quoted. It is remarkable also that the writer does not speak of the *δαίμονες* at all; he speaks only of the devil as *ὁ μισάνθρωπος δαίμων*, though he also recognises the name *διάβολος*^p.

The other points of difference that deserve to be mentioned are not of great consequence. They are the Christology of the Hortatory Address, the doctrine of the Spirit in Plato, the account of the Septuagint, and the theory of prophetic inspiration.

Fault is found with the Hortatory Address because so little is said of the Logos. The references to Christ are few. He speaks of the "Logos, through whom heaven and earth and all creation came into being^q." The principal passage is as follows. He is speaking of the Sibyl as "foretelling clearly and distinctly the coming of our Saviour Jesus

^o c. 21, p. 20 A. B. C.

^p c. 28, p. 28 B.

^q c. 15, p. 16 B.

Christ, who, being the Logos of God, is incomprehensible^r in power, having taken upon Him [the nature of] man who was formed in the image and likeness of God, reminded us of the piety of our ancient ancestors, which was abandoned by those men who sprung from them when they turned, through the teaching of an envious demon, to the worship of those which are not gods^s." The fewness of the references to Christ, however, is no objection to Justin's authorship. The writer wished to turn the minds of his readers to the reading of the Scriptures. He was not urging them to the adoption of Christianity, but to the step which he deemed preliminary, and which he thought it more likely he could persuade the Greeks to take. Some have also found fault with the writer for limiting Christ's work to a mere reminding of the religion of our ancestors, as if he had thought Christianity a mere reproduction of Judaism. But it will be noticed that the writer does not speak of Judaism at all, but of the original religion of Adam and Eve. And no doubt he has special reference in the remark to the belief in one only God, "which," he says in c. 36, p. 34 D, "is the first token (*γνώρισμα*) of true piety." It will be noticed, moreover, that it is not fair to assume that the writer believed this to be the only work of Christ, simply because he does not mention any other.

In regard to the Holy Spirit, the Hortatory Address asserts that Plato learned the doctrine from the Old Testament, but called the Holy Spirit 'virtue.' He appeals to a passage in the Meno, and says, "Fearing to name the free gift of God 'holy spirit,' lest by following the teaching of the prophets he should seem an enemy to the Greeks, he confesses that it really does come down from above from God, but he did not deem it right to name it 'holy spirit,' but 'virtue,'" (*ἀρετή*). And a little farther on he remarks: "Plato having learned these things clearly from the Prophets with regard to the Holy

^r Some MSS. read *ἀχώριστος* instead of *ἀχώρητος*: 'inseparable in power,' i. e. 'having the power of the Father at his command, one with the Father in power.'

^s c. 38, p. 36 C.

Spirit, evidently transfers them to the name of virtue, for, just as the sacred prophets say that the one same spirit is divided into seven spirits, so he, naming the one same virtue, says that it is divided into four virtues, by no means wishing to mention the Holy Spirit, but through some allegory announcing clearly what has been said by the prophets regarding the Holy Spirit^t." In the first Apology^u Justin asserts that Plato mentions a trinity, and that he gave "the third place to the Spirit which was said to move on the water; saying, 'the third round about the third^x,'" (*τὰ δὲ τρίτα περὶ τὸν τρίτον*). Justin does not expressly say that Plato mentions the Spirit by name; but he evidently did not fancy at the time of his writing the Apology that Plato hid his doctrine under the name of ἀπερί. In fact, the writer of the Hortatory Address thinks of the Holy Spirit only as "the free gift which comes down from above from God on the holy men^y." Justin thinks of a personal being. And therefore he might well enough, in the wide use of the term 'holy spirit,' speak as the writer of the Hortatory Address. And he might very easily forget what he had said in the Apology about Plato's notions of a trinity.

In the account of the Septuagint there is no real discrepancy. The writer of the Hortatory Address tells a great deal more than Justin does. He relates how the seventy interpreters were shut up in different cells; how, when the translations were compared, they were found to be the same; and, in proof of his assertions, states that he had seen traces of the cells^z. If Justin had known and believed this when he wrote the Apologies and Dialogue with Trypho, unquestionably he would have related it. But there is nothing to forbid the supposition that after he had written these works he travelled and got more light, or perhaps, to speak more truly, more darkness on the subject.

The last point of supposed difference which we notice relates to the theory of inspiration. Here the only difference is that

^t c. 32, p. 31 B. ^u c. 60. ^x This is taken from one of the Platonic Epistles.

^y c. 32, p. 30 D.

^z c. 13, p. 14 A. B. C.

the theory is more precise than anything that can be found in Justin. Justin might, for all that we know, have expressed himself in the language of the Hortatory Address. For in truth the words are generally taken to mean more than they fairly imply. The passage runs thus: "Since it is impossible for you to learn the truth with regard to piety from your teachers, as they have afforded satisfactory proof of their ignorance through their variance with each other, I reckon it proper to go up to our ancestors who were long anterior to your teachers, and who taught us nothing from their own conception, did not at all differ from each other, nor try to overturn each other's opinions, but peacefully and harmoniously received their knowledge from God, and taught it to us. For it is not possible for men to know such great and divine things by nature or by human thought, but by the free gift which then came down from above on the holy men, who needed not the art of discourse nor the faculty of speaking contentiously and in strife. They had but to yield themselves up pure [free from all vice] to the energy of the Divine Spirit, that the divine plectrum itself descending from heaven and using the righteous men as an instrument like a harp or lyre, might reveal to us the knowledge of divine and heavenly things. On this account, therefore, they taught us as with one mouth and tongue with regard to God and the creation of the world, and the formation of man, and the immortality of the human soul, and the judgment that is to take place after this life; and all that it is necessary for us to know, they taught us in harmony and agreement with each other, though they had given this divine teaching to us in different places and periods^a." Modern disputants have variously interpreted these words. "They intimate," says one party, "a purely mechanical inspiration." Says another, "No; for even a lyre has its own constitution: a bad lyre gives out a wretched sound, even at the hands of the best performer." This much, however, seems pretty plain, that the writer regarded all the

^a Coh. ad Gracc. 8 (8 E). Compare 10 (11 D), 12 (13).

prophets as holy men; and in the words "to yield themselves pure to the Holy Spirit^b" he seems plainly to state that only men free from vice could become the vehicles of the Divine Spirit. This also has to be taken into consideration, that the writer uses the term 'divine spirit' in a peculiar way, like other writers of the same age. When he asserts that the Holy Spirit alone speaks, he conceives of a complete union of the highest part of the prophet's own nature with the Holy Spirit. It is in one sense the prophet speaking; but in a far truer sense it is the Holy Spirit in the prophet. Justin would in all likelihood have agreed with every word of this. The theory, if we may call it such, brings to mind the sentiments of Athenagoras, to whose Apology the Hortatory Address bears a resemblance in some other respects.

The evidence then from the doctrines is, on the whole, against the authorship of Justin, but it is not strong.

The writer of the Hortatory Address does not seem to have been well read in ancient philosophy. All that he says is either derived from the treatise of the pseudo-Plutarch, or is made up of the stock passages from Plato, which were much used by later Apologists. He does not seem to breathe the same philosophic atmosphere as Justin. Justin had to deal principally with Stoics. A Stoic emperor was on the throne during part of his life; and, before he was emperor, he had exercised a strong influence. Justin lived at a time when Stoicism was what we might call the established religion. The writer of the Hortatory Address says nothing particular about Stoicism, and seems to know little about it. He condemns the whole Greek philosophy subsequent to the time of Socrates in one sentence: "Socrates hastened to prison, attributing to God alone the knowledge of things unknown among us, but those who came after him, not being able to know even what was on earth, profess to know the things in heaven, as if they had seen them^c." And then he takes

^b Kaye translates *καθαρὸς* 'entirely,' p. 181, but gives no reason for such a rendering.

^c c. 36, p. 33 E, 34 A.

Aristotle as an instance, and gives an absurd story about his death.

He guards his hearers especially against rhetoric. One would imagine that he was like Tatian, a converted literary man. He tells his hearers to "read the divine histories of the prophets, and to become acquainted with the true religion through them: for they do not announce the arts of composition, nor do they speak plausibly and persuasively (for this is peculiar to those who wish to steal the truth, *τὴν ἀλήθειαν κλέπτειν*), but they use the words and expressions which come first in a simple manner^d." He blames even Aristotle for the elegance of his language (*διὰ δοκιμότητα φράσεως*^e).

The feeling of the writer is also occasionally harsh. In speaking of the ancestors of the Greeks he attaches this clause to the end of a remark: "Your ancestors who, it is likely, are wailing in Hades, feeling a repentance which is now too late^f." Justin speaks strongly enough to the living, but he does not judge the dead. And the use of Hades, as it occurs here, is unknown to him.

Looking at the whole evidence, then, there is considerable probability that Justin was not the author of the Hortatory Address.

ABSTRACT.

In the commencement the speaker states that he will examine the Greek poets and philosophers in regard to their knowledge of God, and then he will examine the teachings of Christians, that his audience may turn from falsely-named piety to true piety^g. He then quotes various passages from the Iliad, to show the irrational notions of the gods given there^h. He proceeds to the philosophers, quoting the various explanations of the first principles of things, and showing that even the very best of them, Plato and Aristotle, differed from each other, and therefore had not attained truthⁱ. Plato

^d c. 35, p. 32 D. See also, c. 36, p. 34 B C; c. 38, p. 36 B.

^e c. 36, p. 34 B.

^f c. 35, p. 33 A.

^g c. 1.

^h c. 2.

ⁱ cc. 3, 4, 5.

and Aristotle differ not only in regard to God and the first principles, but also in their explanations of the soul^j. Plato also contradicts himself. The reason why the philosophers failed, was because they supposed that they could know heavenly things by their own unaided powers, while they did not even know things on earth, differing as they did on the nature of the soul^k. Turn now to the prophets, who were inspired by God. Moses, the first of them, is proved by the writings of the Greeks themselves to have been anterior to all the Greek poets, philosophers, or wise men^l. Even one of your oracles declared that the Chaldeans and Hebrews alone obtained wisdom: and Moses sprang from the race of Chaldeans and Hebrews^m. An inquiry into the age of the philosophers shows that they are quite recent compared with Moses. There is no authentic Greek history before the Olympiads. The only real pre-existing history is the inspired history of Moses, written in Hebrew letters long before Greek letters were knownⁿ. If any one should say that the history of Moses is also written in Greek, an account of the making of the Septuagint version will throw light on this point^o. Even some of the Greeks themselves, especially those of them who were in Egypt and received benefit there from the piety of Moses, could teach them much better things than the common beliefs^p. Orpheus speaks of the unity of God copiously in his verses^q. The teachings of the Sibyl are similar^r. Even Homer, though in many passages he does not seem to dislike polytheism, yet in some points out the unity of God^s. And so does Sophocles^t. Pythagoras, in maintaining the monad to be the first principle of all things, taught the existence of one only God^u. Plato also taught the same truth, but did not speak it boldly, because he was afraid after what had happened to Socrates^x. God revealed himself to Moses in the words, "I am the being that exists^y." Plato borrowed the idea from Moses speaking of the τὸ ὄν

^j c. 6. ^k c. 7. ^l cc. 8-10. ^m c. 11. ⁿ c. 12. ^o c. 13.
^p c. 14. ^q c. 15. ^r c. 16. ^s Il. ix. 445; ii. 204.
^t cc. 17, 18. ^u c. 19. ^x c. 20. ^y c. 21.

a rather free quotation from this work ; but supposing the words were more like than they are, the mere circumstance of a quotation does not inform us of the author, and the quotation may have been made from Irenæus, not by him.

This is all the external evidence. It gives us but the slightest possible basis for attributing the work to Justin. It is perfectly possible that it may have been one of the works which Eusebius says he did not mention. Some who have favoured the idea of Justin's authorship suppose that it formed part of his work against all heresies.

An examination of the work itself gives us no clue to the author. It might be Justin's, and it easily might not. On the whole, the internal evidence is against Justin's authorship, though there is not a single statement which might not have been Justin's.

The principal statements in it which have been supposed to render it probable that the work is not Justin's are these. The writer seems to attach a general stain to marriage, which he calls "lawless through desire^s." The words are regarded as meaning that marriage itself as being necessarily connected with desire or sensual passion had something sinful in it^t. Justin's tendencies were towards such a notion, but though he may have in his latter days become sterner in his ideas, he certainly nowhere hints a disapprobation of marriage. And most probably the words of the text (*δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἀνομον γάμον*) mean simply that marriage, though not unlawful in itself, yet when entered into and used for any other purpose than the begetting of children, became a violation of law. The notion that sexual intercourse even in marriage for the mere gratification of desire is sinful, is common enough in early writers.

The writer affirms that "Jesus Christ was born of a virgin *for no other reason* than to destroy the begetting of lawless desire, and show the ruler (the devil) that the

^s c. 3.

^t See Münscher in Otto, in loc. ; Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Sittenlehre Jesu*, vol. ii. p. 116.

formation of man was possible to God without human intercourse^u." In the Dialogue with Trypho^x Justin mentions a totally different reason why Christ was born of a virgin. Justin may indeed have forgotten what he had written in the Dialogue, but the probability lies the other way. Yet we might also suppose that Justin was so much absorbed in the subject immediately before him as to forget the relation of his arguments to other matters.

The writer defends his use of arguments on the physical possibility of a resurrection, in words which we cannot say Justin would not have used, but which it is very unlikely that he did use. "Now," he says, "we show the possibility of the resurrection, begging pardon of the sons of the Church (*τῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας τέκνων*) if we also touch on arguments that seem to be without (*ἔξωθεν*) and worldly; in the first place, because there is nothing outside of God, not even the world itself, for it is his workmanship; and second, because we address these arguments to unbelievers^y." 'The sons' or 'children of the Church' is a mode of expression which we should not expect in Justin. And the consciousness of a distinction between religious and worldly arguments is also an unexpected phenomenon, especially when the writer could appeal to Paul, Clemens Romanus, and many others. Yet there is nothing very improbable in the words, when we look at them more closely. The children of the Church are those who have been brought up in the Church, or led by the Church to put absolute confidence in Christ. They required only his word in order to believe in a resurrection. On the other hand the writer's immediately-subsequent remarks are applicable only to those who were still adherents of some heathen philosophy. They are meant to show that a resurrection was not impossible even according to the tenets of the Platonic, Epicurean, and Stoic philosophies.

The writer's references to heaven are widely different from those of Justin. Speaking of Christ he says: "And thus having shown to them that there really is a resurrection of

^u c. 3.^x c. 100.^y c. 5.

the flesh, wishing to show this also (even as he said that our habitation is in the heaven) that it is not impossible even for flesh to ascend into heaven, he was taken up into the heaven, while they looked on, as he was in the flesh^a." Here it is implied plainly that the final abode of the risen man is heaven—a belief entirely unknown to Justin, though it is not impossible that towards the end of his life he should have used this language. It is in manifest contradiction to his millenarian notions such as they are given in chapter 81 of the Dialogue with Trypho.

The writer regards the likeness of man to God as lying in his body *alone*. His words are: "'Let us make man in our image and likeness.' What man? It is plain he means the fleshly man. For the Word says, 'And God took dust from the earth and formed man.' It is plain then that the man fashioned according to the image of God was fleshly. How then is it not absurd to say that the flesh fashioned by God according to his image is dishonourable^a?" It is not possible to harmonize with this statement the opinion of Justin, that man's likeness to God lies principally *in his free-will*; for though Justin might along with this believe that the body was in some sort also after the image of God, this writer plainly confines the image to the body. Yet even here we may have what we supposed possible in another instance—a forgetfulness of the various aspects of an opinion in the concentrated attention on one.

If this fragment be the work of Justin, it is the only one which is connected in its structure. The whole is well put together, without any of the usual digressions and repetitions which occur in the Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho^b.

Several objections have been brought by Herbig to the genuineness of the fragment which are utterly without force, and which therefore do not deserve repetition.

On the whole, then, the evidence is slightly against the fragment. Semisch indeed thinks he discovers resemblances in the arguments used in the fragment and in the Dialogue

^a c. 9.^a c. 7.^b Semisch has noticed this, vol. i. p. 228.

with Trypho which make the probability of Justin's authorship strong^c. But the arguments are not so peculiar to Justin as to warrant any inference. On the contrary, the fragment can be more completely paralleled in its reasonings from Athenagoras and Tertullian, and the likelihood is that it is a work of a date somewhere between these two writers.

The fragment seems very nearly complete. It begins with the assertion that the word of truth carries its own authority with it and needs no demonstration^d, Christ Himself being the demonstration. Yet since the devil is continually plotting against the weak, he would consider and refute the objections made to the doctrine of a resurrection^e. He then gives a summary of the various objections, and mentions among opponents the docetes: "There are those who say that Jesus Himself appeared only as a spiritual being, and that he merely presented the appearance (*φαντασίαν*) of flesh, thus trying to deprive the flesh of its promise^f." He then proceeds to refute the objections. It is objected that if the body rises entire, there will be organs of reproduction, and consequently acts of reproduction. But there will not be acts of reproduction, for Christ said they neither marry nor are given in marriage, and therefore the body will not rise entire. The writer replies by showing that 'acts' of reproduction do not necessarily accompany organs of reproduction^g. There are many barren wombs. There are many virgins. There are men who have refrained from marriage. Some animals even do not produce. And Christ Himself did not marry, and was not born through marriage^h. Objection second:—If the flesh rises, it will rise just as it was when it died. The one-eyed man in life will rise one-eyed. The objection the writer regards as utterly contemptible: for Christ healed the blind on earth: much more will every body then be made perfect and wholeⁱ. Third objection:—Some

^c vol. i. p. 180. ^d So Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D. ^e c. 1. ^f c. 2.

^g See Tertullian, De Resurrect. Carn. cc. 57, 60; Semisch, vol. ii. p. 38.

^h c. 3.

ⁱ c. 4. Here again the writer agrees with Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 69, p. 296. This and the previously-mentioned coincidence are the principal ones adduced by Semisch. The same argument is used by Athenagoras and Tertullian.

maintain that the resurrection is impossible. This objection is utterly absurd in the mouth of those who profess to be believers, for even the heathen poets spoke of the gods as able to do all things¹. Besides, God created man; and thereby has given a sufficient proof of his power. And even in the case of the Greek philosophers a resurrection was not inconsistent with their principles^m. The fourth objection comes from those who maintain that it would be unbecoming in God to raise the dead. This is really dishonouring the body which God made, and which was made in God's image. And, moreover, man is not mere soul, and not mere body; but is the compound of these two inseparable elements, and therefore not complete without the bodyⁿ. When salvation, consequently, is promised to man, it is promised to both soul and body^o. Something is here omitted by John of Damascus. The next words given are an argument from Christ's miracles. Why did he heal the flesh, if it was dishonourable? Why did he raise the dead, if raising the dead were an unworthy act? And how was his own resurrection not a mere spiritual one but a bodily one also? Evidently that he might show that the resurrection was to be a corporeal one^p. Something, again, is omitted: and then the argument proceeds. The resurrection must be the resurrection of the flesh; for man is composed of body, soul, and spirit. Now a resurrection is a rising again of something that has fallen. The spirit cannot fall: soul is in the body, and body does not exist unless there be life in it. Consequently, it is the body that rises again^q. The writer then asserts that looking to the worldly or cosmical arguments, and finding that the resurrection is not an impossibility, and then above all looking to Christ "showing through the whole of the gospel the salvation of our flesh," we cannot do anything else than believe that there will be a resurrection of the flesh. If there is no resurrection, he says,

¹ Hom. Od. x. 306; c. 5.

^m c. 6.

ⁿ A similar argument is found in Athenagoras, and in Tertullian, *De Resurrect. Carnis*, c. 7.

^o c. 8.

^p c. 9.

^q This argument is used by Tertullian, *De Resurrect. Carnis*, c. 18.

why should we not now permit the indulgence of all lusts, like physicians in cases where they have no hope. "But if Christ our physician, having torn us from our lusts, directs us to manage our flesh in the same sober and self-restraining way in which He did, it is plain that He thus protects the flesh from sins because it has the hope of salvation, even as physicians do not permit those men who have the hope of health (*σωτηρία*) to be slaves to pleasures." Thus the fragment ends.

There is comparatively little of doctrinal statement in the fragment. What there is, is of the simplest character. The most important passage is the following: "Now God is truth, the father of the whole (*τῶν ὅλων*), who is perfect intelligence (*νοῦς*). The Logos having become his Son, came to us^r wearing flesh, pointing out both Himself and the Father, giving to us in Himself the resurrection from the dead and the eternal life after that. Now this is Jesus Christ our Saviour and Lord: He is therefore Himself the object of faith^s, and the demonstration of Himself and of all. Wherefore those who follow Him, knowing Him, and reckoning faith in Him to be the same as demonstration, will rest in Him^t." The salvation given by Christ is spoken of several times as a salvation both of body and soul. "And to Him (Christ) and his preaching not only did our soul and our flesh along with it listen, and not only did they put their trust in Christ, but both were washed and both wrought righteousness^u."

The devil is several times mentioned as 'the ruler,' 'the adversary.' One passage deserves especial notice: "The ruler of wickedness, being unable otherwise to mar the argument [referred to in the context of the fragment], sent forth his apostles, who introduced evil and pestilent instructions, having chosen them from those who crucified our Saviour. These

^r The words are more indefinite in Greek than I can render them, *ὃς γενόμενος υἱὸς δὲ λόγος ἦλθεν*. Otto translates: *Cujus filius exsistens logos venit*.

^s The Greek is difficult to render exactly, and the meaning doubtful: *οὗτός ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὅλων πίστις τε καὶ ἀπόδειξις*. Perhaps *πίστις* means here 'the cause of belief.'

^t c. i.

^u c. 8.

bore the name of the Saviour, but did the works of him that sent them, on account of whom also evil speaking followed the name [of Christ]²."

IX. THE EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS.

This work occurs only in one manuscript, where the inscription is Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς Διόγνητον, which we know from the connexion means the work or Λόγος of Justin Martyr to Diognetus³. No mention is made of this work in any ancient writer, and no quotation is anywhere taken from it. External testimony is therefore absolutely silent with regard to it.

As we derive our whole information solely from itself, we proceed to examine it. The work opens with the words, "Since I see you, O most noble Diognetus, exceedingly zealous to learn the piety of the Christians, and inquiring very clearly and carefully with regard to them,—what God obeying and how worshipping Him, they look down on the world, and despise death, and neither reckon gods those which are regarded as such by the Greeks, nor observe the superstition of the Jews (τῇν Ἰουδαίων δεισιδαιμονίαν),—and what is the affection which they have towards one another, and why at last this new kind of thing or institution entered into life now and not formerly, I praise you for this eagerness and pray God, who vouchsafes us the power to speak and hear, that it may be granted me so to speak, that you hearing may become better, and you so to hear that the speaker may not be grieved." He begins by showing him that the religion of the Greeks is utterly irrational, since their gods are made of wood, silver, brass, stone, or some inanimate thing which is deaf and blind, and which is fashioned into a god by a man, and can be remade into something else if he liked. He then shows that the religion of the Jews is a piece of superstition based

² c. 10.

³ See pp. 11, 12 of *Epistola ad Diognetum Justini Philosophi et Martyris nomen præ se ferens*. Textum recensuit, translatione latina instruxit, prolegomenis et adnotationibus ornavit: indices adjecit, Joann. Carol. Theod. Otto, Edit. Sec. Lipsiæ 1852.

on the absurd notion that God needs sacrifices. He then describes in beautiful language the habits and manners of Christians, and shows how they are to the world what the soul is to the body. He then explains how Christians have become this, how God sent his Logos into the world, and revealed Himself to them, and how then God at length became known to men, and why this revelation was not made at an earlier period. And he hopes that Diognetus will desire faith in God, and will enjoy the blessings that flow from it. A break takes place here in the MS., and the chapters that follow pursue a different subject. The writer is now addressing "those who are becoming worthy disciples of the truth," and urges on them the benefits to be derived from correct teaching and friendship with the Word, and expounds the relation between knowledge and love.

The doctrines of this epistle now claim our attention.

God.—God is said to be the "almighty, all-creating, and invisible God^z,"—"the Lord and fashioner (*δημιουργός*) of the whole, who made all things and arranged them in order^a." His character is given in these words: "He was not only fond of man (*φιλόανθρωπος*), but also long-suffering. But he was always such, and is, and will be, kind and good, and free from anger (*ἀόργητος*), and true; and He only is good^b."

Christ.—The name of Christ does not occur in the epistle. He is there called the *Λόγος*, or the Son of God, the only-begotten Son. His relation to the Father is not described in exact words, but the statements that let us into the author's mind sometimes seem to identify the Son with the Father entirely, while sometimes the Son seems completely under the control of the Father. Of the former class of passages are the following: "No man has either seen [God] or made him known^c, but he Himself showed Himself. But he showed Himself through faith, by which alone it has been granted to see God^d." The words 'he Himself showed Himself,' one would suppose naturally refer to Christ, and they seem at

^z c. 7.

^a c. 8.

^b Ibid.

^c 'God' plainly to be supplied from the connexion.

^d c. 8.

first sight to identify God with Christ; but they do not do this necessarily. For, supposing a reference to Christ, the words might mean that God showed Himself in Christ, that the Son was a manifestation and declaration of what God was—which He might be, without being in every respect identical with God. But the words that follow leave it a matter of doubt whether even this is implied. For the showing spoken of is one that is accomplished through faith; and all that may be meant is, that the Son having begun to reveal the Father to men, men then began to see and know God through faith. No intimation would then be given how the Son made known the Father to men. The other passage of a similar nature runs thus: "God did not hate us, nor drive us away, nor remember evil, but was long-suffering, endured us, and in pity took up our sins^c," (*ἀνεδέξατο*). At first sight this passage seems to say that it was God Himself who bore our sins, and accordingly the writer has been regarded as inclined, to say the least, to Patripassianism. But a little consideration shows the falsity of the notion. The words 'he took up our sins' do not mean that God Himself bore the penalty of our sins, but that He took them up as if they were his own, and accordingly planned a scheme by which man might get rid of them. Accordingly, the very next words which follow the statement are, "He Himself gave his own Son a ransom in our behalf;" and these words must be taken as explaining the preceding words^f. There is, therefore, no contradiction here, as has been asserted^g, nor is there any very satisfactory reason for expelling the words from the text as a gloss. The words, indeed, *λέγων αὐτός*, an emendation of which we have adopted in our translation, point to a quotation, and the words might be possibly a quotation introduced by a transcriber^h. The only other passage which relates to our subject occurs in chapter 8. It runs thus: "Who at all of men knew what God really is before He cameⁱ?" Stephanus and some others

^c c. 9.

^f This explanation is given by Prudentius Maranus, in loc., who describes the language as "minus accurate." ^g Otto, in loc. ^h See Otto, p. 93.

ⁱ *Τίς γὰρ ὅλως ἀνθρώπων ἠπίστατο, τί ποτ' ἔστι θεός, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν;*

take the *αὐτὸν* as referring to the Son of God. This construction is perfectly admissible, for the whole of the preceding section refers to the work of the Son. But a difficulty arises from there being a break in the manuscript; for as we do not know how much has been omitted, a new subject may possibly have been introduced. And even were there not this difficulty, the more natural construction would be to refer the *αὐτὸν* to *Θεός*. But even this construction does not identify the Son with the Father; for the idea plainly is, that no man had a notion of what deity is until Christ, who was *Θεός*, made his appearance. The Son is not *ὁ Θεός*, but He is possessed of a divine nature, and therefore was capable of exhibiting to man the properties of a divine nature. That this is the right interpretation, other passages of the writing tend to show. For in describing God, while wielding powers over the Son, he says, "As a king sending, He sent a king, his Son; He sent Him as God^k; He sent Him 'as to men'." And in describing the result of his coming he says, "These things are the power of God (*Θεοῦ*, without the article): these are the tokens of his presence^m." We are safe then, we think, in believing that the writer regarded the Son as *Θεός*; that he did not regard the Son as identical with the Father, but thought that He possessed a divine nature which could exhibit the Father's.

There is no express statement of a subordination of the Son to the Father; but many of the statements with regard to the Son plainly imply that He was under obedience to the Father. Thus it is again and again said that the Father sent Him; and the Father is in one passage represented as conceiving a great and inexpressible idea, and then communicating it to his Son aloneⁿ. There is also another interesting passage in which the Son is spoken of as the *Λόγος*, and his personality seems to vanish in a mere property of God's mind according to our ideas. "The truly almighty, all-creating, and invisible God Himself implanted from heaven in men and

^k There seems to me some confusion in the text here: perhaps the proper reading is, *ὡς Θεὸς ἐπέμψεν Θεὸν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους*.

^l c. 7.

^m Ibid.

ⁿ c. 8.

fixed in their hearts the truth and the word [Logos], holy and incomprehensible; not, as one would conjecture, sending to men a servant either an angel or ruler . . . but the very artist and fashioner of the whole, by whom He created the heavens, &c., . . . by whom all things have been arranged and defined and subjected [to man]^o, the heavens and the things in them, the earth and the things in the earth, the sea and the things in the sea^p," &c. We omit part of the description, but the purpose of the whole passage is to show that God made all things in heaven and earth by means of his Logos; that the laws of the material universe are merely the ordinances of this Logos. Interpreted according to our modern ideas this simply means that God displayed the exercise of his reason in creation and the regulation of the material world. But the writer represents the reason as a being, and identifies the reason with the being whom God sent to man. "Him He sent to them," he continues, and describes how He sent Him in a passage, part of which has been already quoted. The Son thus being the reason of God must have a divine nature, and, perhaps, if the whole idea was carried out to its full results, it might imply the identification of the Son with the Father. But the point to be observed is, that the writer here distinctly separates them where the modern mind would unite them.

The object of God's sending Christ into the world is stated in several forms. God sent the Son as saving, as persuading men, since God does not employ violence, as loving men, not as judging them. There is nearly a whole chapter on the work of Christ which deserves examination. "God gave his own Son a ransom for us, the holy for the lawless, the guileless for the wicked, the just for the unjust, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for mortals. For what else could cover our sins than his righteousness? In whom was it possible that we, the lawless and impious, should be made righteous (*δικαιωθῆναι*), but in the Son of God alone? O the sweet exchange! O the unsearchable contrivance! O the unexpected benefits! that the lawlessness of many should be

^o See Otto's note for the defence of this translation.

^p c. 7.

hid in one righteous, and that the righteousness of one should make (δικαιώση) many who are lawless, righteous¹!" It is to be noticed that the work of the Son is described here as purely a moral work; that the writer neither speaks of guilt nor its punishment, and that, therefore, there is no hint of a theory of legal substitution. Accordingly, 'for' in all the expressions, even with *λύτρον*, is expressed by *ὑπέρ*, 'in behalf of.' The exchange mentioned is the exchange of righteousness for lawlessness.

The writer plainly intimates the second coming of Christ. "God will send Him to be our judge, and who shall abide his appearing²?"

One of the most important questions discussed in this letter is the reason why Christ was so long in coming into the world. With this question is connected the state of man before the appearance of Christ. No mention is made of the writer's ideas with regard to the original state of man. He asserts that God loved men, that He made the world for men (*διὰ*), that He subjected all things in earth to them, that He gave them reason (*λόγος*) and intelligence (*νοῦς*), and formed them out of his own image (*ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας εἰκόνης ἐπλασε*). Some of these statements, along with the assertion already quoted with regard to the *Λόγος*, would lead one to infer that the writer must have believed that God did not utterly abandon man before the coming of Christ. Yet in substance this is his explanation of the coming of Christ, that God wished to show that man could not save himself, that salvation must come only through a saviour appointed by God. God was always kind, and conceived an inexpressible idea in his mind which He communicated to his Son alone. While He kept and preserved this wise counsel in secret (*ἐν μυστηρίῳ*) He seemed to neglect and overlook us, but when He revealed through his beloved Son, and made manifest what had been prepared from the beginning, He afforded all things to us at once³. . . . Up to the time, then, at which Christ came, "He permitted us to be carried away by disorderly impulses

¹ c. 9.² c. 7.³ c. 8.

just as we wished, led away by pleasures and desires, not because He at all rejoiced in our sins, but endured, nor because He consented to that period of wickedness, but because He was fashioning the present period of righteousness, so that being proved in time past to be unworthy of life from our own deeds, we might now have it vouchsafed to us by the kindness of God; and having manifested our inability by ourselves of entering into the kingdom of God, we might become able by the power of God. When therefore our iniquity had been filled up, and it had been made perfectly manifest that punishment and death were expected as its reward, and the time came which God had appointed before to manifest his goodness and power^t," God sent his Son. In the conclusion of this chapter it is said, "God, then, having proved in the former time the inability of our nature to obtain life, and now having shown a Saviour who is able to save even what could not be saved; by both things He wished us to trust to his kindness, to regard Him as nourisher, father, teacher, counsellor, physician, intelligence (*νοῦν*), light, honour, glory, strength, life; not to be anxious for clothing and nourishment^u." In accordance with this idea of God's design the author says nothing of the part the Jewish scheme had in the work of Christ. Indeed, the scheme of God was not communicated to any one but the Son. One might be inclined to think that the remark "God kept it *ἐν μυστηρίῳ*^x," might have some reference to the Jewish scheme, that the great idea was not indeed revealed, but it was in the Jewish, concealed, kept a secret. But the writer's exposition of the Jewish system scarcely permits us to do even this. For he rejects the very notion of sacrifice. "For they," he says, "who think that they offer sacrifices through blood and fat and holocausts, and that they glorify God with such honours, do not seem to me to differ from those that show the same zeal in paying honour to dumb things (idols)^y." He attacks the Jewish timidity with regard to food, their superstition with regard to sabbaths, and their absurd pride

^t c. 9.^u Ibid.^x c. 8.^y c. 3.

about circumcision, not because the use of these things had passed away and Christianity had fulfilled the law, but because they were essentially irrational. "How is it lawful," he says, "to receive some of the things created by God for the use of man as if well created, and to refuse others as useless and superfluous? How is it not impious to lie against God as if He forbade the doing of any good deed on the day of the Sabbath? How does it not deserve scorn that people should boast of the diminution of their flesh as a testimony of their selection by God, as if on this account they were especially beloved by God?" At the same time, in considering these passages it has to be carefully borne in mind that the writer contrasts the practices of Jews with those of Christians. He is not speaking of historical Judaism, but of Judaism as it showed itself side by side with Christianity.

The writer's opinion with regard to heathenism is strongly pronounced, but we cannot regard it as giving us a complete idea of all that he thought on the subject. He speaks of the empty and trifling arguments (*λόγους*) of the philosophers; calls them in derision "worthy of trust^a," and after stating the opinions of a few of them, and these only the earliest, he adds, "These things are the wonder-making and deceit of cheats^b." He is equally severe on the common religion of heathens. He finds in it nothing but pure worship of stocks and stones.

Man Converted.—Of the work of God in man after he has trusted God's kindness the writer speaks once or twice. He describes the manners of the Christians in contrast with heathens and Jews, and praises their rectitude and piety; how they live not according to the flesh, but have their life in heaven, and how they love all^c. This moral change is, as we have seen, traced to Christ, and the method of its origin is in some measure set forth. For God has shown his love to men. This love naturally begets love, and "he who loves God will imitate God." He imitates Him when he takes up the burden of his neighbours, when being the superior he tries

^a c. 4.^a c. 8.^b Ibid.^c c. 5.

to do good to the inferior, when he grants to the needy what he has received from God. "He becomes," then says the writer, "a God of those who receive^d."

The writer says nothing of the Church. He makes several references to a future state. He describes the state of the Christians as a true living in heaven^e, and consequently they may well despise what only is a *seeming* death here. He speaks of Christians expecting incorruption in the heavens^f, and he says that God has promised the kingdom of heaven^g to men, and that He will give it to those who love Him^h. On the other hand, he speaks of "the real death," which is kept for those who shall be condemned to eternal fire, which shall punish those delivered to it even to the endⁱ. Some have supposed that the expression *μέχρι τοῦ τέλους* implies a conclusion to the punishment, but it seems far more likely that the writer left his idea of future punishments indefinite. Nor are we to suppose that he must have regarded the punishment as eternal because he speaks of the soul as immortal^k, for the soul might be supposed free from the power of death and yet not necessarily destined to exist for ever.

Style.—The style of this epistle or address is admirable. From beginning to end it reads like a modern article—every word tells. It abounds in admirable contrasts. It sets forth its ideas in plain well-chosen words, and never fails to enforce its meaning clearly and beautifully. The Greek is also good Greek, differing very widely from the Greek common with the Christian writers, and approaching very nearly to what is called the best classic. The opening sentences seem to be an imitation of the introduction of Demosthenes' oration *περὶ στεφάνου*.

After having thus given some idea of the epistle and its contents, we shall now examine the statements that seem to have been thought to throw any light on the writer or date of the letter.

^d c. 10.

^e This probably applies to their state here as well as hereafter. c. 10.

^f c. 6.

^g This also may refer to the state of Christians in this world.

^h c. 10.

ⁱ Ibid.

^k c. 6.

There are three passages which have been adduced as giving some clue to the date.

The Christian religion is called *καινὸν τοῦτο γένος ἡ ἐπιτήδευμα*¹. Some have fancied that the epithet 'new' applied to Christianity is proof that the work was written soon after the time of Christ^m. But the falseness of this notion is sufficiently shown by the circumstance that Tertullian in his day called it 'new,' and so did Eusebius in his time. Others have laid stress on the word 'now' which occurs in the same clause—"This new kind has entered now and not before"—but multitudes of passages show that *νῦν* can apply to centuries as well as days. Two of these passages—one from Justin Martyrⁿ, and another from Eusebius^o—are given in Semisch's work, and have peculiar force as relating to the very same subject. "These things," says Eusebius, "formerly laid up in divine oracles, have *now* become evident to us through the teaching of our Saviour Jesus Christ."

The Jews are spoken of as still offering sacrifices *p*. Hence it is inferred that Jerusalem had not yet been destroyed. But the inference is based on the supposition that the Jews ceased to offer sacrifices on the destruction of the city, whereas we know, on the testimony of Hilary^q, Julian^r, and others, that they continued for a long time after to offer up sacrifices in a private manner; and, at all events, writers subsequent to Justin upbraid the Jews with representing God as delighting in holocausts, the blood of rams, bulls, and goats^s. Otto^t lays stress on the phraseology of the passage. The words are, "They, thinking that they accomplish sacrifices to Him through blood," &c. He supposes that the writer refers more to what they wished and meant to do than to what they did. Or, as Möhler puts it, "The ceremonial law still continued in

¹ c. 1.

^m Tillemont, Mem. tom. ii. P. 1, p. 366, where for the first time doubts were expressed in regard to Justin being the author of the letter. Tillemont does not give the doubts as his own, but those of a judicious person. ⁿ Apol. i. 63.

^o Euseb. præp. Evang. lib. i. p. 3; Otto adduces several more, p. 14.

^p c. 3.

^q In Psalm lviii. n. 12.

^r Ap. Cyrill. Alex. lib. ix. p. 305.

^s Euseb. in Psalm lxxv. n. 15. These passages are adduced by Maranus, Proleg. Pars iii. p. lxxv.

^t p. 15.

force, the sacrifices ought to have been offered up, only unfortunate circumstances prevented this; the Jews were therefore exactly as if they did offer them: and in spirit they really did offer them^u."

Christians are spoken of as being "warred against by the Jews as persons of another tribe (*ἀλλόφυλοι*)."

This is supposed to refer to the Jewish war of Barchochebas, and some have therefore assigned the letter to the year 134 or 135^x; but the only reason for such a reference is that Justin informs us that in that war Barchochebas ordered the Christians to be carried off to terrible tortures if they did not deny Christ^y. From the context it is plain that the writer refers to a regular state of matters, not to a single instance of cruelty; and no one need look out for a single historical instance, when we know from the Acts of the Apostles and all subsequent history, that the Jews waged an exterminating war against the Christians.

On examination, then, these supposed indications of a date fail us entirely. Nor can we find anywhere in it anything like a distinct trace. The description in chapter 5 of the habits of the Christians would lead one to suppose that they were widely spread, but there is not a single phrase in it which would not be perfectly applicable to the condition of the Christians when the Apostolical Epistles were written. Mention is also made of exposing Christians to wild beasts, but it is far more easy to conjecture than fix a date for the first occurrence of such an event^z.

When we try to fix the qualities of the author, we find ourselves engaged in a very curious problem. Let us put the principal points together. Was the author a Greek Christian? If he were, how could he so misrepresent the heathen religion

^u Möhler's *Gesammelte Schriften und Aufsätze*, herausgegeben von Döllinger. Regensburg, 1839. Erster band, p. 23, in an article entitled *Ueber den Brief an Diognetos*.

^x Bunsen, *Christianity and Mankind*, vol. i. p. 170. ^y *Apol. i. c. 31*.

^z On these data some have assigned the date of the epistle to the time of Trajan. See Möhler's article mentioned above, and Westcott's *History of the Canon*, p. 99.

as to suppose it a mere worship of stocks and stones? Only the lowest and basest of the Greeks and Romans paid their devotions to the mere dumb idols that stood before them. All the thoughtful among them worshipped the divinities through the representations (εἰδωλα), and, however they may have occasionally fallen into Fetichism, they would have scorned the application of such a notion to their case. But not only was this the case, but the great majority of heathens had come to have very little belief in the individual parts of the Greek mythology. They respected and worshipped the gods, but they did not believe the stories told about them, and they were superior to the notion that attention to stones was peculiarly gratifying to them. And what could Diognetus be, to whom this argument is addressed? Was he a worshipper of the stones? Many of the Christian writers adduce the same argument against the heathen religion which the writer of the epistle brings forward, but they adduced it as only a part of their argument, and a small part. He is content with it alone, and gives no hint of the ancient idea that demons connected themselves with idols, and felt the honour or dishonour done to their images.

Was the writer a Jewish Christian? But how could he, if he were, so entirely dwell on the dark side of Judaism without one single redeeming word? Could he have so entirely turned from the religion of his fathers as to hate and despise it so thoroughly? And what could Diognetus have been, who was *especially* (μάλιστα) desirous of hearing about the Jews, and to whom the writer thought it enough to say only a few words of withering scorn and contempt about them? If he were interested in them and knew them, the words of the writer must have produced anything but a favourable impression of his candour, and if he were ignorant of them, how unfair it was of the writer to say only what he has said.

Then what are we to think of a man, who writes in a beautiful Greek style, and consequently must have been highly cultivated, hurling indiscriminate abuse on all the Greek philosophers, passing by their solutions of the mysteries of

life in a few sentences, and with evident gusto mentioning their eternal damnation^a.

Among the other remarkable things in this epistle are the following. The writer addresses Diognetus, but in chapter 2, when describing heathens, he changes from the second person singular to the second person plural. If he does so because Diognetus was a heathen, Diognetus would not thank him. "These," stones, &c., "ye call gods; these ye serve, these ye worship, and ye become entirely like them."

The writer makes the assertion that "neither Jews nor Greeks could give a reason for their hatred of Christians." They may not have been able to give a satisfactory reason, but any person living in the first ages of Christianity must have known that both of them had hundreds of reasons for hating the Christians. The writer subsequently gives one reason why the world hated them; namely, because they were opposed to the passions of the world.

The writer never identifies himself with the Christians. He does not in any passage say 'we' when he means Christians, but from beginning to end calls them Christians.

Besides all this there are several modes of expression which at the least look questionable Greek; *τὴν θεοσέβειαν τῶν Χριστιανῶν μαθεῖν, ὑπεροπᾶν κόσμον, γένος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν βίον, καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*, peculiar use of *φρόνησις* and of *ἐρέω, γεραίρειν, εὐδαιμονεῖν*.

Let us look now at the theories regarding it. We pass by those that ascribe it to Timothy, Apollos, Clemens Romanus, and to many others^b, for they are the merest conjectures unsupported by a shadow of evidence, and discuss the reasons which have been given for assigning it to Justin, as is often done, or to Marcion, as Bunsen has done.

But we have already, in fact, stated good reasons for not believing it to be the work of Justin. Justin had juster views

^a Some of these points are well brought out by Pressensé, Second Series, vol. ii. p. 413 ff., who praises it very highly, p. 424. It is generally very highly extolled by evangelical theologians, such as Bennet, pp. 6-10.

^b See Otto, p. 44.

both with regard to heathenism and Judaism. Nor can this objection be removed by the supposition that the epistle is imperfect, for the writer answers all the inquiries made by Diognetus as they are stated in the first chapter. We do not think Justin differs in any other respect from the views of the writer^c. The entire difference rests on the respective ideas which were formed of the work of Christ in relation to the races of men existing on the earth before the coming of Christ, and their destiny. But even if the views had been the same, the style would have formed an insuperable barrier to the belief that Justin was the author.

At first sight there seems more reason for attributing the work to some heretic who, advancing farther than Barnabas, cut off all connexion between the generations before Christ and those after Him. Be this as it may, Marcion cannot have been the writer, at least after he had matured his system. For we have seen that the writer regarded God as not only the creator but the fashioner (*δημιουργός*) of the world, and the Logos is designated its artist (*τεχνίτης*). There is this agreement between the writer and Marcion, that both cut off all connexion between the ante-Christian and post-Christian world. But the theories of both with regard to the world before Christ are widely different; for the writer of the epistle maintains that it was God's plan, known also to the Logos, to let men remain in their sins, and show them that they could not by their own natures save themselves. Marcion, on the other hand, traced the coming of Christ to God's desire to save men from the dominion of the Demiurge. There are many objections besides this which might be urged against Marcion's authorship of the epistle^d. The exposition of the doctrines of the epistle is quite sufficient of itself. Only we may add this remark, that it would be a singular thing for a man in Marcion's circumstances to have written a letter and yet not expressly mentioned one of his peculiar doctrines, and to have indicated the only one which the letter discloses simply

^c The agreement with Justin is elaborately exhibited in Otto, pp. 26-36.

^d See Otto, p. 43, for a few minute objections.

by silence. We should not think it likely, too, that a man who had been compelled to establish a sect would speak of Christians in general, without saying something of some of them in particular. It is indeed possible; for Marcion might put out of sight all subordinate matters in the hope of presenting to his friend a full view of essential Christianity.

Before we conclude our observations on this epistle we have to lay before our readers a few particulars about its codex and the first edition by H. Stephanus. There is extant, as we have mentioned already, only one codex, preserved at Strasburg. There are two handwritings in this MS., the earliest of which is supposed to belong to the thirteenth or fourteenth century, and in which is the epistle to Diognetus. The manuscript contains, in addition to this work, the treatises ascribed to Justin, *De Monarchia*, *Expositio Rectæ Fidei*, *Oratio ad Gentiles*, the *Supplicatio* of Athenagoras, and his treatise on the Resurrection. By the later hand, and placed between the Epistle to Diognetus and the *Supplicatio* of Athenagoras, are "The Red Lines of the Sibyl," and "The Oracles of the Greek Gods." And after the work of Athenagoras on the Resurrection in the later hand, are writings of Cyril of Alexandria, treatises against Armenians, Ishmaelites, and other works of a like nature. An inscription on the back of the wooden binding of the manuscript informs us that the manuscript belonged to Johannes Reuchlin.

Besides this codex there remains a copy of the Epistle to Diognetus, made from some MS. by Henricus Stephanus. This copy is preserved in the university of Leyden. Beurer, Professor of Greek, also made a copy from the same MS. as Stephanus, but after him, and sent to Stephanus his translation and notes. Otto believes that the manuscript used by Stephanus could not have been the Strasburg codex: Bunsen asserts positively that it was. In going over the various readings we have noticed the extraordinary number of successful conjectures which Stephanus says he made, and which agree to a letter with the Strasburg codex. Thus in chapter I,

• Otto, *Prolegomena*, xv.

the Apographon Beureri, as Beurer's copy is called, and that of Stephanus had ὡς, Stephanus put it out and it is not found in the Strasburg codex. In chapter 2 Stephanus gave from his MS., τέλεον τε • ἐξομοιοῦσθε. He thought that αὐτοῖς would supply the blank. The Apographon Beureri had τέλεον δὲ αὐτοῖς, the δὲ being inserted by another hand. In the Strasburg MS. we have τέλεον δ' αὐτοῖς. In the same chapter Stephanus edited τὸ • λέγειν, at the same time stating that in the MS. the letters were τὸ πλ. λέγειν, whence he and Beurer made τὸ πλείω λέγειν, which the Strasburg codex has, "evidently with the first hand^f." In chapter 3 the codex of Stephanus reads τῶν • τὰ. Stephanus supplied εἰς, which "is evidently recognised by the Strasburg codex." In chapter 4 Stephanus read οὐδὲν, but proposed οὐδὲ or οὐδενός. The Strasburg codex reads οὐδενός. In the same chapter Stephanus read μαρτυρ•• χλ... He conjectured from this the reading μαρτύριον χλεύης, and gives reasons for not using μαρτυρίαν (propter affinitatem generis), and for not using χλευασμοῦ instead of χλεύης (spatium breviori tantum vocabulo relictum erat). The Strasburg codex reads exactly μαρτύριον χλεύης. In the same chapter Stephanus gave μ• and conjectured μηνῶν, which is found in the Strasburg codex. In chapter 5 Stephanus edited ἀλλ' •• κοινήν. He conjectured οὐ κοινήν, which is found in the Strasburg codex, in the old hand, but slightly touched. In chapter 7 Stephanus omitted ἀληθῶς, but translated it. In the same chapter Stephanus found ἀ in his MS. and made it ἀγιον, which is found in the Strasburg codex. In chapter 8 Stephanus edited μεν • πῦρ, Beurer's gave μεν πῦρ without any blank. Stephanus conjectured τινες, which is found in the codex of Strasburg, though very faded.

These are the principal coincidences. It is to be remembered that Stephanus made several conjectures which are not found in the Strasburg manuscript. If he used that manuscript, is it possible to suppose him honest; and if he did not, where did he get his copy?

A mystery certainly seems to hang about this epistle and

^f Otto.

its manuscripts. The curious variations of the readings, and the circumstance that Robertus Stephanus—who, his son says, had the manuscript—did not publish the Epistle to Diognetus, led me to suspect that the Epistle to Diognetus might possibly be the production of Henricus Stephanus himself. If the Strasburg codex is as old as it is said to be, this notion would be completely refuted. And even if it were not, one should be cautious in attributing a forgery to any one. I am inclined to think it more likely that some of the Greeks who came over to Italy when threatened by the Turks may have written the treatise, not so much from the wish to counterfeit a work of Justin's as to write a good declamation in the old style. But there is no sound basis for any theory with regard to this remarkable production.

We scarcely need bestow any consideration on the remaining portion of the epistle. The proofs of its lateness are of the most conclusive character. The writer speaks of himself "as having been a disciple of apostles," and as now becoming a "teacher of nations," ministering to those who become worthy pupils of the truth the things delivered to him. Mention is made of the *ῥα παραρρω*, decrees determined on by councils of the fathers, and of *κηροί* (wax-candles), as the text has it, or of *κληροί*, according to the best emendation of it. Besides this, the style is totally different, the subject-matter has no connection with what precedes, and replies to none of the inquiries made by Diognetus; and there are more things at which a modern mind hesitates, such as the references to the tree of knowledge and the virginity of Eve, within its two chapters than within the ten chapters of the preceding portion. Indeed, these flaws are more sure signs of the antiquity of this piece than we have of the other; for the idea that Adam's first sin was that of an unholy desire for the enjoyment of Eve is purely an antique notion.

X. THE SPURIOUS WORKS.

We need say little here of those works which are unquestionably spurious. Some of these are of considerable interest

in themselves, but all those that meddle with doctrinal matters contain unequivocal signs of an origin much later than the time of Justin.

The Exposition of the Right Faith (*ἐκθεσις τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως*) is a discussion of the Trinity and Incarnation. The terms common in controversy after the Nicene creed abound in every page, and the Monophysite heresy is particularly attacked. Its date has therefore been placed towards the end of the fifth century.

The Epistle to Zenas and Serenus is full of moral precepts, some of them of a strongly Stoic character. The whole tone of the writer is quite different from the tone of the second century, and the allusions to the New Testament are frequent and familiar. There is no clue to a date in the work.

The Refutation of Certain Aristotelic Doctrines (*ἀνατροπὴ δογμάτων τινῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν*) is a purely philosophical work. There is no appeal to Christian teaching in any way. The writer treats of God and creation. There is here also no clue to a date.

The Replies to the Orthodox on Certain Necessary Inquiries (*ἀποκρίσεις πρὸς τοὺς ὀρθοδόξους περὶ τινῶν ἀναγκαίων ζητημάτων*) is an interesting work, and solves with great discretion some difficulties that will suggest themselves to most Christians. The writer uses the post-Nicene terms in speaking of the Trinity; he quotes Irenæus^b and Origenⁱ expressly by name. He speaks of *μοναχοί*, eremites and anchorites, of the fall of Hellenism, of the Manichæan heresy, of miracles at the tombs of martyrs, and similar matters.

The Questions of Christians to Greeks (Gentiles) (*ἐρωτήσεις Χριστιανικαὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας*) contains an express allusion to the Manichæan heresy; and the other spurious work, Questions of the Greeks to the Christians (*ἐρωτήσεις Ἑλληνικαὶ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς*), is occupied with philosophical discussions on the incorporeity of God and the resurrection of the dead.

^b cc. 14, 15.

ⁱ Answer 115.

ⁱ Ibid. 82 and 86.

. XI. LITERATURE.

I. MANUSCRIPTS.

Genuine Works.—The manuscripts of the spurious works of Justin are numerous: of the Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho there are only two. These are: 1. Codex Regius Parisinus CDL, formerly numbered 1428, afterwards 2270, in the Royal Library of Paris. It was written in 1364. It contains, in addition to the Apologies and Dialogues, all the other works ascribed to Justin, except the Epistle to Diognetus. It has also the treatise of Athenagoras, *περὶ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν*. 2. Codex Claromontanus LXXXII, now in the library of Thomas Philipps, Middleshill, Broadway, Worcestershire. It is supposed to belong to the fifteenth century. It contains the same treatises as the Codex Regius, and is reckoned a copy of that manuscript.

The Oratio ad Gentiles.—The Oratio ad Gentiles is found in the Codex Argentoratensis, described in our notice of the Epistle to Diognetus.

The Hortatory Address.—The Hortatory Address to the Greeks is contained in the two manuscripts already mentioned, Codex Parisinus CDL, and Codex Claromontanus LXXXII. It is found also in several others. The most important is one in the Public Library at Paris. Otto calls it Codex (Regius) Parisinus CDLI, once numbered 1169 and afterwards 2271. This manuscript was written in A.D. 914, and is valued highly. It contains, among other things, the Apology of Athenagoras and his tractate on the Resurrection.

The Hortatory Address is also contained in Codex (Regius) Parisinus CLXXIV, first marked 1358, then 2919, in the same library. It contains besides the two works of Athenagoras and the Apology of Tatian. It is supposed to belong to the tenth or eleventh century.

It is found in another manuscript of the same library, Codex Parisinus XIX, of little value, written in the sixteenth century; in the Codex Argentoratensis; in a manuscript called by Otto Codex Gissensis DCLXIX, written, it

is supposed, about 1535, collated by Credner for Otto; and in three Italian codices, Codex Florentinus XXXII, n. IX, plut X, Codex Bononiensis, mentioned in our notice of Athenagoras, and Codex Mutinensis, mentioned in our notice of Tatian.

De Monarchia.—The treatise *De Monarchia* is found in Codex Parisinus CDL, and Codex Claromontanus LXXXII, and in the Codex Argentoratensis mentioned above; and a translation of it is found in the manuscript called Codex Vimariensis.

II. EDITIONS.

The first edition was published by Robertus Stephanus, Paris, 1551, fol. It contained the works given in the Codex Regius.

The next edition contained the same works of Justin along with the Oration to the Gentiles and the Epistle to Diognetus. It was prepared by Frederick Sylburg, Heidelberg, 1593, fol.

The works of Justin were edited, along with those of Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, and Hermias, by Frederick Morell, Paris, 1615, fol., and afterwards in 1636. This edition was reprinted at Cologne, or rather Wittemburg, with some additional notes, 1686, fol.

The next collected edition of the works of Justin was superintended by the Monk Prudentius Maranus, Paris^k, 1742, fol. This splendid work contains also the writings of Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias. It is furnished with a *Præfatio* which discusses in a very satisfactory way many points relating to the life, editions, and opinions of the writers. This edition was reprinted at Venice, 1747, fol.; in Gallandi's *Bibliotheca*; and in the collection of Oberthür. The most recent and best edition of Justin is by Joannes Carolus Theodorus Otto. It is divided into three

^k Some of the copies have *Hagæ Comitum* on the title-page. See Mosheim, *Dissertt. ad hist. ecclesiast. pertin.* vol. ii. p. vii. *Præf. not.*; Otto, *Prolegg.* xxxi.

volumes (tomi). The first contains the undoubted works of Justin—the Apologies and Dialogue. The second contains the doubtful works—*Oratio ad Gentiles*, *Cohortatio ad Gentiles*, *De Monarchia*, *Epistola ad Diognetum*, and *Fragments*. The third volume contains the spurious works—*Expositio Rectæ Fidei*, *Epistola ad Zenam et Serenum*, *Confutatio Dogmatum quorundam Aristotelis*, *Quæstiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos*, *Quæstiones Christianorum ad Gentiles*, *Quæstiones Gentilium ad Christianos*. The first edition of this work appeared at Jena, 1842–1847. The second edition appeared also at Jena, 1847–1850, 8vo.

The Apologies and Dialogue of Justin have been often edited separately. Grabe edited the First Apology, *Oxonix*, 1700, 8vo. Hutchin edited the Second Apology, the *Oratio Cohortatoria*, the *Oratio ad Græcos*, and the book *De Monarchia*, *Oxonix*, 1703, 8vo. And the Dialogue with Trypho was edited by Samuel Jebb, London, 1719, 8vo. All these editions are supplied with numerous notes.

The two Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho were carefully edited by Styan Thirlby, London, 1722, fol. Harles mentions that some thought Markland was really the editor of this edition.

The Apologies were also edited by Thalemannus, *Lipsix*, 1755, 8vo.; Ashton, *Cantabrigix*, 1768, 8vo.; Braunius, *Bonnæ*, 1830, 8vo., sec. ed. 1860; and Trollope, 1845, 8vo.

Translations of the Apologies by Reeves, London, 1710, 8vo., reprinted 1716; and by Temple Chevallier, Cambridge, 1833, 8vo. In German, by Brunn; Second Apology by Göz, and extracts in Rössler. In French, by Jean de Maumont and Chanutus. In Italian, by Galliccioli. Brown translated the Dialogue with Trypho in 1745: republished at Cambridge, 1846. A good translation of both the Apologies and of the Dialogue with Trypho appeared in the *Library of the Fathers*, Oxford, 1861.

The *Oratio ad Gentiles* was published for the first time by Henry Stephanus, along with the Epistle to Diognetus, and after that incorporated in the collected works of Justin.

The treatise *De Monarchia* is printed in the collected editions of Justin's works already mentioned. It is edited separately by Jo. Adam Göz, Nürnberg, 1796, 8vo.

The first edition of the Hortatory Address was printed at Paris, 1539, 4to. It appeared afterwards in the collected editions of Justin's works by Robert Stephanus, by Sylburg, Hutchin, Maranus and Oberthür, and Otto. It was translated by the Rev. Th. Moses, London, 1757.

The Epistle to Diognetus has been published along with the other works ascribed to Justin. It has also been edited by Olshausen, Boehl, Hefele, Grenfell, and Bunsen; and by Otto (1852), and by Krenkel (1860), separately. It has been often translated in religious periodicals, and a translation is given in Bunsen's *Christianity and Mankind*, vol. i. p. 174, and in a little work of great merit, "*The Free Church of Ancient Christendom*," by Basil Cooper, London.

Full notices of the manuscripts and editions are given in Otto's *Prolegomena*, and some important information is to be found in Fabricii *Bibliotheca*, ed. Harles, vol. vii. pp. 52-72.

XII. JUSTIN'S CHARACTER AND MERITS.

Justin stands pre-eminent among the Apologists of this age. He was respected and revered by the ancient Christians¹, and his writings are to us the most important which we possess for the elucidation of the history of Christianity in its contests with heathenism and Judaism in the middle of the second century.

It would be absurd to claim for Justin a high place if he were judged merely by the powers of his mind. He is not a profound thinker; he has no great philosophic grasp; he does not arrange well what he has to say, nor does he say it in the best manner possible. On the contrary, his style is careless. Like the other Apologists of his age he deemed it wrong to trick out the truth with cunning words of man's wisdom. He again and again comes back to subjects which he had discussed only a few chapters before.

¹ See Semisch, vol. i. p. 208, note.

Though he always has a distinct train of thought, yet he often fails to express the connexion in words, and it is only by patient thinking that we reach it. Yet Justin is not without considerable merit. He would have been an earnest man even if he had remained a heathen. He must have received a good education. We have seen how eagerly he went to one philosopher after another in search of true knowledge. His works bear testimony to very extensive reading, and especially in a candid representation of the opinions of previous philosophers he is surpassed by none of his contemporary Apologists.

Modern controversialists, for purposes of their own, have frequently endeavoured to diminish Justin's merits to the lowest point. They have dragged the mistakes he has committed into light, as if they were something extraordinary. These men are unfair. Justin is not a whit inferior in accuracy to the best of his contemporaries. He has committed mistakes, but so has Cicero, so has Plutarch, so have all the remarkable men of his own age. Fault has also been found with him because he did not study Hebrew, in order thereby to form a critical acquaintance with the text of the Old Testament. But no one in those days thought that it was essential to know the original of a book. People had perfect confidence in a translation, since a translation supplied all that they wished to know. And especially was this the case with the Septuagint. The tradition was, that this translation was made by men well able to do it satisfactorily; and perhaps Justin may have believed with the writer of the Hortatory Address, that the translators were inspired to do their work perfectly.

It has been inferred from Justin's confidence in the Septuagint, that he was ignorant of the original. This question is one that cannot be settled. Justin was once, etymologies of Hebrew words were known a little at least^m. And he would likely enough attr

But of this there can be no doubt, that he never appeals to the Hebrew original; that he habitually used the Septuagint version; and that his whole mode of thought is based on that version, just as if no Hebrew original had been in existence. It is true indeed that a very few of his quotations harmonize more with the Hebrew than do the same passages in the present text of the Septuagint. But there is every reason to believe that there were various readings in his text of the Septuagint, or interpolations or alterations of subsequent copyistsⁿ.

The instances in which he has exhibited the want of a true criticism are many. He accepts the productions of the Sibyl and Hystaspes as genuine prophetic books^o. His whole treatment of the Old Testament is in the highest degree uncritical; and, as we shall see, he ventures to blame the Jews for expelling from their manuscripts passages which there can be no doubt now were the fabrications of a Christian interpolator. He also appeals to a work, which he styles "The Acts which took place in the time of Pontius Pilate" (*ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου γενομένων ἁκτων*^p). This work was in all probability written by a Christian; for, from the two passages in which Justin notices it, we learn that it mentioned the miracles of Christ, and told how the soldiers cast lots for his garment. As Justin had it, it would very

likely be the earliest form of that gospel which is now extant under the name of the Gospel of Nicodemus or the Acts of Pilate; for both the passages alluded to by Justin are to be found in this gospel¹. It is difficult to say, however, whether Justin was deceived in regard to its authorship. He

it was wrong to treat a Jew or a heathen, himself. They have referred to it as an account of the acts to which he wished to refer. He addressed. The which makes, renders it

Semisch, vol. i. p. 233.

p. 35, p. 76 C; o. 48, p. 84 C.

egg. p. lxiv.

indeed likely that Justin believed the production to be an official document, which any one might find if he went to the right quarter in search of it.

The mistakes which have been laid to his charge are neither numerous nor important. We shall notice the principal of them.

The first is, that he represents Ptolemy king of Egypt as sending to "Herod, then king of the Jews, requesting of him copies of the books of the Prophecies" for his library^r. Some have attempted to remove this mistake ('*pu dendus error*,' as Thirlby calls it) by altering the text. But, if we recollect that Justin trusted to his memory, and if we call to mind how often most scholars would make mistakes in names if they had no opportunity to refer to books, we need not wonder at Justin having fallen into an error about a name.

The second mistake is certainly a venial one. Justin makes Jethro the uncle of Moses by the mother's side^s. In all probability he confounded for the moment Moses with Jacob, as Thirlby supposes.

The third mistake for which he is blamed is, that he makes Herod Antipas succeed Archelaus, and "gives him also the title of king^t." Justin can scarcely be said to give him the title of king. He merely applies a prophecy in Hosea x. 6 to him, in which the word that designates him is βασιλεύς, a word which in a loose way may well enough have been applied to him.

The last mistake is a curious one, and deserves full consideration. "In the third place," he says, "after the ascension of Christ into heaven, the demons sent forth some men who asserted that they were themselves gods. These were not only not persecuted by you, but were deemed worthy even of honours. Among them was one Simon, a Samaritan from the village called Gitta, who, in the time of Claudius Cæsar, having worked miracles of magic through the aid of demons

^r Apol. i. c. 31, p. 72 C.

^s Apol. i. c. 62, p. 95 B.

^t Semisch, vol. i. p. 245. Dial. c. Tryph. 103, p. 331 A.

that acted within him, was deemed a god in your royal city of Rome, and has been honoured as a god with a statue by you. This statue has been erected on the river Tiber between the two bridges, having this Latin inscription, *Simoni Deo sancto*“.” Justin makes the same statement in *Apol. i. c. 56, p. 91 B*: “For among you, as we said before, Simon, who was in the royal city of Rome in the time of Claudius Cæsar, so bamboozled the sacred senate and the people of the Romans, that he was thought a god and honoured with a statue, like the other gods honoured among you.” Justin is precise in his statement, and he appeals to those who could well convict him of a mistake, if he had been wrong¹. The statement, moreover, was believed and repeated by Irenæus, Tertullian, Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Augustine, and Theodoret²; the latter two being possibly independent witnesses. And the statement would probably have been unquestioned to the present day, had not a stone been dug up in the Tiberine island in the year 1574 with the following inscription:—

SEMONI SANCO DEO FIDIO SACRUM SEX. POMPEIUS S. P. F.
COL. MUSSIANUS QUINQUENNALIS DECUR BIDEN-
TALIS DONUM DEDIT.

Immediately it began to be suspected that Justin had seen this stone, and had been led by a misinterpretation of it into the misstatement which we have quoted. And since that time the opinion of commentators has been divided; some maintaining Justin's accuracy, and some supposing him guilty of a gross mistake. I think the probability lies on the side of Justin's accuracy.

It is scarcely possible to believe that Justin could have been so ignorant of Latin as not to be able to read the inscription with intelligence. If he did, then he could scarcely have imagined that the *Semo Sancus* mentioned in the inscription

¹ *Apol. i. c. 26, p. 69 C D.*

² *Iren. Adv. Hær. lib. i. cxxiii. 1*; *Tertull. Apologet. c. 13*; *Euseb. Hist. Eccl. ii. 13*; *Cyrl. Hier. Catech. vi. 14*; *Aug. De Hær. c. 1*; *Theodoret. Fabul. Hæret. i. c. 1.*

³ See Maranus, *Præf., part. ii c. xiii. p. 57.*

was Simon the Magician. Moreover, the inscription does not in the slightest degree indicate that the statue was erected by order of the senate. There is not a word to mislead Justin into such a supposition. There is nothing incredible in the story itself. Lucian's description of the honours which the charlatan Alexander procured by his oracular pretensions is satisfactory evidence that the Romans were not scrupulous in admitting questionable men into the rank of divinities^a. It was, moreover, credible enough to Irenæus and Tertullian and other Christian writers. And, lastly, the evidence on which Justin's accuracy is to be overturned is no evidence at all, but a mere suspicion arising from a singular coincidence.

These are the great mistakes which have been adduced by some to show how extraordinarily careless and credulous Justin was. They really prove that Justin was not above his age. He shows the spirit of his age in many other things; in having no definite system of interpretation, and a great indefiniteness in numbers. He probably makes Adam a prophet, and places him 5000 years before the birth of Christ^a. He sets David down as living 1500 years before Christ^b, and he defines his own day as 150 years after Christ's birth^c.

Justin's great merit lies in the intense hold with which he embraced Christianity. He found it, as he says himself, the only safe and advantageous philosophy^d. And he permitted the new influence to penetrate every corner of his soul and to direct every energy of his mind. Indeed, Christianity seems to have struck him in various aspects. It, on the one hand, solved for him the problem which he fancied he was on the point of solving through the Platonic doctrines. It took the place of philosophy in his mind. But he was at the same time struck with the constancy of Christians in trial, and even in death. He, moreover, clearly saw that

^a See Thirlby's note on the passage in Justin, p. 40.

^b See Thirlby's note on Apol. i. c. 31, p. 73 B.

^c Apol. i. c. 42, p. 80 C.

^d Apol. i. c. 46, p. 83 B. It is possible in this last case that Justin really meant 150 years and nothing more nor less.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 8, p. 225 B.

Christianity had gone far beyond the accomplishments of any system of philosophy; for it had purified the lives of many who were totally incapable of comprehending philosophic discussions. Justin therefore exhibits to us the instance of one who was to make Christianity harmonise with the large culture of a man well trained in Greek philosophy and well read in Greek poetry. And it so happens that he is the first of this class whose writings have come down to us.

Justin is a remarkable instance of the bold martyr spirit which characterised the Christians of his day. He feels no fear in the presence of emperors. He knows he is the citizen of a heavenly kingdom, and the subject of a heavenly king; and therefore he shrinks not from speaking boldly in the presence of those who can merely put his body to death. "We," he says, "have come to the conclusion that we can receive injury from no one unless we be proved to be workers of iniquity or be convicted of wickedness. You can kill us; injure us you cannot^e." Again, after stating that he hoped the emperor would be just to the Christians, he adds: "But if, like fools, ye honour customs in preference to truth, do what you can^f." Again, "But if you listen to these arguments in a hostile frame, you can do nothing more than kill us, as we said before. This assuredly brings no injury to us, but to you and all who hate unjustly and do not repent it works eternal punishment in fire^g." This boldness is natural and is warranted. Some have thought that Justin carried it too far, and that he possibly would defeat his object by it. There is no good reason for such an opinion. Justin is never impolite. He states his opinion with modesty, but with firmness; and if he believed that eternal fire awaited emperor or beggar who hated unjustly, it was right, and he deemed it right, to lay the matter clearly before his readers without mitigation, yet without asperity.

Such a man as Justin would be eminently truthful. He certainly conceals nothing. As the reader will see in the exposition of his theology, he gives those whom he addresses

* Apol. i. c. 2, p. 54 A. ^f Ibid. c. 12, p. 59 D. ^g Ibid. c. 45, p. 83 B.

a full account of the eucharist. "I am not so wretched," he says to Trypho, "as to say other things than what I think^h." And in another passage: "These things, said I, I should say, since I am anxious about nothing else than speaking the truth, and will fear no one, even if you should immediately tear me in pieces for it."

Justin's Apology is an apology for Christians, like most of the other Apologies, and his exposition of Christianity and of the evils of polytheism is introduced to place the hardships of the Christian's treatment in a clearer light. We are therefore not to expect a full and satisfactory refutation of heathen religions or a full and satisfactory defence of the Christian.

His great and principal demand for the Christians is that they be not condemned unheard; that in every case in which a Christian is brought to the bar of justice, a thorough examination be made into his conduct, and sentence be pronounced according to the evidence. What lay in the way of this fair trial, he states to be a prejudice, a too great desire to please superstitious men, an irrational impulse, and a long-continued evil report^k. All these have their origin with the demons^l. "On their [Christians] confession and obedience and piety, punishment even to death has been inflicted by the demons and the host of the devil through the service which has been rendered to them by you [the Jews]^m." The demons are the authors of the violent impulses which drive the heathen into persecuting the Christiansⁿ. And they are also at the bottom of the false reports raised against Christians.

The principal of these reports is that the Christians are atheists. Against this accusation Justin argues in the strongest manner, as may be seen from the abstract. He mentions also the other accusations of indiscriminate sexual intercourse, and the eating of human flesh^o; and he expresses

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 80, p. 306 C.

^k Apol. i. c. 2, p. 53 E.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 131, p. 365 C.

^o Apol. i. 26, p. 70 B C; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 10, p. 227 B.

^l Ibid. c. 120, p. 349 C.

¹ Ibid. c. 5, p. 55 D.

ⁿ Apol. i. c. 5, p. 55 D.

his doubts whether these crimes may not have been committed by heretics, and thus falsely attributed to true Christians^p. He affirms also that the Jews were especially instrumental in creating false impressions in regard to Christians. "Not only," he says, "did you not repent of your evil deeds, but, selecting chosen men from Jerusalem, ye then sent them into all the earth, saying that the atheistic sect of the Christians had appeared, and making against us all those accusations which all those who do not know us make against us^q."

Justin nowhere speaks of the law itself being against the Christians. On the contrary, he maintains that if the Christians were tried, every true Christian would be found leading an irreproachable life, and he therefore demands that they be not condemned merely on account of the name. From one passage perhaps it might be inferred that there were not merely religious but political prejudices against Christians. "You," he says, "hearing that we expect a kingdom (*βασιλείαν*, 'reign') have inconsiderately imagined that we mean a human one (*ανθρώπινον*), while we all the while mean one which is with God, as is plain from the circumstance that when examined by you we confess that we are Christians, though we know that death is the punishment that follows our confession. For if we expected a human kingdom, then we should deny in order that we might not be cut off, and should try to avoid notice that we might obtain what we expect; but since our hopes are not directed to the present time, those who kill us cause us no anxiety, for death is a universal debt^r."

In defending the Christians Justin finds many occasions to attack heathenism. His whole method of viewing polytheism and its rites is simple. The myths and the rites were the inventions of the demons. The stories which the Greeks believed were not entirely false, but were sometimes the nar-

^p Apol. i. c. 26, p. 70 B.

^q Dial. c. Tryph. c. 17, p. 234 E; c. 108, p. 335 C D.

^r Apol. i. c. 11, p. 58 E.

ratives of the real deeds of the demons. They were in the main, however, the inventions of the demons to deceive and lead mankind away from the truth. The demons knew the books of Moses and the Prophets, and to prevent the heathen world from crediting these oracles of God they made their stories somewhat like the narratives given in these books. Justin adduces many instances of this distortion of the words of Moses and the Prophets. The demons thus enslaved the human race, terrifying them through punishments and alarms, teaching them to offer up sacrifices and incense, deluding them through magical writings, and sowing amongst them murders and adulteries, wars and impurities¹. The poets and the myth-writers were the principal agents through whom the demons subdued man. There is thus in mythology, according to Justin, no real evolution of man's nature. It is a delusion, sometimes indeed having an appearance of truth, but in reality all its stories and its rites are the snares of demons. Man is the victim. Poets and myth-writers are victims as much as any other. And Justin thinks that his work in regard to polytheism is to open the eyes of men to the delusions which have been practised on them, and to the immoralities and absurdity of the false worship. Justin's theory, it will be observed, is in the main the same as Plutarch's. Nevertheless, he finds occasional indications of human nature in the mythologic rites. At least he appeals to the summoning of the dead through magic, the descent of Ulysses to the infernal regions, and to many like intimations, as a reason for Greeks believing in a future state in which the souls of men will be capable of feeling².

Though Justin thus condemns polytheism almost wholesale, he does it with the greatest kindness. He says, again and again, that men have been beguiled into it; and he is ready to acknowledge any good that he can find in the poets and philosophers of the ancient world. His doctrine of the Logos came to his help here. The Logos had been God's instru-

¹ See the Doctrine of Demons for the various passages.

² *Apol. i. c. 18, p. 65 A B C.*

ment in the creation of the world, and especially of man, and Justin believed that the Logos had acted on the minds both of Jews and Greeks. Wherever there was any reason, there was a sure proof that the Logos had been in the man. "Those who have lived with reason (*μετὰ λόγου*), even though they were reckoned atheists, are Christians, such as among the Greeks, Socrates, Heraclitus, and those like them: and among barbarians, Abraham and Ananias, and Azarias, and Misael, and Elias, and many others^t." And speaking generally of poets and philosophers, he maintains that seeds of truth appear to be among all, but they are proved not to have apprehended the truth accurately when they contradict themselves. These seeds of truth, however, are not got from the Logos directly. It is only they who lived with the Logos that were Christians. Many who were not, had also seeds of truth. For these were all derived from the prophets. "For all the statements," he says, "which philosophers and poets have made with regard to the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or the contemplation of heavenly things, or the like doctrines, they have been able to learn and have expounded, by drawing from the prophets^u."

Justin, as might have been expected, is far more favourable to the philosophers than to the poets. Especially fond is he of Socrates and Plato. We have seen already that he makes Socrates a Christian. He refers to the persecution of Socrates as a case exactly analogous to the persecutions of Christians. Speaking of the demons, he says, "When Socrates tried to bring these things to light by true reason and through a sifting examination, and to lead men away from the demons, the demons themselves, through men who rejoiced in iniquity, made him be killed as atheistic and impious, saying that he introduced new gods; and they act in like manner in regard to us. For not only among the Greeks were these things refuted by reason through Socrates, but among the barbarians also, by Reason himself, who took a shape and became man, and was called Jesus Christ^v." And in another passage he

^t Apol. i. c. 46, p. 83 C. ^u Ibid. c. 44, p. 82 A. ^v Ibid. c. 5, p. 56 B.

places Socrates and Christ beside each other, remarking, however, that "No one trusted Socrates so as to die for this doctrine; but Christ, who was partially known even by Socrates, was trusted not by philosophers and scholars only, but also by artizans and people altogether unlearned^x."

Justin shows an intimate acquaintance with Plato, and an ardent appreciation of the truths which he proclaimed. The Apology of Justin is not without some resemblance to the Apology of Socrates; more, however, in tone than in form. The doctrine to which Socrates gives frequent utterance in the Apology and in several of the Platonic dialogues, that the soul cannot be injured but by doing wrong, is reproduced, as we have seen already, in Justin^y. The Dialogue with Trypho is in form similar to the dialogues of Plato, and its introductory chapters are filled with Platonic thought^z. In one of these Justin states that the end of the Platonic philosophy was the vision of God: and though Justin felt that the Platonic philosophy failed in accomplishing its end, yet he saw that the aim was Christian. He appeals to Plato as holding many of the Christian doctrines, though in an imperfect way. These doctrines are the arrangement and creation of the world, the belief in a future state of rewards and punishments, and free will. He also imagined that Plato had an indistinct notion of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

In regard to the creation and ordering of the world, he says, "When we say that all things have been arranged and created by God, we shall seem to speak the doctrine of Plato^a." Justin here uses the word *γενεῖσθαι*, which I have rather inaccurately translated 'created.' The word is Platonic, and means that they were brought into a state of phenomenal existence. It does not imply a creation out of nothing. Justin states elsewhere that Plato believed the world to be made out of shapeless matter. "In order," he says, "that ye may learn that it was from our teachers (we

^x Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 48 E.

^y Ibid. i. 2, p. 54 A. Platon. Apolog. p. 30 C.

^z c. 2, p. 219 D.

^a Apol. i. c. 20, p. 66 D.

mean the account given through the Prophets) that Plato borrowed his statement that God having changed matter which was shapeless, made the world (*κόσμος*, 'order'), hear the very words spoken through Moses^b."

In reference to a future state Justin affirms, "Plato in like manner said that Rhadamanthus and Minos would punish the unjust that went to them; but we say that the same thing will take place but by Christ^c."

Justin quotes with approbation the assertion in the tenth book of the Republic—*αἰτία ἐλομένου, Θεὸς δὲ ἀναίτιος*, 'the fault lies with the person who chose, God is faultless'—and he tries to show that Plato borrowed this from Moses.

In fact, as we have seen already, he believed that Plato gathered most of his truths from Moses, and therefore we need not wonder that he attempts to discover traces of a reference to God's Son and Holy Spirit in Plato. It will be seen too that Justin imagined that Plato read Moses^d.

The passages referring to the Son and the Spirit are so important that we give them fully. "Then that which is said in the course of an inquiry into nature (*φυσιολογούμενον*) in the *Timæus* of Plato with regard to the Son of God, when he says 'He placed Him crosswise in the whole,' he said taking it in like manner from Moses." Then Justin gives the narrative of the brazen serpent, and adds, "Which things Plato reading, and not accurately understanding, and not apprehending that it was the sign of the cross, but taking it to be a placing crosswise, he said that the power after the first God was placed crosswise in the whole. As to his speaking of a third, he did this when he read, as we mentioned before, that which is said by Moses, 'that the Spirit of God was borne above the waters.' For he gives the second place to the Logos, which is with God, who, he says, was placed crosswise in the whole; and the third place to the Spirit which was said to be borne upon the water: saying, 'But the third round the third^e.'"

This is the only reference which Justin makes to the

^b *Apol.* i. c. 59, p. 92 C.

^c *Ibid.* c. 8, p. 57 B C.

^d *Apol.* i. c. 6c, p. 93 B.

^e *Ibid.* c. 60, p. 92 E, 93 A B C.

supposed Platonic Trinity, and this is the only foundation on which the theory rests that Justin derived his Trinity from Plato, or was influenced by Plato in his formation of it. The passage in the clearest manner possible bears witness to the fact that Justin foisted his doctrines into Plato. The two passages which he quotes are among the most difficult in Plato. The one, *ἐχίλασεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παντί*, does not occur at all, but is a paraphrase of a passage in the *Timæus*^f where Plato speaks of the soul of the universe. Justin has shut his eyes to the main drift of Plato's argument; and, blindly misled by an eager desire to find the cross everywhere, he selects an illustration in which Plato uses the letter χ to explain how double circular motions might arise. This χ he supposes Plato derived from Moses, but he was so far wrong in his interpretation as to make it a X instead of a cross. The other passage is taken from the second epistle ascribed to Plato, and which all great modern critics, with the exception of Grote, believe to be spurious. The words he quotes, *τὰ δὲ τρίτα περὶ τὸν τρίτον*, are exceedingly obscure. If both passages were thus obscure, and could not therefore reveal to the reader with certainty any of the doctrines of Plato, it is plain that Justin could not have got his notion of the Trinity from them. And the circumstance that he chooses two exceedingly obscure passages is proof that he had not been influenced by more intelligible passages, and that his interpretation of them depended on ideas in his mind that had got there irrespective of Plato.

Justin expresses sympathy with Plato in his expulsion of Homer and the other poets from his Republic, and says that "He^g urged them to a full knowledge of the unknown God through the investigation of reason (*λόγον*), saying, 'The Father and Fashioner of all it is not easy to find, and after finding Him it is not safe to disclose Him to all^h.'" Justin here

^f p. 36.

^g The 'he' in the text of Justin is properly Socrates, but of course it is the Socrates of Plato whom he means.

^h *Apol.* ii. c. 10, p. 48 D.

quotes the famous passage of the *Timæus*ⁱ, but instead of *ἀδύνατον* reads *ἀσφαλές*. There is no reason, however, as we have remarked elsewhere, for supposing that Justin imagines that Plato used the word 'safe' because he was afraid of the fate of Socrates, for the words are placed by Justin in the mouth of Socrates.

Justin notices the great defect of Plato's teaching. It was not the whole truth. "I confess," he says, "that I boast and contend on all hands to be found a Christian, not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all points like, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, poets, or historians^k." He then explains how these writers have only a part of the *logos*, and often contradict themselves.

Of all philosophic sects the Stoics are those who attract Justin's attention most. He is careful to praise the philosophers themselves. He strenuously condemns their teachings on some essential points. In his own search for truth his Stoic teacher failed to satisfy him, because he gave no instruction with regard to God, for the teacher "himself did not know nor did he deem this knowledge necessary^l."

The two points in regard to which Justin disputes the position of the Stoics are the final burning up of the world and the doctrine of fate. At the bottom of both lay a denial of a personal god, the real matter of offence to Justin. "The Sibyl and Hystaspes declared that there would be a burning up of destructible things. Those, however, who are called Stoics make it a doctrine (*δογματίζουσιν*) that the god himself^m is dissolved into fire, and they say that the world comes into existence again by a process of change; but we think that God, the maker of all, is something greater than things that are changedⁿ." Justin's objection is not to the Stoic doctrine of a burning of the world, but to its taking

ⁱ p. 28 C. ^k Apol. ii. c. 13, p. 51 B C. ^l Dial. c. Tryph. c. 2, p. 219 A.

^m Justin speaks generally. Some of the Stoics would have objected to this language, and some denied the *ἐκπύρωσις* altogether.

ⁿ Apol. i. c. 20, p. 66 C.

place by a natural process of change without the intervention of God. "Thus," he says, "we affirm that the burning up will take place, but not, as the Stoics represent, according to the doctrine of a change of all things into one another, which appears to be most base°."

Justin presses his objections against the Stoic doctrine of fate with great force. He supposes that they were misled into this doctrine by their ignorance of the energy of the demons; and he maintains that their moral teaching is inconsistent with a belief in fate. "Nor do we affirm," he says in continuation of the passage last quoted, "that it is by fate that men do what they do or suffer what they suffer, but, on the contrary, that it is by free choice that men act rightly (*καρποῦν*, the Stoic word) or sin, and that it is through the energy of the wicked demons that earnest men, as Socrates and the like, suffer persecution and are in bonds, and that Sardanapalus and Epicurus and the like seem to be blessed in the midst of abundance and glory. The Stoics, not observing this, maintained that all things take place according to the necessity of fate^p."

The doctrine of free-will, he affirms, is implied in all the moral efforts of philosophers and legislators. "This is shown," he says, "by those men everywhere who have made laws and philosophised according to right reasoning (*κατὰ λόγον τὸν ὀρθόν*), in their suggesting to do some things and refrain from others. Even the Stoic philosophers in their doctrine of morals steadily honour the same things, so that it is clear that they do not proceed in the right way in their doctrine with regard to first principles and incorporeal things. For if they maintain that what is done by men is done according to fate, either they will maintain that God is nothing else than the things which are ever turning and altering and dissolving into the same things, and will appear to have had a comprehension only of things that are destructible, and to have looked on the God Himself

° Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 C.

^p Ibid. p. 45 CD.

as arising (*γινόμενον*) in every wickedness, both through the parts and through the whole; or that neither vice or virtue exist at all, which is contrary to all sound sense, reason, and intelligence^a.”

Justin adds, in regard to the Stoic philosophers, “We know that those of the Stoic school, since they have been orderly in their moral teaching, as is the case with the poets in some things, on account of the seed of reason (the Logos) implanted in every race of men, have been hated and put to death; Heraclitus for instance, as we said before, and Musonius in our own time, and others^r.”

Justin expresses his strong dislike of the Epicureans and Cynics. We have already quoted a passage in which he speaks contemptuously of Epicurus himself. He mentions “the writings of Epicurus and the poets” as being a defence of the worst vices^s, and he applies the epithet ‘Epicurean’ in company with licentious adjectives^t. He condemns the Cynic as being unprincipled. “It is impossible,” he says, “for a Cynic, who makes indifference his end, to know any other good than indifference^u.”

Justin does not quote much from the poets. His general opinion of them, as we have seen, was bad. He couples them with Epicurus. He praises Plato for expelling them from his Republic. He looked upon them as instruments which the demons used to spread licentiousness and irreligion. “Some,” he says, “of these [philosophers] taught atheism, and those who became poets set forth Zeus and his sons as licentious. The followers of the philosophers are not hindered by you: and you assign rewards and honours to those who euphoni-ously insult these gods^v,” (*τοῖς εὐφώνως ὑβρίζουσι τούτους*).

Justin did not shut his eyes to the seed of reason which might be in the poets, and therefore he appeals to them several times in proof of an agreement between heathen and

^a Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 46 A B.

^r Ibid. c. 8, p. 46 B C.

^s Apol. ii. c. 12, p. 50 E.

^t Ibid. c. 15, p. 52 B.

^u Ibid. c. 3, p. 47 C.

^v Apol. i. c. 4, p. 55 C D. The same expression occurs in Theoph. ad Autolyc. iii. c. 30.

Christian teaching, especially in regard to the sensibility of man in a future state : "In maintaining that the souls of men exist after death in a state of sensibility and suffer punishment, and that the souls of the good are removed from penalties and live happily, we shall seem to make the same affirmations as poets and philosophers^a." And then he goes on to refer to Menander as objecting to the worship of stones : "And in maintaining that men ought not to worship the works of their hands, we say the same as what Menander, the comic poet, and those who maintained these things, said ; for they affirmed that the fashioner was greater than that which was prepared^b."

Justin's position towards heathenism was thus peculiarly conciliatory, and the conciliating effect would be all the greater that his point of view was one naturally adopted, and not taken for the purpose of conciliation. He abhorred in the strongest manner the licentious stories of the Greek mythology. He seems to have been unwilling even to use the name of the goddess Venus in the designation of the day of the week^c. Yet he had great sympathy with heathens. He recognised the seed of the Logos in them. He believed that many of them knew Moses, and had learned from him. He believed, moreover, that the demons were actively engaged in beguiling men, and, as they knew Moses and the Prophets, they had distorted the truths proclaimed by them to mislead mankind. He even found an historical element in mythology, for, like Philo, he identifies Noah with Deucalion^d.

^a Apol. i. c. 20, p. 66 D.

^b Ibid. p. 66 E.

^c The instance referred to occurs in Apol. i. c. 67, p. 99 B, where Justin, in speaking of the day on which Christ rose from the dead, says : "On the day before^{*} the Saturday (*κρονικῆς*) they crucified Him, and on the day after the Saturday, which is the day of the sun, he appeared to his apostles and disciples, and taught them those doctrines which we have submitted to your consideration." Halloix supposes that Justin used the periphrastic expression *τῇ πρὸ τῆς κρονικῆς* to avoid the bad odour of the mention of Venus. Thirlby laughs at this, but there is some sense in it. See Braun's note on the passage.

^d Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 C.

Justin is eminently successful in his presentation of Christianity to heathens. He was defending Christians, it must be remembered, and not Christianity. Christianity as yet had not been attacked by written arguments, and its teachings were comparatively unknown. But in defending Christians Justin was naturally led to explain how they had been converted; what truths they held, and how they obtained them. Justin's exposition of Christianity, its teachings, and its power is unquestionably the best which any of the Apologists have given. It is not formal. The arguments are not stated logically. And that argument on which he laid most stress is not nearly so powerful to a critical mind as he reckoned it. But still he has mentioned all the principal arguments, and they tell perhaps with all the greater force that they are not set forth in logical form, but come fresh from his feelings and experience.

Justin deserves special praise in concentrating his exposition of Christianity around Christ. He appeals to his teachings as showing what are the precepts that regulate the life of the Christians, and he tries to show that He was really the Logos, the Son of God, who became man to save men from their sins. The proofs that He was the Son of God are thus summed up: "If God proclaimed a new covenant as destined to be established, and that too for a light to the nations, and we see and are persuaded that through the name of that Jesus Christ who was crucified men have come to God from idols and other iniquity, and confess Him and are pious even to death, both from the works and from the accompanying power it is possible for all to understand that He is the new law^c." In the following passage they are given more fully: "Wherefore we pray for you and for all men that bear hatred to us, that repenting with us ye may not blaspheme that Jesus Christ who is proved to be blameless and irreproachable in all things by his works, by the miracles which now take place in consequence of his name, by the doctrines which He taught,

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 11, p. 228 D E.

and by the prophecies which were prophesied in regard to Him^f."

If we systematize Justin's arguments we shall find them to be: the mighty change which was produced in man's character by Christ; the fixing of the highest truths in the minds of the poorest; the excellence of Christ's teaching; the miracles which He wrought in his lifetime; the miracles which Christians in Justin's day wrought through the name of Christ, and the fulfilment of prophecy in Christ.

The changes in man's character and belief necessarily go together, and they are adduced as proof that Christ was the whole Logos, and that Christians possess Him. Socrates failed to persuade men to die for his teaching, but Christ convinced not merely philosophers, but artisans, so that they despised glory, fear, and death; "since," Justin says, "He is the power of the inexpressible God ϵ ."

In describing the effects of Christ's teaching Justin says, "We formerly rejoiced in fornication, now we welcome chastity alone; once we used magic arts, now we have dedicated ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; then we loved the procuring of money and possessions more than anything else, now we bring all that we have into a common fund and share it with every one who needs it. We who hated and murdered each other, and would not share our hearths with those not of the same tribe on account of our customs, now, after the appearance of Christ, live together, and we pray for our enemies, and try to persuade those who unjustly hate us to become, by living according to the noble suggestions of Christ, sharers of the good hope of obtaining the same blessings with us from God the ruler of all^h." And in the following chapter, in which he continues to discuss the teaching of Christ, he says, "Why should I mention the innumerable multitude of those who have turned from impurity and have learned these thingsⁱ?"

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 35, p. 254 B.

^g Some however translate, "since it is the power of the inexpressible God that has done this." Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 49 A.

^h Apol. i. c. 14, p. 61 BC.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 15, p. 62 B.

The principal passage which embodies the argument derived from Christ's power to inoculate the lowest of mankind with the highest truths occurs in Justin's exposition of his belief that Plato and the other great heathens derived their wisdom from the books of Moses. "We," he says, "do not have the same opinions as others, but they all speak imitating ours. With us, then, it is possible to hear these opinions and to learn them from those who know not even the forms of the letters, from men who are uneducated and barbarous in their language, but wise and full of faith in their minds; some of them also weak of sight or entirely blind, so that you can see that these things have taken place not by human wisdom, but are spoken through the power of God^k."

The words of Christ carry the testimony of His divine mission in themselves. "They have something awful in themselves," he says, "and they are able to put to shame those who turn out of the right way, and they are a most sweet refreshment to those that practise them^l." In the *Apology* he quotes many of these sayings of Christ, and remarks that He was not a common teacher (*σοφιστής*)^m, but the power of God, even his *Logos*, or, as it has been translated, "His discourse was a power of Godⁿ."

Justin refers frequently to the miracles of Christ. He never hints that any one doubted the fact of his miraculous powers; but he does not lay stress on the general argument from miracles. He lays little stress on the argument from Christ's miracles, and gives rather more weight to the miracles performed in the name of Christ in his own day.

There was a twofold objection to the use of miracles in argument—one Christian, the other heathen. Justin himself believed that the demons performed magic miracles (*μαγικὰς δυνάμεις*) through Simon and Menander, two heretics^o; and he explained by the same agency many other marvellous deeds in

^k *Apol.* i. c. 60, p. 93 C.

^l *Dial.* c. *Tryph.* c. 8, p. 225 C.

^m Lucian actually calls him a *σοφιστής*. *Peregr. Vit.* c. 13.

ⁿ *Apol.* i. c. 14, p. 61 D.

^o *Ibid.* c. 56, p. 91 B.

whose reality he believed. He could not therefore feel secure himself of the argument. Accordingly he demands that the doctrines of the miracle-worker be true before he will use the miracles as an argument. Speaking of the prophets, he says, "Although, on account of the miracles (*δυνάμεις*) which they performed, they deserved to be believed, since they glorified God the Father, the maker of the universe, and announced his Son the Christ that is from Him, which the false prophets, who are filled by a lying and impure spirit, neither did nor do, but they dare to work some miracles (*δυνάμεις*) to astound men, and they glorify the spirits of error and demons^p." Justin did not see any circle in this reasoning, but the truth of the doctrine and the miraculous powers were mutually confirmatory. Yet he saw that he could not lay stress on the argument, and in the passage above quoted it is merely added to another argument which he believed to be absolutely incontrovertible.

The heathens objected that the miracles were the result of magic, in the power of which they firmly believed. After mentioning the various miracles which Christ performed, and stating that through his works Christ awed the men that lived then into a recognition of Him (*διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐδυσώπει τοὺς τότε ὄντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπιγινῶναι αὐτόν*), Justin adds, "They who saw these things done said that a magic vision (*φαντασίαν*) was taking place, for they dared to say that He was a magician and a deceiver of the people^q." Justin states the objection in another passage^r, and in consequence passes from the argument from miracles to the argument from prophecy. We shall adduce the whole passage when we speak of the argument from prophecy. Indeed, Justin views the miracles as satisfactory evidence only when they are regarded as fulfilments of prophecy. This is especially the case with regard to the miracles performed by Christians in the time of Justin. He looks upon them mainly as proofs of the fulfilment of prophecy. An exception is to be made

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 225 A.

^q Ibid. c. 69, p. 296 A.

^r Apol. i. c. 30, p. 72 A.

in favour of those miracles which consisted in the expulsion of demons. They were positive proof in themselves that Christ had control over the demons, and that He came to rescue man from subjection to them.

Justin does not give any special instance of a miracle wrought in his own time. All his assertions are general. He mentions the existence of prophetic gifts: "With us even to the present day there are prophetic gifts (*χαρίσματα*), from which circumstance you [Jews] ought to understand that what was anciently in your race has now been transferred to us." And he makes the same statement as illustrative of the fulfilment of prophecy in c. 88, p. 315 B: "And with us it is possible to see both women and men having gifts from the Spirit of God."

In regard to the expulsion of demons, Justin lays special stress on what he states as a fact, that "Every demon when exorcised is conquered and made subject," if it is the name of Christ by which he is exorcised. "If," speaking to the Jews he says, "ye exorcise by any name whatever of those who have been among you, either kings or righteous men, or prophets, or patriarchs, not one of the demons will be rendered subject; but if indeed one of you should exorcise in the name of the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, perhaps the demon will be rendered subject. Those of you, however, who are exorcists^t, exorcise, like the gentiles, by the use of art and employ fumigations and chains (magic chains)^u." He asserts boldly that "We have all demons and evil spirits subjected to us through exorcism^x." And he makes the same absolute statement in his Apology: "For many seized with demons throughout the whole world and in your city were cured by many of our men, that is, Christians, when they adjured them by the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 82, p. 308 B.

^t The word used here and in Apol. ii. c. 6 is *ἐπορκιστάι*, men who cure by pronouncing oaths over the demoniac. It comes to the same as *ἐξορκιστάι*.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 85, p. 311 C.

^x Ibid. c. 76, p. 302 A.

Pontius Pilate, after all other exorcists and charmers and drug mixers had failed to effect a cure; and they even still cure them, destroying and driving out the demons that possess the men^v.”

In Justin's mind the argument of most value was that derived from prophecy. He believed prophecy to be a work of God in a peculiar manner. The demons not only did not know the future, but they misinterpreted the Old Testament prophecies. It was the feeling that the argument was irrefutable that made it exceedingly valuable to Justin and the rest of the Apologists. And very likely in Justin's day the argument would have great effect with the heathens; for they would to a certain extent share with him the intellectual deficiencies which made him even overlook the gaps in the argument.

In reasoning from prophecy, it is essential, in the first place, that it be clearly proved that the utterance has been made before the event which it is supposed to prophesy has occurred. In the second place, it is essential that the event, said to be a fulfilment of the prophecy, be proved by historical evidence really to have happened. In the third place, it is essential that the interpretation of the passage said to be a prophecy, be a legitimate interpretation. And in the fourth place, it would be necessary in each case of supposed prophecy, to examine as to whether the event is not a mere coincidence, or has not arisen from a desire on the part of the agent to fulfil the supposed prophecy. Justin troubles himself with none of these investigations. He is totally unconscious that they were necessary. He adopts the prevalent belief that the books attributed to Moses and the Prophets were genuine. He does not prove their genuineness to the heathen. He merely affirms that Moses was older than all the Greek writers. In consequence of this want of critical discernment, he ranks among his genuine prophets the Sibyl and Hystaspes.

^v Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 45 A B.

Then, again, he does not deem it necessary to prove that the events took place. This may be well enough accounted for on the supposition that no one doubted their occurrence. In two cases, [however, he refers his readers to authorities which would satisfy them, the registration tables made in the days of Quirinus^z, and the Acts of Pilate^a.

It is in the matter of interpretation, however, that Justin fails most egregiously to our minds. He saw notices of Christ everywhere in the Old Testament. He finds clear allusions and prophecies in passages that do not bear the slightest reference to Him, that are indeed often not prophetic at all. To take one instance: he says, "That it was known beforehand that these evil reports were to be spread against those who confess Christ, and that they would be wretched who speak evil of Him, and say that it is honourable to keep up the old customs: hear what has been said in few words through Isaiah; they are these, 'Woe to those who call sweet bitter, and bitter sweet^b.'" Such interpretations are innumerable in Justin^c.

The application of the argument from prophecy to Christ is twofold. He was in the first place a prophet, and therefore his teaching is to be believed. Speaking of the persecutions of Christians Justin says, "That all these things would take place, was foretold by our teacher Jesus Christ, who is the Son of the Father of all, the Lord God, and his messenger (*ἀπόστολος*), from whom we have got the name of Christians. Whence also we feel sure with regard to all that He has taught us, since we see taking place in reality what He in anticipation foretold would take place. For this is indeed a work of God, to tell the thing before it takes place, and that the event should be shown taking place so as it has been foretold^d."

^z Apol. i. c. 34, p. 75 E. ^a Ibid. c. 35, p. 76 C. ^b Ibid. c. 49, p. 85 B.

^c See Semisch, Justin Martyr, vol. ii. p. 111, for an account of the passages which Justin supposed prophetic of the history of Christ.

^d Apol. i. c. 12, p. 60 A. Comp. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 35, p. 253 B, 254 A, and c. 82, p. 308 C.

The second application of the argument to Christ is the fulfilment of the prophecies in Him. Justin's argument is to the following effect :—He asserts that certain unquestionable facts in the life of Christ were clearly foretold in the Old Testament. The fulfilment of these indubitable facts is a guarantee that those things of which there cannot be an exact fulfilment are also true. Thus when it was foretold that Jesus was to come out of the tribe of Judah, there could be no mistake about the fulfilment of the prophecy ; but when it was said that He was to be the Son of God, there was no way in which that statement could be supported by a prophet. And consequently, Justin affirms that the fulfilment of the clear prophecies is reason why we should accept the statements made authoritatively. Justin goes so far in this, that he believes such statements with regard to Christ, not on the word of Christ, nor on the word of the apostles, but on the evidence of prophecy.

Justin nowhere expresses his reasoning so fully as I have just now stated it. But the main point is given in the following passage regarding the prophets : “ For they did not then make known their sentiments with demonstration, since they were trustworthy witnesses of the truth above all demonstration ; but events which have happened, and are now happening, compel us to assent to what is said through them^e. ” The matter seemed to Justin's mind indisputable. He accordingly passes from the argument from miracles to that from prophecy in these words : “ But that no one may say in opposition to us, why should not He who is called Christ with us have been a man born of men, and by magic have performed the miracles which we say He performed, and on this account have appeared to be the Son of God, we shall now make our demonstration, not trusting those who say it, but yielding by compulsion our confidence to those who prophesied before the events took place, on account of our seeing with our own eyes that the events have happened and do happen as they were prophesied. This will

• Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D, 225 A.

seem even to you as we think the greatest and truest proof^f." Justin then goes on to give an account of the prophets and their prophecies in regard to Christ. In the course of his remarks he affirms that he believes the writers of the Memoirs of the Apostles on account of the prophecies: "And the angel of God, who was sent to the virgin herself at that time, brought the good news to her, saying, Lo! thou shalt conceive of the Holy Spirit, and shalt bear a son, and He shall be called the Son of the Most High, and thou shalt call his name Jesus, for He shall save his people from their sins, as those taught who have related all that concerns our Saviour Jesus Christ. Them we believed, since the prophetic Spirit through the forementioned Isaiah said that He would be born as we pointed outs." Even Christ's own word is not sufficient evidence: "With what reason would we trust a crucified man who affirmed^h that He is the first-born to the unbegotten God, and will Himself judge the whole human race, unless we found testimonies proclaimed with regard to Him before He came to earth as man, and see them thus fulfilled, the desolation of the land of the Jews? &c.ⁱ" In all these cases Justin's argument is as I have stated. He proves the sonship of Christ from the prophecies, the authority of the prophets from the fulfilment of the prophecies. He sometimes, however, states the argument very loosely, and especially in the extract from c. 33 he seems to intimate that his belief in the occurrence of at least extraordinary events did not depend on historical evidence, but on the fact that the prophets said they would happen. He states the principle more exactly in these words: "For events which were incredible, and which it was thought among men could not happen, these God pointed out beforehand through the prophetic Spirit as going to happen, in order that when they did occur they might not be discredited, but might be believed from their having been foretold^k."

^f Apol. i. c. 30, p. 72 B.

^g Ibid. c. 33, p. 75 A B.

^h The Greek is peculiar: *τινι γὰρ ἂν λόγῳ ἀνθρώπῳ σταυρωθέντι ἐπειθόμεθα ὅτι πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ Θεῷ ἐστι.*

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 53, p. 88 A.

^k Ibid. c. 33, p. 74 E.

The argument from prophecy was based on the inspiration of the Old Testament. This is an important point. Justin nowhere appeals to any portion of the New as inspired. Not merely all the doctrines but all the facts of Christianity were contained in the Old Testament. Justin could thus easily meet the heathen objection that Christianity was something new. It was as old as Moses. Nay more, in his belief that the Logos had acted always and everywhere on mankind, he could affirm that the Greeks had in a partial measure partaken of Christianity. If, moreover, the heathen objected that it was absurd to believe in a crucified man as the Son of God, Justin could show them that this had been long ago foretold. Justin on such occasions adopts also another means of refutation. He proves that the Greeks themselves believed similar wonders in their own mythology. Justin thus easily refutes the general objections which had got abroad in society to the new doctrines by a double mode of procedure, by an *argumentum ad hominem*, and by an appeal to the argument from prophecy.

Justin's Dialogue with Trypho gives us his method of dealing with the Jews. From beginning to end it is an appeal to the Old Testament. Trypho interprets in one way, Justin in another; and the victory depends upon the success in the interpretation. The Jew interprets literally. Justin regards his belief concerning Christ as the key to the right interpretation. The Christians have grace from God to understand the Scriptures. The Jews have not. And this is the great difference between them. "I was not," he says, "going, O Trypho, to adduce the proofs through which I know they are condemned who worship these and such things, but such proofs as no one can speak against. But they will appear strange to you, though read daily by you, so that you may understand by this that on account of your wickedness God has concealed from you the capability of perceiving the wisdom which is in his words, with the exception of some to whom, according to the grace of his great mercy, as said Isaiah, he left a seed for salvation, in order that your race

may not be completely destroyed, like that of Sodom and Gomorrah¹."

This mode of proof was that, as we have seen, which Justin was least able to handle. A fair method of interpreting documents of earlier ages was unknown in his days, and accordingly Justin does nothing more than what we might expect when he misapplies and misinterprets very many passages. Especially does he fail in verbal and textual criticism; and, as we shall see, he blames the Jews for striking out of the Scriptures passages which owed their existence to Christian interpolators.

The main subjects on which Justin has to argue with the Jew are three—the perpetual obligation of the law; the coming of the true Messiah, and his nature and work as revealed in the prophets; and, lastly, the right which the Jews had to claim to be the special people of God in all ages.

In regard to the law, Trypho expresses his astonishment that people like the Christians, who pretended to be pious, could persist in the non-observance of what God had commanded. "That which puzzles us most," he says, "is this; that you, saying that you are pious and thinking that you are better than others, are in no respect different from them, nor do you alter your mode of life from that of the nations [Gentiles], while you observe neither feasts nor Sabbaths, nor are you circumcised; and, moreover, placing your hopes on a man who was crucified, you nevertheless hope that you will obtain some good from God, though you do not perform his commandments. Have you not read that 'That soul will be destroyed from its race which shall not be circumcised on the eighth day^m?''" Justin's reply to this is, that good men existed before the law; that these men neither kept the feasts nor the Sabbaths, and were not circumcised; that the law was given to the Jews on account of the hardness of their hearts; and that what was given for such a reason could not contribute to piety. The proper interpretation of the law,

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 55, p. 274 C D.

^m Ibid. c. 10, p. 227 C.

he maintains at the same time, is symbolic. The abstract of the Dialogue will show how he gave a spiritual interpretation to the feasts, to the Sabbath, and to circumcision. It will be sufficient to quote here some of the passages which speak generally of the reasons why the law was given. "Consider that it was on account of the hardness of the heart of your people that God through Moses laid these commandments on you, in order that through these many [performances] you might always have God before your eyes in every deed, and might begin neither to do injustice nor to be impious^a." Justin adduces the knowledge that this was the occasion of the law as a sufficient reason why Christians should not observe the law: "For we should now observe the circumcision of the flesh, and the Sabbaths, and all the feasts without exception, did we not know the reason why they were enjoined on you, namely, on account of your iniquities and hardness of heart^b." And for the same reason he affirms that they do not tend to piety: "And we know that injunctions given on account of the hard-heartedness of your people do not at all contribute to righteous conduct and piety^c." Indeed, he maintains that the literal observance of the law had been a complete failure. The Jews had not been kept pious, nor had their idolatrous propensities been restrained^d.

The refutation of the Jewish opinion that the law was of eternal obligation, Justin makes rest principally on those grand moral passages which occur in every part of the Old Testament prophets, but especially in Isaiah. He shows how they spoke of a circumcision of the heart, of a cleansing of the mind from all sin, of a perpetual daily Sabbath, of a fast that consisted in righteousness and feeding the hungry. He also points to the passages which speak of an eternal law, which law, he maintains, must be Christ, and an everlasting covenant, which covenant is also found in Christ. And he

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 46, p. 265 A B. See c. 21, p. 238 A ; c. 22, p. 238 D.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 18, p. 235 E.

^c Ibid. c. 46, p. 265 D.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 46, p. 265 C.

enters into particulars to show that each ceremony had a special meaning attached to it in relation to Christ and his work. In fact, everything was symbolic. "And all the other injunctions given by Moses, without one exception, I can prove to you, if I were to go over them one by one, to be types and symbols (*τύποις καὶ σύμβολα*) and announcements of what was to happen to Christ, of those who, it was foreknown, were to put their trust in Him, and of what was in like manner to be done by Christ Himself^r."

It is worthy of notice that Justin nowhere speaks of the law of Moses as having an educating power. On the contrary, he regards the ceremonial law as a punishment inflicted on the Jews for their worship of the golden calf, and as preventive of farther impieties and idolatries, but nothing more. At the same time, however, it is to be noted that Justin deals with the Mosaic law purely as ceremonial, with its feasts, its Sabbaths, and its circumcision. He recognises in it also the inculcation of "what is naturally noble and pious and righteous." They who do such deeds, he maintains, will be saved, as Noah and Enoch and Jacob, who knew nothing of the ceremonial law^s. But this moral part of the law does not come much in the range of his discussion. He has to separate very distinctly the moral from the ceremonial, and he saw nothing in the literal interpretation of the ceremonial but a proof of the hardness of the Jewish heart, though, in the symbolic interpretation, every arrangement was pregnant with Christian prophecy.

The second part of Justin's argument turns solely on the interpretation of Scripture. Was Jesus who was crucified the Messiah predicted in the Old Testament? Justin proceeds to prove this in rather a novel fashion. He shows first that the God often referred to in the Old Testament was not the Supreme Father of all, but the Christ. And after having got this clue to the explanation of the Old Testament, he proceeds to discuss the various prophecies that speak of the birth, life,

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 42, p. 261 B.

^s Ibid. c. 45, p. 263 D, 264 A.

death, and resurrection of the Christ, refuting the objections of Trypho, and showing how they were all fulfilled in Christ.

In the last part of his argument Justin shows that the trust of the Jews in their descent from Abraham was vain, that the Old Testament distinctly points to the Gentiles as the recipients of God's favour, and that it speaks of an Israel which is not the result of earthly relationship, but is composed of all the good, whatever be their earthly position.

In discussing these several questions Justin incidentally brings out the whole evidence for the truth of Christianity. A noble moral tone pervades Justin's reasonings, and it is no doubt this which would really give him the advantage in the discussion. It is the spirit in Justin himself that is the most powerful argument, and this spirit in Justin is but representative of the loving and noble spirit of Christianity, which stands out in vivid contrast with the narrow and bitter intolerance of Judaism. The Jews had shown the bitterest hostility to the Christians, spreading false reports against them and putting them to death when they could.¹ "Ye slew the righteous one," Justin says, "and his prophets before Him, and now ye set at nought, and, as far as ye can, dishonour those who fix their hopes in Him, and in Him who sent Him, even the Almighty God, the Maker of All, cursing in your synagogues those who put their trust in Christ. For you have not power to be our murderers on account of those who have now the supremacy, but as often as ye could you did this."² Even while Justin mentions the cursing of Christians in the synagogue, he shows no feeling of bitterness, but his heart burns with love for the Jews. "You," he says, "in your synagogues curse all who are made Christians by Him [Christ], and so do the other nations who give reality to your curse, putting to death those who merely confess that they are Christians; to all of whom we say, 'Ye are our brothers; know the truth of God more thoroughly.'" And, after stating that Christians will die rather than deny Christ, he goes on: "And in addition to all these things we pray for

¹ See above. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 17, p. 234 E, 235 A. ² Ibid. c. 16, p. 234 B C.

you, that Christ may have mercy on you. For He Himself taught us to pray even for enemies, saying, 'Be ye kind and merciful, as your heavenly Father^x.'” This high moral tone pervades the whole of Justin's discussion. He rejoices that a remnant of the Jews will be brought to Christ.

Justin's activity extended also to the heretics. As we have seen already, he wrote a work against all the heresies that had appeared. The loss of this work, no doubt, deprives us of much information with regard to the careers of those who formed the heresies, for Justin was a contemporary of many of them. He mentions in particular that Marcion of Pontus was alive and actively engaged in propagating his doctrines when he wrote his first Apology. Justin's temper of mind fitted him for dealing candidly with those who differed from him, and he was evidently a man who was slow to believe evil reports. Notwithstanding this, Justin speaks most strongly and decidedly against the heretics whom he mentions. He asserts in the case of all of them that their teaching was inspired and aided by the demons. He accuses Simon of giving himself out as a god, and he asserts that some in his own day worshipped him as the First God, and Helena, who had been a prostitute, as his first notion. He affirms that Menander persuaded his followers that they would not die, and some in his own day still adhered to that opinion. And of Marcion of Pontus he states that he taught men to deny the Maker of All and to believe that some other had done greater things, inasmuch as he was greater, and that he had the help of the demons in spreading this doctrine over every race of men. He says he does not know whether these heretics are guilty of the crimes imputed to Christians—indiscriminate intercourse and the eating of human flesh^y. In the Dialogue with Trypho he speaks more sweepingly against heretics. He mentions by name the Marciani, Valentiniani, Basilidiani, and Saturniliani. He asserts that their teachings proceed “from the spirits of error,” and contrasts them with true Christians, “the disciples of the genuine and pure teach-

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 96, p. 323 D, 324 A.

^y Apol. i. cc. 26, 56.

ing of Jesus Christ." He says, "There are and were many who taught to speak and do godless and blasphemous things, coming forward in the name of Jesus," blaspheming, as he mentions particularly, the Maker of All, and Christ, and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He affirms that he knows "them to be godless and impious and unjust, and instead of worshipping Jesus, confess Him only in name." He says that they, moreover, "take part in lawless and godless rites," referring to their eating things offered to idols². He repeats most of these assertions in chapters 80, 82, where he mentions the millennium, the genuineness of which chapter we shall have to discuss in speaking of the millennium.

The only other subject that calls for discussion in regard to Justin is his position in regard to Christian doctrine. Three questions arise here:—How far was he influenced by Greek philosophy in doctrinal developments; how far may we affirm any of Justin's opinions to be new; and what was his relation to the various elements in the Christian Church?

The first question has generally been answered by the assertion that Justin was much indebted to Platonism for some of his doctrines, especially for his explanation of Christ as the Logos. We have already seen that so far was Justin from having really derived his opinions from Plato, that there can be no doubt that he fancied, by his absurd licence in interpretation, intimations of Christian doctrines in the Platonic writings of which Plato was entirely ignorant. He unquestionably felt more sympathy with Socrates and Plato than with other philosophers; but there is not a single proof that he borrowed any essential doctrine from them, consciously or unconsciously. He agrees with Socrates, that the world was made for man, and occasionally he uses Platonic language. But this is all. Indeed, it is remarkable how Justin, trained as he was in philosophic schools, has entirely abstained from the expression of philosophic ideas. He adheres closely to the phraseology of the Old Testament, and discusses

² Dial. c. Tryph. c. 35, p. 253 C D.

human nature concretely, not abstractly. Duncker and some others have tried to exhibit what the psychology of Justin was; but the only important passages which they quote are taken from the treatise on the Resurrection and the Platonic discussion in the commencement of the Dialogue with Trypho. They are thus entirely irrelevant; the one set as being taken from a work not proved to be Justin's, and the other as being taken from an account of a discussion held when Justin was a heathen. If they prove anything at all, however, they prove that Justin rejected the Platonic psychology. The old man denies the natural immortality of the soul. Justin seems to have been much more influenced by the Stoic philosophy. This influence acted unconsciously on him, and, as it were, by antagonism, for he had to fight with it. But being the pervading philosophy of the day, it sank insensibly into Justin's mind, and is clearly perceptible in his doctrine of the spermatic Logos. The idea of reason pervading men, and seeds of it distributed more or less in them, is eminently Stoic. And the materialistic tendency seen in the reason which he assigns for the supreme God not appearing in the burning bush, or in one locality, plainly indicates the same pervasive influence^a.

The novelty of Justin's opinions, especially in regard to Christ, has been the subject of warm discussion. Justin's writings unquestionably are the first to contain the doctrine that Jesus is the Reason as well as the Creative Word. The two meanings of the word 'Logos' are applied clearly and precisely by Justin to Christ. Moreover, in Justin occurs for the first time the identification of Jesus with the God in the Old Testament who makes Himself visible in earthly manifestations. But it would be very rash to assert that Justin was really the first to apply the full idea of the Logos to the person Jesus, and to explain by it the theophanies in the Old Testament. Justin shows no consciousness of

^a See Duncker's Programme. *Apologetarum secundi sæculi de essentialibus naturæ humanæ partibus placita exposuit Ludovicus Duncker. Particula I. Gottingæ, 1844.*

developing Christian doctrine, and the whole circumstances of the case warrant us in concluding that we have in him a decided advance in the formation of a Christian theology; but that this advance was made in utter **unconsciousness** and in **consequence of numerous external** influences. The Apostles Paul and John both speak distinctly of the pre-existence of Christ, and of God as having made the world through Him. John even calls him the Logos. This much of Justin's doctrine was in the Church in its earliest times. Justin advances a step in the exposition, and as Philo had used the Logos to explain the theophanies, Justin interprets as a Christian, and, making the personal Christ the Logos, makes the personal Christ the God who appeared. There is no reason to suppose that Justin borrowed directly from Philo. This is not at all necessary. Philo's method of interpretation was the prevalent one among the Christians in the earliest times, with the difference that they regarded the concrete human Christ as the key, instead of an undefined Logos. Justin had simply to apply Philo's method Christianised, or, in other words, the Christian method; and all he has done is to apply that method most fully and minutely. The result is that an unquestionably new mode of speaking of Christ is introduced. He is now for the first time recognised fully and clearly as God; not merely the Son of God, but God. Consequently Justin has to explain how He could be God and yet there be but one Supreme God and Father of all.

The attempt at a solution of this theological problem appears for the first time in Justin; but we may well believe that the matter had been discussed to some extent in Christian assemblies before it found its way into writings. At the same time, it is to be observed that Justin's advance is only a very slight one. He does not divide Christ into two natures. He does not speak abstractly of Christ at all. With him Christ is one, and conceived concretely. It was the Logos that became man. It was the Logos that was man^b. Beyond

^b See Dorner, vol. i. pp. 433, 434.

this Justin does not inquire. And in his explanation he is equally concrete. Jesus is God's Son, therefore partakes of God's substance; and the mode of the participation Justin explains by a purely material image.

Justin is also the first to apply the word 'Logos' in the sense of 'Reason' to Christ. He is the first to explain how heathens who lived with Reason were Christians. How far his fellow Christians agreed with him in thus finding Christ wherever there was rational conduct it is difficult to say. But Justin was here following the more usual meaning of 'Logos' in Philo, and he was, as we have seen, influenced by the Stoic philosophy. The Christians after Justin generally adopted both meanings, though they might not make the inferences from them which Justin makes.

The last point for our discussion is Justin's relation to his fellow Christians. Justin's own words seem to me to settle this point. Justin welcomes all men as Christians who put their confidence in Christ, whether they agreed with his opinions on the Logos or not, or whether they observed the law or not, provided they did not insist on their peculiar opinions as essential. The two chapters in which Justin states his opinions deserve careful consideration, and therefore I translate all the important passages.

"Then inquired Trypho again, 'If any one, knowing that these things are so, along with a full knowledge that this is the Christ, and a confidence in Him and obedience to Him, also wish to keep these ordinances of the law, will he be saved?'

"And I said, 'As it seems to me, I say that such an one will be saved, if he do not strive in every way to persuade the rest of men, I mean those of the Gentiles who have been circumcised from error through Christ, to keep the same ordinances as himself, alleging that they will not be saved unless they keep them, as you were doing in the beginning of our discussion, when you affirmed that I should not be saved unless I kept them.'

"Then said he, 'Why did you say, As it seems to me,

such an one will be saved? Are there any who say that such persons will not be saved?

“‘There are some,’ I answered Trypho, ‘who dare to refuse even to join with such in conversation or in family intercourse, with whom I do not agree. But if they, in consequence of the weakness of their mind, wish to observe, as far as they can now, all that portion of the law of Moses that, as we think, was appointed on account of the hardness of the people’s hearts, and if, at the same time, they also perform those eternally and naturally just and pious acts inculcated in the law, and place their hopes in this Christ, and if they choose to live together with Christians and the faithful, as I said before, not persuading them either to be circumcised like themselves, or to keep the Sabbaths, or to observe any other suchlike institutions, I declare my opinion to be that we ought to welcome these, and share all things with them, as being kinsmen and brothers. But if those of your race who assert that they put their confidence in this Christ, O Trypho, compel by every means those of the Gentiles who trust in this Christ to live according to the law appointed through Moses, and if they do not choose to join them in such familiar intercourse, these I in like manner do not welcome. But in regard to those who are persuaded by them to observe the law along with a steady confession of the Christ of God, I imagine that perhaps they will be saved.’”

Justin then affirms that those who first have confessed Christ, and then passed to the observance of the law, denying Christ^d, will not be saved if they do not repent before their death. He affirms also that those of the seed of Abraham who observe the law will not be saved if they do not put their trust in Christ, especially if they have cursed Christians^e.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 47.

^d Schliemann supposes that a total denial of Christ cannot be meant here: but Justin’s words do not warrant the milder interpretation which he wishes to make. He is unquestionably right in regarding the words as applicable to the Gentile Christians. Die Clementinen, p. 554, note 3.

^e c. 47.

Justin in this passage plainly asserts that he is willing to fraternize with Jewish Christians who are willing to associate with him, and at the same time not insist on the observance of the law. The passage, moreover, asserts that there were some who would not associate with those Christians who observed the law. The passage, moreover, is proof positive that Justin was not a Jewish Christian, and had no leaning in that direction. He regards their adherence to the observance of the law as proof of the weakness of their mind. The various opinions which he adopted, and which are given in an exposition of his theology, are good evidence that he held the essential doctrines common to all Christians. Those who have attempted to prove him Ebionitic or Pauline have signally failed. Justin is Christian. Baur is right in asserting that he cannot be placed on the one side or the other with certainty^f. The reasons which have led some to suppose him anti-Pauline are mainly these. Justin nowhere mentions Paul. He seems to go against Paul's deliverance on eating food offered to idols. And Justin represents Christ rather as the teacher and law-giver than as the Saviour of mankind. These reasons do not stand examination. Justin does not mention Paul; this is a fact; but neither does he mention Peter, or James, or the Gospel of John, or the Epistles—nothing but the Apocalypse of John in a doubtful passage. He evidently does not mention Paul because it was not his way to quote from the writings of the Apostles. Yet in many portions of his work, and especially in those chapters in which he discusses the abrogation of the law, he is Pauline in his arguments and sometimes in his language^g.

The appeal to the passage in Justin on the eating of things offered to idols is a vain one. Justin does not pronounce an abstract judgment on the question. Justin asserts that "those

^f *Das Christenthum*, p. 139.

^g See, for instance, *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 11*, p. 228 E. For the various passages in which he is supposed to refer to the letters of Paul, see Otto's *Index*, tom. i. Pars ii. p. 509.

of the Gentiles who have come to know God the maker of the universe through Jesus that was crucified," not only do not commit idolatry, "but endure all manner of evil treatment and punishment even to death rather than commit idolatry or eat things offered to idols^g." Justin here simply states a fact. The Gentile Christians, as far as he knew, endured death rather than eat things offered to idols. Trypho interrupts him with the statement that he had heard of many called Christians who ate things offered to idols, and said that they were none the worse for it. Justin replies that those persons were not true Christians, but men who spoke godless and blasphemous sentiments: in other words, that they belonged to the heretical sects. And the chapter in which he gives this explanation^h is the chapter which we have already examined as throwing light on his relation to heretics. Here again Justin simply relates a fact, not an opinion.

Justin's presentation of Christ rather as a teacher than a Saviour is also a mere accident. He does present Christ as a Saviour most distinctly, and the prominence given to the one view or the other depends entirely on the necessities of his subject.

We have still to give Justin's opinion with regard to those who believed Christ to be simply a man. Trypho, in c. 48, says that the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence as God and of his becoming man is a very extraordinary one, and indeed a foolish one. Justin replies that he knows that the doctrine appears extraordinary, especially to the Jews. Before discussing the point, however, Justin remarks by way of precaution that Jesus being the Christ of God remains a fact, even if he fail to prove His pre-existence, and urges Trypho not to deny on this account that "He is the Christ, if it should appear that He was a man born of men, and if it should be proved that He became Christ by election." Then follows an important sentence, which, unfortunately, is liable

^g Dial. c. Tryph. c. 34, p. 252 E.

^h c. 35.

to several interpretations, none of which can be affirmed to be certainly the correct one. The Greek is as follows:—
Καὶ γάρ εἰσὶ τινες, ὧ φίλοι, ἔλεγον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον ἀποφαινόμενοι· οἷς οὐ συντίθεται, οὐδ' ἂν πλείστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάσαντες εἴποιεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀνθρωπείοις διδάγμασι κεκελεύσμεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ τῶν μακαρίων προφητῶν κηρυχθεῖσι καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ διδαχθεῖσι. Kaye translates the passage as follows:—"For there are some, my friends, of our race (Christians as opposed to Jews, *ἡμέτερον γένος*) who confess that He was the Christ, but affirm that He was a man born of human parents, with whom I do not agree; nor should I, even if very many of those who think as I do were to say so; since we are commanded by Christ to attend not to the doctrines of men, but to that which was proclaimed by the blessed prophets and taught by Himself." He adds that he understands by *πλείστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάσαντες* those who agreed with Justin in professing Christianity¹. The difficulty lies with the *τινες*. Who are they? Most commentators take the *τινες* to be heretics, and some, like Bull, changing *ἡμετέρου* into *ὑμετέρου*, make the heretics Jewish Christians. It seems to me that this interpretation is far from likely. I allow, indeed, that Justin sometimes speaks of heretics as being "among us," and as calling themselves by the name of Christians. But it appears to me unlikely that Justin would introduce the opinion of heretics without mentioning that it was such. Then the introduction of heretics is out of place, and destroys to a certain extent Justin's advice to Trypho. Justin urges him to accept the conclusion that Jesus is the Christ, even if he cannot go farther than believe that He was born of human parents and became the Christ by election. Is it likely that Justin would present as an inducement to this belief the fact that some heretical sect of Christians with whom he and most Christians had no intercourse had also come to this conclu-

¹ Kaye, Justin Martyr, p. 51, note.

sion? What the better would Trypho be of his new belief if it were to land him in a narrow sect, of whom Justin would probably affirm that they acknowledged Christ only in name? It appears to me far more likely that Justin meant real Christians, men whom he accepted as Christian brothers, and into whose ranks he would willingly see Trypho enter, if he could not induce him to believe in the nobler and higher doctrine with regard to Christ. The words that follow seem to me to bear out the supposition that the *τινές* were real Christians in full fellowship with the rest. I translate them in the main with Thirlby, quite differently from Kaye: "With whom I do not agree, nor would most, having reached the same opinions as myself, say so, since." The objections to Kaye's translation are grammatical. Kaye makes Justin join *ἀν* for *ἐάν* with the optative, a construction not to be paralleled in Justin, as far as I know, and extremely unlikely in itself. Then he gives no force to the aorist in *δοξάσαντες*, but translates as if it were *δοξάζοντες*; and, finally, he inserts the article, translating as if it were *οἱ δοξάζοντες*. According to my translation, the meaning is that most Christians had come to the same conclusions as Justin, namely, that Christ pre-existed and was God, and therefore they would refuse to agree to the opinion of the *τινές*. The clause in which the reason is given I take to refer to the Jewish teachings. Justin had noticed before that the Jews "wished not to understand the things of God, nor to do them, but to understand and do those of their teachers." From this we gather that Justin looked on the interpretation of the Old Testament, which made the Messiah a man, to be merely human teaching. He looked on his own interpretation as the real teaching of the prophets and Christ. Not at all noticing that it was merely his own interpretation, but identifying the subjective thought in his own mind with the infallibly true objective statement, he regards his own thought as infallibly true. If we were to read *ὑμετέρου*, a not unlikely emendation, then my supposition would be strengthened. For it would then appear that some of those

Jews who were converted brought along with them the Messianic ideas of their teachers (all the Jews, according to Justin's statement, at that time expecting a merely human Messiah), and refused to yield to the wider and larger interpretations of the Old Testament which the great majority in the Christian Church accepted as the only correct ones.

From the whole passage, then, I gather that Justin insisted on a belief in Jesus, as the Christ, as the essential point. If he could move Trypho to this, he would have made him a Christian. This is the inference from the sentences that precede the disputed one, and the only way in which this inference has been staved off is by supposing that Justin assumes an indifference which he did not feel as "a strategetical means of securing his object^k." But such a supposition is based on no good reason. For what would be the use of persuading Trypho to believe that Jesus, though born of human parents, was the Christ, if in order to salvation it was absolutely necessary that he should believe also that He pre-existed and was God? The fact of his Messiahship was not a step in the argument to his pre-existence. And then it is utterly unfair to Justin to suppose that he would assume anything for the sake of argument which he did not believe, or that he would condescend to deception on any point, much less on such an important point. Justin is nobly ingenuous, and to all such insinuations as that now made against him we may oppose his own statement to Trypho, "I am not such a wretch as to say anything different from what I think^l." Justin then did not really regard the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence and divinity as essential to salvation. At the same time it is utterly absurd to suppose from this that he did not regard the doctrine as a very important one. His whole writings bear testimony to his earnestness in upholding it, and no doubt, though he would not exclude those who refused to believe it from his Christian brotherhood, yet he felt that it was a very important doctrine and contained great issues in it. At the same time we must take care not to mistake the doctrine

^k See Semisch, vol. i. p. 321, note 2.

^l c. 80, p. 306 C.

of those whom he was willing to recognise as Christians. The doctrine is not that Christ was a mere man and wielded only human power, but that being originally only a man God had chosen Him to be the Messiah, had endowed Him with extraordinary supernatural gifts for this purpose, and had in every way fitted Him for rescuing men from sin, death, and the devil. There is no reason to suppose that they would deny any of those assertions made in the New Testament, that all power had been given Him in heaven and on earth, that every knee was to bow to Him, and that He was the power, the wisdom, the righteousness of God.

If my interpretation of the perplexing sentence in the end of the chapter is correct, then we learn that there actually were some real Christians who maintained that Christ was a man born of men, and that though their numbers were few, they were yet recognised and treated as Christian brothers. Much confusion has been thrown round the discussion of the passage by identifying these few Christians with the Ebionites, and by attributing to Justin's 'some' the doctrines which later writers attributed to the Ebionites. Justin gives them no name. He does not mention the Ebionites in his list of heretics. He says nothing elsewhere about a heresy that denied Christ's pre-existence. And, in fact, we have no right to identify them with any sect of later times. There seems every reason to believe that they were within the Church, that they were not a party at all, and that they were peculiar simply in this one opinion.

XIII. ABSTRACTS.

I. THE FIRST APOLOGY OF JUSTIN MARTYR.

Justin begins his Apology by an appeal to the persons addressed to free their minds from prejudice and to judge according to reason. He shows the absurdity and injustice of condemning Christians, simply on their confessing that they were such. Their lives should be examined. Philosophers were allowed to teach what they liked. But in the case of Christians the rulers were actuated by an irrational

impulse proceeding from demons—of the same nature as that which had impelled the Athenians to put Socrates to death. They were not atheists. They did not indeed believe in the demons; but they worshipped God the Father of righteousness, his Son, the host of angels, and the prophetic Spirit.

Some one, however, might say that several Christians had been convicted of evil-doing. He does not deny this: but he maintains that that is no reason why Christians should be punished without trial. A fair trial is all that he wants. As far as the simple fact of their Christianity is concerned, they could easily deny it; but they wish to live a pure life, and cannot lie. To shew that this is the teaching of Christ, we shall go over some of the main points. He mentions, first, the belief in a judgment by Christ and a resurrection^m. From this he diverges and alludes to the circumstance that they did not honour the gods with garlands and offerings. He shows how derogatory to the honour of God is the heathen conception of Him and his worshipⁿ, that God does not require material sacrifice, but accepts those who imitate his goodness, and will at last render them partakers of a life with Him, reigning with Him in incorruption^o. This reign is not, as some thoughtlessly imagined, a human or earthly kingdom^p. In fact, Christians help earthly governments; for the hope of a future state of bliss and the fear of eternal punishment have the most salutary effects on the morals of men; for Christians believe that it is impossible for word or thought to escape the notice of God. Justin states that he does not suppose that the emperors would do anything unreasonable: but that if they did persist in preferring customs to truths, they might try their best. They would never succeed against Christianity. Their teacher, Christ, had foretold this. They saw his prophecies daily coming to pass, and they were thereby confirmed in the truth of their religion, for prophecy is the work of God. Justin says that he might here stop, since he had shown his demands to be just and reasonable; but as

^m c. 8.ⁿ c. 9.^o c. 10.^p c. 11.

it is difficult to change a soul held by ignorance, he will add a few things to what he had said ^q.

He asserts again, then, that Christians were not atheists, worshipping, as they did, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit^r. He warns the emperors to be on their guard against the demons. Christians themselves had been, under the same influence, led into all vice; but what a change had come over them through Christ; from hatred to love, from filth to purity, from cupidity to liberality, from vice to virtue. He appeals to Christ's teaching as showing what were their maxims^s. He then quotes many of the sayings of Christ^t. He urges the emperor and his friends to believe these sayings, and he appeals to various heathen rites and teachings as corroborative of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments^u. He obviates the objection to a resurrection which consisted in the assertion that it was impossible^x. He shows the resemblance between the doctrines of the Sibyl, Hystaspes, and the Stoics in regard to the end of the world and the belief of the Christians, and this leads him to a general notice of the points in which he can trace a resemblance between heathen and Christian opinions^y. He appeals most particularly to the circumstance that the life, death, and ascension of Christ are paralleled by similar beliefs in regard to the sons of Zeus; but he observes that the horrid deeds ascribed to Zeus and his sons were the inventions of demons^z. He repeats that Christ was in an especial manner the Son of God, the *Λόγος* of God, even as Hermes among the Greeks was the announcing Word (*Λόγος*). And he shows that they can take no objection to his having suffered, as the sons of Zeus did the same. His birth through a virgin is also paralleled in Perseus, and his raising the dead in Asklepios^a. He then asserts that it was the demons who prevented heathens from recognising the facts of Christ's life and character, and from believing that the teachings of Christ were alone true and older than those

^q c. 12.^r c. 13.^s c. 14.^t cc. 15, 16, 17.^u c. 18.^x c. 19.^y c. 20.^z c. 21.^a c. 22.

of the Greeks^b. They did this by misrepresenting the truth in the fables of the poets, just as in his own day it was the demons that got up the reports of the Christians having done evil deeds. He proceeds to prove this last point by three assertions. First, that Christians were hated for difference of religion. The gods of the nations spread over the earth were as various as the nations themselves, and yet they were not interfered with^c. In the second place, men of every race worshipped gods like Dionysus, Apollo, Aphrodite, who were said to have committed the greatest crimes. Christians, on the other hand, had given themselves to the one unbegotten God, and yet they were persecuted^d. And in the third place, the Romans had granted perfect toleration to men like Simon Magus and Menander, whom Justin believed to have been sent forth by the demons. He says he does not know whether these heretics who were also called Christians were guilty of the crimes of which real Christians were accused^e. He is sure, however, that real Christians were not guilty of the crimes, while the great majority of heathens wallowed in the vices for which they said they disliked the Christians. They even assigned their profligacy to the institutions of the gods: and of these gods the serpent was the common symbol^f. But with Christians the leader of the evil demons was called serpent. And he and all his followers will be punished at last, and the punishment would have been by this time inflicted had not God known that some men would be saved through repentance^g. In farther confirmation of the fact that Christians did not indulge in licentious practices, Justin observes that Christians either did not marry at all or married only to rear children^h. He then supposes the objection made that Christ performed his miracles by magic. To this he regards it as the most satisfactory reply of all that he could appeal to those who had prophesied such things of Christⁱ. He

^b I have changed $\eta\delta\eta$ into $\mu\eta$. The connexion is somewhat obscure, but it seems to me to become clear with this change.

^c c. 24.

^d c. 25.

^e c. 26.

^f c. 27.

^g c. 28.

^h c. 29.

ⁱ c. 30.

explains the nature of the Septuagint translation, and relates what was prophesied in the Old Testament regarding Christ^k. He quotes several passages from the Old Testament and gives his allegorical interpretation of them^l. He then remarks that the Jews misunderstood many points of the Old Testament from not observing that the prophet spoke in many persons^m. And he adduces as examples several passages, such as Isaiah i. 3, spoken in the name of the Fatherⁿ, Isaiah lxxv. 2, &c., in the person of the Son^o. He then shows how the prophetic Spirit foretold the spread of the Gospel by means of Christ's apostles^p, and this leads him to quote the whole of the first and second Psalms as an illustration of the prophetic Spirit's mode of exhorting men how to live^q, and of his prophesying the principal events in the life of Christ, and he then adduces 1 Chron. xvi. 23, 25-31, as a prophecy of Christ's reign after his crucifixion^r. He explains how the prophetic Spirit speaks of things future as past, and shows that this must be the way of understanding the prophecies, since the statements of David were applicable to Christ alone^s. To prevent the supposition that the Christians believed in fate, because they believed in prophecies, he goes on to exhibit the Christian doctrine of free-will^t, showing that it is recognised by the prophetic Spirit, and that it is not inconsistent with God's foreknowledge^u. He returns again to the prophecies, explaining how it was foretold that God would raise Christ from the dead and lead Him up to heaven^x. He supposes, however, that some might base an objection on the circumstance that Christ was born only one hundred and fifty years before. They might assert that therefore those who lived before that time ought to be, according to the Christians, irresponsible. He therefore expounds his opinion of Christ as the Λόγος of whom the whole race had a share, and according to whom even heathens like Socrates lived in some measure^y. He then proceeds to adduce the prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem^z, of

^k c. 31.^l cc. 32-35.^m c. 36.ⁿ c. 37.^o c. 38.^p c. 39.^q c. 40.^r c. 41.^s c. 42.^t c. 43.^u c. 44.^x c. 45.^y c. 46.^z c. 47.

Christ's powers of healing all diseases and raising the dead, then of his own death^a, of his rejection by the Jews and the worship of Him by the Gentiles^b, of his crucifixion, and of his coming a second time in glory^c, of his inexplicable descent, and his rule over his enemies, of his ascension into heaven, and his second coming^d. He then asserts that we ought to have perfect confidence in the unfulfilled prophecies, for that they will be as surely fulfilled as the others. He quotes some of these prophecies relating to the second coming of Christ and the resurrection of men accompanying it, the punishment of the wicked, and the too late repentance of the Jews^e. He says he thinks these prophecies enough as proof, though he might have adduced many more. And he asks what evidence for the fact that Christ was the Son of God could be better than that derived from the circumstance that it was foretold, before He became man, that He would appear. Justin appeals also to the desolation of Jerusalem patent to all eyes, and to the incontestable fact that there were more and truer Christians from Gentiles than from Jews, which he says was prophesied^f. He then observes how the demons imitated the prophecies that related to Christ in order to seduce men, and traces the resemblance in the stories of Dionysus, Bellerophon, Perseus, and Asklepios^g. He remarks that in the case of none of the sons of Zeus who were put to death did *crucifixion* take place, and he proceeds to show how universal the form of the cross is in nature^h. The demons were not content with altering and turning into fables the prophecies with regard to Christ, but after his appearance they raised up such men as Simon and Menander to deceive the people by magic miraclesⁱ. These demons wish to persuade men that there will be no punishment after death^k. They also raised up Marcion from Pontus, through whom the demons turn men away from the true God and his Son^l. He then proceeds to show how Plato borrowed some of his teachings from Moses^m.

^a c. 48.^b c. 49.^c c. 50.^d c. 51.^e c. 52.^f c. 53.^g c. 54.^h c. 55.ⁱ c. 56.^k c. 57.^l c. 58.^m cc. 59, 60.

And after that he relates how Christians dedicate themselves to God ⁿ, but on mentioning the *λειτουργία* he is led to remark that the demons instituted purificatory rites in imitation of it. They also made worshippers take off their shoes in imitation of Moses ^o. Jews maintained that it was the unnameable God that appeared to Moses in the bush. He undertakes to show that it was God's Son or Λόγος ^p. The erection of a statue of Proserpine at fountains was also a perversion by the demons of a passage in Moses, as was also the story of the origin of Athena ^q. After this digression he proceeds to relate the mode in which a man is admitted into the Christian community, and describes the proceedings of the Christians on Sunday ^r. He then appeals to the sense of justice in the emperors, and appends the decree of Hadrian ^s.

II. THE SECOND APOLOGY.

The second Apology commences with an appeal to the Romans. He alludes in the first chapter to the influence exerted by demons over judges, inducing them to condemn Christians; and then he relates a case which has especially called forth his present appeal ^t. A vicious woman lived with a vicious man. The vicious woman became a Christian and tried to convert her husband, but in vain. She wished then to procure a divorce. Her friends urged her to wait; but after waiting she found herself compelled again to ask for a divorce that she might not be a partner in his crimes. She obtained the divorce. The husband determined to wreak his vengeance on the Christians. He urged a hecatontarch, a friend of his, to seize hold of Ptolemæus, a teacher of the Christian doctrines whom Urbicus had punished, and to ask him if he were a Christian. He confessed. Urbicus condemned him. A Christian of the name of Lucius saw this and asked Urbicus why he condemned a man merely on account of the name of Christian. Urbicus gave no reply; asked if Lucius

ⁿ c. 61.

^o c. 62.

^p c. 63.

^q c. 64.

^r cc. 65-67.

^s c. 68.

^t c. 1.

also was a Christian, and, on his confessing, condemned him. Another Christian acted in like manner and shared the same fate^u. Justin expresses a fear that he also will be put into the stocks, naming Crescens the philosopher as the man most likely to plot against him. He mentions that he had disputed with Crescens, and is willing to show the disputation to the emperors if they have not seen it. Crescens, he asserts, either knows nothing of the Christians, or, if he does, he does not venture to speak out^x. He supposes some one to say: Why, if you go to God after death, don't you kill yourselves immediately and save us all trouble? We should thus at once, he replies, put an end to the spread of God's truth and should be acting contrary to his design in creation and his will^y. Then some one might say: If God were on your side, you would not be overpowered by the wicked. In answering this question he explains the origin of demons, Christ coming to destroy their power, and God's putting off the destruction of the world until the whole seed of Christians be gathered^z. He remarks that the demons persecuted even some of the Stoics, because they had in them the seed of the Λόγος. How much more likely that they would persecute Christians who have the knowledge of the whole Λόγος^a! He then proceeds to reply to the objection that what Christians say about future punishments are mere sounding words to frighten people. His reply is that punishments are an essential part of the constitution of the world, that there would be no virtue or vice if there was no punishment^b. He returns to the subject of the Λόγος, and shows how the demons persecuted such men as Socrates who had a share of the Logos. But Christ was the whole Logos. Socrates was not able to persuade any one to die for his belief; but Christ is obeyed not by philosophers only, but by uneducated tradesmen, for He is the power of the unspeakable Father^c. The demons, besides, would have had no power over us, had not death been a debt which all must pay. In special reference to Crescens he now relates the fable about

^u c. 2.^x c. 3.^y c. 4.^z cc. 5-7.^a c. 8.^b c. 9.^c c. 10.

Hercules told in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. The Christians choosing virtue are enabled to despise death^d. He himself was once a Platonic, and was struck with wonder at the manly way in which Christians endured the cruelties perpetrated on them. The Christians might have tried to conceal their principles: but they were not afraid of death and they were bound to speak the truth. He repels strongly the accusation that the Christians could murder men; and shows how easily they might have justified the practice, if it had been theirs, by appeal to heathen rites and myths^e. Justin proclaims himself to be a Christian; not that the teachings of Christ are different from those of Plato and other philosophers, but they are more complete. They had part of the Logos—Christians have the whole in Christ^f. He then urges the emperors to let the sentiments of the Christians be everywhere known, and asserts that his great desire is that all men everywhere be deemed worthy of the truth. He prays that it may be granted unto them to give a fair judgment in respect to the Christians^g.

III. DIALOGUE WITH TRYPHO.

The Dialogue with Trypho opens nearly in the same way as Cicero's *Brutus*. "While I was walking in the morning in the walks of the Xystus, some one, accompanied by others, met me with the words, 'Hail, philosopher!' And on this he turned round and walked along with me, and his friends also turned round along with him." The person thus accosting Justin was Trypho the Jew. He had been attracted by Justin's philosophic cloak, and he immediately enters on a discussion regarding philosophy; in the course of which Justin relates his conversion to Christianity^h. The friends of Trypho burst out into a laugh at the conclusion of his narrative, and Trypho himself, with a quiet smile, says that it would have been much better for Justin to have remained a philosopher. He recommends him to be circumcised,

^d c. 11.^e c. 12.^f c. 13.^g cc. 14, 15.^h cc. 1-8.

to keep the Sabbath, the feasts and new moons, and observe all the law. Justin, in reply, says that he will shew that he has not trusted to vain words, if he but wish to wait. On this the friends of Trypho become again uproarious in their laughter, and Justin was for going away. Trypho seizes him by the cloak, and he and Justin retire to a quiet place to carry on their discussion; two of Trypho's friends go away. The Dialogue then really commencesⁱ.

Justin asks Trypho if he finds fault with Christians because they do not observe the law, or because he believes the accusations of cannibalism and licentiousness made against Christians to be true. Trypho replies, that he does not believe the accusations, but that he cannot understand how men could lay claim to piety and yet violate the law of Moses, especially in regard to circumcision^k. Justin replies that there is a new law promised in the Old Testament, that this law displaces the old, and that this new law is Christ. Henceforth there is to be no more circumcision of flesh, but of the heart: and there is to be no special Sabbath day, but men ought to sabbatize the true Sabbath every day and hour. Justin appeals in proof of this to many passages of the Old Testament^l. The circumcision of Abraham was given as a mark that the Jews might be distinct from other nations, and might be punished for their cruelty to Christ and Christians. As much as this was distinctly foretold by the prophets^m. The law was given to the Jews on account of their iniquities and hardness of heart. Adam, Abel, and Enoch, all the saints down to the time of Abraham, were uncircumcised, and yet pleased God. And all these and their sons, down to the time of Moses, pleased God, though they did not keep the Sabbath nor offer sacrificesⁿ. God ordered you to refrain from certain kinds of food that you might have Him before your eyes. He gave Noah full liberty to eat the flesh of all animals: but this liberty was taken away when ye set up a golden calf^o. These assertions are

ⁱ cc. 8, 9.^k c. 10.^l cc. 11-15.^m cc. 16, 17.ⁿ cc. 18, 19.^o c. 20.

proved by many passages from the Old and New Testaments^p. Circumcision, moreover, is not an act of righteousness: for women are capable of doing all the deeds of righteousness, but cannot be circumcised^q. The only true circumcision is the circumcision wrought by Christ on the heart: and only they who are holy and righteous will inherit Sion, whether they be circumcised and keep the Sabbath or not^r. Trypho objects that Justin selects those passages from the Prophets which speak of a spiritual circumcision, but omits to quote those which enjoin a fleshly one. Justin replies that the Prophets enjoin outward rites for the same reason as Moses; namely, on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Jews. And now only a short time was left to them to repent and receive Christ, as was prophesied, while God's pleasure has been manifested to the nations^s. Christ showed his power in subduing demons: and Christians look on Him as their ransom and helper^t. But if Christ showed so great power in the time of his humiliation, what will He show when He comes again in glory, as Daniel (vii. 9-23) has pointed out^u? Trypho objects that the prophecy of Daniel plainly points out the Son of Man as glorious, but the Christ of Christians had come under the greatest curse of the law—He was crucified. Justin replies that he had sufficiently answered this objection in quoting the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, but that he would enter now more fully into the passages which relate to Christ in the Old Testament. Accordingly he quotes and makes observations on many passages, refuting the Jewish reference of them to Jewish kings and prophets, and showing that they referred to Christ. Thus Psalm cx. refers to Christ and not to Hezekiah^v. And Psalm lxxii. does not refer to Solomon, but to the Christ of Christians; for Solomon went so far wrong as to commit idolatry, while Christians, through Christ, are able to refrain even from eating things sacrificed to idols^w. Trypho takes hold of the last remark, and asserts that there were many Christians who did not think it wrong

^p cc. 21, 22.^q c. 23.^r cc. 24-26.^s cc. 27-29.^t c. 30.^u c. 31.^v cc. 32, 33.^w c. 34.

to eat things sacrificed to idols. Justin replies that these were Christians only in name, that they blasphemed God, the Father of all, and that their appearance had been foretold by Christ^z. Trypho returns to the subject, and asks Justin to prove that the passages in the Old Testament really refer to the Christ of Christians. Justin replies that he will first prove that the Christ is called God and Lord of Hosts. He appeals to Psalms xxiv., xlvii., xcix., and xlv.^a Trypho again urges Justin to proceed to prove that the Christ of Christians was the Christ of the Scriptures. Justin replies that it has been proved; that, moreover, he will prove it more fully, but that he will now go on with the continuation of his subject^b. The paschal lamb was a type of Christ. The two goats were symbols of his two appearances^c. The offering of fine flour was a type of the eucharist. Circumcision was a type of the true circumcision of the heart^d. Twelve bells attached to the dress of the high priest were symbols of the twelve apostles, and every ordinance in the law of Moses foreshadowed something Christian^e. Circumcision, and sabbaths, and sacrifices, end in Christ. Justin will therefore quote the passages which refer to the birth of Christ, especially Isaiah vii. 10-16, the Jewish interpretation of which he will afterwards discuss^f. Meantime he warns Trypho and his companions not to trust in their descent from Abraham, but to lay hold of Abraham's faith. Only in Christ is their salvation; for so the Prophets testify^g. Trypho asks if those who kept the law will be like Noah and Enoch in the resurrection. Justin replies that they will be saved, since they did those things in the law which are naturally and eternally right, and therefore were righteous^h. Trypho then asks, if any wished still to keep the law, and at the same time put their trust in Christ, would they be saved? Justin replies that if they did not insist on the observation of the law by others, he would welcome them as brethren, and he believes that they would be savedⁱ. Trypho then remarks that the doctrine that Christ existed

^z c. 35.^a cc. 36-38.^b c. 39.^c c. 40.^d c. 41.^e c. 42.^f c. 43.^g c. 44.^h c. 45.ⁱ cc. 46, 47.

before the ages was a foolish one. Justin affirms that the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ may be denied by one who believes in Him as the Messiah. Trypho then affirms that Elias will come to announce his appearance. Justin affirms that the spirit of Elias did actually appear in John the Baptist, who was put to death by Herod^k. Trypho then asks Justin to prove to him that there can be another God besides the God who made all things. Justin asks permission to quote the passages in Isaiah xxxix. and xl., descriptive of John's office as forerunner^l. Trypho asserts that the application of these passages to John is doubtful. Justin relates the circumstances of John's career, and thinks that any one who knows these would not doubt in regard to the matter^m. Justin then quotes the passages Gen. xlix. 8-12, Zech. ix. 9, xiii. 7, and shows how minutely they foretold the circumstances of Christ's work and the spread of his power among Jews and Gentilesⁿ. Trypho again requests Justin to prove that there is another God besides the maker of all. Justin now sets to this work, and appeals first to the history of Abraham as given in Genesis. He maintains that one of the three angels who appeared to the patriarch is in another part of the narrative called God and Lord, and is distinguished from the Lord who is in heaven (Gen. xix. 24)^o. He then appeals to the history of Jacob, and God's wrestling with him, quoting largely the narrative from Genesis^p. And then he appeals to God's appearance in the bush to Moses^q. Trypho finds some difficulties in Justin's interpretation of the passage in Exodus, but they are satisfactorily removed^r. Justin gives more fully his ideas of the Logos, appealing to Prov. viii. 21-36 as proof that He was in the beginning^s. The words "Let us make man in our image" were addressed to the Logos, and the Logos is referred to in Joshua v. 13^t. Trypho requests Justin now to prove from the prophets that the Logos would become

^k cc. 48, 49.^l c. 50.^m c. 51.ⁿ cc. 52-54.^o cc. 55, 56.^p cc. 57, 58.^q c. 59.^r c. 60.^s c. 61.^t c. 62.

man, die, and rise again. Justin replies that he has done this already, and quotes again some of the passages which he had already adduced^u. Trypho says that the Jews, as they worship the true God, do not require to worship Christ or confess Him. Justin undertakes to show from the Scriptures that salvation is to be found only in Christ. He appeals to Psalms xcix., lxxii., and xix.^x Trypho says that he does not know what to make of the passage which says that God would not give his glory to another. Justin quotes the whole context, and shows that it is meant that God will give his glory to no other one than to Him who is the light of the nations. Trypho assents, and asks Justin to go on with his subject^y. Justin now attempts to prove that the Christ was born of a virgin from Isaiah vii. 10-16. Trypho objects that the right reading is 'young woman,' not virgin, and that the prophecy relates to Hezekiah and not to Christ. He moreover remarks that the story of the virgin-born Son of God is like some of the mythological stories of Greece^z. After some preliminary remarks, in the course of which he gives as a reason for the resemblances in Greek myths to facts in Christ's history, that the devil imitated Moses and the prophets through the Greek legends, he affirms that the statement of the Jews, that the Septuagint translation was in some points inaccurate, was not true, and that the Jewish teachers had tampered with the text of Scripture. Trypho demands proof of this assertion^a. Justin quotes four passages, which he affirms the Jews struck out. [Three of these are not found in our manuscripts, and the other occurs in them all^b.] Trypho remarks that he thought the words in Psalm xcvi., which Justin had just quoted, referred only to God the creator of all. Justin begins to show that they also refer to Christ, but something is here wanting in the text^c. Justin now proceeds to prove that he really became man. He affirms that from God's appearances to men in

^u c. 63.^x c. 64.^y c. 65.^z cc. 66, 67.^a cc. 68-71.^b cc. 72, 73.^c c. 74.

various shapes, it is not unreasonable to expect that He might become man, though not of human seed. And he points out passages in which his superhuman origin is intimated^d. Trypho requests Justin to return to the explanation of the passage Isaiah viii. 4, and Justin goes on to prove that it could not refer to Hezekiah. He details the circumstances narrated in the first and second chapters of Matthew's gospel, and maintains that they are complete fulfilments of the prophecy^e. Trypho finds fault with Justin for having spoken of *evil* angels. Justin adduces several passages to prove that some angels did revolt from God^f. Trypho asks Justin if he is serious in maintaining that Jerusalem will be rebuilt and all the saints will rejoice with Christ in it. Justin affirms that he is, and quotes Isaiah lxxv. and the authority of the apostle John in proof of a millennium^g. Moreover there are prophetic gifts now among Christians; and just as there were false prophets among the Jews beside the true, so there are false teachers beside the true among Christians^h. But the Jewish teachers are wrong in referring Psalm cx. to Hezekiah, for he was not a priest after the order of Melchizedek, and the other circumstances of the Psalm do not suit himⁱ. The prophecy in Isaiah vii. 14 also relates to Christ's birth through a virgin. The reading of the Jews—'a young woman'—is a corruption, for it would be no sign that a young woman should conceive. That was an ordinary occurrence^k. The words in Psalm xxiv. are applicable to Christ alone. Justin repeats these statements summarily for the sake of those who were absent from yesterday's discussion^l. The wood also, Justin remarks, is a symbol of Christ in the Old Testament. He quotes many passages to prove this^m. Trypho calls the attention of Justin to a passage in Isaiah xi., in which it was stated that the Spirit of God was to rest on the Christ, and inquires how the powers of the Spirit could be given to Him as

^d cc. 75, 76.^e cc. 80, 81.^k c. 84.^e cc. 77, 78.^h c. 82.ⁱ c. 85.^f c. 79.^l c. 83.^m c. 86.

needing them, if He had lived before the ages. Justin replies that all the powers of the Spirit finally rest in Christ, and this is all that is meant. Christ did what He did not for his own sake, but for the human race; and the Holy Spirit came down upon Him, that men might know He was the Christ^a. Trypho acknowledges that the Scriptures foretold that the Christ was to suffer, but he says that the circumstance that He died a death accursed in the sight of the law is a great difficulty to him. Justin replies by stating that it would have been of no consequence if the manner of his death had not been foretold; but that the cross is again and again mentioned in a way calculated to escape observation. The Jews, vainly trusting to their outward rites, which were plainly given on account of their hardness of heart, have not recognised these intimations. Such intimations are given in Moses stretching out his hand: and God made Moses make a brazen serpent and put it on a sign, though He had strictly forbidden the making of images. So Christ was not cursed though He hung on a tree, but died by God's will for the human race who were cursed^o. Moreover, various circumstances of Christ's death and resurrection are distinctly pointed out in the Prophets and Psalms. Justin quotes several passages and the whole of Psalm xxii.^p He then discusses the various assertions in this Psalm, and shows how completely they tally with the accounts given of Christ's death in the memoirs of the Apostles^q. He notices how the Psalm in the conclusion prophesies the resurrection of Christ, and adduces Christ's own sayings, and his giving no other sign but that of Jonah in confirmation^r. The Jews, notwithstanding this fulfilment of prophecy in Christ, have for the most part rejected Him, but the Gentiles have received Him, as was distinctly foretold by Micah, iv. 1-7^s. The Scriptures foretell two comings of Christ; but the Jewish interpreters adopt a low and earthly method of interpretation, and thus

^a cc. 87, 88.^o cc. 89-96.^p cc. 97, 98.^q cc. 99-105.^r cc. 106, 107.^s cc. 108-110.

fail to see the secret symbols of Christ's cross and death^t. As an instance of a right interpretation he gives the history of Joshua, and shows how he was a type of Christ^u. He then makes some remarks on the language of Scripture^r, and expresses his belief that the Jews ought at least to trust the words of Zechariah, ii. 10. This prophecy is fulfilled in the Christians. And the Jews are wrong in applying it to those of their number who are scattered over the earth; for there are many nations in which there is no Jew, but none where sacrifices—that is, prayers—are not offered up to God in the name of the crucified Christ^v. Therefore the Jews should repent before the day of judgment comes, for Christ is an eternal priest, and is to judge all^z. The Christians, then, are now the chosen people of God, the seed of Abraham by faith; for Christ is the expectation of the nations, as was foretold^a. In Christ, according to David, and not in himself, were all nations to be blessed, and He has become a light to all nations^b. The Jews interpret the nations to mean their proselytes, but they are wrong. Jesus said truly of them that they were doubly sons of Gehenna, imitating their teachers in hatred. The nations are those who now trust in Christ^c. By the nations proselytes cannot be meant, for proselytes have the same law as the Jews; are as if they were of the same nation, and are as blind as the Jews: whereas the prophets speak of a new and eternal covenant and an enlightened people. Trypho then asks, Are you Israel? to which Justin replies that Christians are the true Israel (Isaiah xlii. 1-4), and they are sons of God^d. That they are is proved by Psalm lxxxii., and by the meaning of the name Israel, for Israel foreshadowed Christ's conquest over the devil in his temptation^e. If ye had known who Christ is, ye would not have blasphemed Him; for Christ is God. Justin quotes again passages which he had adduced in a previous part, and asserts that God the Father of all

^t cc. 111, 112.^u c. 113.^r c. 114.^v cc. 115-117.^a c. 118.^z cc. 119, 120.^b c. 121.^c c. 122.^d c. 123.^e cc. 124, 125.

cannot be meant in these passages^f. Some indeed regard the words 'angel,' 'glory,' and similar terms used in the narratives of the Old Testament, as figurative expressions simply of God's activity, but Justin asserts that this notion is an utter mistake, for the passages plainly imply that they are two in number^h. The words in Deut. xxxii. 43 imply that the Gentiles were to rejoice with Abraham and Isaac and all who pleased God through good works, while the Jewish nation was to be rejected as disobedientⁱ. The history of the Jewish nation is full of tokens of God's kindness to them, and yet they continually rebelled against Him, and worshipped idols. And now at last they have done their utmost against Christ, and are persecuting Christians. God knew this, and expressed his condemnation of them beforehand in Isaiah iii. 9-15 and Isaiah v. 18-25^k. Therefore you should no longer obey your teachers but follow God. They tell you that it is not wrong to imitate Jacob in having a plurality of wives. They do not understand that Jacob's history is full of types^l. The Scriptures proclaim Christ as eternal king, and state that the nations, not the Jews, will trust in Him (Isaiah xliii. 15; xlii. 1-4; lxv. 9-12^m). He who insults Christ insults Him that sent Himⁿ; therefore you should not speak against the crucified one. Justin now says that as the sun was coming near to the time of setting he will add but one other remark to what he had said^o. He then adduces a passage which he says is taken from Isaiah, but which is not now found in the text of that prophet, to this effect, "In the flood of Noah I saved thee." Justin explains how Noah was a type of Christ in many respects, especially in the number eight that were in the ark, and in the blessing of his two sons and the cursing of the third, and how in the passage from Isaiah and in the blessings of Noah the Gentiles are clearly pointed out as the people of God^p. Your teachers, on the other hand, lead you to believe

^f cc. 126, 127.^g c. 128.^h c. 129.ⁱ c. 130.^k cc. 131-133.^l c. 134.^m c. 135.ⁿ c. 136.^o c. 137.^p cc. 138, 139.

that if only you are of the seed of Abraham you will be saved. But the Scriptures condemn this teaching. Each man will perish by his own sin, or be saved by his own righteous conduct^a. God's foreknowledge of the event does not at all interfere with man's free-will, for whoever repents will be forgiven. "Saying these things, dearest Marcus Pompeius, I ceased^r." Trypho expresses the gratification he has had in the interview, and wishes that their meetings could have been more frequent. This cannot be, however, as Justin is on the eve of sailing. They wish each other every blessing, and part^s.

XIV. THE DOCTRINES OF JUSTIN.

In the works of Justin we have no theology properly so called, no attempt to arrange the whole of his beliefs under one system; but we find him pressed by his Apologetic position, and especially by his doctrine of the Logos, into more definite notions than most of his predecessors.

God.—The doctrine of Justin with regard to the being of God comes out most distinctly in the epithets which he applies to Him. He calls Him the only God^t, the God that really is^u, the unbegotten God^x, the unspeakable God^y. The force of these epithets has been matter of dispute. Some have supposed that they discover in Justin the Platonic notion that the Absolute is entirely and completely unknowable by man; but except in so far as the epithets above quoted warrant us, we cannot assign this notion to Justin; for though he mentions the Platonic doctrine and quotes from the Republic of Plato the exact words of the philosopher, yet he does so only when speaking of himself in the days in which he was a Platonic. Throughout his works he never

^a c. 140.

^r c. 141.

^s c. 142.

^t Apol. i. c. 13, p. 60 E.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 55, p. 274 C.

^x Apol. ii. c. 12, p. 50 C.

^y Several epithets are often united. "The only, unbegotten, and unspeakable God." Dial. c. Tryph. c. 126, p. 355 C.

appeals to this Platonic doctrine, and though it is perfectly possible he held it, yet he certainly does not say so. It is far more likely that he thought the abstract speculation involved in the Platonic ideas about the absolute had little to do with the practical work of Christianity. The epithet the 'only' or 'one God,' he employs in opposition to the polytheism of the heathens. The epithet 'unbegotten' has evidently a double reference; first, to the circumstance that the gods of the heathens were begotten, and second, to the nature of the Logos. In confirmation of the first reference there is a passage in which Justin plainly contrasts the unbegotten God with Dionysus the son of Semele, and Apollo the son of Leto². There is no express proof of the second reference, but the epithet is most frequently applied when speaking of the Logos^a; and, as will be seen from a consideration of the doctrine of the Logos, the idea involved in the epithet was part of the basis of the doctrine. The epithet ἀρρητος (unspeakable, indescribable^b), seems to refer to the manner of God's existence, which is inconceivable by us. It approaches towards the Platonic doctrine, but differs from it in this respect, that it is not a philosophical notion. All men who reflect feel the impossibility of fathoming the Divine existence, especially the mode of that existence, and yet all reflective men are not necessarily Platonists. Justin, then, merely expresses the common Christian feeling with regard to the mode of God's being, when he calls God the unspeakable Father of all. Perhaps the epithet was all the more readily and regularly used from the prominence given to the doctrine of the Logos.

The epithets we have mentioned are of frequent occurrence. There are some of great importance that occur only once. Thus God is called the passionless God (ἀπαθής^c), in contrast to the heathen gods, who were given to all lusts.

² Apol. i. c. 25.

^a Apol. i. c. 14, p. 61 B; c. 49, p. 85 B; ii. c. 6, p. 44 D E.

^b Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 49 A; c. 12, p. 50 C; c. 13, p. 51 C.

^c Apol. i. c. 25, p. 69 B.

He is described as the "unchangeable and ever-existing God^d." God is thus represented as the being that exists, that exists for ever, that has never been begotten, that is never changed, that is subject to no passion, and that man cannot describe. Man's incapability of describing God is manifested in his not being able to give a name to God. He is the nameless God (τὸν ἀνωνόμαστον Θεόν^e). "For no one can give a name to the indescribable God; and if any one would dare to say that there is a name, he is utterly mad^f." It is an impossibility for a man. And accordingly God has no name; the words Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Ruler, not being proper names, but appellations given in consequence of good deeds and functions^g. Justin in several places insists on God's not having a name, the fact being of considerable use in an apologetic point of view. For the giving of a name (*a proper name*, κυριολογεῖσθαι^h) implies that there existed a being before the one to whom it is given, who should give it to himⁱ; and moreover, the object of proper names is to distinguish beings of the same class, whereas God is the only God, the only God that truly exists (ὁ ὄντως ὢν Θεός^j). God thus being indescribable, how does man attain his notion of God? Justin answers this question thus: "The appellation 'God' is not a name, but an opinion implanted in the nature of men of a thing that can with difficulty be explained, (πράγματος δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα^k)."

These expressions give us no insight into Justin's idea of the spirituality of God's nature. The passages which Justin quotes from Plato are conclusive as to God's being perceived only by the mind, but they are not to be considered as indicating the sentiments which Justin held as a Christian; and Justin may have believed that man could perceive God only with the mind, while at the same time holding that God was in

^d Apol. i. c. 13, p. 61 A.

^e Apol. i. c. 61, p. 94 D.

^g Coh. ad Gent. c. 21, p. 19 B C.

^j Coh. ad Gent. c. 21, p. 19 B; c. 20, p. 19 B.

^f Ibid. c. 63, p. 95 C.

^g Ibid. ii. c. 6, p. 44 D.

^h Ibid.; Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 D.

^k Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 E.

some way or other material as well as spiritual. That he was of this opinion, however, is a matter of doubt, for his expressions are indefinite, and where they are definite enough we may doubt whether they are not anthropomorphic.

Justin believed that God in a special manner was in super-celestial places. This belief comes out very strangely in Justin's remarks on the supposed appearance of God to Abraham and Moses. "For Moses," he says, "points out that He was divine who appeared to Abraham beside the oak of Mamre, accompanied by two angels who were sent to the condemnation of Sodom by another who always remains in the super-celestial regions^m (*ἐν τοῖς ὑπερουρανίοις*), who never appears or speaks to any one by means of Himself, whom we conceive of (*νοοῦμεν*) as Maker of the whole and Fatherⁿ." "No one whatever," Justin says, in speaking of God's appearance in the bush to Moses, "that has but a small particle of sense, would dare to say that the Maker of the whole and Father, leaving all the things above heaven (*τὰ ὑπὲρ οὐρανὸν πάντα*), had appeared in a little portion of earth^o;" and farther on in the same chapter the Logos is spoken of as "serving God who is above the world, above whom is no other^p." In harmony with this idea God is called

^l *μηνύων*. Justin's sentence is incomplete. See Otto, in loc.

^m There is no noun added, and therefore it might be 'among the super-celestial beings.'

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 275 A.

^o Ibid. c. 60, p. 283 B.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 60, p. 284 A. Bull's explanation of these passages is: "Ex his omnibus manifestissimum est ecclesiæ doctores, qui ante exortam Arii hæresin scripserunt, quoties ita ratiocinantur, Deum non Patrem, sed Filium fuisse, qui sub Veteri Testamento apparuit et in plenitudine temporis incarnatus fuit, quod Pater immensus sit neque loco includatur et invisibilis qui a nemine conspici possit, nequiquam negare voluisse, Filium Dei pariter ac Patrem natura sua immensum atque invisibilem esse: sed id tantum significasse, tum apparitiones illas Dei omnes, tum ipsam *ἐνσάρκωσιν* ad *οἰκονομίαν* spectasse quam suscepit Dei Filius; quæ œconomia Patri, quippe qui a nullo ortus sit principio, nullique auctoritatem suam acceptam referat, nequaquam conveniat." Def. Fid. Nic. IV. III. 12, pp. 274, 275. Justin never mentions economy, and had not the slightest notion of it. See Semisch, vol. ii. p. 194 for an exposition of the attempts to make Justin orthodox.

the "Father and King of the heavens⁴," and this language is used in speaking of a Christian leaving this world and going to God. What notion Justin attached to these super-celestial places we cannot say, but in speaking of these very appearances of God he uses language with regard to the Father of all which shows that he had thought on the nature of God. "I suppose," he says, "that enough has been said by me to prove that where God anywhere says, 'God went up from Abraham,' &c., ye should not reckon that the unbegotten God Himself has descended or ascended from any place. For the unspeakable (*ἄρρητος*) Father and Lord of all never has gone anywhere, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in his own place, wherever that may be (*ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ, ὅπου ποτέ, μένει*); seeing keenly and hearing keenly, not with eyes, nor with ears, but with power indescribable (*δυνάμει ἀλέκτω*); and He sees all things and knows all things, and no one of us escapes his notice. He moves not, and He cannot be contained in place, not even in the whole world (*ὁ τόπῳ τε ἀχώρητος καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ὅλῳ*), who also was before the world came into existence⁵." This passage seems to me to explain why Justin called God *ἄρρητος*. God had a place (*χώρα*) of his own; he could not conceive Him without this. But this place was in no respect to be thought of as identical with any place (*τόπος*) that we know, for God could not possibly be in the world (universe), since there was a time when the world was not. This place which Justin cannot describe is unquestionably the super-celestial places mentioned above, which in the subsequent part of this chapter he simply calls the heavens. He states what he had often stated before, that it was not the Father of all that had appeared to men. "Neither Abraham nor Isaac nor Jacob, nor any other man, saw the Father and unspeakable Lord of all, of all without exception, even of the Christ Himself. . . . If we do not thus understand the

⁴ Apol. ii. c. 2, p. 43 C.

⁵ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 127, p. 356 D.

Scriptures it will come to this, that the Father and Lord of the whole was not in the heavens then when it was said by Moses, 'And the Lord rained upon Sodom fire and brimstone from the Lord out of heaven^s.' Justin here clearly distinguishes between earth and the heavens, and assumes the impossibility of God being in both places.

Perhaps Justin went farther than this. For he speaks of God as having indescribable glory and shape (*ἀρρητον δόξαν καὶ μορφήν*^t). This may be mere anthropomorphic language, but it is likely that Justin did not mean it for such. But whatever Justin's notions with regard to the shape of God were, he rejected what he calls the Jewish notion, that God had hands and feet, and fingers and soul, like a compound animal (*σύνθετον ζῶον*^u).

The extract made from the 127th chapter of the Dialogue with Trypho is proof that Justin had a firm belief in God's omniscience. He sees and hears all things. He states this doctrine very distinctly elsewhere. He says that "it is impossible for a man to escape the notice of God, not only in doing a thing, but in resolving on it^v. Not only deeds but thoughts are manifest to God^x. Christians know that they have the unbegotten and unspeakable God as a witness of their reasonings and deeds^y. He is the just surveyor of all things (*ἐπόπτης τῶν πάντων*^z). He foreknows that which will be done by all men^a."

Justin moreover describes God as almighty^b. He can do whatever He wishes^c.

These notions of the Deity are not inconsistent with the notion of God's being in his own place ; for wherever that place is, it was before the world existed. He Himself is the Maker

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 127, p. 357 C. The same remark is repeated about the same passage in c. 129, p. 358 D.

^t Apol. i. c. 9, p. 57 E.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 114, p. 342 D.

^v Apol. i. c. 12, p. 59 C.

^x Ibid. c. 15, p. 62 B.

^y Apol. ii. c. 12, p. 50 C.

^z Ibid.

^a Apol. i. c. 44, p. 82 B ; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 16, p. 234 B.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 16, p. 234 B ; c. 83, p. 310 A ; c. 96, p. 324 A.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 84, p. 310 D.

of the whole, and it is but an inference from this fact that his power over it is unlimited, and that He knows it from beginning to end.

Justin frequently speaks of God as the creator of the world. Some of the passages in which God is so called have been quoted already. The epithets are very various. He is called the Father of the whole^d, the Maker (ποιητής^e) of the whole^e, the Maker of all (ὁ πάντων ποιητής^f), the Father of all and Lord (δεσπότης^g), the Father of all and Fashioner^h, the Fashioner of this all (ὁ δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντόςⁱ), the Begetter of the all (γεννήτωρ τῶν πάντων^k). We have also already seen the names Κύριος and Κτίστης, Lord and Creator, applied to Him. He is also described as "the God who made the whole world (ὁ Θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας^l), or 'all things'^m."

A doubt has arisen as to whether Justin denied the eternity of matter. Several passages occur in which God is described as making the world out of shapeless matter. In speaking of Plato's borrowing from Moses, he quotes Gen. i. 1-3, introducing the quotation thus: "The Holy Spirit points out how in the beginning and from what God fashioned the world." And in summing up he says, "So that Plato and those who agree with him, and we ourselves, have learned that the whole world was made by the word (λόγῳ) of God from materials already existing and previously pointed out by Moses (ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ προδηλωθέντων διὰ Μωυσέωςⁿ). That previously pointed out is the shapeless matter (ἄλη ἀμορφος) mentioned in the chapter. The work of the first day's creation is thus described: "God, changing the darkness and matter, made the world (order^o). Some

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 108, p. 335 D.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 60, p. 283 B; c. 16, p. 234 B.

^f Apol. i. c. 20, p. 66 C.

^g Ibid. c. 32, p. 74 B; c. 61, p. 94 D.

^h Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 A.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 13, p. 60 C.

^k Apol. i. c. 13, p. 61 A.

^l Ibid. ii. c. 5, p. 44 A.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 55, p. 274 C.

ⁿ Apol. i. c. 59, p. 92 D.

^o Apol. i. c. 67, p. 99 A; also c. 10, quoted afterwards.

have thought that they find an intimation of a creation, a making out of nothing, in the varying of the phrases employed by Justin to designate the work of God. Thus it is said, "God in the beginning created (*ἔκτισε*) and arranged (*ἐκόσμησε*) all things^p." "For in saying that all things were arranged and made (*γεγενῆσθαι*) by God we shall seem to be speaking the opinion of Plato^q." "There is no other God, and there never was but the God who made and arranged the whole^r." Then, again, God is sometimes said to make, sometimes to fashion. In the Hortatory Address the distinction between the maker (*ποιητής*) and fashioner (*δημιουργός*) is drawn: "The maker, requiring nothing else, makes what is made from his own power and authority, but the fashioner, having received the power of fashioning from the material, gets ready what is made," (*κατασκευάζει τὸ γινόμενον*^s). The distinction here drawn the writer does not give as his own, but as Plato's, yet he so introduces it that we are led to believe he agreed with the distinction. The distinction is not carried out in the Apologies and Dialogue. In some of the passages in which Justin speaks of God as making the world out of shapeless matter, he uses this very word *to make* (*ποιεῖν*); and in describing Plato's opinion with regard to the world as taken from Moses, he defines it thus: "That God, changing matter that was shapeless, made (*ποιῆσαι*) the world^t." Moreover, there is not one single passage which expressly opposes the eternity of matter. There is one passage^u which seems to do so, but it occurs in Justin's discussion with the old man, and is not therefore satisfactory evidence of Justin's own mature convictions.

Though we have thus no certainty in regard to this matter, yet one can scarcely doubt that Justin's view of the origin

^p Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 E.

^q Ibid. i. c. 20, p. 66 D.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 11, p. 227 E.

^s Coh. ad Gent. c. 22, p. 21 C.

^t Apol. i. c. 59, p. 92 C.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 5, p. 223 A; and Coh. c. 23, p. 22 A, quoted by Semisch, ii. p. 240.

of the world was that it was a creation. It may indeed have been a point about which he thought speculation foolish and utterly unsatisfactory, and therefore he did not wish to pronounce an opinion one way or the other, or he may have thought it unwise to obtrude his notions on those who were trained in another opinion^y. But his frequent references to God as the only unbegotten, and his mention of Him as the begetter of all, and his employment of the words 'making' and 'creating,' tell on the side of his belief in a creation^z.

God made the world for man. "We have been taught that God being good fashioned all things in the beginning out of shapeless matter on account of men^a;" and we are "to thank God for having created the world with all things in it on account of man^b."

God still takes care of man^c and provides for him (*προνοεῖται*)^d, and this providence is not of such a nature as to take care of the whole, and of classes only, while indifferent to individuals, as some philosophers think: for the Christian's belief, his caring for individuals, is proved by his praying to God day and night^e. And indeed almost all the references Justin makes to God's moral character intimate a belief in God's care for and interest in man. Thus, in regard to the Mosaic laws, he remarks that God, "who is always the same," made the laws on account of sinful men, and "it is possible," he adds, "to demonstrate Him to be a friend of man (*φιλόανθρωπον*), and foreknowing and needing nothing, and righteous (*δίκαιον*), and good^f." His kindness and mercy extend to all, for He causes his sun to shine on all^g, but are shown

^y Mar. Præf. p. xviii.

^z Justin, in the passage already referred to (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 5), speaks of the world as begotten (*γεννητός*), and says that God alone is unbegotten and indestructible (*ἀφθαρτος*), and on this account is God.

^a Apol. i. c. 10, p. 58 B; so also Apol. ii. c. 4. p. 43 C; c. 5, p. 44 A.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 41, p. 260 A.

^c Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 C.

^d Apol. i. c. 44, p. 82 B.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 23, p. 241 A.

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 1, p. 218 A.

^g Ibid. c. 96, p. 324 A.

especially to him who turns from evil^b. To them He is the much pitying and much loving Father of all, the merciful and kind God. And God Himself calls all men to turn from evilⁱ. He accordingly has especial delight in those who imitate his own conduct. "We are taught and persuaded and believe that He accepts only those who imitate the good things that naturally belong to Him, (his attributes, τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ), soundness of mind (σωφρονύνην), and righteousness (δικαιοσύνην), and love of man (φιλανθρωπίαν), and whatever things are natural to God^k." He is, on the other hand, displeased with those who do evil^l, and mention is made of his wrath^m. God Himself is not only holy but the cause of holiness and lightⁿ. He is the "truest, and Father of righteousness, and soundness of mind, and the other virtues, and is free from all evil^o." It was He who through Christ freed men from sin^p and saved them^q. Christ's whole work was undertaken and carried on in obedience to God, and the great aim and end of it was to beget us to God. A holy life is consequently described as a life with God^r. Christians devote themselves to Him^s, hope in Him^t, and put their trust in Him^u, and believe that they will receive incorruption from Him^x. They pray to Him for intelligence^y, and they know that "especially the prayer with prostrate body and bended knees, accompanied by lamentation and tears, softens (μειλίσσεται) God^z." We shall have occasion to say a good deal more with regard to Justin's idea of God in speaking of his doctrines with regard to Christ and man.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 370 C ; c. 107, p. 334 D ; c. 108, p. 335 D : also c. 47, p. 266 D.

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 40, p. 79 A.

^k Ibid. c. 10, p. 58 B.

^l Apol. ii. c. 4, p. 43 C.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 123, p. 351 D.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 225 B.

^o Apol. i. c. 6, p. 56 B.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 41, p. 260 A.

^q Ibid. c. 74, p. 300 A.

^r Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 A.

^s Apol. i. c. 25, p. 69 B ; c. 49, p. 85 B.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 16, p. 234 B.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 83, p. 310 A ; c. 92, p. 320 A.

^x Apol. i. c. 39, p. 78 C.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 225 B.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 90, p. 318 A.

Christ.—We have already found that the great doctrine of the Christian writers was that He was the Son of God. They did not speculate on this fact. Justin, however, had to consider the subject more minutely in his Apologetics. What was this Son of God? Was He man, or angel, or God? Justin answered that He was God. But if He were God, how then could he maintain his position that there was but one God? Justin sought his solution of this difficulty in a consideration of the nature of a son, and by adopting a notion propounded in a quite different form by Plato and in a very allied one by Philo. The Son of God to be a son, must have been begotten; but what could God beget? Justin answered ‘Reason.’ The Son of God then is Reason. As He is thus a product of God, He is God’s; He is completely under God’s control; He does everything according to his will; and thus, though He is divine, his very divinity is but a present bestowed on Him from the divinity of the one God, who imparts it without in the slightest degree diminishing his own. The Son of God was thus indeed God, but subordinate to the Father, directed by Him, and revealing Him. Such was Justin’s idea of the Son of God.

We proceed to substantiate and develop the several features of it, as given in Justin’s works. He speaks frequently of Christ as the Son of God, and affirms that he means by Son of God something peculiar. The “Jesus called Son of God, even if He had been only man after the common fashion, would have been worthy on account of his wisdom to be called Son of God^a.” But He was not born after a common fashion, but “peculiarly from God^b.” This assertion unquestionably relates to his miraculous birth on earth. But Justin extends the peculiarity much beyond this, for “Jesus Christ alone was begotten peculiarly a Son to God, being his reason and first-born and power^c;” “who alone is properly called son^d.” “He is the only-begotten^e.”

^a Apol. i. c. 22, p. 67 E.

^b Ibid.

^c Apol. i. c. 23, p. 68 C.

^d Ibid. ii. c. 6, p. 44 D.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 105, p. 332 C.

The manner in which Justin speaks of this part of his belief with regard to Christ is noteworthy. He says, "We have been taught that Christ was the first-born of God." It was a part of the recognised belief of the Church. He adds, "and we have pointed out before that He was the Logos, of whom the whole race partook^f."

The most important statements of Justin with regard to the Logos are the following :—"I will give another proof," he says, "from the Scriptures, that, as a *beginning* (*ἀρχήν*^g) before all creatures, God begot a certain rational (*λογικὴν*) power from Himself, which is also called by the Holy Spirit 'glory of the Lord,' and sometimes Son, and sometimes Wisdom, and sometimes Angel, and sometimes God, and sometimes Lord and Reason (Logos), and sometimes He calls Himself Commander-in-Chief, when He appeared in the shape of man to Jesus (Joshua) the son of Nave, for He derives all these names from his attending to the Father's wish, and from having been begotten from the Father by willing ; for is not this such a thing as we see take place among ourselves? For putting forth (*προβάλλοντες λόγον τινά*) some discourse we beget discourse (*λόγον*), not by way of cutting it off, so that the discourse in us (*λόγον*) should be lessened when we put it forth^h. And such a thing we see also in the case of fire ; that from which the lighting takes place is not lessened, but remains the same, while that which is lighted from it also manifestly exists, and did not lessen that from which it was lighted. But the Word (*Λόγος*) of wisdom will bear witness to me, being Himself this God (*ὁὗτος ὁ Θεός*), who was begotten from the Father of all, and being

^f Apol. i. c. 46, p. 83 C.

^g *ἀρχήν* may mean here 'in the beginning,' or 'a principle and origin of things.'

^h It is impossible to translate the *λόγος* here exactly. I have had recourse to the old use of the word 'discourse,' which combines thought and expression. The sense is, "when we give utterance to some expression we are exercising our reason, but that reason is not diminished, though its results have gone forth in the form of expressions or arguments."

(ὑπάρχων) reason (λόγος) and wisdom, and power and glory of Him who begot, and who has said these things through Solomon, ‘If I proclaim to you what takes place daily I shall rehearse to you things that took place long ago (τὰ ἐξ αἰῶνος). The Lord (ἐκτίσσει) created me in the beginning of his ways for his deeds. Before the age He laid my foundations in the beginning, before He made the earth and before He made the abysses¹.’” Justin goes on to quote the remainder of the eighth chapter of Proverbs. This passage of Justin’s gives a pretty fair idea of the various features of the doctrine of the Logos and of the parts of the Old Testament by which he supported it.

From some of the expressions in it one would be inclined to think that Justin did not mean a person. Thus, when he speaks of “God’s begetting a certain rational power (δύναμιν),” we should be inclined to suspect that Justin did not attach personality to the power. But other parts of the same extract are conclusive on this point, and if that were not enough, Justin combats the idea that the Logos and angels were not persons, but activities of the Divine Being. He states the theory opposed to his own thus: “That this power (δύναμις) is indivisible and inseparable from the Father, exactly as they say the light of the sun on earth is indivisible and inseparable from the sun which is in heaven, and when it sets the light is carried away with it; so the Father, when He wishes, they say, causes his power to leap forth, and, when He wishes, again takes it back to Himself².” The various names applied to angels and Christ were explained, as having reference to the modes of manifestation; Logos, for instance, being used to denote the exercise of God’s power in “bringing communications from the Father to men.” On this theory Justin remarks, “That there are angels, that they always remain, and are not dissolved into that from which they arose, has been proved, and I have also shortly examined

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 61, p. 284 A B C.

² Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, p. 358 C.

and shown in what has been already said, that this power, which, as has been in like manner proved by many proofs, the prophetic word calls God and Angel, is not, as the light of the sun, counted in name only, but is also something different (*ἕτερον*, other, second) in number; for I said that this power was begotten from the Father by his power and will, but not by way of cutting off, as if the substance of the Father were divided¹;" and then he refers to his previous analogy of the fire. In harmony with the idea that He was different in number, we shall find that He is frequently called the second after God the Father.

After obtaining this clear proof that Justin held to the personality of the Logos and his difference in number from God, we inquire when did Justin suppose Him to be begotten? Now it is plain that the very fact of his being begotten implies a time, and Justin invariably looks upon the begetting of the Logos as an act of the Father's. What is called the 'eternal' generation of the Son is a contradiction in terms, though perfectly allowable as expressing an incomprehensible idea. Justin knows nothing of it; for if he had, he would have been sure to qualify the temporal expression 'to beget' by something to show that he meant to exclude from it the temporal notion conveyed in it.

At the same time Justin could assign no date for such an event as the begetting of the Son, for, according to Justin, this begetting took place before anything else. He is the "first-born (*πρωτότοκος*) to the unbegotten God^m." And it is expressly stated that He was before all creation. "Now his Son, who alone is properly called Son, the Logos, being with (God) and being begotten before his works, when in the beginning He created and set in order all things through Him, is called Christ, in reference to his being anointed and God's ordering all things through Him, a name which also includes an unknown significationⁿ." "But this offspring (*γέννημα*) which was put

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, p. 358 C.

^m Apol. i. c. 53, p. 88 A; c. 63, p. 96 C.

ⁿ Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 E.

forth really from the Father was with the Father before all created things (πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων^ο).” These two passages contain the most positive statements with regard to the pre-existence of the Logos, but they are so indefinite, or have been supposed to be so indefinite, that the most extraordinary interpretations of them have been made. Some have found the eternal generation of the Son in them, and some have found exactly the opposite.

Both Semisch and Otto regard συνών (‘being with’) as expressive of an attribute inherent in God, and consequently the expression they take to refer to the eternal residence of Reason in the Divine mind. The γεννώμενος (‘being begotten’) forms a contrast with the συνών, and refers to the hypostatizing of the Logos. And then they take the clause, “when He created the world,” as intimating the date of the hypostatizing^p. The objection to this view of the words is that συνών is not the proper word for an attribute, ἐνών or προσών being the words used for it; σύνοιμι implies ‘existence along with,’ and therefore separate distinct existence. And even if this were not the case, the second extract proves conclusively that Justin so uses it here. The γέννημα, the thing begotten, was with the Father. This cannot by any possibility be said of an attribute. Justin wishes to show that the Logos was the person to whom God said “Let us make man,” and he adduces the fact in partial proof that the Logos was with God before all created things. If the συνῆν implied that He was a mere attribute of God, the argument fails completely. The first extract seems to me to be an instance of Justin’s confused way of stating his opinions, but I do not think that it can be adduced to prove anything but what Justin elsewhere in clear language positively asserts. The whole difficulty lies in the word γεννώμενος, and the joining of this word with the ὅτε. Now if the context be examined closely it will be found that the main object of the sentence is to give an explanation of the word ‘Christ,’ and not an explanation of the Logos. We

• Dial. c. Tryph. c. 62, p. 285 D.

^p See Semisch’s Note, vol. ii. p. 181 ff.

therefore think that the *ὅτε* ought to go with the meaning of Christ and not with the *γεννώμενος*¹, both the *συνών* and the *γεννώμενος* being inserted simply to qualify the *λόγος*. The meaning of the sentence therefore is, 'the Logos who was with the Father far before all creatures, and whose nature is to be begotten (who is a being that is begotten, not *made*), is called the Christ, when in the beginning God created and arranged all things through Him.' According to this interpretation we have nothing here but what Justin states throughout the whole of his Apology and Dialogue. He does not anywhere assert that the Logos was begotten immediately when God made the world; but, on the contrary, says that He was with Him then. How long He was with Him is a question that he never answers; and by far the greatest probability is that Justin never put this question to himself. He used the words 'begotten,' 'put forth,' 'offspring,' because this was the relation between Father and Son. But his mind had not been directed to the possible inferences to be drawn from applying a temporal word in an unqualified manner to the Son of God. Kaye² thinks that Justin must have believed in the co-eternity of the Son with the Father, since he regarded the words *ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν* as spoken by Christ to Moses³. But Justin does not give his interpretation of these words, and nowhere so applies the words to Christ that we can draw the inference which Kaye draws.

We should scarcely be allowed to make this inference with regard to the indefiniteness of Justin's ideas if he had spoken of the Logos as created, as some say he does. But the only two passages which are adduced in proof do not testify to any such thing. The first and principal occurs in Dial. c. Tryph. c. 114, p. 341 D. Justin is speaking of the mode in which the Holy Spirit uses the tenses of verbs, speaking

¹ So Bull takes it, Def. Fid. Nicæn. sect. iii. c. 2, p. 187, only he translates *ὅτε*, 'quoniam.' Grabe translates *ὅτε*, 'quando,' and joins it with *γεννώμενος* in his annotation to Bull's remarks, p. 191.

² Kaye's argument is given in Bull, Def. Fid. Nicæn. sect. iii. 2. 2.

³ Apol. i. c. 63, p. 95 E.

of things that were to happen either as now happening or as having happened. He adduces several instances, and then he proceeds: "And again when He says, 'I will look on the heavens the work of thy fingers,' unless I hear (bear in mind) the workmanship of his words, I shall not hear them with understanding." The meaning of these words seems to me perfectly plain—that if the reader of the Psalm do not bring before his mind the method employed by the Holy Spirit in the use of language, he will come to the absurd inference that God had real fingers. The *ἐργασία τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ* is the *τέχνη* or art, previously mentioned[†], of the Holy Spirit shewn in the words of Holy Scripture. Editors, however, thinking that there was no sense in the words or not a good one, proposed various changes in the reading of the manuscripts. And thus Maranus converted *τῶν λόγων* into *τὸν λόγον*, and we get the doctrine, unknown to Justin, "If I hear not the Logos his workmanship." Otto, with more consistency, changed *τῶν λόγων* into *τοῦ λόγου*, but the change is not merely unnecessary, but does not give such a satisfactory meaning. The other passage adduced can scarcely be called a proof of Justin's opinion. Trypho, in reply to Justin, says, contrasting Judaism with Christianity, "But we, being worshippers of the God that made this one Himself [Christ], do not require to acknowledge or worship Him^u." Justin, it is said, does not reply to this, and his silence is supposed to favour the notion that he regarded Christ as a creature. But the inference is entirely unjustifiable. Trypho speaks in the strongest contempt of Justin's beliefs, and Justin replies not to the particular assertions, but to the spirit of Trypho, and blames him especially for "preparing not to understand the things said." Added to this is the circumstance that though Justin has very frequently to speak of the Son, he invariably selects peculiar words. The Father puts forth or begets (*προβάλλει, γεννᾷ*). The Son is put forth, begotten, or comes forth^x, and He is a *γέννημα*.

[†] Dial. c. Tryph. c. 114, p. 341 C.

^u Ibid. c. 64, p. 287 C.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 B.

It would be extraordinary if Justin had believed Christ to be a creation that he should have systematically avoided the use of words in regard to Him which were continually employed in regard to other creatures.

The actions of the Logos are numerous. He was the instrument employed by God in creating and arranging the world ^γ. There is no mention of the peculiar necessity requiring the activity of the Logos in creation. Some have thought that Justin intimates that the thought of making the world was God's, and that it was the part of the Logos to carry out this thought into reality. But the passage adduced states no such thing. The words are, "Since they knew that God, having thought, made the world through the Logos^α." The mode of expression here is exactly the same as in the other passages which speak of God's making the world. And the introduction of *ἐννοηθέντα*, 'having thought,' is merely accidental, and occasioned by a wish to show that the mythological idea of Athena's being the *πρώτη ἐννοια*, 'the first thought,' was borrowed from the Old Testament.

The Logos was present at the creation of man, and "the whole race of men partook of Him^α." "He is and was in every one^β." "The seed of the Logos is implanted in the whole race of men^γ." All that was good in the heathens sprung from this seed of the Logos. "And those who lived with the Logos are Christians, even though they were reckoned atheists: such as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them; and among barbarians, Abraham, and Ananias, and Azarias, and Misael, and Elias, and many others^δ." Justin calls this logos *σπερματικὸς λόγος*, 'logos that is sowed,' and asserts that heathen writers "spoke well according to the share which they had of the spermatic logos, for they saw what was related to it^ε." And, again, "All the writers were able to see realities darkly through

^γ Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 E.

^α Apol. i. c. 46, p. 83 C.

^β Apol. ii. c. 8, p. 46 C.

^α Ibid. i. c. 64, p. 97 B.

^β Ibid. ii. c. 10, p. 48 E.

^δ Ibid. i. c. 46, p. 83 C.

^ε Apol. ii. c. 13, p. 51 C.

the sowing of the implanted (*ἐμφύτου*) logos that was in them^f." Justin distinguishes this spermatik logos from the complete Λόγος. These men had but a part or seed of the logos, saw the truth but faintly, and often therefore contradicted themselves. "The seed and imitation," says Justin, "imparted according to a capability of receiving is one thing, and quite another is that of which there is the participation and imitation according to the favour which proceeds from it (or Him^g)."^g Christians have the whole Logos, and Justin remarks that it cannot be deemed wonderful if "the demons make those more hated who try to live, not according to a share of the sowed logos, but according to the knowledge and contemplation (*γνώσιν καὶ θεωρίαν*) of the whole Logos—that is, of Christ^h," since even Socrates and the like were punished with death. Justin's doctrine on this subject is so peculiar that one would be inclined to imagine that he did not attribute personality to the Logos, but he himself prevents us from fancying any such thing, for he again and again identifies this Logos with Christ, as in the passage last quoted, and somewhere in the context of most of the passages quoted.

The activity of the Logos was most marked in the case of the Jews. He was continually appearing to them in some shape, performing the will of his Father. Thus He appeared to Abraham, to Jacob, to Moses, and to Joshua. He was also the inspirer of the prophetsⁱ, and Justin goes so far as to identify the function of the prophetic spirit with that of the Logos. "That those who prophesy are God-borne by nothing else than the divine Logos, even you, as I think, will grant j." And the words spoken by the inspired prophets are not to be supposed as proceeding from them, but "from the divine Logos moving them^k." We shall have to notice also the activity of the Logos in the birth of Jesus.

Justin unhesitatingly and frequently speaks of Christ as God. Justin admits the possibility of even men becoming

^f Apol. ii. c. 13, p. 51 D.

^g Apol. ii. c. 8, p. 46 C.

^h Apol. i. c. 33, p. 75 D.

ⁱ Ibid.

^j Ibid. c. 10, p. 49 A.

^k Ibid. c. 36, p. 76 D.

gods¹. But whatever may have been his thoughts in regard to this matter, he regarded Christ as God in a peculiar sense, as being, in fact, part of the Divine substance, though not by way of cutting off.

Justin applies the term *θεός* to Christ, without the article. Three passages have been adduced in which he uses the article. In the case of one of the passages it may be doubted whether Justin applies the words *ὁ θεός* to Jesus. He is speaking of Joshua, "For he gave to them a temporary inheritance, since he was neither Christ the God nor the Son of God^m." The two possible meanings that seem to me fair to put on this passage are:—that Joshua, as not being an anointed person, who was God or the Son of God, could not give an eternal inheritance. If this is the meaning, the words have no reference to Christ, but to a state of existence in which Joshua was, and here mentioned without reference to personalities. The *ὁ θεός* means, therefore, a being who is God. If personalities are to be thought of, then the meaning will be, that because Joshua was not an anointed person, being neither the "Supreme God nor his Son," he could not give an eternal inheritance. According to this meaning, the *ὁ θεός* refers to the Supreme God: the Son of God is Christ. If we take the words to refer to Jesus Christ alone, they do not appear to me to give a proper meaning: "Joshua, because he was not Christ who was God, and because he was not the Son of God." Here we have Christ referred to in two relations, as being God, and the Son of God; a reference totally unnecessary to Justin, as he considered the Sonship of Christ to imply his divinity, "being God from his being the firstborn son of all created thingsⁿ."

The other two passages^o in which Justin is supposed to apply the term *ὁ θεός* to Christ are plain and distinct. They both occur in the course of remarks on the appearance of God to Abraham and other Jews. Some editors have been inclined to suppose that the article in these passages is the work of

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 124, p. 354 A.

^m Ibid. c. 113, p. 340 C.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 125, p. 354 C.

^o Ibid. c. 56, p. 276 C; c. 75, p. 300 D.

transcribers; but there is no need of such a supposition, as there is a manifest reason for Justin's deviation from his common practice. Justin is proving from the Old Testament that Christ is God. He appeals to the appearances of God to the Jews, and the passages which he quotes do not employ the single *θεός*, but *ὁ θεός*. Justin imitates this, and, in fact, in one of the passages he could not do otherwise, for his words are, "If therefore I could not prove to you that one of those three (angels) is (*ὁ θεός*) God." Now, *ὁ θεός* is the very word used in the passage quoted*, and with which Justin promises to show the identity of the angel. Justin, before mentioning Christ at all, uses *ὁ θεός*, and it is only by the context that we know Justin does mean Christ. Trypho also uses *ὁ θεός* several times, and in the clause that immediately precedes our quotation. The fact is, that Justin, in both cases, does not make an immediate application of the term to Christ. His reasoning has not reached this point, but is only on its way. In the first case, he is to show that one of the three angels is *ὁ θεός*; in the other case, that God (*τὸν θεόν*) appeared to Abraham and Moses. The argument before it relates to Christ has to proceed thus: it is impossible that the Father of all should either take the form of an angel, or in any way appear to men. Therefore there must be some other being who is God besides the Father of all. This is the Logos, or the Christ.

The passages of the Old Testament in which the *ὁ θεός* occurred must have presented a difficulty to Justin, which he could overcome only by choosing the least offensive explanation. Neither Justin nor the Gnostics were able to reconcile some of the statements of the Old Testament in reference to God with their own notions of the deity. The Gnostics fancied their Demiurge, Justin found the Divine Being in the Logos. He had accordingly to prove that there was a God different from the Father of all, and in the chapters 56-62 of the Dialogue with Trypho he labours to establish this point. But he has at the same time to be on his utmost guard against destroying

* Gen. xviii. 1.

the doctrine of the oneness of God. And the way in which he accomplishes this is, by regarding Christ not as $\delta \theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$, the Divine Being, because one of his aims was to shew that He was another; but as $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$, possessed of a divine nature and in complete subjection to the Father of all. It was, therefore, a real stumbling-block in Justin's way that he found $\delta \theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$ in the Old Testament, in the passages speaking of God's appearance. He was compelled to allow that such was the language of the Old Testament, and that, as such, it must be correct. But he had an inward feeling that two beings called $\delta \theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$ made two Gods, supreme and independent, and therefore, when he is left to himself, or when coupling the word $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$ with Jesus Christ, he invariably uses $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$, and he almost as invariably points out either that the divinity was derived, or that Christ was acting in obedience to his Father's will.

The proofs of these statements are frequent in the chapters referred to. "What I say," he says, "I will endeavour to prove to you who understand the Scriptures, namely, that another is God and Lord, and is so called, subordinate to the Maker of all, who is also called Angel on account of his announcing to men what things the Maker of all, above whom there is no other God, wishes Him to announce to them ^p." Again: "I will try to prove to you that He who is said to have appeared to Abraham, and Jacob, and Moses, called and described as God, is other than the God who made all things—in number I mean, not in mind ($\gamma\nu\acute{o}\mu\eta$, intention, or resolution). For I maintain that He has never done [or said ^q] anything but what He who made the world, above whom there is no other God, has wished him to do and say^r." "That which is begotten is different in number from that which begets^s."

The complete subjection of the Son to the Father is intimated in almost every reference that Justin makes to the divinity of Christ. The very begetting of Him was the

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 275 C.

^q Justin, in his inaccurate way, has omitted this 'or said.'

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 276 D.

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 129, p. 369 B; c. 62, p. 285 C.

result of the will of the Father, as several passages quoted already prove[†]. "He came forth from the Father by his power and will^u." His divinity has God for its cause. In speaking of Christ's appearances as God in the destruction of Sodom, Justin quotes the verse, "The Lord rained fire from the Lord from heaven," and then adds, "The prophetic word points out that there were two in number; one who was on earth, who^v, it says, came down to see the shout of Sodom; the other existing in the heavens, who is Lord also of the Lord that was on earth, as being Father and God, and is cause to Him of his being powerful, and Lord, and God, (αἰτίος τε αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ δυνατῷ καὶ κυρίῳ καὶ θεῷ^w)."[†] And in reference to the same subject, Justin remarks that no one saw the Lord of all but "Him who, according to the will of the Lord of all, was also God, his Son, and his messenger (ἄγγελον) from serving his will^x." "He is placed under the Father and Lord^y." He derives all his offices from God. "He Himself [Christ] received from the Father the privilege of being (or being called) King, and Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and every other such office as He has or had^z." "He is Lord of hosts on account of the will of the Father who gave to Him to be so^a." The various names which He receives in the Old Testament, and which Justin enumerates several times, are given Him according to the service which He performs for the Father. Thus He is called Angel, "because He Himself announces what ought to be known;" and Apostle, "because He is sent to point out what things are announced^b." His

[†] Dial. c. Tryph. c. 76, p. 301 B. Justin, speaking of Christ being called a stone, says, "The saying that He was cut out without hands means that He is not human work, but the result of the will of the God of all, the Father putting him forth" (ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπινον ἔργον ἀλλὰ τῆς βουλῆς τοῦ προβάλλοντος αὐτὸν πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ).

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 B.

^v Otto reads *ὅς*, 'who says,' but translates as if it were *ὅν*.

^w Dial. c. Tryph. c. 129, p. 358 D. ^x Ibid. c. 127, p. 357 B.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 126, p. 356 B.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 86, p. 313 C. The word 'being,' or 'being called,' has to be supplied from the context.

^a Ibid. c. 85, p. 311 A.

^b Apol. i. c. 63, p. 95 D. His names are given in Dial. c. Tryph. c. 34, p. 251 D; c. 86, p. 313 C, already quoted; c. 126, p. 355 B.

whole earthly life was the result of the will of the Father. His resurrection was caused by the Father, and his subsequent glories were the gift of the Father. He could not even be saved without the Father ^c.

Christ, therefore, is God. As Justin says, "God He is called, and God He is and will be ^d." But his divinity is derived from the Father, entirely subjected to the Father, and employed in his service at his will. "The sense," says Semisch, "in which Justin believed that the Logos was subordinate to the Father is twofold—that of complete dependence, and of a quantitative inequality of being ^e." It is worthy of note that Justin permits divinity only to the Son. "Do you think," he says to Trypho and his friends, "that any other one is to be worshipped, and is called Lord and God in the Scriptures, except Him who made the universe, and Christ, who was proved to you by so many passages in Scripture to have become man ^f?" "God gives his glory to his Christ alone ^g." He is the first power after the Father of all ^h, and held in the second place by Christians ⁱ. "We worship and love the Logos, who is from the unbegotten and inexpressible Father, after God ^j." Justin frequently refers to the worship paid to the Son, but, as usual, maintains that this worship is justified by its being the will of God ^k. "For he who loves God with all his heart and all his strength, being full of pious resolution, will honour no other God, and he will also honour that angel, God wishing it, who is loved by the Lord God Himself ^l."

The Incarnation.—The incarnation of Christ and his earthly life are often spoken of by Justin. The words by which he denotes the incarnation are numerous; they will be given in the quotations we make. Justin derives his information with regard to the incarnation from, and bases his speculation on, the Old Testament, referring to the memoirs of

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 102, p. 330 A. ^d Ibid. c. 58, p. 281 D. ^e vol. ii. p. 191.

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 68, p. 293 B. See also c. 65, note 6 in Otto.

^g Dial. c. Tryph. c. 65, p. 289 D.

^h Apol. i. c. 32, p. 74 B.

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 13, p. 60 D E.

^j Ibid. ii. c. 13, p. 51 C.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 63, p. 287 B.

^l Ibid. c. 93, p. 321 A.

the Apostles as confirmatory. He speaks of the incarnation of the Son as a thing determined on before creation. He appeals to the words of Psalm cx., "In the brightness of thy holy ones, from the womb, before the morning star, I begot thee;" and says, "Does not this point out to you that the God and Father of all intended Him to be born from above and through a human womb^m?" And we have evidently the same idea in the sentence, "David also proclaimed that He would be born of the womb according to the will of the Father, before sun and moonⁿ."

Justin speaks in the most decided terms of the reality of the humanity of Christ. He speaks of a psalm as "showing that He truly became man, capable of feeling sufferings (*ἀντιληπτικός παθῶν*)," "that He was born a man truly capable of suffering (*ἀληθῶς παθηγός*)."^o And in one passage he makes an express reference to the opinion of the Docetes. He says that his heart was trembling and like wax, "that we may know that the Father wished his own Son truly to endure even such sufferings on our account, and that we may not say that He being the Son of God did not feel those things that happened and fell to his lot^p."

Justin makes no distinction between the divine and the human natures of Christ. He considered the pre-existent Logos and the man Jesus Christ as in all respects the same, and what in any respect he affirms of the one he affirms of the other. The proofs of this will be manifest in many of the extracts which we shall make in reference to other points. We adduce one or two here, principally because they have sometimes been misunderstood. "These words," says Justin, "are to prove that Jesus the Christ is Son of God and Apostle, formerly being Logos, and having sometimes appeared in the form of fire, and sometimes in the image of incorporeal things, but now through the will of God having become man for the human race, He endured to suffer what the demons caused Him to endure at the hands of the senseless Jews^r." The

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 63, p. 286 D. Maranus translates *ἀνωθεν* 'antiquitus,' and not 'oelitus.'

ⁿ Ibid. c. 76, p. 302 B.

^o Ibid. c. 98, p. 325 A.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 99, p. 326 B. ^q Ibid. c. 103, p. 331 D. ^r Apol. i. c. 63, p. 96 A.

identity of the Son, Logos, and the man could not be more distinctly announced in an unconscious manner. Kaye^s supposed that it was here stated that Christ was the Logos before He was Son or Messenger, but such a notion is at utter variance with the repeated assertions of Justin, and, indeed, with his whole doctrine of the Logos, which had its foundation in the Sonship of Christ. Kaye's supposition arises from a mistake with regard to the *πρότερον*, which has no reference to the preceding clause, but to the *νῦν δέ*, which follows. Justin has the very same contrast in the same chapter: "And formerly He appeared in the shape of fire and an incorporeal image to Moses and the other prophets, but now in the times of your government, as we said before, having become a man through a virgin according to the counsel of God." And in Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, this *πρότερον* is used by itself to signify "before the incarnation^t." The Logos or Son thus endured all the sufferings which Jesus endured. Justin did not speculate on the possibility of the divine Logos being capable of suffering, for He seems to have regarded his capability of appearing to man and taking upon Him man's nature as the feature which distinguished Him from the Father. The Father was in his super-celestial places, immovable and unchangeable, and hence could not be liable to any human affection. There is only one passage in Justin which states the contrary of this, but the passage is in such complete opposition to all Justin's beliefs and to his whole theory that editors have wisely changed it. In the MSS. it reads, "In which remembrance is had of the suffering which through it (or Him) the God of God suffered." Thirlby has altered it into "which the Son of God suffered on their account^u." To this Justin could have no objection, for though he regarded the term 'Son of God' as implying divinity, yet he did not suppose that his divine nature could not suffer. He did not indeed put his

^s Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr, by John, Bishop of Lincoln, second ed., p. 64, note 1. Apol. i. c. 63, p. 96 D.

^t Maranus, in loc., and Otto, note 2.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, p. 345 A. ὃ πέπονθε δι' αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, changed into ὃ πέπονθε δι' αὐτοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ.

doctrine in the form we have now put it, and we cannot venture to say that his mind had struck upon this inference from his general belief. The identity of the Logos with the man Jesus is also seen in the way in which Justin justifies the idea to heathens. "We do not bring any thing new," he says in his First Apology¹, "alongside of those who are called with you sons to Zeus, when we say that the Logos, who is the first offspring of God, was born without mixture Jesus Christ our teacher, and that He was crucified, and died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven." And he appeals to Hermes, whom he calls the hermeneutic or interpretative word, to the death of Asklepios, who was first struck with a thunderbolt and ascended into heaven, and to various instances of Apotheosis. And he repeats similar assertions in the next chapter, making especial reference to his crucifixion, which he maintains is common to him with the sons of Zeus. So complete was the identity of the man with the Logos that the Logos or reason is said to reach even to his whole being. "Our doctrines," he says, "are evidently more sublime than all human teaching, because Christ who appeared for us was the entire reason (τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον), body, Logos, and soul²." This passage is not without its difficulties, yet still the sense seems not to be mistaken. The σῶμα of Christ is his body, the ψυχή is the living principle with its attendant affections and passions, and the Logos is the highest nature. Both the σῶμα and the ψυχή are completely subjected to rational principles, and the highest or regulative power in man is not called πνεῦμα in Christ; for the πνεῦμα was in Him pure reason. Neander was inclined to regard these words as spurious.

The incarnation of Christ took place on account of the will of the Father. This doctrine has been attested by several of the passages quoted already. We adduce a few more. "Jesus Christ being his Logos, and firstborn, and power, and by his will having become man³." "He became man according to the will of God, even the Father⁴." The doctrine is still

¹ c. 21, p. 67 A.

² Apol. i. c. 23, p. 68 C.

³ Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 48 B C.

⁴ Ibid. ii. c. 6, p. 45 A.

farther seen in the especial descriptions of the method in which the Logos became man. For there is scarcely a mention of this subject in which the Father's will is not spoken of.

Justin frequently refers to the miraculous birth of Christ by a virgin. "For if," Justin says, "like all other firstborn children, He also was to be begotten from intercourse, why did God say He would give a sign which is not common to all first-begotten children? But that which is indeed truly a sign, and which was to be credible to the human race, namely that the first-begotten of all creatures having been made flesh through a virgin's womb should truly become a child, this circumstance, he taking hold of it beforehand through the prophetic spirit, proclaimed it in various ways, as I have related, so that when it took place it might be known to have taken place by the power and will of the Maker of all ^b." "He was born (*ἀπεκνήθη*) by means of a virgin who was of the seed of Jacob, who was the father of Judah, the previously-mentioned father of the Jews, through the power of God ^c." Christ's connexion with the fathers of the Hebrew race through Mary is several times mentioned. The ceremonies of the law "ought to cease in Him who, being the Son of God, the Christ, was born, according to the will of the Father, through a virgin, who was of the race of Abraham and of the tribe of Judah and David ^d." Justin seems to have felt that this doctrine of the Logos being born of a virgin might prove a stumbling-block to the Jews, and he therefore refers them to the appearances of God to Abraham and the other patriarchs as of a like nature. "If then," he says, "we know that God ^e was manifested in so many shapes to that Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, how do we doubt and not believe that He could be born man through a virgin according to the will of

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 84, p. 310 A.

^c Apol. i. c. 32, p. 74 D.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 43, p. 261 C. See also Ibid. c. 45, p. 264 A; c. 48, p. 267 C; c. 100, p. 327 C.

^e This is the instance of *τὸν Θεόν* not quoted above.

the Father of all, especially when we have so many Scriptures from which we can expressly learn that this also took place according to the will of the Father^f?"

Justin refers frequently to the miraculous birth without mentioning the virgin. Thus, "Christ has blood, but not from the seed of man, but from the power of God^g;" and in words slightly different, "his blood not having arisen from human seed, but from the will of God^h."

Two passages deserve especial notice in this connexion. The one has been quoted already in which it is said that Christ was born "without mixture," the most likely explanation of which is, that it refers to his miraculous birth by the power of God. The other passage refers to the Mosaic ritual, and runs thus: "Nor now is there in like manner any need of it after Him who was born according to the will of God, [apart from sin, through] the virgin of the race of Abraham, the Son of God, Jesus Christⁱ." The reading in the manuscript is corrupt; for it is *δίχα ἀμαρτίας* *τῆς*. Editors generally supply *διὰ* before the *τῆς*, and render as I have rendered above. Now both of the meanings which can be assigned to the *δίχα ἀμαρτίας* are objectionable. Otto and others, who regard the Fragments on the Resurrection as Justin's, suppose that he refers here to the opinion that there is sin always in sexual connexion, and that Christ was born *δίχα ἀμαρτίας* because He was born of a virgin. But there is not a single passage in Justin's own writings to justify such an interpretation. Others have supposed a reference to the doctrine of original sin, but as this doctrine is totally unknown to Justin, this interpretation has been generally rejected. Thirlby proposed to read *διὰ Μαρίας*, but the change is too great, and the name Mary is seldom inserted. It seems to me that the right reading is probably *διὰ ἀμαρτίας*, that the *χ* of *δίχα* has arisen from a repetition of the sound *ἀ* in *ἀμαρτίας*, and the omission of the second *διὰ* may be

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 75, p. 300 D.

^g Ibid. c. 54, p. 274 A.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 63, p. 286 D. See also Apol. i. c. 22, p. 67 E.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 23, p. 241 B.

accounted for by the unusual juxtaposition of διὰ twice. The words διὰ ἀμαρτίας would have a peculiar force in the connexion which might account for their being there at all. Justin intimates that the Mosaic ritual was appointed on account of men being sinners, and he now states that there is no need of this ritual now that Christ has been born for the express purpose of taking away sins.

Justin was placed in a peculiar predicament in reference to the birth of Christ by his Logos-doctrine. God the Father willed the creation of the world, but accomplished it through the Logos. So He continually acts through the Logos. But when God wished the Logos to become flesh, who was there to be the instrument? Justin does not hesitate to answer that it was the Logos Himself. "Jesus Christ our Saviour was made flesh through the Logos of God ^j." And in describing his birth he says, "But the power of God coming upon the virgin overshadowed her and made her, though a virgin, conceive. And the angel of God who was sent to her at that time gave her the good news, 'Lo, thou shalt conceive of the Holy Spirit,' " &c. On this passage, taken from the Gospels, Justin remarks: "It is not lawful, then, to understand by the Spirit and the power which proceeds from God anything else than the Logos, who is also God's firstborn ^k."

Of the earthly life of Christ Justin mentions most of the events as recorded in our Gospels. He especially dwells on those occurrences which throw light on the prophecies of the Old Testament. We need not relate them here particularly ^l, but we shall take care to notice where Justin says anything different or additional to our narratives.

Justin narrates with great particularity the circumstances of the nativity and infancy of Christ. He tells how Joseph and Mary went to Bethlehem, and affirms that Christ was born in a cave. He drew this information from a prophecy,

^j Apol. i. c. 66, p. 98 A.

^k Ibid. c. 33; p. 75 A B C.

^l See Otto, *De Justini Martyris Scriptis et Doctrina*, p. 158, for a full and accurate account.

Isaiah xxxiii. 16. He relates all the events recorded in the first and second chapters of Matthew, and draws the inference from the worship rendered by the Magi, that the presence of the infant freed them from the powers of an evil demon^m. He also describes John the Baptist, and how Jesus came to him to be baptised. He adds the circumstanceⁿ that, at the baptism, on Christ's descending into the waters, a fire was lighted in the Jordan, and that the voice from heaven said, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee o."

Up to the age of thirty Jesus had remained unknown to the world, according to prophecy, being thought the son of the carpenter Joseph, and acting Himself as a carpenter, making ploughs and yokes^p. Justin mentions his teaching, his miracles, and his prophecies. He also mentions several of his apostles, and relates one or two occurrences of his life—his triumphal entrance into Jerusalem, and his partaking of the passover with his disciples. He dwells more minutely on the circumstances of his death. He was crucified on the day before Saturday (*τῇ πρὸ τῆς κρονικῆς*), and on the day after, that is, the day of the sun, He arose again from the dead and appeared to the apostles^q. The Father of all, after raising Christ from the dead, led Him up to heaven^r.

Justin himself in several places gives a summary of the principal facts in the earthly life of Christ. "In the books of the prophets," he says, "we found Him proclaimed beforehand as coming, as being born through a virgin, and as reaching manhood, as healing all disease and weakness, and raising the dead, as envied and unrecognised and crucified, Jesus our Christ, and as dying and being raised up, and ascending into heaven^s, and being called Son of God." The formula used in exorcism seems to have included these circumstances. "For by the name of this very Son of God and firstborn of all creation, who was born through a virgin, and became

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 78, p. 304 D.

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 316 D.

^q Apol. i. c. 67, p. 99 B.

ⁿ Ibid. c. 88, p. 315 D.

^p Ibid. p. 316 A C.

^r Ibid. c. 45, p. 82 D.

^s Apol. i. c. 31, p. 73 A.

man capable of suffering, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate by your people, and died and rose again from the dead, and ascended into heaven, every demon exorcised is conquered and subdued[†]."

Semisch draws particular attention to two points connected with the earthly life of Christ—"his descent into Hades, and his reassumption of his crucified flesh." But he goes considerably farther than the words of Justin warrant. He supposes that Justin taught that Christ went down to Hades to preach the gospel, and speculates as to what object Christ might have had in so doing, as Justin maintained that the pious Jews would be saved. The passages on which Semisch bases his opinions and suppositions are these. In expounding the words of Psalm xxii. 1, 2, he remarks on the words "not for ignorance to me:"—"As it was not from ignorance that God asked Adam where he was, nor Cain where Abel was, but to evince the character of each, and that the knowledge of all might come to us through writing, so he also referred not to his own ignorance, but to that of those who thought that He was not Christ, but reckoned that they would put Him to death, and that He would remain like a common man in Hades[‡]." Here Justin himself does not say a word about Christ's remaining in Hades. He merely states the thoughts of Jews, and uses the language which he knows these Jews would have used. The other passage to which appeal is made is in Dial. c. Tryph. c. 72, p. 298 B. Justin is speaking of the passage which the Jews struck out of the text of the Septuagint: "And from the words of the same Jeremiah they in like manner cut off these, 'The Lord, the Holy God of Israel, remembered his dead who had fallen asleep in mounded earth, and He went down to them to preach the good news of his salvation to them.'" Justin gives no interpretation of these words, makes no further remark with regard to them. He may have interpreted them with regard to Christ's descent into Hades, but he would be a rash man who would venture to assert that he assuredly did so interpret them.

[†] Dial. c. Tryph. c. 85, p. 311 B.

[‡] Ibid. c. 99, p. 326 B.

There is even still less evidence for the other opinion, that Christ reassumed the *same* body, which, remaining still essentially the same, passed into a state of glorification at his ascension. The passage to which appeal is made is in the Treatise on the Resurrection. And even it says nothing more than what we find in the Gospels, that the body of Christ risen was a real body, that He could eat, and that it had the marks of the nails. The writer does not speculate, and does not speak as if he were conscious of propounding any opinion, but as if he were stating facts. And the same fact of Christ ascending with the mark of the nails in his body, and altogether in the state of body in which his sufferings would make Him, is implied in a general way in ch. 36 of the Dialogue with Trypho. Justin is explaining Psalm xxiv., especially the verses, "Lift up your gates, ye rulers, and be ye lifted up ye everlasting gates, and the King of glory shall come in. Who is this King of glory? The Lord of hosts, He is the King of glory." "That the Lord of hosts," says Justin, "is not Solomon, has been proved, but when our Christ rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, the rulers who are appointed by God in the heavens are ordered to open the gates of the heavens, that this one who is King of glory may enter, and, ascending, may sit down on the right hand of God until He place his enemies as the footstool of his feet, as has been shown by means of another Psalm. For when the rulers in heaven saw Him disfigured, and having a form dishonourable and inglorious, not knowing Him, they asked, 'Who is this King of glory*?'"

Justin says comparatively little of the character of Christ, and what he does say is taken principally from the Old Testament prophecies. He mentions his complete obedience to his Father, quoting Psalm xxii. 4-6, and remarking that in it he points out "that He would be saved by God, but does not boast that He does anything by his own will or strength. For when He was on earth He did the same. When some one said to Him 'good teacher,' He answered, 'Why do you

* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 36, p. 255 B.

call me good? One is good, my Father, who is in heaven ^γ.” He also appeals to the same psalm as proof “of his piety to the Father, and how He refers all things to Him and seeks to be saved from this death through Him^α.” Justin calls Christ the only blameless and righteous (*δίκαιον*) man^α. He speaks of Him as sinless^β, and calls Him the most righteous and only spotless and sinless Christ^γ.

With regard to the object of the incarnation, Justin speaks in that unspeculative manner in which we have found all the early writers speak. He does not give us the slightest hint how he thought the incarnation accomplished the object intended, or rather he did not trouble himself about the how, content with the great fact that it was God’s plan and that it fully succeeded.

The passages we have adduced already in regard to the incarnation show that that event was the result of God’s will and of the exercise of his power. The object consequently was also his object. It was a service (*οικονομία*) undertaken at the will of God, and consummated on the cross^δ. Through the mystery of the crucified one God showed his pity to the whole race of believing men, and therefore Christ urged them to praise God^ε. It is to “salvation prepared by the Father that we are called through Christ^ς.” “Christ, according to the power of the Almighty Father given to Him, came, calling to friendship, and blessing, and change of mind, and social life^ς.” And even in the teaching of Christ it was God who was teaching through Him^α. In examining the subject more minutely the reader will notice many other proofs of the same great truth.

The grand purpose of Christ’s appearance may be stated in one word as salvation. The name ‘Jesus,’ according to Justin,

^γ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 101, p. 328 A.

^α Dial. c. Tryph. c. 98, p. 324 D. See also Ibid. c. 102, p. 330 A.

^β Dial. c. Tryph. c. 17, p. 234 D.

^δ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 102, p. 330 A ; c. 103, p. 330 C, with special reference to his death.

^ε Dial. c. Tryph. c. 110, p. 337 D.

^δ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 103, p. 331 A.

^ς Ibid. c. 106, p. 333 C.

^ς Dial. c. Tryph. c. 131, p. 360 D.

^ς Ibid. c. 139, p. 369 A.

^β Apol. i. c. 19, p. 66 B.

implied this, for "it has the name and meaning both of man and saviour¹." Justin is much more obscure on the name 'Christ,' for in one place already quoted he spoke of the name 'Christ' as being given to the Logos because He arranged the world, and in another he affirms to Trypho that Jesus might be the Christ even though He were only a man. In the first passage² he affirms that the name 'Christ' (anointed) has an unknown force, probably referring to the impossibility of our conceiving what could be meant by anointing the Logos before his creating the world. The second passage is interesting as stating Justin's opinion definitely and in contrast, that Christ was more than man. "His being the Christ of God," he says, "is not destroyed, if I am unable to show that He was pre-existent Son of the Maker of all, being God, and was born a man through the virgin³." Trypho was not to deny that this one was Christ "if He appear as a man born of men and be proved to have become Christ by selection." And he adds the difficult passage which we have adduced already in proof of his liberality.

It is a matter of the greatest importance to determine the nature of the salvation. Justin expressly says that it was a "salvation from the bites of the serpent, which are evil deeds, idolatries, and other iniquities¹." Justin does not once mention salvation from punishment due to men in connexion with the death of Christ. The death of Christ, according to him, rescued men from sin, dissolved the power of demons, and destroyed death. But he nowhere speaks of it as directly abating suffering or procuring happiness. Christ having risen from the dead became judge, with power to dispense eternal blessings or everlasting punishment, but Justin nowhere speaks of its being Christ's object in coming into the world to dispense the one or the other.

A more minute inquiry into what Justin states with regard to the objects of Christ's incarnation and the way in which he actually accomplished them will develop these ideas.

¹ Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 44 E.

² Ibid.

³ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 48, p. 267 C.

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 94, p. 322 A.

There are some passages which speak in general terms of the object of Christ's coming. He became man in behalf of the human race^m, on account of usⁿ, for our salvation^o, for men diverse and of various forms from every race^p. He endured to be born and to be crucified, not because He required to do these things for Himself, but in "behalf of the race of men that from Adam had fallen under death and the deceit of the serpent^q."

In examining more particularly the objects of the incarnation we shall best exhibit them by discussing the means. Justin speaks of two characters of Christ in which He accomplished his work—as a teacher, and as a sufferer. It has been remarked that Justin says nothing of the example of Christ.

Christ's teaching is in Justin's mind an essential feature of the work of Christ. For Christ was the reason (Logos), the complete reason, and consequently those in whom He dwelt completely were necessarily holy. Accordingly when He came to earth, "became man and taught these things, not merely philosophers and scholars obeyed Him, but also handicraftsmen and people entirely uneducated, despising both glory, fear, and death, since He was a power of the inexpressible Father and not a mere getting up of human speech^r." "His words were short and concise, for He was not a literary man (*σοφιστής*), but a power of God, even his Logos^s." "And He alone taught without concealment (*ἀπαρκαλύπτως*) the great things which the Father had determined for all men who were and would be well-pleasing to Him, and for those who revolted from his will, men or angels alike." Therefore Isaiah called Him the angel of the great counsel^t.

Justin states the object of his teaching in general terms in

^m Apol. i. c. 63, p. 96 A.

^o Apol. i. c. 66, p. 98 A.

^q Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 315 D.

^s Apol. i. c. 14, p. 61 D. The words might be translated, 'but his discourse was a power of God.'

ⁿ Ibid. ii. c. 13, p. 51 D.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 134, p. 364 C.

^r Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 49 A.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 76, p. 301 C.

one passage: "And Jesus Christ alone was begotten peculiarly Son to God, being his Logos, and firstborn, and power, and having become man by his will, He taught us these things for the conversion and reformation of the human race^u." In other passages the object in a negative and positive aspect is more precisely the persuading men to leave the demons, and the urging of them on to holiness: "His powerful word has persuaded many to leave demons to whom they were slaves, and to trust on the Almighty God through Him^x."

The effects of Christ's teaching are more fully set forth in two passages. In the one Justin urges the emperors to give heed to the words of Christ, and asks them to beware, lest demons deceive them and turn them away from reading and understanding what is said. He asserts that "we have revolted from these demons after yielding obedience (*πεισθῆναι*) to the Logos, and we now follow the only God, the unbegotten, through his Son." He then contrasts the former character of Christians with their present, and appeals to the words of Christ as proof of the kind of regulations according to which they lived^y. In the second passage he says, "For his word of truth and wisdom is more fiery and enlightening than the powers of the sun, and penetrates into the depths of the heart and the mind." And shortly after he adds, referring to the figure used here: "If He shone so much and was so powerful in his first appearance, which was dishonoured, disfigured, and despised, that in no race was He unknown, and that men of every class were converted from the old evil mode of life of each race, so that even the demons were subjected to his name, and all principalities and kingdoms feared his name^z." Here reference is made to more than his teaching; yet almost immediately after he adds, "To us then it has been granted both to hear and to understand, and to be saved through this Christ, and to know fully (*ἐπιγινώσκειν*) all the things that are the Father's."

^u Apol. i. c. 23, p. 68 C.

^y Apol. i. c. 14, p. 61 B.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 83, p. 309 D.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 121, p. 350 B.

The second aspect in which Christ appears as a worker for man is as a sufferer. This suffering, however, includes not merely his suffering on the cross, but his endurance in becoming a man. We have had several passages stating this already^a.

And, in fact, Justin seems unconsciously to have held the theory that the principle on which Christ saved man was by going through all the trials of man, overcoming them, and leading men to the same victory. Justin does not state this theory positively, but the reader will notice many passages which are in harmony with it. Thus he says, "We worship and love the Logos after God, since He became man on our account in order that, being partaker of our sufferings (*παθῶν*), He might also effect a cure^b." Hence the frequent references to his true humanity: and so much is this the case that his intense sufferings at the close of his career are appealed to as proof that the Father wished Him to suffer really^c. The same principle is applied to the explanation of his being born through a virgin. For he says "that He became man through the virgin in order that in the very way in which the disobedience springing from the serpent had its beginning it also might have its dissolution^d." And perhaps it may be seen in the statement that though Christ was sinless, yet He could not be saved without God; and hence also those who are saved through Him are also said to be "saved with Christ, who was well-pleasing to God^e." The same principle may also be observed in those passages in which Christ is said to destroy death by his death. And in one passage he represents Christ as undergoing slavery even to death, and thus through the blood and the mystery of the

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88.

^b Apol. ii. c. 13, p. 51 D.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 103, p. 331 D. See the passage fully quoted, p. 232.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 D. His explanation of Eve's virginity is dependent on allegorical interpretation.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 92, p. 320 C. Otto explains *μετά* here, 'conjuncti cum Christo, aut ejus auxilio'—a meaning which it might well enough have. See also Thirlby's emendation of the passage.

cross gaining possession of those who keep his commandments^f.

The two phases of Christ's suffering may thus be kept separate, but we shall find that the objects of both are the same. Justin names two objects for the incarnation of Christ—the dissolution of demons and the destruction of death. In one place the object is stated to be in “behalf of men who trust, and for the dissolution of demons^g ;” but in general the two objects are stated together. Thus, “God through Him (Christ) destroys (καταλύει) the serpent and those angels and men likened to him, and procures removal of death to those who turn from their sins and trust in Him^h.” The full import of the removal of death is more accurately given in another passage: “He endured to be made flesh and to be born through this virgin of the race of David, in order that through this dispensation the serpent, who acted wickedly at the beginning, and the angels who became like him, might be destroyed and death might be despised ; and that in the second appearance of Christ Himself it might cease completely from those who trust Him and live well-pleasing to Him ; for death will not exist any more after this, when the one class shall be sent to the judgment and condemnation of fire to be punished unceasingly, but the others shall live together in freedom from suffering, and corruption, and grief, and deathⁱ.”

Justin speaks most frequently of the crucifixion of Christ, or death or blood, as producing effects or accomplishing objects. These are three : there is the purifying influence of the blood of Christ ; it dissolved the power of demons ; and it destroyed death. Justin says of the blood of Christ, “That Christ purifies through blood those who trust Him^k.” The same truth is involved in the passage, “We should give thanks to God for his having freed us from the wickedness in which we were, and for having made a complete dissolution of

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 134, p. 364 C. See the whole chapter.

^g Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 45 A.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 C.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 45, p. 264 A.

^k Apol. i. c. 32, p. 74 A.

the powers and authorities through Him who became capable of suffering according to God's will¹." And it is also involved in this passage, "Christ ransomed us when we had been sunk in heaviest sins which we committed, through his being crucified on the wood and purifying us through water, and He made us a house of prayer and worship^m."

Sometimes the purifying influence of Christ's death is spoken of in a positive form, not merely as freeing from wickedness and ransoming those plunged in it, but as turning men to holiness. Thus, in explaining Deut. xxxiii. 17, he remarks, "For being struck with horns, that is, pricked in heart, men of all the nations were turned through this mystery (the cross) to piety from the vain idols and demons, but the same sign is manifested to unbelievers for dissolution and condemnationⁿ." And again, in explaining the symbol of Amalek and Joshua, he remarks, "God makes it manifest that through Jesus, the crucified one, of all of whose deeds these symbols are pre-intimations, the demons were to be thoroughly destroyed and to fear his name, and that all principalities and kingdoms were in like manner to dread Him, and that those who trust Him from every race of men were to be shown to be pious and peaceful^o."

With regard to Christ's death destroying the power of demons we have already quoted two passages, which are sufficient to show his opinion.

On the subject of death Justin remarks, "Having become man through a virgin according to the will of the Father for the salvation of those who trust Him, He endured to be despised and to suffer, that having died and risen again He might conquer death^p." And in the Dialogue with Trypho he remarks that "the blood of Christ will rescue those who trust Him from death^q."

Justin presents Christ in several aspects, which must be noticed before we conclude our exposition of his work on

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 41, p. 260 A.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 91, p. 318 D.

^p Apol. i. c. 63, p. 96 D.

^m Ibid. c. 86, p. 313 D.

^o Ibid. c. 131, p. 361 B.

^q Dial. c. Tryph. c. 111, p. 338 C.

earth. We have already quoted a passage in which Justin represents Christ as ransoming men. The passage itself is sufficient to show that Justin meant nothing more by the term than that He freed or rescued them. And, indeed, Justin elsewhere applies the word to the Israelites when "ransomed from Egypt with a mighty arm^r."

Christ is also spoken of as an offering and as sacrificed. Justin never hints a natural principle on which God appointed the regulations of offerings and sacrifice to the Jews. These regulations looked forward to the coming of Christ, and found their explanation in the facts of his case. As the blood of Christ was to cleanse from sin, so sacrifices were instituted to purify. Both had their foundation in God's will. This is not expressly stated in Justin, but it is fully implied. Thus Christ is spoken of as the paschal lamb, but the point of analogy chosen from the type is that "those who trust in Him anoint their houses, that is, themselves, with his blood, according to the proportion of faith^s." Here plainly a moral result is intended. In another place Justin finds an analogy in the effect produced. As the blood of the paschal lamb saved those in Egypt, so also the blood of Christ would rescue from death those who trust^t. The two goats used on the day of atonement are also quoted by Justin as types of two appearances of Christ^u. The one represented Christ as rejected, the other intimated that He was "an offering for all sinners who wished to change their minds and fast^x" a true fast, described by Isaiah, lviii. 5-7.

Of the offering of the fine flour he says that it was "a type of the bread of thanksgiving which Jesus Christ our Lord handed down to us to partake of, in remembrance of the suffering which He suffered for those men whose souls are purified from all iniquity^y."

Besides these particular references to offerings and sacrifices,

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 131, p. 360 D.

^s Ibid. c. 40, p. 259 A.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 111, p. 338 D.

^u See the notice of Barnabas in vol. i. p. 206.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 40, p. 259 C.

^y Ibid. c. 41, p. 260 A.

Justin makes one general reference thus: "Isaiah did not send you to the bath to wash away there your murder and other sins, for not even all the water of the sea would be sufficient to cleanse you; but, according to reason, that bath of which He spoke even then was the saving one which belongs to those who change their minds and are no longer cleansed by blood of goats and sheep, or the ashes of a heifer, or the offerings of fine flour, but by faith through the blood of Christ and his death, who died for this purpose, as Isaiah himself said^a." And then he quotes the whole of Isaiah liii. Here Justin refers solely to the purifying influence of Christ's blood and death on individuals who believe.

There remains still one other phase of Justin's doctrine with regard to Christ which has attracted considerable attention, because some of his expressions resemble doctrines prevalent in our time. Trypho brought against Jesus the objection that He died by a death cursed by the law. In the course of the explanations which Justin makes, the following sentence occurs: "If, then, the Father of all wished his own Christ to take up the curses of all in behalf of all men of every race, knowing that He would raise Him up again after He had been crucified and died, why do you speak with regard to Him who endured to suffer these things according to the Father's will as if He were cursed, and not much more lament yourselves^a?" Neander paraphrases this passage and its context thus: "The law pronounced a curse on all men, because no man could fulfil it in its whole extent. Christ, by bearing it for us, delivered us from this curse." And then he thinks "We may recognise the idea of a satisfaction rendered by Christ through suffering, lying as the basis, though not developed and maintained with clear consciousness." The process of thought which passed through Justin's mind, he fancies was this: The Son of God could not really be cursed. His curse was only apparent; the curse concerned mankind. To free mankind from it He took it

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 13, p. 229 D.

^a Ibid. c. 95, p. 323 D.

upon Himself^b. Now, if this was Justin's process of thought, we must consider it as most illogical and unsatisfactory. According to this interpretation, Christ took upon him a curse, and yet was not cursed. He saved others from the curse by being cursed in their stead; and yet his curse was only apparent, not real. Surely the inference from such a mode of thinking would be, that Justin held the doctrine not of a real satisfaction but of an apparent satisfaction. Justin, however, is much more consistent with himself. The whole mistake depends on the meaning attached to *τὰς πάντων κατὰς ἀναδέξασθαι*. Neander supposes the words to mean that Christ took on Him the curses of all, and suffered the punishment implied in the curse. But Justin does not speak one word of suffering punishment. He is anxious to prove that Christ was not really accursed, that the curse was merely apparent, not real. He has already proved it in one way. Christ's death on the cross was exceptional. True it is that the law pronounces a curse on every one that hangs on a tree; so did God in like manner pronounce a sentence against those who should erect images. Yet God Himself set up the serpent in the wilderness, and was free from guilt: and so in like manner God wished his Son to suffer and be crucified for man; and, therefore, though in the law a curse lies against man, there is no curse of God lying on Him, for it is through Him that God saves all that do things worthy of the curse.

Justin proceeds to give a second reason for believing that Christ was not cursed. He says, that according to the law of Moses all the race of men were under the curse. If God then wished Christ to undertake the case of the curses of all, how could Christ Himself be cursed? If He Himself was appointed to be the means of removing the sins which brought on the curse, how is it possible to conceive that He Himself had been cursed by God? This is unquestionably the reasoning of Justin, and it is perfectly sound. 'He took up the curses' means and can mean nothing else than that He took

^b Neander's Church History, vol. ii. p. 385 (Bohn's Transl.).

in hand the curses, took up the case of the curses, in behalf of men; that is, undertook to remove them from men. And, in fact, this is the proper meaning of ἀναδέξασθαι (suscipere).

Justin adds a third argument, that Christ was cursed indeed; that this cursing was foretold by God in the words "Cursed is **every** one that hangs on a tree." But then he **was** cursed not by God, but by the Jews. The words pointed to the time when Christians should be cursed in the synagogues, and have the curse executed on them by Gentiles. "That which is written in the law," he says, 'Cursed is every one that hangs on wood,' strengthens our hope which hangs on the crucified Christ, not because God curses this crucified one, but because He foretold that which was to be done by you all and the like of you, who do not know that this was He who was before all, and an everlasting priest of God, and King, and Christ^c." "Our suffering and crucified Christ was not cursed by the law, but showed (in it) that He alone would save those who do not remove from his faith^d."

We have now concluded the exposition of Justin's doctrine with regard to the incarnation and death of Christ. And our investigations confirm the assertion of Semisch, that "Justin was completely unacquainted with substitutionary satisfaction in its first and simplest rudiments." Christ rescued men from sin, by dying He destroyed the death inflicted on man for his disobedience, and He destroyed the power of those demons who had seduced and were seducing men from the right path. The incarnation of the Logos brought the whole Logos into communication with man, He made fully known to them the whole will of the Father. He thus changed their minds, and by removing death and undermining the demons, He destroyed all the great external obstacles to their holiness; so that it might well be said, "Through his blood men from all nations who were formerly fornicators and unjust, are saved, receiving remission of sins and no longer sinning^e."

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 96, p. 323 C.

^d Ibid. c. 111, p. 338 B.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 111, p. 338 D.

Christ's activity did not cease with his earthly career, but rather began then : for He had not completely overthrown the demons, and He had not brought men back to God. He had already acquired some through his blood ; He was "the beginning of a new race that was born again by Him through water, faith, and wood ^f." He had now to gather all who should trust in Him, and therefore He had to receive power from the Father. This power is represented sometimes as a kingdom. "The prophetic Spirit through David pointed out that Christ would reign after being crucified ^g." And so it came to pass. For "Our Jesus Christ having been crucified, and having died, rose again, and reigned, ascending into heaven ; and in consequence of what was preached from Him through his apostles, in all nations, He is a delight of those that expect the incorruption promised by Him ^h." Christ was thus "thought worthy to be King of the whole earth ⁱ," and "to be lord of all ^k."

Christ uses his kingly power for two great purposes—the utter destruction of the demons who seduce men to wickedness, and the dispensation of spiritual blessings to those who trust Him.

We have seen already that the great object of the incarnation was the destruction of demons and earthly powers. They knew this and were afraid of his coming^l. They acknowledged his power in abandoning the Magi, and "there was a secret power of God present with the crucified Christ, for the demons, and all principalities, and authorities of earth tremble at Him ^m." After his ascension they were subjected to Him, and He was to reign until He should completely subdue them. Justin, in speaking of the prophecies made through David, says that the prophetic Spirit points

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 138, p. 367 D.

^g Apol. i. c. 41, p. 79 E.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 74, p. 300 A.

^l Dial. c. Tryph. c. 111, p. 338 B: *πάντα ἀρχή*. See note of Maranus, who takes this as including 'earthly powers.'

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 49, p. 269 C.

^h Ibid. c. 42, p. 80 C.

^k Ibid. c. 76, p. 302 A.

out "that God calls Him (Christ) Son, and has promised to subject all his enemies to Him; and how the demons, as far as is in their power, try to avoid the authority of the Father of all, and Lord God, and that of Christ Himself". Justin refers again to the 110th Psalm as speaking of the "Father leading Christ up from the earth and setting Him on his right hand, until He should place his enemies the footstool of his feet." And he adds, "This is taking place ever since our Lord Jesus Christ was received up into heaven after rising from the dead^o."

Christ exhibits his power over demons in two aspects. He enables those who trust in Him to drive them out of men. Justin appeals especially to exorcisms of evil spirits by the name of Christ, in cases where a cure could be effected in no other way^p. And he regards such facts as making it "evident that his Father had given Him so great power, that even the demons are subjected to his name and to the dispensation of his suffering that has taken place^q."

The other aspect of Christ's power over demons is presented in the context of the passages last quoted: "We entreat God," he says, "to be preserved through Jesus Christ from the demons who are averse (*ἀλλότρια*) to the piety of God, but whom we formerly worshipped; that after turning to God through Him, we may be blameless; for we call Him our Helper and Ransomer, at the strength of whose name even the demons tremble^r."

The present activity of Christ is seen also in his distribution of spiritual gifts. He is still the Logos. "I assert," says Justin, "that He came to be born man through the Virgin Mary, and exists for ever." And he adds, as if stating his special work, "For this is He from whose time, and through whom, the Father is to renew the heaven and the earth. He is the person who is to shine an eternal light

^o Apol. i. c. 40, p. 79 A.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 32, p. 249 E. See also Apol. i. c. 45, p. 82 D.

^q Apol. ii. c. 6, p. 45 A; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 76, p. 302 A; c. 85, p. 311 B.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 30, p. 247 C.

^r Ibid. c. 30, p. 247 C.

in Jerusalem. This is He who is king of Salem, and the eternal priest of the Most High, according to the order of Melchisedek¹." And he goes on to show that it is He that performs the spiritual circumcision of the heart.

Christ is thus ever present with his people. He dwells as the Logos in those who trust Him². In "those who have received forgiveness of sins through Him, He is present potentially (*δυνάμει*) always, and He will be present manifestly in his second appearance³." It was power sent down by Him from heaven after his ascension that enabled the apostles to perform their mission to all nations⁴. And He dispenses the various gifts which Christians possess. The whole powers of the Spirit are inclosed in Him, as we have shown in discussing Dial. c. Tryph. c. 87. The gifts which He dispenses are named: "a spirit of understanding; of counsel; of strength; of healing; of foreknowledge; of teaching; of the fear of God⁵." He also dispenses grace, which strips off sin⁶.

Christians dedicate themselves to God through Christ, and hope and trust in Him.

There are two aspects of Christ's present activity which deserve special notice here, though they are also exhibited in his earthly work:—He is called lawgiver or law and priest.

He is called the "new lawgiver⁷," to contrast not so much with the giver of the Mosaic law, as with its requirements. For Justin speaks more explicitly of Christ "as an eternal law and new covenant," foretold as "about to come to the whole world." "And we," he adds, "who have approached to God through Him have received not this fleshly circumcision, but the spiritual one which Enoch and men like him observed⁸." Justin expressly contrasts the exclusiveness of the old law with the universality of the new law. "For

¹ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 113, p. 340 D: ἀφ' οὗ, 'from whom,' means, I agree with Otto in thinking, from the time of Christ's incarnation.

² Apol. i. c. 32, p. 74 B.

³ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 54, p. 273 D.

⁴ Apol. i. c. 50, p. 86 B.

⁵ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 39, p. 258 A.

⁶ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 116, p. 343 D.

⁷ Ibid. c. 18, p. 236 A; c. 14, p. 231 E.

⁸ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 43, p. 261 C.

the law given in Horeb is now old and belongs to you (the Jews) only, but this to all, without exception: but a law passed in opposition to another law annuls the law first given, and a covenant afterwards established in like manner destroys the first. Christ was given to us an eternal and a final law and faithful covenant; after which there is no law, no injunction, no commandment^b." Justin finds a sign of the activity of this law and covenant in the turning of men to God. "We see," he says, "and are persuaded that through the name of this very crucified Christ men come to God from idols, and other wickedness, and enduring even to death stand steadfast in their confession and piety, and from the deeds and the power that accompanied them it is possible for all to understand that He is the new law and the new covenant, and the expectation of those who, out of all nations, wait for the blessings of God^c." Through the calling of the new and eternal covenant—that is, Christ—Christians are made intelligent and pious^d.

Justin calls Christ eternal priest of God, or high priest; sometimes referring to his being a priest after the order of Melchisedek, as we have seen already^e. Justin does not mention any work peculiar to Christ as high priest. He mentions, however, two points of resemblance. As Melchisedek blessed, so did Christ. "God pointed out his eternal priest as about to be the priest of those who were uncircumcised; and those who come to Him in circumcision, that is, those who trust Him and seek blessings from Him, even these He will welcome and bless^f."

The other resemblance is in the high priest having twelve bells attached to his robe, which Justin thinks referred to the "twelve apostles who were dependent on the power of the eternal priest Christ, and through whose voice the whole earth was filled with the glory and grace of God and his Christ^g."

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 11, p. 228 B. ^c Ibid. D. ^d Ibid. c. 118, p. 346 B.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 19, p. 236 E; c. 113, p. 341 A; c. 33, p. 250 E; c. 96, p. 323 C.

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 33, p. 251 A.

^g Ibid. c. 42, p. 260 C.

We have no more exact allusion to Christ's priestly work. But in a passage which mentions his priesthood with his Sonship, and also with his kingly power, Justin alludes to the offerings of Christians being presented through Him. "For the Christ," he says, "is an especial priest, and an eternal king, as being God's Son, and do not imagine that Isaiah or the other prophets speak of sacrifices of blood or libations as being offered on the altar in his second coming, but of real and spiritual praises and thanksgivings ^h."

The second coming of Christ occupies a prominent place in the doctrines of Justin. It served to explain very many passages of the Old Testament, and it was the consummation of the work of Christ. Justin believed that after Christ had remained in heaven for a certain time he would descend to earth in gloryⁱ, on the clouds^k, accompanied by angels; that then He would completely destroy the demons and earthly powers, and give his followers an eternal possession of the earth.

These portions of Justin's doctrine will be more fully brought out in those passages which we adduce to exhibit Justin's peculiar opinions. He believed that Christ would appear in Jerusalem itself. Justin appealed for this belief to the words of Christ Himself, "that it behoved Him to suffer many things from the Scribes and Pharisees, and to be crucified, and on the third day to rise again, and again to be present in Jerusalem, and then to drink again and eat with his disciples ^l." Justin does not say whether he regarded these latter words as literal or metaphorical; but his whole doctrine on this subject scarcely permits us to doubt that he took them literally. He remarks, in speaking of one of the two goats being indicative of the second coming, "that in the same place of Jerusalem ye will know Him that was dishonoured by you ^m;" and

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 118, p. 346 B.

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 32, p. 73 D; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 52, p. 272 C; c. 49, p. 268 C.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 31, p. 247 D.

^l Ibid. c. 51, p. 271 A.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 40, p. 259 C.

he seems to appeal in confirmation to the circumstance that this goat could be offered nowhere but in Jerusalem. Again, quoting Isaiah lxvi. 5-11, he remarks that in the words is "the mystery of the second birth (τῆς πάλιν γενέσεως) of us, and of all, without exception, who expect that Christ will appear in Jerusalem, and try through deeds to be pleasing to Him". And Justin says elsewhere, "God has prepared a rest in Jerusalem for the people that obey Him"; words which might have a figurative meaning, but it is far from likely that Justin understood them in any but an earthly sense.

There has been considerable discussion about the time at which Justin thought Christ would appear. The passages which will be adduced seem to me to show that Justin had no fixed time in his mind, that he believed that Christ might come at any time, that he was inclined to think He would come soon, but that he could not state anything definitely. He tells Trypho that "A short time still remains to you of approaching Him (προσῆλύσεως); if Christ comes first, in vain shall ye change your minds, in vain shall ye weep, for He will not listen to you^p." He informs us that Christ "will appear in glory from the heavens when the man of rebellion (ὁ τῆς ἀποστασίας ἄνθρωπος), who speaks strange things even against the Most High, has dared on the earth his iniquities against us Christians^q." He mentions this man as "being already at the door." He rejects the Jewish interpretation of a "time, times, and a half;" which made a time a hundred years, apparently as if it were ridiculous that 'the man of iniquity' should reign so long; but he gives no interpretation of his own.

The next point to which we draw attention is a very important one. Justin in very many passages connects the coming of Christ with his raising the dead and judging all men; and sometimes these events are so connected that we cannot help inferring that Justin regarded the two latter

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 85, p. 312 B.

^o Ibid. c. 138, p. 368 A.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 28, p. 245 C.

^q Ibid. c. 110, p. 336 D.

as immediately consequent on the former. Thus: "For the prophets proclaimed beforehand his two appearances; one which has already taken place, in which He appeared as a man dishonoured and suffering; but the second, when, it has been proclaimed, He shall be present in glory from heaven, with his angelic host, when He shall also raise the bodies of all men that have existed, and He shall clothe the bodies of those who are worthy with incorruption, but He shall send the bodies of the unjust with eternal sensibility along with wicked demons into the eternal fire." Again, it is said, "Some of the words refer to his second coming, when He shall be present in glory on the clouds, and your people (the Jews) shall see and recognise Him whom they pierced^s." Here the resurrection of the Jewish people on the coming of Christ seems plainly to be implied, though the connexion is not so close as in the last extract. Again, Justin urges the Jews to turn from their foolish ways, that "trusting on Him ye may be saved in his second and glorious appearance, and may not be condemned to the fire by Him^t." Again, Justin says that the rulers of the earth will not cease, under the influence of the serpent, to persecute those who confess the name of Christ, "until He appear again and destroy all (the princes), and distribute to each one according to his merits^u." Again, Justin refers, in a passage already quoted, to the second coming as the time when death shall not exist and judgment shall take place^x. Again, in chapter 49^y, Justin contrasts the two appearances, and describes the second as "that in which He will come in glory and as Judge of all;" and adds, "Shall we not understand that the word of God has proclaimed that Elijah will be the forerunner of the terrible and great day, that is, of his second appearance?" Here, as

^r Apol. i. c. 52, p. 87 A.

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 14, p. 232 D.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 35, p. 254 C. See also c. 36, where Justin gives Trypho's interpretation of his words.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 39, p. 258 C.

^x Ibid. c. 45, p. 264 B.

^y p. 268 B.

plain as words can say, it is said that the second appearance is the great and terrible day. Again, in chapter 121^z, he contrasts the first appearance with the second. We have already quoted that which describes the first; that which refers to the second is in the form of a question: "Will He not," he asks, "in his glorious appearance, destroy all who hate Him, and those who unjustly revolt from Him, but refresh his own, giving them all the things they expect?" And again, in chapter 139^a, part of which has also been quoted already, "Christ came calling men to a living together, which is to be of all the holy in the same land of which, as has been shown already, He has promised the possession^b. Whence men from all parts, whether slave or free, trusting in Christ, and knowing the truth that is in his and his prophets' words, know that they will be with Him in that land, and will inherit what is eternal and incorruptible."

The doctrine of Justin on this point is precise and intelligible. None of the Christians hitherto imagined that Christians went to heaven after death. Heaven was the peculiar habitation of God; they assigned some indefinite place to dead Christians, and they all looked forward to a complete renovation of the earth, which, as we have seen already, had commenced with the incarnation of Christ, and which, as we shall see afterwards, was to be completed at the judgment. Justin was therefore consistent in looking to earth as the final habitation of the blessed. And we need not wonder that he should regard the judgment as taking place on earth, and the Jews there actually seeing Him whom they had pierced on the very spot where they had pierced Him. But Justin is totally inconsistent with

^z p. 350 B.

^a p. 369 A.

^b I have taken the liberty to translate an emendation rather than the text, which seems to me not to give good sense. Some word the editors feel is omitted. Otto supposes a *καί*, but fancies Justin may have omitted it intentionally. I have inserted *ἦς* before *ὧς*, as being a likely omission, and as giving to the whole sentence a better sense.

himself^c, when in chapters 80 and 81 he mentions with approbation the opinion that Christ was to appear in Jerusalem, and raise only the saints; that they were to be a thousand years with Him, and that after that He was to raise the wicked. In fact, Justin's millennium is rather an absurdity; for the saints are actually to enjoy in the millennium nothing more nor less than what they are to enjoy for ever. The millennium differs in no respect from the subsequent period, except in this, that the wicked would be in their graves instead of having received sentence of condemnation. The very mode in which Justin introduces his opinion with regard to the millennium is peculiar; for he does not do it exactly in his own words, but only in the words of the apostle John, without an explanation of what he thought the meaning of these words, without attempting to reconcile them with his own opinions. Trypho puts the following question to Justin: "Tell me, do you confess that this place, Jerusalem, will be really rebuilt, and do you expect that your people will be collected and made glad with Christ, along with the patriarchs and the prophets, and the holy^d of our race, or of those who were proselytes before your Christ came; or have you been moved to confess these things that you may seem to get the better of us in the discussions?" Justin replies, "I am not such a wretch, Trypho, as to speak differently from what I think. I have then confessed to you already that I and many others think these things, as ye also fully know that it will happen." Editors have been at a loss to discover where Justin mentioned this. But there is really no difficulty. Justin mentions the salvation of just Jews in chapter 45, and he had already mentioned that Christ would appear in Jerusalem in chapters 41 and 51.

^c Prudentius Maranus notices this: "Illud autem maxime observandum esse Justinum, etsi mille annos interponit inter secundum Christi adventum et extremum judicium, sic tamen loqui solere quasi nihil intervalli inter utrumque eventum intercedat." p. lvi. Praef.

^d The Greek here has τοῖς ἀπὸ, 'of those from,' which gives the sense that all the Jews were to be saved. I have changed the ἀπὸ into ἀγίοις.

He did not, indeed, mention the rebuilding of Jerusalem, but Justin, as he does frequently, replies to the main question of Trypho. Justin goes on: "But I have pointed out to you that many even of those who belong to the pure and pious opinion of Christians do not know this." Very many scholars have changed *τῶν τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς* into *τῶν μὴ καθαρᾶς*, and I agree with them; for the opinion just adduced is one in which the whole Church shared. All expected Christ to appear on earth, to raise his saints, to grant them the possession of the earth, and to bless them with uninterrupted happiness. They may not have had such a definite opinion with regard to the rebuilding of Jerusalem, but there is nothing in any contemporary or previous writer to show that they had not even this opinion; and that Justin refers to heretics in this clause the subsequent sentences prove. In explanation, he adds that many are called Christians who are not, "who say that there is no resurrection of the dead, but that souls when they die are taken up into heaven." Hitherto there is not a word about the millennium. The first announcement of it occurs towards the end of the chapter: "I," he says, "and all who are Christians in all respects right-minded know that there will be a resurrection of the flesh even for a thousand years in Jerusalem, built and adorned and broadened, as the prophets Ezekiel, Isaiah, and the others confess." Some have supposed that the Christians who are in all respects right-minded (*ὀρθογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα*) are those who agree with Justin; the Christians who do not agree are not *ὀρθογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα*. But we have already seen that Christians did agree in the main opinion of Justin; and Justin expressly contrasts the *ὀρθογνώμονες* with the heretics mentioned in the preceding sentence. Justin goes on to prove his assertion from Isaiah lxv. 17-25, laying especial stress on the words, "According to the days of the tree of life shall the days of my people be;" which he thinks secretly conveys an intimation of the thousand years. For God told Adam that on the day on which he ate of the tree he would die. But he did not die on *that day*. God's day,

however, is as a thousand years. And Adam did die within the thousand years, and so the days of the tree are a thousand years. Then Justin adds, "And after that a man among us of the name of John, one of the apostles of Christ, in a revelation which he had, prophesied that those who trusted our Christ would spend a thousand years in Jerusalem, and after that the universal and, to speak concisely, the eternal resurrection at the same time with one accord of all and the judgment would take place. Which also our Lord said, 'Neither shall they marry nor be given in marriage, but they shall be like the angels, the children of God belonging to the resurrection.'"^f This last extract is the only passage which gives us information that Justin knew of two resurrections. He does not say that he agreed with the opinion, but he could scarcely help giving his assent to an apostle. Some have fancied that they find in chapter 113 a trace of the two resurrections, for there the expression occurs the 'holy resurrection.' But little stress can be laid on this, for of itself it tells almost nothing. Besides, the early writers, as we have seen, were accustomed to speak more frequently of the resurrection of the holy without mention of that of the wicked. And in the passage alluded to Justin is speaking only of the holy.

How are we to account for the sentiments of these two chapters? One might propose many hypotheses; but there seem to me to be but two feasible ones: either that the passage is much corrupted and interpolated, or that Justin's general views lay in a direction considerably different from those advocated in these chapters, but that when he came to speak of this particular opinion he did not reject it. It did not, as it were, enter deeply into his mind. He did not see its inconsistency with his usual modes of expression. In fact, it did not occupy a prominent position in his thoughts, but still it was part of his opinions^f.

^f Maranus accounts for it thus: "Antequam hanc de regno mille annorum doctrinam adoptaret, ita loqui assueverat, nec eum nova opinio a consuetudine communis sermonis abstraxit." p. lvi.

There is some reason for adopting the first alternative. The first sentence in which mention is made of the thousand years is plainly faulty; for what can be the meaning "of a resurrection of the flesh for a thousand years in Jerusalem?" And notice, too, that it is not a resurrection of saints, but simply of flesh. Then the proof is wretched, though this would scarcely be evidence against its being Justin's, but rather the contrary. And then, in the passage relating to John, there is the peculiar expression *ποιεῖν ἔτη*, and the extraordinary and unparalleled description of the resurrection, a universal (*καθολικῇν*) and eternal (*αἰωνίαν*) resurrection and judgment of all with one accord at one time (*ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἅμα πάντων*). Then the chapters occur where we should have expected some intimation of the second day's conference, so that it might not be improbable that some one had very much shortened the Dialogue here and introduced some of his own matter.

The other alternative, however, is not without its reasons. There is nothing in the manuscripts to intimate anything wrong. There is nothing in the passage that shows conclusively that we have not Justin's opinions before us; and we have no reason to suppose that Justin was not sometimes inconsistent with himself.

Some have accused Justin of "maintaining that the saints will pass the millennium in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures." How far the accusation is true our readers can judge for themselves, for they have the whole evidence before them. They were to eat and drink with Christ; they were to be free from all pain; they were to be blessed with all joys; but there is not one syllable to intimate a single enjoyment that was not consistent with the utmost holiness. And indeed, the glory of the state was that Christ was to be the eternal light shining in Jerusalem; that He was to be king and priest there; that they were to offer up spiritual praises and thanksgivings, and to be entirely free from sin.

We have only one point more to allude to with regard to Christ. He is to be Judge of all. Some of the passages

quoted already prove this. Others mention this by itself: He "was crucified, rose again, ascended into the heavens, and will be present again as Judge of all men without exception even up to Adams." Christ is the instrument of God in this judgment: "God the Father of all is to make this judgment through my Lord Jesus Christ^h."

Holy Spirit.—Justin did not speculate at all on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and accordingly his works are peculiarly free of any assertions that might enable us to place his opinions in comparison with those of modern writers. It is essentially necessary in reading him to remember the exact meaning of *πνεῦμα*, 'breath' or 'spirit,' 'that which is breathed from some one or other,' or 'breathed into.' And perhaps it may not be unimportant to remark that neither Jews nor heathens could have found difficulty with what Justin says of the Spirit. Some have supposed that Justin held back explicit explanations of this doctrineⁱ, because it was so new, and would place formidable obstacles in the way of both Jew and Gentile. But if this doctrine was calculated to create doubt in the minds of many, would not Justin for this very reason have felt himself bound to explain it?

There is a very remarkable difference between the teaching of the Apology and that of the Dialogue with Trypho in respect to the Spirit. This difference concerns the place which the Spirit has in worship. The Apology distinctly asserts that the Spirit is to be worshipped; the Dialogue as distinctly asserts that God has given his glory only to Christ, that only God and Christ are to be worshipped, that no being deserves to be worshipped but God and Christ. There is a very striking passage in Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 277 C, in which the Spirit Himself acknowledges that only the Father and the Son have the names of God and Lord. Justin wishes to shut up Trypho in a dilemma. One of the angels that appeared to Abraham is called Lord and God. Justin

* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 132, p. 362 A; Apol. i. c. 53, p. 88 A; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 118, p. 346 A.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 58, p. 280 B.

ⁱ Semisch, ii. 216, note.

wishes to show that the angel is the Son, and does so by showing that He is not the Father. He therefore puts this question to Trypho: "If ye say that the Holy Spirit calls God and Lord (Θεολογεῖν καὶ Κυριολογεῖν) any other than the Father of all and his Christ, answer me." The whole of the subsequent proof depends on the negative answer which is implied in Trypho's tacit admission. Besides this, there is scarcely one single expression in the whole of the Dialogue with Trypho from which one could absolutely conclude that he believed in the personality of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit's chief work, both in the Dialogue and the Apology, is the inspiration of the prophets. Whatever the prophets said the Holy Spirit said, and all the language which is applicable to them is applicable also to the Spirit. Thus, if a prophet urges to repentance, Justin would think himself entitled to say, "The prophetic Spirit urges to repentance." And one might be apt to conclude from such expressions that Justin regarded the Spirit as a person. But passages of a similar nature show how fallacious such an inference would be, for we have expressions like these: "the prophetic word points out^k;" "the words proclaim^l;" "the word of prophecy says^m;" "the word of prophecy orders through David;" "the word of David provedⁿ;" "the word of God, explaining through Moses the things relating to Jacob, speaks thus^o;" "the Scripture, explaining to us, thus spoke^p." There is only one passage in the Dialogue which at first sight appears conclusive against the impersonality of the Spirit. The words run thus: "And the Holy Spirit answers them either in the person of the Father or in his own^q." One naturally supposes that "his own person" is the person of the Spirit; but a little consideration renders such an interpretation extremely doubtful. Justin is explaining the twenty-fourth Psalm. The rulers in heaven see Christ coming up disfigured and

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 275 D; c. 129, p. 358 D.

^l Dial. c. Tryph. c. 63, p. 287 B.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 85, p. 311 C.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 135, p. 365 A.

^m Ibid. c. 30, p. 247 B.

^o Ibid. c. 58, p. 280 C.

^p Ibid. c. 36, p. 255 C.

dishonoured, and ask, "Who is this King of glory?" Justin then explains the answer given in the Psalm. The Holy Spirit, he maintains, puts an answer into the mouth of God or into his own: "The Lord of hosts, this is the King of glory." Now, according to this interpretation, Justin supposes the Holy Spirit to come forth in heaven and explain that Christ is the Lord of hosts, the King of glory. It seems to me much more natural to suppose that Justin meant by 'his own,' not the Spirit's but Christ's own. Christ Himself answers the question, "This is the King of glory." And besides, the introduction of a third person alongside of the Father and Son is completely foreign to the Dialogue with Trypho, so much so that in explaining the words "Let us make man," Justin speaks of the Father and Son as being the only beings there. We do not think it fair to infer from this that Justin, when he wrote the Dialogue with Trypho, did not believe in the personality of the Spirit. Indeed, though there are no decisive passages, the many expressions indicative of personality render the probability of his holding to the personality of the Holy Spirit very great. But there is, in addition to this, the consideration how uniformly the ancient writers hypostatize the Spirit or spirits, as we have already seen most prominently in the Pastor of Hermas, and there is the fact that Justin unquestionably speaks of the Spirit as a person in the Apologies.

Some, indeed, have thought that in the Apology Justin identifies the Spirit with the Logos. Christ^{as} there said, as we have seen already, to foretell events through the prophets, and the exact words are used in reference to both—that the prophets are God-borne (inspired) by the divine Logos and by the prophetic Spirit^r. There is unquestionably here an identification of functions, but not of personalities. But this identification of functions is explicable on the supposition that the Spirit is under the control of Christ, and that in prophesying He but gives forth what Christ commissions Him to give, just as the

^r Apol. i. c. 35, p. 76 A.—Θεοφορούμενος τῷ πνεύματι τῷ προφητικῷ.

same work is frequently attributed in the same words to God and Christ. Justin, indeed, nowhere gives exact expression to this doctrine in relation to prophecy, but the doctrine was a common one in the Church, and there can be no doubt that Justin did believe that the Spirit was under Christ's control. Appeal, indeed, might be made to the passage where the gifts of the Spirit are said to rest on Christ, as proof that Justin regarded the Spirit as under the control of Christ only after the incarnation. But the passage is not definite enough to forbid the supposition that Justin may have believed in a previous activity of the Son through the Spirit, and, as we shall see, there are not wanting traces of such a belief.

The other passage adduced to prove the identity of the Logos and the Spirit proves no such thing. It has been quoted already: "It is not lawful, therefore, to understand by the Spirit and power which proceeds from God anything else than the Logos who is God's first-begotten^s." Justin here maintains that the words 'spirit of God' and 'power of God,' mentioned in the first chapter of Luke as the cause of Mary's conception, can refer only to the Logos. He here simply gives an explanation of the word *πνεῦμα* and applies it to the Logos. If he had imagined that any one would have drawn the inference that the Logos and prophetic Spirit were one individuality, he could have said, "*πνεῦμα* here does not mean the prophetic Spirit, but the Logos." The Logos was unquestionably a *πνεῦμα* or 'spirit;' but his spirituality cannot in the slightest degree affect the personality of the prophetic Spirit.

Justin adheres to the traditional notion and uses the traditional language in regard to the Spirit. He is perplexed by no difficulties in regard to Him, and he evidently expects his readers to rest content with his simple statements. He never gives one hint as to the origin of the Spirit. He does not speak of Him as an offspring, nor as an emanation. He does not puzzle himself in the slightest degree with regard to the

^s Apol. i. c. 33, p. 75 C.

metaphysical relation between the being of the Spirit and the being of God. Moreover, there is a want, if I may so speak, of a full development of the results of personality in the case of the Spirit. Justin speaks of Him only in connexion with his two functions of prophetic inspiration and the bestowing of gifts. There is a marked exception to this in the larger Apology, where He is spoken of as being worshipped, and is coupled with the Son. Nowhere, however, is He called God.

We proceed now to an exact inquiry into what Justin thought with regard to the Spirit. We shall notice first what he says with regard to the Spirit in those relations which indicate his personality. We shall then examine those passages in which the impersonality of the Spirit is implied.

In the Apology the name of the Spirit is several times joined with those of the Father and Son, and He is spoken of as worshipped and honoured. Thus, "We reverence and worship Him (the Father of all), and the Son that came from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good angels that follow and are likened to Him, and the prophetic Spirit^t." He defines more exactly the place of the Spirit: "Holding," he says, "the Son in the second place, we honour Him, and with reason we honour the prophetic Spirit in the third place (*ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει*)."^u And he thinks this doctrine of the third position being assigned to the Spirit was borrowed by Plato from Moses's mention of the Spirit moving on the waters^x. The conjunction of the three occurs in the baptismal formula adduced by Justin: "In the name of the Father of all and Lord God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and a Holy Spirit^y." The formula is repeated in the same chapter, and the mention of the Spirit is explained by a relative clause: "And in the name of a Holy Spirit who through the prophets proclaimed beforehand all

^t Apol. i. c. 6, p. 56 C.

^x Apol. i. c. 60, p. 93 B.

^u Ibid. c. 13, p. 60 E.

^y Ibid. c. 61, p. 94 A.

that related to Jesus^a." Mention is also made of the three in the description of the Thanksgiving (the Eucharist): "The president sends up praise and glory to the Father of all through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit^a." And also in all their meals they blessed "the Maker of all through his Son Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit^b."

Justin nowhere says a word with regard to the nature of the Spirit. He gives us positive assurance of his complete subordination to the Father, but even here his language is not precise. This subordination has already been pointed out in those passages which speak of the prophetic Spirit as being in the third rank, or in those which represent thanks as being rendered to God through Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is seen also in those passages where the Holy Spirit is spoken of as an instrument of God. "God by means of the prophetic Spirit pointed out these things as about to take place^c." It is also implied in those passages where the prophetic gift is spoken of as completely under the control of God^d. Thus, in *Apol.* i. c. 60, p. 93 A, Moses is said to act "according to the inspiration and energy which was from God."

There is still farther indication of the subordination of the Spirit in the name, 'the Spirit of God,' which Justin applies to the prophetic or Holy Spirit. One might, indeed, hesitate to identify the Spirit of God with the Holy Spirit at first; for in the four passages in which it occurs, two refer to the spirit that moved on the waters^e, one to a spirit in Elias^f, and one to the spirit which gives the gifts in the period after Christ's ascension^g. Yet, as Justin uses the corresponding

^a *Apol.* i. c. 61, p. 94 E. I lay no stress on the omission of the article in these passages, but translate merely that the reader may know the article is omitted.

^b *Apol.* i. c. 65, p. 97 D.

^c *Apol.* i. c. 67, p. 98 C.

^d *Apol.* i. c. 33, p. 74 E; c. 44, p. 82 B; *Dial.* c. *Tryph.* c. 84, p. 310 B.

^e *Dial.* c. *Tryph.* c. 87, p. 314 D.

^f *Apol.* i. c. 60, p. 93 B; c. 64, p. 97 A.

^g *Dial.* c. *Tryph.* c. 49, p. 268 C.

^h *Ibid.* c. 88, p. 315 B.

phrase, the 'Divine Spirit,' in reference to prophecies^b, we cannot doubt that he thought only of one Spirit in the two names. Besides this, Justin expressly calls the prophetic Spirit "the prophetic Spirit of Godⁱ," so that we cannot doubt that he believed the prophetic Spirit to belong to God and to be under his control.

The subordination of the prophetic Spirit to Christ is not so distinctly implied. His inferiority is to be inferred from his being in the third place, while Christ is in the second. Some have also found in the expression applied to Christ, *πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, 'the first offspring of God,' the doctrine that the Spirit was the second. But such inferences are totally unwarranted; for we have not the slightest indication that Justin ever thought of the origination of the Spirit. He was the 'breath of God;' how could He be either begotten or created? Far more satisfactory is the passage in which the gifts of the Spirit are spoken of as under the control of Christ. The powers of the Spirit rested on Him, and He gave them as gifts to those who trusted in Him^k. When, also, it is said that Joshua derived strength from Christ's spirit in making the sun stand still, we have an express testimony to Christ's right over the Spirit. But it might be questioned whether Justin would there identify the spirit of Christ with the holy prophetic Spirit, or whether, rather, 'spirit' here is not equivalent to 'power.' Some have found another testimony to the subordination of the Spirit to Christ in the following passage: "We," says Justin, "who being given to fornication, and, in one word, to every filthy deed, put off all the filthy wickednesses with which we were clothed through the grace which comes from our Jesus according to the will of His Father. Close upon us presses the devil, always opposing us and wishing to drag all to himself, and the angel of God, that is the power of God, sent to us through Jesus Christ, rebukes him, and he departs

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D; c. 9, p. 226 D.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 49, p. 269 A. See Semisch, vol. ii. p. 235.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 87, pp. 314 C, 315 A; c. 39, p. 258 A.

from us¹." Neander^m thinks that by the 'angel of the Lord' Justin could not have understood anything else than the Holy Spirit, and he therefore speaks of the Holy Spirit as standing in some relationship with angels. But such an inference is wholly unwarranted. The power sent through Christ may be the Holy Spirit, and Justin might or might not have understood anything else by it. But there is nothing in Justin's works to compel us to any inference with regard to the Spirit at all, since Justin does not bring the two ideas into juxta-position. Moreover, a true method of interpreting Justin will recognise the looseness with which he uses the words 'spirit' and 'power,' and the ease with which he hovers between personalities and impersonalities. Justin here is explaining the third chapter of Zechariah. An angel of God is mentioned there, and Justin explains this angel, or messenger, as the power sent by God through Jesus Christ. Now the remarkable thing here is, that Justin is content with this explanation; that he applies the indefinite expression 'a power,' and does not use 'the Spirit;' for this power is the power that creates a moral revolution in man, and makes him holy. It is remarkable that Justin never assigns such a work to the Spirit, and it is curious to find him attributing it to a power sent by God through Christ, which cannot and ought not to be crystallized into such a definite notion as that of the Holy Spiritⁿ.

The notice of this passage leads us to a consideration of the other passage on which Neander grounds his opinion of the angelic nature of the Spirit. It is that quoted already, in which it is said that we worship Christ and the host of other angels and the Holy Spirit. Neander thinks the Holy Spirit is one of these other angels; the words being equivalent to "the host of angels, but especially the Holy Spirit." The objection to this interpretation is that the 'other' would, according to the laws of composition, more naturally refer to

¹ Dial. c. Tryph, c. 116, p. 344 A.

^m Church History, vol. ii. p. 338, and note.

ⁿ Semisch has very thoroughly expounded this passage, vol. ii. pp. 224 ff.

Christ, who is frequently called ἄγγελος, angel, or messenger; and therefore nothing could justify its application to the Spirit, unless there was clear reason for thinking that Justin really did regard the Spirit as an angel. As throughout his works there is not the slightest indication of such a doctrine, it is absurd to build a theory on an unlikely translation of a single passage. The angels and the Spirit seem coupled together, but the idea by which they were connected in Justin's mind is not given, and can only be guessed at. We have no right to suppose this idea to be that both angels and Spirit were angels, because we have no proof that Justin held such a doctrine. The idea seems to me to be that both angels and Spirit were completely under the control of the Father and Son.

We have already defined the work of the Spirit as foretelling future events^o, and we also described the mode in which Justin speaks of Him as varying according to the import of the words quoted. Thus the Spirit is spoken of as pointing out^p, as speaking^q, as naming^r, as urging to a certain course of life^s, as reproving^t, and as reproaching^u. "In the ninety-eighth Psalm the Spirit reproaches us." Almost nothing is said of his work, apart from his acting on the prophets. In one passage he mentions that "it was the Spirit in the prophets that anointed and appointed the Jewish kings^v." The only work assigned to the Spirit in post-

^o Apol. i. c. 31, p. 72 B; c. 32, p. 73 C; c. 42, p. 80 B; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 114, p. 341 B C.

^p Apol. i. c. 41, p. 79 E.

^q Ibid. c. 38, p. 77 C; c. 39, p. 77 D.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 61, p. 284 A B; c. 56, p. 277 C; c. 33, p. 251 B; c. 54, p. 273 D.

^s Apol. i. c. 40, p. 78 E.

^t Ibid. c. 63, pp. 95 C, 96 C.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 37, p. 255 D.

^v Dial. c. Tryph. c. 52, p. 272 B. I do not think that the passage Dial. c. Tryph. c. 86, p. 313 B, ascribes the same function to Christ as Semisch, vol. ii. p. 231, is inclined to think: 'All the kings and anointed ones derived from Him (Christ) the privilege of being called kings and anointed.' This merely points out that Christ is the antetype of all kings and the source of all their kingly power, but does not indicate in the slightest degree how they were anointed or appointed.

Christian times is the giving of the peculiar gifts, and even this function is mentioned only once, where Justin, closing his remarks on the resting of the powers of the Spirit on Christ, appeals to fact: "It is possible to see among us women and men having gifts from the Spirit of God^w." The power which touches men's minds and renews their moral nature is never called the Spirit, but is a power of God exercised by and through Christ.

We now turn our attention to those passages where the impersonality of the Spirit is more decided than the personality.

The most common impersonal use of the word 'Spirit' is where there is a result or power of the Spirit. It may be questioned whether Justin did not regard these as separate spirits or individualities, but there is nothing to give a satisfactory explanation. Thus, Christ bestowed a spirit of understanding, and a spirit of strength, and a spirit of teaching, and a spirit of the fear of God^x. And the prophets themselves did not all receive the same power from God: "For Solomon had a spirit of wisdom, and Daniel of understanding and counsel, and Moses of strength and piety, and Elias of fear, and Isaiah of knowledge, and the others in like manner had each one power, or one power along with another by turns, as Jeremiah, and the Twelve, and David, and, without exception, all the prophets that have been with you^y." Here the *δύναμις* is plainly equivalent to the *πνεῦμα*. Justin resolves the spirit into a power. The word is also applied in a general way to the influence of the Divine Spirit. Thus, prophets are said to speak with a Divine Spirit (*θεῖῳ πνεύματι λαλήσαντες*^z), to be filled with a holy Spirit^a, and to be "full of a Divine Spirit, teeming with power and blooming with grace^b." There is one passage where the word 'Spirit' would be most

^w Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 315 B.

^x Ibid. c. 39, p. 258 A.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 87, p. 314 D.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D. These are the words of the old Christian man who spoke to Justin when a heathen.

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D.

^b Ibid. c. 9, p. 226 D.

appropriately interpreted as the higher principle in man, when the Jewish people are said to be called to a change in the convictions of the Spirit (*μετάνοιαν τοῦ πνεύματος*^b). The reading, however, is doubtful. There is also one passage in which a 'holy spirit' means the spirit of holiness with which Christ was to baptize those who trusted in Him: "What need is there of that baptism (Jewish purification) to me, who have been baptized (purified) with a holy spirit^c."

There is also one passage in which the mode of expression is personal, but the assertions made in it seem to indicate an impersonal view of the Spirit. Justin asserts that the spirit which was in Elias was transferred to John. "The Spirit of God which had been in Elias came before us as a herald of Christ's first appearance in John, who was a prophet among you^d." Justin does not assert that the same spirit influenced Elias and John, but that the identical spirit which was in Elias was also in John. This doctrine proves a stumbling-block to Trypho, and he says, "It does indeed seem marvellous to me that the prophetic Spirit of God which appeared in Elias appeared in John also." Then Justin appeals to the transference of the spirit in Moses to Joshua, when God said, "I shall remove of^e the spirit which is in you to him." "As God then removed part of the spirit that was in Moses, while Moses was still among men, to Joshua, so God was able to make part of the spirit of Elias to come upon John; that, as Christ appeared inglorious in his first advent, so also the first appearance of the spirit which was always pure in Elias, namely Christ, might be perceived inglorious." I do not see how this difficult passage can be properly explained. Justin seems to state that the spirit in Elias was Christ, and that this spirit was kept uninjured (*minime laesus aut violatus fuit hac communicatione.—Maranus*). Otto has tried to get rid of part of the difficulty by inserting a *ὡς* before *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 30, p. 247 A.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 29, p. 246 C.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 49, p. 268 C.

^e That is, 'a portion of the spirit' (*ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος*).

makes Justin repeat himself. Thirlby has amended the text in a rough way.

Angels.—Justin says very little of the origin, nature; or functions of good angels. He maintains their permanent existence and reality^f, as we have seen already. He expresses his belief that those who are ordered to lift up the gates that the King of glory may come in are “angels and powers^g.” In the full exposition of the Psalm he calls them “rulers appointed by God^h.” So that we may regard ‘rulers’ and ‘angels’ and ‘powers’ as all applicable to certain beings in heaven. These terms may express different classes of the same race, but Justin does not enable us to draw any distinction. God made these angels, endowing them with a rational and moral nature, and making them voluntary agentsⁱ. They are therefore called the angels or messengers of God. But they seem to be especially the servants of Christ. He is the Lord of powers^k; He is Lord of the two angels that went to Sodom with Him^l. “The angels are described as waiting around Him^m,” and the words, “Let all the angels of God worship Him,” seem to be applied by Justin to Christⁿ. It is also worthy of note that most of the special services of the angels mentioned by Justin are somehow or other connected with Christ. The angels that visit Abraham go in the company of the Logos^o. Justin mentions the angel of God Gabriel^p, that was sent to Mary, the angel that was sent to Joseph^q, and he speaks of angels coming with Christ at his second appearance^r. The only instance of a special service done by an angel not connected with Christ is the destruction of the Assyrian army^s, but as Justin does not explain what he means by “an angel of the Lord,” he might very probably have interpreted

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, p. 358 C.

^g Ibid. c. 85, p. 311 C.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 36, p. 255 B.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 141, p. 370 B.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 85, p. 311 C; c. 36, p. 254 D.

^l Dial. c. Tryph. c. 56, p. 279 A.

^m Ibid. c. 79, p. 305 C.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 130, p. 359 B.

^o Ibid. c. 56, p. 275 A.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 C; Apol. i. c. 33, p. 75 A.

^q Dial. c. Tryph. c. 78, p. 303 C.

^r See p. 256 of this volume.

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 83, p. 309 B.

the expression as denoting either the Logos Himself or a messenger of the Logos.

Justin has been supposed by some to describe the regular work of angels, but a consideration of the passage will show that he speaks only of some angels. Justin says that "God delivered the care of men and things under heaven to angels whom He appointed to this duty. But the angels transgressed this appointment¹." These angels became wicked, as will be shown immediately. We have seen already that Justin believed that God's providence extended over small as well as great things, and these angels were but to carry out his behests. Justin says nothing as to other angels filling their place.

The habitation of the angels is heaven. They eat manna. Justin evidently thought that they really did eat, and he speaks as if he believed that the two angels really partook of the meal set before them by Abraham. Trypho feels a difficulty in supposing that the Logos ate, and Justin replies to him, "That they did eat, is written ; but if we should understand it as being said that the three ate, and not the two only who were really angels and were in the habit of being nourished in the heavens, as is plain to us, although they are not nourished with food like what we men use, (for with regard to the nourishment of manna with which your fathers were nourished in the wilderness, the writing thus says that they ate the bread of angels,) I should say that the passage which says that they ate says so as we should say of the fire that it devoured all things, but that it does not at all mean that they ate munching with their teeth and jaws²." This statement of Justin may be paraphrased thus: 'If the words refer only to the two who were real angels, we have no difficulty. They do eat, though our food is not like theirs. Theirs is manna, such as your fathers ate in the wilderness. But if the words are to apply to the three, then we must adopt a somewhat metaphorical interpretation, and we can

¹ *Apol. ii. c. 5, p. 44 A.*

² *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 57, p. 279 C.*

thus suppose the Logos spoken of as eating just as we speak of the fire as devouring.' The reader is at no loss to determine that Justin prefers the first of these interpretations. Justin makes another reference to the food of angels, but the passage is supposed to be corrupt: "He rained down upon the Jews bread for nourishment through heavenly angels, namely manna." Maranus thinks that few will be pleased with a reading that assigns to the angels the supplying the Israelites with bread. He accordingly changed it into *ἄρτον ἀγγέλων*, 'bread for nourishment peculiar to heavenly angels*.' Many others have agreed with Maranus, but it seems to me that the ingenuity of editors is turned in a wrong direction in this case. For Justin evidently looked on the manna as something that really was in heaven, and he thought that the angels were regularly in the habit of feeding on this manna. What then could be more natural than the supposition that when God rained manna down from heaven, it was the angels themselves who were asked to distribute part of their supplies to the famishing children of Israel? There is more objection in the epithet 'heavenly' applied to angels, because all angels were heavenly except those wicked angels who had lost their place in heaven, and who could not be brought even into contact in such a connexion as this. I should think *οὐράνιον* perhaps better, applying the term to the bread, to mark the extraordinary character of God's kindness to the Israelites; or if *οὐρανίων* be retained it must be supposed to have the same force. God not merely supplied their earthly wants but gave them of the delicious food of heaven. We shall have another indication of Justin's ideas of the relation of angels to matter when we discuss the fall of angels. In the meantime it may be remarked that Justin's notions do not seem to have occupied his attention deeply. He read in the Old Testament of angels eating, and that manna was their food. He naturally took these statements literally, and believed them without thinking farther about the matter.

* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 131, p. 361 A.

Justin gives no indication of what he considered the intellectual attainments of the angels. Semisch^y fancies that he placed them in a low sphere, because the rulers or angels did not recognise the disfigured Christ when He came to heaven^z. But surely such ignorance is no sign of want of intellect. They were concerned with things in heaven; they had not known what had taken place on earth, or at least had not known accurately, and when they saw their Lord appear in such a state of humiliation they could not believe that it was He. But besides, if it had been a more glaring instance of ignorance we should not at all have been warranted in affirming that Justin regarded their intelligence as low. For Justin's opinions not being arranged, his mode of explaining the Old Testament would often drive him into particular statements which would not cohere well with his general opinions. In the celebrated passage already quoted, in which Justin speaks of the worship of angels, it is unquestionably implied that angels were superior to men. We lay the passage again before the reader, that we may examine more minutely into what it says: *'Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἑξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατόν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντες*^a. This has been translated in three ways. The straightforward way is: "But we reverence and worship Him [the Father of all, mentioned in the preceding clause], and the Son that came from Him and taught us these things [the character of the Father especially, and all that we are now relating to you], and the army of the other good messengers who follow Him and are made like to Him, and the prophetic Spirit; honouring them in word and truth." Here there are four objects of worship mentioned—the Father, the Son, the host of angels, and the prophetic Spirit. There is a difficulty presented in the word 'the other.' The use of it seems to

^y vol. ii. p. 247.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 36, p. 255 B C. This contains the explanation of the twenty-fourth Psalm previously mentioned.

^a Apol. i. c. 6, p. 56 C.

indicate that when Justin spoke of Christ as coming from the Father, the idea of his being a messenger presented itself, and he then spoke of the 'other messengers.' The Greek idiom would also permit it to mean 'and the host besides of angels.' I do not think that Justin could not grammatically have applied the term to the Spirit, because Justin is far from strict in his adherence to grammatical rules. But before we can suppose him violating a rule, we must have it well ascertained that he thought of the Spirit as a messenger. Now we have seen that he did not so think of Him; that the Spirit is never spoken of in this way, while Christ is frequently called 'messenger.'

Protestants have been very anxious to ward off the plain meaning of this passage, and hence the attempts to translate it otherwise. The ways in which this has been done are two: either by making *ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν σπαραόν* the object after *διδάξαυρα*, or by taking *ταῦτα καὶ τὸν σπαραόν* as the second object after the verb. The first gives us this sense: "We worship the Father and the Son who taught us and the host of angels these things." But surely the good angels knew the character of God before Christ came. And it would be strange in Justin to speak of angels to heathens for the first time in this way, as being taught by Christ. Besides, there is something peculiarly awkward grammatically in the insertion of the *καὶ ταῦτα* between the *ἡμᾶς* and the *τὸν σπαραόν*. This makeshift therefore is both grammatically, and on the score of sense, totally unsatisfactory. The second mode of translation is: "We worship the Son who taught us these and the host of angels:" that is, who taught us these things and all that relates to the host of angels. But here, again, this is not true. Christ did not teach his disciples particularly about angels. The doctrine of angels occurs again and again in the Old Testament, and was quite familiar to the Jews. And the translation, moreover, bids defiance to all the rules of grammatical structure and to all probabilities of Justin's violations of them. Some, seeing how unsatisfactory these translations were, have pro-

posed changing the *σταιρὸν* into one thing and another, but no emendation yet proposed has commended itself to unbiassed critics.

There seems no good reason for doubting the reading of the manuscripts and the plain construction of the words. We must regard the statement as applying purely to the mental state of Christians; not to their external worship. In fact, it is something equivalent to this: 'It is not true that we are atheists. We do believe in one God the Father of all; and more than this, we recognise also in his Son, in angels, and in the Holy Spirit, beings who demand our veneration and awe. Not only do we believe and worship God and his Son, but we believe in a host of supernatural beings called angels, and in a Holy Spirit.' We thus take the words *σεβόμεθα* and *προσκυνούμεν* in a wide and general sense, not in the peculiar sense in which it is used by Christian writers and by Justin himself in the Dialogue with Trypho. We need not wonder that Justin should so use the word when heathen writers spoke of the worship of emperors and revered human beings as gods. On the other hand, we cannot doubt that the mature opinion of Justin was that only the Father and Son were to be worshipped: the Father, on account of his nature alone deserving worship; and the Son, because to Him alone had God given his glory. Neither angels nor Holy Spirit are objects of worship: Justin never speaks of praying to them, of asking their aid, and he nowhere intimates that they had any such power of themselves as to warrant Christians to adore them. But they might notwithstanding be legitimate objects of awe and reverence.

Evil Angels.—The doctrine of evil angels occupies a prominent place in the writings of Justin. As we have seen already, one feature of Christ's work is the destruction of the powers of darkness. Accordingly Justin is very profuse on their various activities; yet he does not give us a connected view of his opinions with regard to them. Trypho at first denied that there were evil angels. Justin men-

tioned that he had conclusive proof in Scripture, and quotes Isaiah xxx. 1-5 to show that evil angels did dwell and now dwell in Tanis, a district of Egypt. He appeals also to Job i. 6, Gen. iii. 1-6, 14, and Psalm xcv. 5 (Sept.)^b.

He distinguishes between the devil, evil angels, and demons.

The devil was one of the rulers in heaven, and fell from his high position "on account of leading Eve astray^c." Justin grounded this opinion on the circumstance that the serpent, whom he took to be the devil, was then cursed^d.

The evil angels are those mentioned already, whom God set over men. "They transgressed their commission, and fell by mingling with women, and begot children, who are the so-called (dæmones) demons^e." The demons were thus sprung from human as well as angelic parents, and had consequently a greater affinity with men. Justin goes so far as to say that the shapes of the demons were given in the heathen idols^f. Justin, in speaking of the fall of angels, is peculiarly anxious to show that it was their own fault: "Because God made both the race of angels and of men in the beginning free agents, they shall justly be punished for their sins in eternal fire; for this is the nature of every thing begotten (γεννητῶν), that it is receptive of vice and virtue^g." "Wishing angels and men to follow his will, God wished to make them free agents as to doing right, endowing them with reason that they might know by whom they were created, and on account of whom they, formerly not existing, now are, and giving them a law by which they may be judged by Him if they act contrary to right reason; and, on our own account, we, both men and angels, will be convicted as having done evil, if we do not first change our mode of thought and life^h." Justin is particular in insisting on this doctrine.

It deserves notice that Justin does not enter into the origin

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 79, p. 305 C.

^c Ibid. c. 124, p. 353 D.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 79, p. 306 A; c. 91, p. 319 B.

^e Apol. ii. c. 5, p. 44 B.

^f Apol. i. c. 9, p. 57 D.

^g Ibid. ii. c. 7, p. 45 D.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 370 B; c. 88, p. 316 A; c. 102, p. 329 A.

of sin. He gives no reason for the devil's deception, much less does he discuss how deception could arise in a mind that knew nothing but holiness. He contents himself with maintaining the free agency of angels and men.

Though there is thus a difference between devil, angels, and demons, yet their activity all lies in the same direction, and sometimes the same act is attributed to two or the three of them; and sometimes it is impossible to decide to whom Justin assigns the action.

The devil is the leader of the wicked demons. "For with us the leader (*ἀρχηγέτης*) of the evil demons is called serpent, and satan, and devilⁱ." Justin says of these names that "Moses calls him serpent; he is called devil in Job and Zechariah, and was named Satan by Jesus;" the name being given from his conduct. For, according to Justin, *Satanas* was derived from two Hebrew words: one, 'sata,' signifying apostate, and the other, 'nas,' signifying serpent^j. In Dial. c. Tryph. c. 125, p. 354 D he is spoken of as a power. When Christ became man, "there came to Him the devil, that is, that power which is also called Serpent and Satan." Justin does not by these words attempt to resolve Satan into a force, for we have already remarked the application of *δευαμῖς* to real beings. Justin not unfrequently calls him "the beast through whom transgression and disobedience had their beginning^k." Justin also calls him an "impure spirit^l."

The attendants of Satan are called his army. Sometimes the demons are included in the army of Satan^m, and sometimes they are mentioned separatelyⁿ. The demons are also sometimes identified with wicked spirits^o, and sometimes wicked spirits and demons are mentioned separately^p. The difference between the evil angels and the demons is also occasionally kept up^q. Justin, however, speaks far more frequently of the demons than of the angels.

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 A.

^j Dial. c. Tryph. c. 103, p. 331 A B.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 112, p. 339 B.

^l Ibid. c. 82, p. 303 D.

^m Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 B.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 131, p. 360 C.

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 30, p. 247 B.

^p Ibid. c. 76, p. 302 A.

^q Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 B.

The whole activity of the demons, with the devil at their head, is directed to the propagation of evil. They tempt men, and seduce them into evil ways: men always, however, acting as free agents. "They enslaved the human race to themselves, partly through magical writings, partly through terrors and punishments which they occasioned, and partly through the teaching of sacrifices and incenses and libations, which they (the demons) came to need after they were enslaved to the passions of lusts; and among men they sowed murders, wars, adulteries, incontinencies, and all wickedness^r." They are evil and deceptive spirits, foreign to holiness^s. The bites of the serpent "are evil deeds, idolatries, and other iniquities^t." "The so-called demons do nothing else than struggle to lead men away from God the Creator, and his first-begotten Christ^u." "The devil wishes to drag every one to himself^v;" and for this purpose they employ all the cunning which they possess, adapting their schemes to the kind of men with whom they have to deal. "They have nailed, and still nail, those who cannot be lifted up from the earth, to things that are earthly and made with hands [to pure idol-worship], but those who are eager for speculation in divine things, they throw into impiety by secretly baffling them in their pursuit (*ὑπεκκρούοντες*), unless they possess sound reason, and a life pure and free from passion^w." They generally influence men, as mentioned above, by magic and suchlike tricks. "They struggle," says Justin to the emperors, after warning them to take care lest the demons should prevent them from understanding what he was saying, "to have you slaves and servants; and sometimes, through the appearances of dreams, and sometimes through magical wiles, they worst all who are not at all anxious for their salvation^x." The evil demons scatter among men "many lying and godless accusations, receiving as an ally the evil

^r Apol. ii. c. 5, p. 44 B.

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 94, p. 322 A.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 116, p. 344 A.

^x Apol. i. c. 14, p. 61 A.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 30, p. 247 B.

^v Apol. i. c. 58, p. 92 B.

^w Apol. i. c. 58, p. 92 B.

lust that is in every one towards all things, but different according to constitution⁷." Hence arises the apparent perversion of the natural principles of rectitude in man, which is seen in one country regarding as right what another forbids as wrong. "We know," he says, as his explanation of this fact, "that the wicked angels appointed laws similar to their own wickedness, in which men who have become like them rejoice²;" but right reason in man shows some of the laws to be good and others bad.

From the beginning of their existence as evil spirits they were enemies to the Logos, and showed their enmity at first principally through the introduction of polytheism. Justin regarded the demons as the gods of the heathen^a, founding his opinion on the Septuagint reading of Psalm xciv. 5^b. "The wicked demons of old, making appearances, committed adultery, corrupted boys, and showed men objects of terror, so that they were frightened and did not judge according to reason the deeds that were done, but, carried away by fear, and not knowing that they were wicked demons, named them gods, and called each one by the name which each of the demons gave himself^c." The poets and myth-writers are especially spoken of as attributing the actions of demons to God himself, and his sons, and the sons of his brothers, and their children; and naming them by the name "which each of the angels gave himself and his children^d." The idols, accordingly, before which heathens worshipped, were "lifeless and dead, and had not the shape of God, but they had the names and figures (*σχήματα*) of the wicked demons that appeared^e." Justin accordingly believed that all the fearful outrages committed by the gods were facts; and after enumerating some of them—Jupiter slaying his father and outraging Ganymede and many women—he adds, "The evil demons did these things^f." And again, after mentioning

⁷ Apol. i. c. 10, p. 58 D.

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 83, p. 310 A.

^c Apol. i. c. 5, p. 55 E.

^e Apol. i. c. 9, p. 57 C D.

² Ibid. ii. c. 9, p. 48 A.

^b Ibid. c. 79, p. 306 B; c. 73, p. 298 C.

^d Ibid. ii. c. 5, p. 44 C.

^f Ibid. c. 21, p. 67 C D.

the lusts of Dionysus and Apollo, of Persephone and Aphrodite, and the crimes and weakness of Zeus, he says, "But we know the demons to be the cause of these things^ε."

The demons were not content with making the nations believe their own actions to be the actions of gods, but made vigorous preparations from the first to defeat the efforts of Christ to redeem men. The plan they took was this: they perverted the Scriptures, basing fables on them, so that when the prophecies should be fulfilled, and Christ appear, his miracles should be regarded as the works of a deceiver, and the narratives about him myths. Sometimes they failed egregiously in their plans, for they often did not understand the words of the prophets. Justin sets forth this notion of the action of the demons in *Apol. i. c. 54, p. 89 A*, where he says, "Those who hand down the myths made by the poets adduce no proof to the young men who learn them, and we prove that they have been related through the action of the wicked demons to deceive and lead the human race astray. For having heard it proclaimed through the prophets that the Christ was to appear, and the impious of mankind were to be punished with fire, they got many to be called sons of Zeus, thinking that they would be able to make men reckon the things said with regard to Christ as mere wonder-stories, and like to those related by the poets. And these things were said both among the Greeks and among all nations where they (the demons) understood the prophets as proclaiming that the Christ would be more believed in. But that in hearing what was said by the prophets they did not understand it accurately, but that, erring, they imitated the things relating to our Christ, we shall make plain." Justin then goes on to adduce several instances where he supposes the fictions of mythology to be based on a misinterpretation of the Old Testament. For instance, the story of Dionysus is based on *Genesis xlix. 10*. Traces of the same mode of procedure are perceptible in Bellerophon, who ascended to heaven; in Perseus,

^ε *Apol. i. c. 25, p. 69 A B C.*

who was born of a virgin; in Herakles, who was strong^h; and in Asklepios, who raised the dead. But in no case did the demons feign that a son of Zeus was crucified; for all that was said on this point was symbolical, and the demons did not understand it. Justin adduces nearly the same instances in *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 69*, p. 294 D, but attributes the fiction to the devil, and makes a more marked comparison between the mythological stories and the miracles of Christ. And he remarks that "they dared to say that He was a magician and a deceiver of the people." Justin adduces also the instances of Persephone and Athenaⁱ.

The demons, moreover, introduced rites into the worship of the nations which were similar to those mentioned by the prophets or instituted by Christ. Sacrifices, as we have seen already, they wished to be offered up to them because they liked them. They imitated baptism by making their followers sprinkle themselves before entering the temples. They also borrowed from Moses the practice of taking off the sandals before entering sacred places^k. The raising of the image of Kore at fountains arose from a misapprehension of what Moses says about the Spirit moving on the waters^l, (*Gen. i.*) And the evil demons imitated the Thanksgiving (Eucharist) in the mysteries of Mithras^m.

The evil demons not only led the people astray, but afflicted as much as they could all who tried to live according to reason. "The demons always caused all those who were eager in any way whatever to live according to reason and to avoid vice, to be hatedⁿ." Hence Socrates and the like were persecuted and imprisoned, while Sardanapalus and Epicurus, and similar men, seemed to be happy (*εὐδαιμονεῖν*) in plenty and glory^o. Hence also the death of Heraclitus, and of Musonius "in our own times^p." Their rage was especially poured out on Socrates, who strove to lead men away from

^h Psalm xviii. 5.

^k *Apol. i. c. 62*, p. 94 E.

^l *Apol. i. c. 66*, p. 98 C.

^o *Apol. ii. c. 7*, p. 45 D.

ⁱ *Apol. i. c. 64*, p. 97 A.

^j *Ibid. c. 64*, p. 96 E.

ⁿ *Ibid. ii. c. 8*, p. 46 C.

^p *Ibid. c. 8*, p. 46 C.

them^q, and expelled them from his model-state^r. "The demons," therefore, "caused him to be put to death as godless and impious, by means of men that rejoice in wickedness, saying that he introduced new *dæmonia*; and in like manner they get the same done to us^s."

Satan and his servants exerted their utmost energy to repress Christianity. Satan did not know his own condemnation till Christ's appearance, and therefore he did not blaspheme God till then^t. He made a strong effort in the wilderness to seduce Christ from the worship of God, but Christ cast him down. It was the demons that acted on the minds of the Jews when they put Christ to death. And after his death they spread all kinds of lies and false accusations in order to prevent Christianity making progress. Their agency was evident in three ways: in the persecutions of Christians, in laws framed against the spread of Christian knowledge, and in the production of heresies.

Justin speaks of the persecution of Christians as all that the demons could do against them. "The wicked demons cannot persuade men that there is not a conflagration for the punishment of the impious, even as they had it not in their power to cause that Christ after He had come should remain unknown; but this only can they do, they can make men who live irrationally and are brought up in evil habits, in the gratification of their lusts, and are fond of glory, slay us and hate us^u." But Justin thinks this nothing wonderful, seeing that the demons persecuted those heathens who had only a share of the Logos^x. Justin describes this persecution as "a tribulation and a burning which the devil and all his servants set on fire for us^y." These demons act through judges "whom they have subject to them, and serving them, and whom they prepare to murder us^z;" and "through rulers,

^q Apol. i. c. 5, p. 56 A.

^r Ibid. ii. c. 10, p. 48 D.

^s Apol. i. c. 5, p. 56 A.

^t Justin ap. Iren. adv. Hær. v. xxvi. 2.

^u Apol. i. c. 57, p. 91 C.

^x Ibid. ii. c. 8, p. 46 D.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 116, p. 344 A; also c. 131, p. 360 C.

^z Apol. ii. c. 1, p. 41 D.

who, under the influence of the wicked and deceitful spirit, the serpent, will not cease putting to death and persecuting those who confess the name of Christ, until Christ appear again ^a."

The anti-Christian law is referred to thus : " Under the influence of the wicked demons death was assigned to those who should read the books of Hystaspes, or the Sibyl, or the Prophets, that they might turn away through fear those men who read them from receiving the knowledge of good things, but keep them slaves to themselves; which they were not able to accomplish to the end ^b."

The demons also gave powerful assistance to heretics. When Christ had appeared, and all men were like to believe on Him, "The evil demons," he maintains, "put forth some men, Simon and Menander from Samaria, who, performing magical miracles, deceived many, and still hold them deceived ^c." He mentions in a previous chapter, Simon, Menander, and Marcion, as having been powerfully assisted by the demons in the spreading of their blasphemous doctrines ^d. The demons helped these men in various ways; they gave them favour in the eyes of rulers so that they were not persecuted ^e, and they enabled them to perform miracles. These were the false prophets and the false Christs who were to come in Christ's name and deceive many. "They taught and will teach what was put into their minds by the unclean spirit, the devil ^f." Justin seems to have believed in the reality of the miracles performed by these heretics. He thought also, as we have seen already, that the demons had exercised magic on heathens before Christ's appearance. He mentions in particular the assistance they gave to the Egyptian magicians who contended with Moses.

Justin believed that evil angels watched the souls of Christians at death with the hope of laying hold of them. Jesus himself had thus to be on his guard, as was intimated in the

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 39, p. 258 C.

^b Apol. i. c. 56, p. 91 A.

^c Apol. i. c. 26, p. 70 C.

^d Apol. i. c. 44, p. 82 B.

^e Ibid. c. 26, p. 69 C.

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 82, p. 308 C.

words of Psalm xxii. 19-21, "Rescue my soul from the sword, and my only-begotten from the hand of a dog: save me from the mouth of the lion." Jesus in this prayer, according to Justin, "asked that no one might have dominion over his soul: that, when we should be in the course of passing away from life, we may ask the same things from God, who is able to turn away every shameless and wicked angel from laying hold of our souls." Justin adds that all the souls of the prophets and just men of the Old Testament did fall under such powers.

Justin believed that demons were often the causes of disease in men. Persons so affected were called demon-seized. We have already noticed the power which the Christians had over these demons. In regard to their ultimate destiny Justin remarks that "the demons try to escape the authority of the Father of all and Lord God, and that of Christ Himself, as far as lies in their power^b." But they will all be entirely subdued, and "punished, shut up in eternal fireⁱ."

Man.—Justin says little of the constitution of man in general. His whole powers were brought to bear on one point—the moral freedom of man. He took up this question of free-will against the fate of the Stoics, as he himself again and again asserts, and maintained that in all circumstances man had full freedom of choice, and had full powers to be good if he chose. This doctrine of free-will is a fundamental one in the mind of Justin, and one which he always takes into account in all the assertions he makes with regard to angels and men, and God's dealings with them.

He maintained that God made man capable of knowing and doing what was right. "In the beginning God has made the human race with the power of thought (*νοερόν*), and capable of choosing the truth and doing the right, so that all men are without apology before God; for they have been born rational and contemplative^k." "Our being born at first was not in our power; but that we ought to pursue

^g Dial. c. Tryph. c. 105, p. 332 D.

ⁱ Apol. ii. c. 8, p. 46 D.

^b Apol. i. c. 40, p. 79 A.

^k Ibid. i. c. 28, p. 71 C.

those things which are pleasing to Him, deliberately by means of the rational powers which He gave us, this is the conviction and belief to which He leads us¹." Probably both these statements have no reference to the first men, but to all men; the latter most certainly. An objection may be urged against this opinion of Justin's, that men have not always regarded the same things as morally wrong. We have already seen how Justin replied to this objection in the case of immoral laws, attributing them to the inspiration of demons, and the willing acquiescence of men that rejoiced in iniquity. Justin in another passage meets the difficulty. "God," he says, "exhibits among every race of men things that are always and everywhere just, and all justice; and every race knows that adultery is wicked, and fornication, and murder, and suchlike. Even though all commit them, yet they are not removed from knowing that they act unjustly when they do them, except as many as are filled by an impure spirit, and, corrupted by education, and evil habits, and wicked laws, have lost the innate (*φυσικὰς*) notions, or rather have quenched them and keep them suppressed. For you may see that even such persons do not wish to suffer the same things as they themselves inflict on others, and with consciences full of hatred reproach each other with the very things they themselves do^m."

The giving to men free-will is an arrangement of God. In one passage Justin represents this arrangement as if it had been in some respects an experiment on the part of God. He is discussing the early history of Christ, and states that God had determined that He whom He had begotten should be put to death only after He had grown up to manhood, and had proclaimed his message. He therefore sent Him to Egypt, when Herod attempted to destroy the child. Justin supposes an objector to say, "Could not God have killed Herod?" To which Justin replies by a question, "Could not God at first have deprived the serpent of existence, and refrained from saying, 'I will put enmity between him and the woman, and

¹ *Apol. i. c. 10, p. 58 C.*

^m *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 93, p. 320 C D.*

between his seed and her seed?' Might not God have created at once a great multitude of men?" To this Justin himself replies: "But since He knew that it was good to come into being (*γενέσθαι*), He made both men and angels free agents as to the doing of right, and appointed times until He should know that it was good that they should have free-will; and because in like manner He knew that it was good, He made universal and particular judgments, free-will, however, being unimpairedⁿ." The universal judgments, I suppose, mean such judgments as the flood, or which extend over a whole nation; the particular, such as befall individuals.

God in appointing free-will to man, appointed rewards for the voluntary doing of the right and punishment for the neglect. Justin does not base this appointment of rewards on the inherent justice of God. On the contrary, he regards it as a purely arbitrary act. But now that the arrangement has been established, he deems it imperatively necessary to show that God leaves man full free-will before He punishes him.

The terms of obedience and disobedience are entirely dependent on God. He speaks of the appointment of terms as a matter as purely dependent on God's will as the act of creation. He first states the terms: "If men show themselves worthy through works, in harmony with God's will, we understand that they are regarded worthy of living with Him, reigning with Him, becoming incorruptible, and free from all passion and suffering." He then adds: "For as at first He made us when we did not exist before, in the same way we reckon that they who choose what is agreeable to Him are deemed worthy of incorruption and an existence along with God on account of their choosing^o." It is of importance to note that Justin does not speak of the first human beings, but of all human beings, and the terms set down are applicable to all. Justin regarded the punishment also as arbitrary:

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 102, p. 328 D, 329 A. *γενέσθαι* is usually translated here, 'since he knew that it was good that it should be so.'

^o Apol. i. c. 10, p. 58 B C.

"God wishing angels and men gifted with free choice and having the command of themselves to do whatever He had given each one power to do, made them such that if they should choose things that were well-pleasing to Him, He would preserve them incorruptible and unpunished; but if they should commit iniquity, He would punish them as might seem good to Him^p." These terms once established, Justin thinks that men and angels "will justly suffer punishment in eternal fire for the sins they commit;" and he thinks that there would be none of their deeds praiseworthy if they had not the power to turn either to good or evil^q. "If the human race has not the power by free choice of shunning the base and choosing the good, it is guiltless of actions done in any way whatever^r." "A man who is good by fate is not to be praised, nor a man bad by fate to be blamed."

Justin proves the existence of free-will by the contrarieties in man's actions: "If it had been fated that a man should be wicked or good (*σπουδαῖον*, earnest) he would not have been capable of the opposites, and he would not frequently change from the one to the other^s."

Justin also refutes the objections which might be brought against free-will from the prophecies with regard to events. He says this is owing entirely to God's foreknowledge. When we say that what was about to happen was prophesied, we do not say this because the things were done by necessity of fate, but "God foreknowing what is to be done by all men, and it being his fixed resolution to reward every man according to his deeds, He tells beforehand through the prophetic Spirit^t." God indeed acts in harmony with this foreknowledge, for He puts off the destruction of the wicked demons, since He foreknew that some men would be saved (*ἐκ μεταβολας*) in consequence of turning from their evil thoughts,

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 316 A.

^q Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 D.

^r Apol. i. c. 43, p. 80 D E.

^s Ibid. p. 80 E.

^t Apol. i. c. 44, p. 82 B; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 42, p. 261 B; c. 141, p. 370 C; c. 88, p. 316 A B.

and some too not yet born^u. But God never interferes, in his action on men, with their free will.

In speaking of the fall of man, therefore, we should not expect Justin to favour the idea of original sin. He might, indeed, have given in his adhesion to the doctrine if it were clearly pronounced in the Old Testament, for his opinions are very far from being always consistent. But he found no such passage; and he states therefore, in the most positive way, that each will suffer punishment or be rewarded according to his own actions. Justin gives no exact account of the fall of Adam and Eve. We have seen already that he attributed it to the action of the serpent. He seems also to have interpreted the account in Genesis allegorically; for, contrasting Eve with Mary, he says, "Eve being a virgin and uncorrupted, conceiving the word which was from the serpent, brought forth disobedience and death^x." This means simply that Eve listened to the words of the tempter, disobeyed God, and was punished with death. But the question remains: Did Adam and Eve's guilt entail any loss on their descendants? Justin answers it in the negative; that the devil indeed introduced disobedience, and that this disobedience ended in death; but that the disobedience and the death are in the option of each man. "The human race," he says, "fell from the time of Adam (ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ) under death and the deceit of the serpent, each of them having acted wickedly by his own fault^y." Some have absurdly supposed that *παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν* might mean 'contrary to his own fault,' and have therefore found in this sentence an intimation of original sin. Semisch, Otto, and others have well replied to this. The context shows that this can have reference only to free-will. The meaning, then, is that the human race have been successively the prey of Satan and death, simply because of their own choice they committed iniquity. Each man stands or falls by himself. Justin states this doctrine in the most precise terms in another passage. In explaining a passage of the Septuagint—"Lo,

^u Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 B; c. 45, p. 82 D; ii. c. 7, p. 45 E.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 C.

^y Ibid. c. 88, p. 316 A.

ye die as men"—he says that this refers to the disobedience of Adam and Eve. Then he adds, the word is said "to show that the Holy Spirit reproaches men. Although they were made to be free from all suffering and free from death, like God, if they but keep his commandments, and were deemed worthy by Him to be called His sons; yet these very men becoming like to Adam and Eve, in like manner work death to themselves. Be the interpretation of the Psalm, however, as it may, this has been shown, that they were thought worthy of becoming gods, and all were thought worthy of being able to become the sons of the Most High, and they will be judged and condemned each by himself (*παρ' ἑαυτούς*), as Adam and Eve²."

Justin's doctrine, then, is simply this: that all men, when they break the terms of free-will, lose their incorruptibility and freedom from pain; that Eve was the first; but each one breaks the contract for himself, and brings the penalty on himself, and on no other.

But what is the penalty? It is summed up in the one word 'Death.' Yet it is difficult to get an exact idea of what Justin meant by death. That he meant common physical death, at all events, is plain. For one benefit conferred on Christians is that they despised death. And moreover, we have seen already that Justin interpreted the threat pronounced against the disobedience of Adam and Eve as involving physical death. For he explained the passage, not by interpreting figuratively the word 'die,' but by interpreting the word 'day' figuratively. Did Justin include also the notion of spiritual death? This seems to me doubtful, because there is not one passage from which this is to be inferred with certainty. Yet it seems to mean more than mere physical death. It seems to me to be exactly the opposite of the incorruptibility and freedom from pain which was to be the lot of those who did what was pleasing to God. Death itself can take place only in a constitution which is corruptible

² Dial. c. Tryph. c. 124, pp. 353 E D, 354 A; c. 140, p. 370 A.

and exposed to pain, and Justin placed death as the consummation of this corruptibility and pain for the whole state. So it seems to me to mean in passages already quoted^a.

Justin maintains the universality of man's sinfulness. "The whole race of men," he says, "will be found to be under a curse according to the law of Moses^b." "And if those who are under this law appear to be under a curse on account of not observing all its ordinances, will not all the nations much more appear to be under a curse, committing idolatry, destroying children, and working other iniquities^c?"

Justin, however, did not attempt to account for this universality. In fact, he could not; for his doctrine of free-will was something unaccountable, and therefore he could not explain it otherwise than by saying, "men chose so to act." He recognises the fact, indeed, that men had to contend with great difficulties; that they were influenced by lust and evil habits; and that they were continually exposed to the deception of the serpent and the demons. But the question still remained with him, why they possessed of the Logos did go astray. Justin, however, goes so far as to say that the Logos being divine would have brought back man to holiness, a thing which all human laws had failed to do, "had not the evil demons spread false and godless accusations, of which not one is true as far as we are concerned, while they had an ally in lust, which is evil towards all things, and diverse in its nature^d." Some have supposed this desire or lust to mean sensuality, and they take Justin to affirm that it is inborn with man; but Justin says no such thing. Justin accounts for the slow progress Christianity had made, and finds the secret of this in the eagerness of the demons and the evil desires of men. He says a similar thing elsewhere in different words, when he speaks of the action of the demons on the making of laws. There is not the slightest reason for referring any part of this chapter to man original,

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 D; c. 45, p. 264 A.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95, p. 322 C.

^c Ibid.

^d Apol. i. c. 10, p. 58 D.

but simply to all men, and the accusations "which are not true of us," and which accusations can be applicable only to Christians, show plainly that Justin is speaking of the action of the Logos on and after his appearance on earth.

There are two questions which Justin might have asked himself with regard to the free-will compact: Is man to lose his hope of eternal felicity if he breaks one single commandment, commits one sin? and how long time is God to give men that their obedience may be tried? Justin gives no definite answers to these questions; yet he seems to have thought that if men were regularly in the habit of acting in a way pleasing to God, and whenever they did wrong turned from the wrong to the right, they would be saved. And this principle seems to have determined the length of man's probation. The world was to last as long as there would be any Christians to be saved. "God puts off making a confusion and dissolution of the whole world, that wicked angels and demons and men might no longer be, on account of the seed of Christians^c."

The doctrine of repentance, or change of mind, or conversion, is therefore a very essential one in Justin's mind. It is this: Change of mind is an act of man's free will by which he turns from evil to good, or good to evil. Justin means by it most frequently a turning from evil to good; in fact always, unless when he states otherwise. If a man changes his mind towards God, God at once pardons all his sins, and gives him the freedom from pain and death already spoken of. It is not Christ's work to procure pardon. It is God's prerogative to give it whenever He wishes, but He has announced that only those who turn to him will receive it. What, then, was Christ's work? God through Him wished to make men change their minds; not to compel them, but in perfect harmony with their freedom of choice to turn them towards a love of God. And Christ therefore removed the obstacles—the fear of death, and the subjection to the demons; and He taught men the true character of the Father and his

^c Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 B.

whole will towards man. But how can man benefit by what Christ did? There is only one way conceivable. By believing what He said was true, and by acting on the belief; though Justin would scarcely have added the latter clause; for he did not know of a faith in man that did not act. Change of mind is thus the great aim of Christ's work, as shown already, and trust in Christ as a teacher, trust in the crucified Christ, is the great instrument towards the conversion of man's heart to God, towards his putting his faith in God.

Justin seems to have looked on this remedial scheme of Christ as in some measure supplementary to the scheme of free-will. He believed, indeed, that all men in all nations were responsible, and does not hesitate to state that he believed some of them would be saved. For the foundation of all salvation is righteousness or faith in God. And Justin believed that both Jews and heathens might have this faith in God, which God Himself regarded as righteousness. He says: "Each man will be saved by his own righteousness. . . . For in the law of Moses it has been ordained that those who obey it should do things that are naturally good, and pious, and righteous. . . . Since, therefore, those who did things that are universally, and naturally, and eternally good are pleasing to God, they all shall be saved by means of this Christ in the resurrection, in like manner as the righteous men who lived before them—Noah, and Enoch, and Jacob, and all others^f." Justin makes similar remarks in refuting the same objection which he here refutes; viz., that the Jews will be saved on account of their being the children of the patriarchs and prophets. "Each one," he says, "will perish by his own sin, and each will be saved by his own right-doings^g." But this righteousness is simply trust in God, as Justin often remarks in speaking of Abraham's faith, and showing its identity with the faith of Christians: "Abraham himself being uncircumcised was declared righteous (*ἐδικαιώθη*), and

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 45, p. 263 D.

^g Ibid. c. 140, p. 369 D. Deut. xxiv. 16.

blessed on account of the faith with which he trusted God^b." Or, as Justin in another passage paraphrases the *ἐδικαιώθη*: "For Abraham was not borne witness to by God as being righteous on account of circumcision, but on account of faith; for before he was circumcised it was said of him, 'Abraham trusted God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousnessⁱ.'" Righteousness or trust in God is the only condition requisite for salvation; for salvation is God's work. Justin explains Psalm xxii. 10, 11, "Thou art my God, do not depart from me," as the words of Christ, "teaching that all must put their hope in God, who made all things, and seek from Him alone salvation and help^k." For the Son Himself could not be saved without God, though He was sinless^l.

Justin, however, felt and saw how difficult it was for a heathen to do what was pleasing to God, and therefore he seems, as we have said already, to have regarded the work of Christ as supplementary of the free-will compact. Thus he says, "Since we were born our first birth in ignorance of it, and by necessity, from moist seed in consequence of the sexual intercourse of our parents, and were brought up in evil manners and wicked training, that we may not remain the children of necessity or ignorance, but of free choice and true knowledge (*ἐπιστήμης*), and may obtain forgiveness of our past sins, the name of the Father of all, and Lord God, is named in the water over him who chooses to be born again and has changed his mind in regard to his sins committed^m." Perhaps we should be rather cautious in drawing inferences from this passage, because Justin is not expressing himself accurately, but is evidently led away by the contrast. In speaking of himself and his fellows as children of ignorance and necessity, it is to be remembered that he recognises the fact that they had the power to get rid of the ignorance; and he says nothing directly with regard to those who were children of ignorance, and yet had no such opportunities

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 23, p. 241 B.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 92, p. 319 D.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 102, p. 329 D.

^l Ibid.

^m Apol. i. c. 61, p. 94 C.

as he had, except what we have already laid before the reader.

We proceed now to examine how those who know of Christ are to be saved. It is essential to remember ~~what~~ has been said of righteousness as the ~~fundamental~~ condition of salvation. This ~~righteousness~~ is expressed in various ways when ~~salvation~~ is made of Christ. The turning-point, if we may so call it, is named change of mind, or a being born again. And it deserves notice that the words expressive of changing the mind never necessarily imply sorrow, regret—*μεταμέλομαι* never being used. They mean either to change one's position (*μετατίθεσθαι*), to change one's knowledge (*μεταγινώσκειν*), or to change one's mind and whole purposes (*μετανοεῖν*). This change of mind may be accompanied with great lamentation, and Justin speaks of David's repentance as exhibited by his weepingⁿ. The means for this change are trust or hope in Christ, or a knowledge of Christ. And the result both of trust in Christ, and of the change of mind, is a life of righteousness and piety; so that sometimes trust in Christ producing the change, is also said to produce the righteousness. All these are mutually dependent on each other. There can be no righteousness without trust in God; there is no change of mind or trust in Christ without a holy life. So that in speaking of salvation, Justin sometimes speaks of the one alone as the condition, sometimes of all together.

Justin's doctrine of change of mind in relation to salvation is this: "The kindness and the philanthropy of God, and the boundlessness of his riches, regards him who turns from his sins (*μετανοοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων*) as righteous and sinless, as He points out through Ezekiel; and knows him who turns himself (*μετατιθέμενον*) from piety or righteous conduct, to iniquity and godlessness, as sinful and unrighteous and impious. Wherefore our Lord Jesus Christ said, 'In whatever I lay hold of you, in that will I judge you °.' " As this change of mind is an act of free-will, it lies within the power of angels and men; and Justin takes care

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 370 D.

^o Ibid. c. 47, p. 266 D.

to assert that if angels should change to God, they would be saved too. We have already quoted part of the passage relating to this subject. It goes on, "If the word of God points out beforehand that absolutely some, both angels and men, will be punished, He foretold these things because He foreknew that they would become unchangeably wicked, but not because God made them such. So that, if they change their mind (*μετανοήσωσι*), all who wish can obtain mercy from God^p;" or, in other words, which Justin uses immediately after, may have their sins forgiven. Before this repentance takes place, no pardon can be given. Justin makes this assertion in opposition to the opinion of some, that if they knew God, God would not reckon sin to them even though they were sinners^q. Justin states expressly that men will be saved in consequence of a change of mind (*ἐκ μετανοίας*^r).

Justin, in speaking of the new birth, almost always connects it with baptism, the symbol of this new birth. We have already quoted one passage in which Justin refers to being born again, and we now draw attention to the circumstance that he speaks of this new birth there as a matter of choice. This new birth takes place "through water, and faith, and wood;" water being the outward symbol of baptism, and wood being the cross. Justin expresses the same thought in the same chapter: "Those who are previously prepared through water, faith, and wood, and repent of the sins they have committed, will escape the judgment of God that is to come^s." Justin elsewhere describes the new race thus born, as "being born of faith and spirit." These peculiar expressions are to be interpreted by the more plain statements of Justin's works.

Faith, or trust in Christ, must be clearly distinguished from faith, or trust in God. Faith in God is righteousness, and the end to faith in Christ. "We who have put our trust in God the Maker of all, through the name of Jesus^t." And

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 370 C.

^q Ibid. pp. 370 D, 371 A.

^r Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 B.

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 138, p. 368 A.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 116, p. 344 B.

in speaking of the identity of the faith of Abraham with that of Christians, he says, "For as he trusted the voice of God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness, in the same way we, having trusted to the voice of God which was spoken again through the apostles of Christ, and proclaimed to us through the prophets, have bid adieu to all the things in the world, even up to dying ^u."

With regard to faith in Christ, it is often said that Christ will save those that put their trust in Him ^x. Many passages have already been quoted. Sometimes this faith is placed in Christ as a teacher ^y. More frequently, when epithets are added to Christ in connexion with faith, He is spoken of as the high-priest, or as having been crucified ^z.

The effect of faith is to make man holy. "For we who from all nations have become pious and righteous through confidence in Christ, expect Him to appear again ^a." There is one passage ^b in which Justin seems to indicate that the Christian derives blessings in proportion to his faith (*κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν πίστεως*). Perhaps it only means by reason of his faith.

When the change of mind and faith are placed side by side, change of mind has reference to the past life; faith is the positive side of the same feeling. They are thus frequently joined together. Thus, "God works removal of death to those who turn (*μεταγινώσκουσιν*) from their evil ways and trust Him ^c." So faith in Christ and change of mind are coupled. The nations that have trusted in Him and repented of their sins shall inherit ^d. Change of mind is also joined with the results of faith: thus, "The saving bath is to those who change their minds (*μεταγινώσκουσι*), and are no longer purified by the blood of goats and of sheep, and with the ashes of a

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 119, p. 347 D; c. 92, p. 320 A.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 111, p. 338 B C.

^y Apol. i. c. 19, p. 66 B.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 116, p. 343 D; c. 94, p. 322 A.

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 52, p. 272 C.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 D.

^b Ibid. c. 40, p. 259 A.

^d Ibid. c. 26, p. 243 C.

heifer, or offerings of fine flour, but by faith through the blood and death of Christ, who died for this purpose^e."

Sometimes also salvation is spoken of in connexion with the knowledge of Christ, but almost invariably some other condition is mentioned. Justin lays special stress on knowing Christ, when, in the commencement of the Dialogue with Trypho, he speaks of the burning desire he had on his conversion to make all give heed to the words of the Lord. "For they have something awful in themselves," he says, "and they are able to put to shame those who turn out of the right way, and they are a most sweet refreshment to those that practise them. If, then, you care at all about yourself, and are anxious for salvation, and trust in God, you may, knowing the Christ of God fully, and becoming perfect, attain to happiness^f." More frequently the knowledge of Christ is spoken of thus: "Cutting away," he says to the Jews, "this hope from your souls, you should be eager to know through what way there will come to you forgiveness of sins, and hope of the inheritance of the blessings promised; but there is no other way than this, that knowing this Christ fully, and bathing in the bath for the forgiveness of sins, proclaimed through Isaiah, ye may live after that free from sin^g."

Sometimes salvation is also said to be dependent on good works. We have already quoted several passages in which this is stated. Almost invariably these good works are coupled with something else. Thus, they are joined with change of mind: "If, then, repenting of your sins, and knowing well that this is the Christ, and keeping his commandments, ye say these things, I have told you before that there will be pardon of sins to you^h." "Christ was an offering for all sinners who wish to repent, and fast the fast which Isaiah describesⁱ, . . . observing those commandments which they who trust Jesus do^k." Justin also describes the brethren

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 13, p. 229 D.

^f Dial. c. Tryph. c. 44, p. 263 B.

^g Isaiah lviii. 5-7.

^h Ibid. c. 8, p. 225 C.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 95, p. 323 B.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 40, p. 259 D.

assembled as praying, "that we, having learned what is true, may be thought worthy to be found living a life of good deeds and keepers of the commandments, that we may be saved with an everlasting salvation¹." And those admitted to partake of the Thanksgiving are described as "believing that the things taught by us are true;" "as having washed in the bath for the forgiveness of sins and the new birth;" and as "living as Christ has handed down to us to live^m."

We have already drawn attention to the kind of change which Justin mentions as coming over Christians through the teaching and power of Christⁿ.

Justin speaks also, like other writers of the same age, with delight of the adaptability of Christ's power to all classes. Not philosophers nor scholars alone gave their obedience to Christ, but handicraftsmen and entirely ignorant persons, having come to despise glory and fear and death, since He is the power of the unspeakable Father that has been operating, and not the contrivances of human speech (λόγος^o).

The Church.—Justin says very little of the Church. He speaks several times of the complete unity of Christians, a unity determined by union in thought and feeling, and not by external organisation. In explaining Isaiah liii. 2, he remarks that the expression 'as a child' points out "that those who were wicked should become subject to Him and serve his pleasure, and that all should become as one child: as is to be seen in the case of the body, where though many members are counted, all together are called and are one body. For the people and Church (δῆμος καὶ ἐκκλησία), though many men in numbers, as being one thing are called and addressed by one name^p." In explaining also Psalm xlv., he

¹ Apol. i. c. 65, p. 97 C.

^m Ibid. c. 66, p. 97 E.

ⁿ Apol. ii. c. 14, p. 61 B.

^o Apol. ii. c. 10, p. 49 A. There is no nominative expressed to the verb ἔστι. Otto thinks the meaning is, "since the power which accomplishes this is the power of the unspeakable Father." The latter part of the passage has also been the subject of emendation. See Otto in loc.; but the change proposed does not materially alter the sense.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 42, p. 261 A.

remarks that part of it is addressed to "those who put their trust in Him as being one soul and one assembly and one Church, a Church which is sprung from his name and partakes of his name (for we are all called Christians^a)."

It will be noticed in these passages that under the name 'Church' Justin includes all believers, and that he identifies the people and the Church. Justin gives more exact expression to the priestly character of every member of the Church. "We," he says, "who as one man have trusted in God, the creator of the whole, through the name of Jesus, having put off our filthy garments, that is, our sins, through the name of his first-born, having also been inflamed through the word of his calling, are the true high-priestly race of God, as God Himself bears witness, saying that in every place among the nations sacrifices well-pleasing and pure are brought to Him. But God does not accept sacrifices from any one unless through his priests^r." Justin immediately explains that the sacrifices offered by all Christians are the thanksgivings poured out over the cup and bread. Justin also alludes to these sacrifices in speaking of the universal spread of Christianity. "There is not even one race of men," he says, "whether barbarian or Greek, or called by any name whatever, or of those who live on waggon, or have no houses, or feed cattle and live in tents, among whom prayers and thanksgivings are not offered up to the Father and Maker of the whole through the name of the crucified Jesus^s."

Christians are begotten through Christ. "We," he says, "hewn out of the womb of Christ, are the true Israelitish race^t." Of their being his people we have already spoken. Christians, however, were ever the foremost to pay taxes and offer their respects to the emperors^u.

The only officers of the Church whom Justin mentions are a president and (deacons) servants. Justin mentions these in describing the worship on the Sunday, and baptism, and the

^a Dial. c. Tryph. c. 63, 287 B.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, p. 345 C.

^u Apol. i. c. 17, p. 64 C.

^s Ibid. c. 116, p. 344 B C.

^t Ibid. c. 135, p. 365 B.

Thanksgiving. It is possible that the president might be appointed for the occasion only, as far as Justin's words go; but Justin's mode of speaking seems to intimate that the president was a regular servant of the Church, and that there was only one.

The mode of procedure on Sunday is thus described: "On the day called the day of the sun there is a meeting of all who live in city or country in the same place, and the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are read as long as there is time. Then when the person who reads ceases, the president (*ὁ προεστώς*) makes an admonition and exhortation in words to imitate these good things. Then we rise up all together and send up prayers; and, as we said before, when we cease from prayer, bread is brought, and wine and water, and the president sends up prayers in like manner and thanksgivings, according to his power, and the people add aloud Amen, and the distribution and sharing of those things for which thanks have been given takes place to every one, and it is sent to those who are not present by means of the 'servants.' Those who are in good circumstances, and who wish, give as much as they like, and that which is collected is laid up with the president, and he in person helps orphans and widows, and those who are in need on account of disease or for any other reason, and those who are in bonds, and those who have come from a foreign country: and, in one word, he is guardian to all who are in need*." The order of the service, according to this extract, is the reading of the Scriptures; the address of the president; the prayer, at which all stand, and which perhaps all uttered; then the Thanksgiving, which the president uttered extempore, and the Amen of the people; then the distribution of the bread and wine; and some time or other there was the collection for the poor. Perhaps we ought not to suppose Justin exact in his description, for he makes no mention of singing. We cannot, therefore, form inferences from his scheme; but these points are clearly affirmed, that

* Apol. i. c. 67, p. 98 C D, 99 A.

the Thanksgiving of the president was extempore⁷, and that the Thanksgiving took place every week. It seems also as if there were but one place of meeting for at least one town and the neighbouring country.

Justin, at the conclusion of the ~~passage~~ now quoted, assigns two reasons for meeting on Sunday. "We meet on Sunday," he says, "since it is the first day on which God, changing the darkness and matter, made the world, and Jesus Christ our Saviour rose on the same day from the dead²." Justin is very far from connecting the Sunday with the observation of the Sabbath. He says, "The new law wishes you to sabbatize continually, and you, being idle for one day, think you are pious, not understanding for what reason it was appointed you³." He gives the reason in another passage, in which he also speaks of the Sabbath as a purely Mosaic appointment. "For all those righteous men mentioned before, though they did not observe the Sabbath, were pleasing to God, and after them Abraham and all his sons down till Moses, under whom your people showed themselves unjust and ungrateful to God by making the calf in the wilderness. Wherefore God, suiting Himself to that people, ordered them to bring sacrifices as to his name that ye might not commit idolatry, which ye did not observe, but ye sacrificed even your children to demons. And therefore has he commanded you to keep the Sabbath that ye may remember God; for his word points out this, saying, 'That ye may know that I am the God who ransomed you⁴.'" He also makes especial reference to the mode in which the Jews observed the Sabbath: "Do not reproach us," he says, "with bodily uncircumcision, which God Himself formed, nor reckon it a terrible thing that we drink hot drinks on the Sabbaths, since God has carried on the administration of the world on this day just as on all the other days, and

⁷ See Otto's note on the words *ἡσθη δυνάμει αὐτοῦ*.

² Apol. i. c. 67, p. 99 A B.

³ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 12, p. 229 C.

⁴ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 19, p. 236 E, 237 A.

the high priests were ordered to present their offerings on this as on other days. And so many righteous men who performed none of these ordinances have been borne witness to by God Himself^c." The same reason which Justin assigns here for the non-observance of the Sabbath is assigned in another passage in different words: "See," he says, "the elements are not idle, nor do they keep the Sabbath^d." The only point of resemblance between the first day of the week and the Old Testament procedure is found in the circumcision on the eighth day, which he regards as symbolical of the true circumcision. He says that the eighth day had a secret meaning in it more than the seventh^e. He explains this in another passage: "The commandment of the circumcision, ordering the circumcision of those that were born exactly on the eighth day, was a type of the true circumcision with which we have been circumcised from deceit and wickedness, through Jesus Christ our Lord, who rose from the dead on the first day after Sabbath; for the first day after the Sabbath, being the first of all days, is called according to the number of the revolution of all the days again, the eighth day, and continues to be the first^f."

Baptism.—Justin, like other early Christian writers, speaks of baptism in a peculiar way, in which he seems to include under the word the spiritual effects which it symbolised. He therefore seems to attribute to the outward act more than he really would have done had he been led to think about the matter. His mode of thought is somewhat in this fashion: A man when he feels he is a sinner turns his heart towards God. He has been directed to God by Christians, and his mode of procedure is to confess his sins, and to promise that he will live as Christ directs. The way in which he can do this publicly is to be baptized, and accordingly in this baptism all his sins are washed away; he consecrates himself to God, and is re-born. The public confession is regarded as the consummating act of his whole conversion. Justin did

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 29, p. 246 E.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 23, p. 241 B. Otto translates *στοιχεῖα* 'stars.'

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 24, p. 241 D.

^f Ibid. c. 41, p. 260 C.

not put to himself many of the questions which have since agitated the Church. Thus, for instance, he did not ask himself if a man could be saved without baptism; for if a man turned from his sins to God, it seemed to Justin to be his only clear course to go and be baptised; and the man who said privately that he would live as Christ wishes him and refused publicly to say as much and to go through Christ's ordained way of saying it, he would have regarded as a mere hypocrite and liar. Then, again, he does not say anything of the question whether the external pouring of water on a man had any effect in itself. He would have unquestionably answered No; for he affirms that the Jewish baptisms were of no effect, and he urges them to "be baptised in their soul from wrath, covetousness, envy, and hatred." "For what," he says, "is the use of that baptism which brightens up only the flesh and the body?" He therefore calls the Christian baptism the bath of a change of mind and of the knowledge of God, which was for the iniquity of the people of God, and he says that "that baptism which alone can purify those who change their minds, is the water of life^h." He therefore calls the Christian baptism "the baptism of lifeⁱ." He was very far from supposing that the Christian water had more effect than the Jewish. It was the change of mind in the man who chose to be re-born that was the main thing, and which by public consecration brought along with it forgiveness of sins. This is most clearly brought out in the account which Justin gives of baptism to the emperor Antoninus. "We shall explain to you," he says, "how we consecrated ourselves to God, having been made new through Christ, lest by omitting this we may seem to be somewhat deceitful in our exposition. As many as are persuaded and believe that the things taught and said by us are true, and promise to be able to live so, are taught to pray and with fasting to ask of God the forgiveness of past sins, while we pray and fast with them. Then they are led by us where there is water, and are re-born after the manner in which we

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 14, p. 231 C.

^h Ibid.

ⁱ Ibid. c. 19, p. 236 B.

ourselves have been re-born, for in the name of the Father of all and Lord God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit they then make their bath in the water. For Christ also said, 'Unless ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'^k Then Justin states that this second birth is a birth of choice, and proceeds: "This bath is called enlightenment, since those who learn these things are enlightened in their understanding. And he who is being enlightened is bathed in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in the name of the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets proclaimed beforehand all the things relating to Christ^k." Justin, after a considerable digression, goes on to relate the procedure of the Church: "But we, after thus bathing him who was persuaded and had agreed with us, lead him to those who are called brethren, where they are assembled to offer up common prayers for themselves and for the person enlightened, and for all others everywhere, earnestly, that we may be thought worthy, having learned the truth, to be found good citizens in our actions and keepers of the commandments, that we may be saved with an everlasting salvation. On ceasing from prayers we salute each other with a kiss. Then there is brought to the president of the brethren bread and a cup of water and wine, and he, taking it, gives praise and glory to the Father of all through the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and offers much thanks for his having thought us worthy of these things. When he concludes his prayers and thanks, all the people say aloud Amen; but Amen in Hebrew means 'so be it.' When the president has given thanks and all the people have said Amen, those who are called servants (deacons) with us, give to each of those present to partake of the bread and wine and water for which thanks have been rendered, and they carry them to those not present^l."

It will be well to recapitulate the principal points of this narrative. The individual who is to be baptized has inti-

^k Apol. i. c. 61. A few sentences have been omitted, not pertinent to our subject.

^l Apol. i. c. 65.

mated to his teacher or teachers that he believes that what they say is true and that he wishes to live a new life. The teachers and he fast and pray for the forgiveness of his past sins. They then lead him to the water and bathe him in God's name. The teachers then take him to where the Church is assembled for prayer. They pray for him: then they salute him with a kiss; and then they all partake of the Thanksgiving.

We have already seen water, coupled with faith and the cross, spoken of as the means of man's moral renovation. It deserves notice that the special work assigned to baptism and the prayers of the person to be baptized, is the procuring the forgiveness of past sins. But Justin could not regard baptism as pertaining only to this one point. He regarded it, as we have said already, as the starting-point of the Christian's new life. And accordingly he says that "we through baptism have received the spiritual circumcision, after we had been sinners, on account of the mercy which is from God, and it is possible for all to receive it in like manner^m." The spiritual circumcision here can be nothing else than the destruction of the power of sin in man and the creation of a holy life. We do not think that in this connexion we can appeal to passages such as "What need is there to us of such a baptism when we have been baptized with the Holy Spiritⁿ," because the words 'baptized' and 'enlightened' have their common meanings as well as their special^o.

Justin makes no mention of infant baptism. Two passages have been appealed to, one in which some Christians are spoken of as being instructed in infancy^p; and the other a passage already quoted in reference to the spiritual circumcision^q.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 43, p. 261 C.

ⁿ Ibid. c. 29, p. 246 C.

^o Accordingly we take the passage "enlightened through his name," Dial. c. Tryph. c. 39, p. 258 A, to have no reference to baptism. Justin speaks, as we have seen already, of "being baptized with the heaviest sins."

^p Apol. i. c. 15, p. 62 B.

^q See Semisch, vol. ii. p. 335; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 43, p. 261 C.

It will be observed that Justin always speaks of baptism as a bath, or washing. He affirms that the demons hearing of this bath made those who went up to temples sprinkle themselves^r; but whether he laid any stress on sprinkling, as part of the dæmonic perversion, is a matter of little consequence.

The Thanksgiving (Eucharist).—We have already quoted the two principal passages in which the Thanksgiving is described. The passages refer to two different celebrations—the one after the introduction of a baptized person to the brethren, and the other the regular celebration of it on Sunday. It will be noticed that the celebration of the Thanksgiving took place every week, and that Justin mentions bread, wine, and water. Some suppose that water is mentioned because the Greeks were in the habit of mixing wine with water. And this is the most likely supposition, though it is strange that Justin should in one of the passages where he mentions the three things, use the word *κράμα*, ‘mixture,’ for wine; a word which is rare in classic Greek, but in the shape of *κρασίον* is now the common one in modern Greek.

Theologians have had endless disputes about Justin’s view of the Thanksgiving, since some of his modes of expression allow men to imagine that he believed in consubstantiation, transubstantiation, and the mass.

The most prominent feature of Justin’s view of the Thanksgiving is implied in the name. The eating of the bread and wine was an opportunity of rendering thanks to God. It was peculiarly an act of worship towards God—not a rite which as such was to bring benefit along with it, and not even a feeling or attitude in which the brethren were to indicate their wants. Therefore Justin assigns no effect to the Thanksgiving, except in one peculiar passage which will soon be quoted. Nor does he ever speak of consecrated bread or wine, or of elements, or of its being a rite, or a mystery, or a sacrament, or a supper. He on all occasions speaks of it as a Thanksgiving, and the bread and wine as the bread and wine of thanksgiving, or for which thanks have been rendered.

^r Apol. i. c. 62, p. 94 E.

Justin mentions two things for which the Christians gave thanks on this occasion—for the creation of the world and all things in it for the sake of man, and for salvation from sin through Christ. "The offering of fine flour," he says, "was a type of the bread of thanksgiving, which Jesus Christ our Lord has delivered to us to make, to recall to memory the suffering which He suffered for those men whose souls are purified from all iniquity, that we may give thanks to God at once for his having created the world with all the things that are in it, on account of man, and also for his having freed us from the iniquity in which we were, and having made a complete dissolution of the principalities and powers through Him who became capable of suffering according to his (God's) will^s." Justin saw in the bread and wine representations of the whole material nourishment of man. "For Christians," he says, "have been taught to sacrifice these sacrifices alone, both in recollection of their dry nourishment and their moist, in which also there is remembrance of the suffering which the Son of God suffered on account of them^t." Justin lays more especial stress on its recalling the suffering of Christ, and mentions this object alone several times. "In this prophecy," he says, "he plainly speaks with regard to the bread which our Christ taught us to make in remembrance of his taking on Him a body on account of those who trust in Him, on whose account also He became capable of suffering, and of the cup which He taught us to make with thanks in remembrance of his blood^u."

The reader has before him all the passages which have been adduced to show that Justin regarded the Thanksgiving as a sacrifice. Justin's idea is very simple. He maintains, as we have seen already, that God does not require material sacrifices, and that He instituted them among the Jews to prevent idolatry. He says expressly, in a sentence preceding one already quoted in reference to the Thanksgiving, "I also myself maintain that prayers and thanksgivings offered up

^s Dial. c. Tryph. c. 41, p. 259 D, 260 A.

^t Ibid. c. 117, p. 345 A.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 70, p. 296 D.

by the worthy are the only sacrifices which are perfect and well-pleasing to God^v." Every prayer and thanksgiving of a true Christian was thus an offering to God, and Justin says as much in regard to thanksgivings for all food in refuting the charge of atheism. "What sensible man," he says, "will not acknowledge that we are not atheists, since we worship the Fashioner of this All, since we affirm as we have been taught, that He needs not blood, and libations, and incense, but by word of prayer and thanksgiving we praise Him with our utmost power for all that we eat, believing it to be the only proper way of honouring Him not to consume by fire those things which were made for nourishment, but to use them for ourselves and for the needy, and being grateful to Him, to send up solemn prayers^x and hymns in words, on account of our having been made, and for all the means of health, the qualities of the different kinds, and the changes of the seasons; and since we send up requests to Him that we may again be in incorruption on account of our trust in Him^y." Justin regarded the Thanksgiving as representative^z of all the other thanksgivings, just as he regarded the bread and wine as representatives of dry and moist food, and therefore he makes more frequent allusion to it as the true sacrifice of Christians. One or two of the passages quoted might at first sight lead one to suppose that Justin regarded the bread as the sacrifice: but such a notion is in direct opposition to most clear statements already adduced. And the apparent inconsistency is easily explained by the loose way in which Justin speaks. When it is said that the offering is a type of the bread of thanksgiving, it is not meant that the offering is a type of the bread used in the Thanksgiving; but the expression 'bread of thanksgiving,' or 'bread for thanksgiving,' is employed to designate the whole service, the

^v Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, p. 345 A.

^x *προσευχῆς*, 'processions': Grabe says that these are "preces solemnī modo recitatæ."

^y Apol. i. c. 13, p. 60 C.

^z Comp. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, p. 344 C.

taking of the bread and the giving of thanks. There cannot be a doubt with regard to this matter; for Justin in the same passage speaks of "making the bread for Thanksgiving;" which can mean nothing else than going through the whole service of the Thanksgiving. Justin varies the expression in another passage quoted; he speaks of "making the cup," evidently with the same meaning.

We have yet to examine one passage of a peculiar nature. In continuation of the passage already adduced from *Apol. i. c. 65*, Justin goes on to explain to the emperors—"This nourishment is called with us the Thanksgiving, of which no one is allowed to partake but he who believes that the things taught by us are true, and who has bathed in the bath which is for forgiveness of sins and a new birth, and who so lives as Christ has handed down to us to live. For we do not take these as common bread, and common drink; but as through the reason (*Logos*) of God, Jesus Christ our Saviour became flesh, and had flesh and blood for our salvation, so we are taught that the nourishment for which thanks are given through a prayer of reason, which is from Him, from which nourishment blood and flesh are nourished by a process of change, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh. For the apostles, in the memoirs made by them, which are called Gospels, handed down that it was thus commanded them: that Jesus taking the bread gave thanks, and said, 'Do this in remembrance of me; this is my body:;' that in like manner, taking the cup, He gave thanks and said, 'This is my blood,;' and that He gave it to them alone^a." Justin here affirms that the teaching of the apostles was that the bread and wine were the body and blood of Christ. This was the general belief of the Church. Justin volunteers an explanation of this statement. It is plain that he understands the words literally, and so he says that as Jesus Christ through the *Logos* became flesh, so the bread and wine, when a prayer of reason has been offered up in thanksgiving, become the flesh and blood of Christ. We are not bound to

^a *Apol. i. c. 66, p. 97 E, 98 A B.*

suppose that Justin understood what he was writing. In fact, he himself would acknowledge that there was a deep mystery connected with the incarnation of the Logos through the Logos; and therefore he was volunteering an explanation by means of a mystery. Nor are we to press on Justin any inferences which we might draw from his statement. Most probably he made it without thinking very deliberately on it. But as it stands, we can scarcely doubt that at the moment he was thinking of it he supposed the bread and wine really to become the flesh and blood of Christ. Some doubt may hang on the meaning of the words "by a process of change," and the words "through a prayer of reason which is from Him," but on the whole the following seems the most satisfactory explanation. The words "a prayer of reason which is from Him" is a prayer suggested by and springing from the Logos Himself, by means of the reason which He has implanted in his followers. It has thus no reference to the Lord's Prayer, as some^b have supposed, but it is applicable to any truly Christian prayer. The introduction of the 'process of change' is partly to explain the transformation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. His unconscious reasoning is this: Bread and wine introduced into our bodies become flesh and blood by a process of change. Add to this process of change the energy of the Logos upon it, and then it becomes the flesh and blood of the Logos. But a question might have occurred to Justin of this nature: "Are the flesh and blood of the Logos thus produced to be regarded as part of the earthly body of Christ, or is it to be supposed that they become his body in us?" "Just as He distributes his Logos in us, does He also distribute his flesh and blood in us?" It seems to me that if Justin had thought of this question, he would have answered it in the affirmative. But as it is, he has left us with the general statement that it is the flesh and blood of Christ, but with no explanation. We do not know whether he would have deliberately affirmed that the bread and wine in some mysterious way became part of the man who was crucified; or

^b Blunt's *Right Use of the Early Fathers*, p. 35.

whether he looked upon the change as if it were a new incarnation. His statement as it stands certainly favours the first idea; for he expressly says that it is the flesh and blood of the Jesus that was made flesh. Nor have we any right to lay stress on the fact that he appeals to a narrative which spoke of Christ as calling the bread and wine his body and blood, while his body and blood were before the apostles' eyes entire and complete. Justin may not have noticed this. But it seems to me most likely that Justin's mode of thought was as I have represented it, and that it has in modern thought nothing to correspond to it.

We need scarcely remark that it is pure fancy to suppose that Justin connected the transformation here spoken of with the renewal of Christ's sacrifice. For in the first place, he never does so connect them; and then his ideas of the sacrificial nature of the Thanksgiving are contrary to the ideas of sacrifice attributed to him in the supposition; and in the third place, he did not regard Christ's death as effective on account of any virtue resident in mere sacrifices.

Future State.—We have already laid down some of Justin's views with regard to a future state in speaking of the second coming of Christ.

Justin believed that the souls of men did not become insensible after death. The most explicit statement on this point is contained in the conversation of the old man with Justin, and therefore there is an uncertainty as to whether we ought to regard the sentiments as those of Justin. The similarity of the opinions to those of Theophilus and Tatian scarcely permits us to doubt that they were substantially the sentiments of Justin. The old man says, "I, for my part, assuredly affirm that no souls whatever die: for then this would be truly a blessing to the wicked. What then? I maintain that the souls of the pious remain in some better place, and the unjust and wicked in a worse, waiting then for the time of judgment. Thus then some that have appeared worthy of God do not die any more, but the others are punished as long as God wishes them to exist and to

be punished^c." The old man was led into this explanation because he had maintained that souls were not naturally immortal. Justin in reply to the old man asks him if his belief is not as follows: that God alone is incorruptible and unbegotten, and that "all other things after Him are begotten and destructible. For this reason souls die and are punished^d." When Justin says that souls die, he plainly means that they can die; and so in the passages quoted above, where he affirms that the souls of the pious no longer die, he means that God has made them immortal and destined never to die.

The old man goes into the philosophy of his views. "The soul," he says, "either is life or has life. If, then, it is life, it would make something else live not itself, as motion would move something else rather than itself. But that the soul lives, nobody would deny. But if it lives, it lives not as being life, but as partaking of life; but that which partakes is different from that of which it partakes. But the soul partakes of life, since God wishes it to live. Thus, then, it will never partake of it when He does not wish it to live. For it is not its own characteristic to live, as it is God's, but as man does not always exist, nor is the body always with the soul, but when this harmony should be dissolved the soul leaves the body and man no longer is; so also, when the soul should no longer exist, the living spirit removes from it and the soul no longer is, but it goes again there whence it was taken^e."

Justin himself has been supposed to state that the souls of men remained in Hades; but, as we have seen already, he is referring to Jewish ideas and Jewish modes of speech.

Justin expressly states that souls have perception after death. He says of kings, "that they died the death common to all men; and if this were to end in insensibility, then it would be a gain to all who are unrighteous. But since sensibility remains to all who have been born and eternal

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 5, p. 223 B.

^d Ibid. p. 223 D.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 6, p. 224 A.

punishment is reserved, do not neglect to be persuaded and to believe that these things are true^f." He appeals to the various heathen rites in which the souls of the dead took a part, as proof to the Greeks that "souls after death are in a state of sensibility^g;" and he refers to this belief as being the belief not only of Christians but of Greek poets and philosophers^h. He also infers the sensibility of the soul after death from Samuel's appearance to the witch of Endor. "That souls remain," he says, "I have shown you from the soul of Samuel being summoned by the ventriloquist woman, as Saul requestedⁱ." Justin has nowhere shown this, but the reference itself is sufficient. He introduces this subject when he is speaking of the need Christians have of praying at the close of life, lest an evil angel seize their souls; and he says that "it appears that all the souls of those who were thus righteous and of the prophets fell under the authority of such powers, as the facts themselves show in the case of that ventriloquist woman^k."

As we have seen already, Justin regards the opinion that souls go to heaven as heretical. The passage occurs in the doubtful chapter in which the millennium is set forth. He says, "If ye meet with some who are called Christians and do not confess this, but dare to blaspheme the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, who also say that there is not a resurrection of the dead, and that when souls die they are taken up into heaven, do not suppose that they are Christians^l."

Throughout Justin's works there is no expression that gives a clue to his exact notions with regard to the state of men immediately after death. The old man's statements are the most precise, and in a passage already quoted we have seen that he speaks of Lucius as going to the Father and King of the heavens^m.

^f Apol. i. c. 18, p. 64 E.

^h Apol. i. c. 70, p. 66 D.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 105, p. 333 A.

^m Apol. ii. c. 2, p. 43 C.

^g Ibid. c. 18, p. 65 A B.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 105, p. 332 D.

^l Ibid. c. 80, p. 306 D.

We have already adduced many of the passages relating to the resurrection. Justin believed that men rose with the same bodies. "Plato," he says, "said that Rhadamanthus and Minos would punish the unrighteous that came to them, but we say that the same thing will take place, but Christ will be the judge, and they will be with their souls in the same bodies, and that they will be punished, not, as he says, a thousand years only, but with an everlasting punishmentⁿ." He makes a slight exception in the case of those good men who are maimed. "Christ Himself," he says, "did these things (cured the dumb, maimed, &c.), persuading those who were to trust in Him, that if any, having any defect in his body, should keep the instructions delivered by Him, He would raise him up whole and sound in his second appearance, at the same time making him immortal, indestructible, and free from all sorrow^o."

Justin reasons with the Greeks on the possibility of the resurrection, and uses the argument that, if God made men, He could certainly raise them up again^p.

After the resurrection comes the judgment, which God is to make through Christ. The principle of this judgment is, "that each one goes to eternal punishment or salvation, according to the worth of his deeds^q."

The good, as we have seen already, are to become incapable of dying (*ἀθάνατοι*), incapable of destruction (*ἀφθαρτοι*), and incapable of pain (*ἀπαθείς* or *ἀλύπητοι*). They are to be on earth, but their life is to "be a life with God, where sin gives no troubler."

The wicked are to be punished in everlasting fire. Justin unquestionably understood the fire in a literal sense. He never^s mentions the punishment of the wicked without also remarking that it was a punishment through fire. And he

ⁿ Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 B.

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 69, p. 296 A.

^p Apol. i. c. 19, pp. 65 C-66 B.

^q Apol. i. c. 12, p. 59 B; c. 17, p. 64 D E; c. 44, p. 82 B; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 47, p. 267 A.

^r Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 B.

^s Semisch, vol. ii. p. 382.

says, in explaining Isaiah i. 20, that in the words "the sword shall devour you," Isaiah does not mean "that the disobedient are to be put to death by swords, but the sword of God is the fire whose food they become who choose to do evil^t." Justin also regards the punishment as occurring in a place: "Gehenna is a place where those will be punished who have lived unjustly and who do not believe that those things will happen which God taught through Christ^u."

Justin seems to connect the doctrine of a conflagration at the end of the world with the burning of the wicked. The three passages referring to this *ἐκπύρωσις* are the following: "The Sibyl and Hystaspes said that there would be a consumption of things destructible through fire^x;" "The demons cannot persuade men that there will not be a conflagration for the punishment of the wicked^y;" "God puts off the confusion and dissolution of the world, so that the wicked angels and demons and men may no longer exist, on account of the seed of Christians who know that they are the cause of preservation in nature. Since if this were not so, it would not have been possible for you to do these things and to be worked on by evil demons, but the fire of judgment coming down would separate all things in utter confusion, even as formerly the flood left none but one man with his friends^z." Then he adds, "For so we say that there will be the conflagration, but not as the Stoics," &c.

Justin in these passages plainly intimates a general burning; but he has not taken any notice of the difficulty which it introduces into his belief that this world was to be the seat of the blessed. Perhaps he thought that as Christians became indestructible, they could not be affected by fire, and that while the fire swept away the wicked, it prepared the new earth.

Justin believed in the eternity of the punishment of the

^t Apol. i. c. 44, p. 81 D.

^x Apol. i. c. 20, p. 66 C.

^z Apol. ii. c. 7, p. 45 B.

^u Ibid. c. 19, p. 66 B.

^y Ibid. c. 57, p. 91 C.

wicked. He has not indeed applied the word *ἀθῆτος* to punishment; but he has so frequently used the word *αἰώνιος*, and at the same time varied it by equivalents, that there is scarcely room to doubt his opinion. There are two or three passages which have been adduced to show that he supposed the punishments would come to an end; but they prove no such thing. Thus the statement of the old man in the Dialogue with Trypho, that the wicked were punished only so long as God wished them to be punished, is intended simply to affirm that punishment is dependent on God's will, but it is not intended to declare what God's will is. In a passage just quoted, where it is said "that wicked angels may no longer exist," the words can well mean that they should no longer exist upon the earth. And the various passages in which the dissolution of the demons is spoken of are intended to convey the idea that their influence on man will then be null, and their power over him entirely destroyed.

Several of the passages in which Justin speaks of the duration of punishment have been adduced already. He calls the fire eternal (*αἰώνιον πῦρ*^a), the unquenchable (*ἄσβεστος*^b), and he speaks of the eternal punishment through fire^c. He speaks of the demons and men as to be punished for a "boundless age" (*ἀνέπαυτον αἰῶνα*^d), and as "being sent to the judgment and condemnation of fire, to be punished unceasingly^e." None of these passages indeed express the definite and philosophical idea of an eternity of punishment. They are all undefined expressions, and Justin may not have thought it right to conceive of punishments as really *ἀθῆτα*. Nor is there one single passage that gives us a definite notion. As we have seen already, he contrasts the punishment that is eternal with that which is only for a thousand years^f; but he still uses the indefinite word *αἰώνιος*. In the

^a Apol. i. c. 21, p. 67 D; ii. c. 1, p. 41 C.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 120, p. 349 B.

^c Apol. i. c. 45, p. 83 D; ii. c. 8, p. 46 D. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, p. 345 A.

^d Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 B.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 45, p. 264 B.

^f Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 B.

Dialogue with Trypho, c. 130, p. 359 D, where he says, "We know through Isaiah that the limbs of those who have transgressed are to be devoured by the worm and ceaseless fire, remaining immortal, so as to be in the sight of all flesh," no stress can be laid on the word 'immortal' (*ἀθάνατα*). For the word is used to show that though the bodies are in the fire they will not die, because they cannot. But Justin never says that the bodies are indestructible.

Justin believed that souls after judgment could not repent to salvation. If he left any room to himself for doubt as to the absolute eternity of punishment, it could only be by supposing that God might annihilate the wicked. He several times warns his readers to change their minds "before the day of judgment come^s."

Justin believed that the wicked would always feel the pains of fire. "He will send the bodies of the wicked in eternal sensibility (*ἐν αἰσθησει αἰωνία*) with the wicked demons into the eternal fire^h." He also thought that it was right to tell men of these fearful punishments because they were facts. "That no one may say," he remarks, "that which is asserted by those who are considered philosophers, that the things said by us, that the unrighteous are punished in eternal fire, are big words and bugbears, and that we wish men to live virtuously on account of fear and not because such a life is good and agreeable; I shall answer briefly to this, that if this is not so, God does not exist, or if He does, He cares not for men, and there are no such things as virtue and vice, and lawgivers unjustly punish those who transgress good commandmentsⁱ."

The Scriptures.—Justin makes very frequent allusions to the Hebrew prophets, and quotes largely from some of them. He mentions the following by name: Moses, whom he calls the first of prophets^k; David, the king and prophet^l; Isaiah,

^s Apol. i. c. 40, p. 79 A; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 118, p. 345 D.

^h Apol. i. c. 52, p. 87 C.

^k Apol. i. c. 32, p. 73 C.

^l Ibid. ii. c. 9, p. 47 D.

^l Ibid. c. 35, p. 76 B.

"borne along by the prophetic Spirit^m;" Jeremiah, "the Holy Spirit speaking through himⁿ;" Ezekiel^o; the holy Daniel^p; Amos, "one of the twelve^q;" Micah^r; Zechariah^s; and Malachi, "one of the twelve prophets^t." He also refers to Zephaniah, but the passage which he quotes is found in Zechariah, so that Justin probably committed a slip of memory in the name^u. He also refers to the book of Ezra, but the extract which he makes is not found in it, and is supposed to be an interpolation of a Christian^x. He quotes from all the other books of the Old Testament, except Judges, the Second Book of Chronicles, Ruth, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Haggai, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, Nahum, Obadiah, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon. But, as we have seen, we have evidence that he knew the books of Ezra and Zephaniah, and we can scarcely doubt that he also knew the twelve minor prophets, since he calls Amos one of the twelve^y.

Justin calls the Scriptures sometimes the writings^z, sometimes the holy writings^a, or "our writings^b," and when he quotes he frequently opens with "the word of God says^c." The word of God in such a connexion does not designate the whole of the books of the Old Testament. It means only the particular saying adduced. And we have noticed already that the expression has no reference to Christ as inspirer of the prophets.

Justin makes no reference to any of the books of the Apocrypha as inspired^d. He believed, however, that Hys-

^m Apol. i. c. 35, p. 76 A.

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 44, p. 263 A.

^q Dial. c. Tryph. c. 22, p. 238 D.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 115, p. 342 C.

^s Apol. i. c. 35, p. 76 C.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 69, p. 294 D.

^u Dial. c. Tryph. c. 55, p. 274 D.

^x See Otto on Dial. c. Tryph. c. 19, p. 237 A, note 14.

^d One passage shows an acquaintance with the Apocryphal addition to Daniel, and another, in which Isaiah is said to have been sawn with a wooden saw, is supposed to refer to the *Ascensio Isaie Vatis*, cap. v. ver. 11, as edited in Ethiopic, with a Latin and English translation, by Richard Laurence, LL.D., Oxoniæ, 1819. See his General Remarks, p. 141. It is also given in *Gfrörer's Prophetæ Veteres Pseudepigraphi*. See also Semisch, vol. i. p. 252 note.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 78, p. 304 C.

^p Ibid. c. 32, p. 250 B.

^r Apol. i. c. 34, p. 75 D.

^t Ibid. c. 28, p. 246 A.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 72, p. 297 D.

^z See Semisch, vol. i. p. 254.

^a Apol. i. c. 28, p. 71 B.

taspes and the Sibyl were inspired. One of the passages in which their prophecies are mentioned has been quoted already. In another both are placed alongside the prophets. "By the energy of the evil demons death was decreed against those who should read the books of Hystaspes, or the Sibyl, or the prophets^e."

We have already adduced passages in which Justin speaks of the prophets as inspired (God-borne) by the Logos and by the Holy Spirit. Many instances have incidentally been given of the way in which Justin begins his quotations. The Holy Spirit speaks through Moses^f, cries through Isaiah^g. God cries through the prophets^h, through Mosesⁱ, through Isaiah^k. God speaks through Malachi^l. Justin regards the sayings of the prophets as having all the authority of God, and therefore true^m. So complete is his confidence in the perfect accuracy of Scripture, that if one passage seems to contradict another he will suspend his own judgment. "If," he says, "you have said these things because you think you can put me into the dilemma of saying that the Scriptures are contradictory to each other, you have made a mistake, for I shall never dare to think or say this. But if a passage of Scripture be set before me, seeming to be such, and having the appearance of contradicting another, being completely persuaded that no passage (Scripture) is contradictory to another, I will rather confess that I myself do not understand what is said, and I will try to persuade those who suppose the passages (Scriptures) contradictory to agree with men." The work and character of the prophets Justin has thus described: "There were some men a long time ago older than all those who are reckoned philosophers, men blessed and righteous and loved by God, who spoke by the Holy Spirit and foretold things about to happen, which things are now of a truth

^e Apol. i. c. 44, p. 82 B.

^g Dial. c. Tryph. c. 25, p. 242 B.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 16, p. 233 D.

^l Dial. c. Tryph. c. 28, p. 246 B.

ⁿ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 65, p. 289 C.

^f Ibid. p. 81 B.

^h Ibid. c. 67, p. 292 C.

^k Ibid. c. 16, p. 234 C.

^m Apol. i. c. 36, p. 76 D.

happening. 'Prophets' is the name given to them. These alone saw and told the truth to men, neither fearing nor being in awe of any one, not overpowered by the desire of glory, but speaking those things only which they heard and saw when filled with a holy spirit. And their writings remain to this day, and any one reading them may derive great benefit from them and instruction with regard to principles and final causes, and those things which the philosophers ought to know, if he trust them. For they did not frame their discourses with demonstration, inasmuch as they were trustworthy witnesses of the truth superior to all demonstration; but the things that have happened and are happening compel agreement with what has been said through them. Although they also deserved belief on account of the miracles which they wrought, since they glorified God the Father and the Maker of all, and announced the Christ that is from Him, namely his Son, which these false prophets, who are filled with the deceitful and impure spirit, neither did nor do, but they dare to work some miracles in order to strike men with astonishment, and they glorify the spirits of deceit and the demons^o."

Justin nowhere gives expression to an exact theory of inspiration. It is not likely that his mind had been directed to the subject; and accordingly we have the usual difference between his language and his practice. In many of the expressions already adduced the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures is plainly implied. Probably if he had formed a theory at all, it would be something to the effect that the holiness of the prophets brought them into peculiar contact with the Divine Spirit, that they then became filled with this Spirit, and in this way rose through a loss almost of their individuality into organs of the Divine Spirit for the instruction of men. There is one passage in which Semisch^p thinks that Justin actually asserts that the prophets were beyond themselves. It is as follows: Zechariah "saw not the devil

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 224 D.

^p vol. i. p. 266; also note 3.

and the angel of the Lord with his own eyes, as being in his usual state, but while out of his usual state (*ἐν ἐκστάσει*), when a revelation was being made to him^q." It appears to me that we make the passage carry too much if we regard it as containing a theory of the inspiration of all the prophets. In all the extracts quoted it will be seen that Justin lays especial stress on the prophets as being the only teachers of religious truth, but they had also special revelations, revelations of the future, and Justin refers to some apocalyptic vision which Zechariah saw not with his bodily eyes, but in a state of trance. The visions of the other prophets would also take place in some such way, but it is unfair to suppose that Justin regarded all the preachings and teachings of the prophets as given them in trances.

Notwithstanding these notions of the inspiration of the prophets, Justin is exceedingly careless in his quotations. Scarcely one large passage exactly agrees with the Septuagint from which he quotes. There is a remarkable exception in the case of a Psalm, and this exception probably arose from the more frequent recitation of the Psalms at home and in the Christian assemblies^r.

Justin continually uses the Septuagint version, and regarded it as having been well executed. In *Apol. i. c. 31*, p. 72 C he relates how Ptolemy sent for Jews to translate the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek, and he remarks that "the books remained with the Egyptians up to this time, and are everywhere with all the Jews, who reading them do not understand what is said." He observes that the Jews did not agree with some of the interpretations of the seventy elders, and accuses them farther of striking off many passages from the Septuagint translation^s. He says that this tampering with the Scriptures was worse than the calf-

^q *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 115*, p. 343 A.

^r *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 22*, p. 239 C. See notes of commentators, Thirlby and Otto. The Psalm is the forty-ninth of the Septuagint, the fiftieth of our version.

^s *Dial. c. Tryph. c. 71*, p. 297 B.

worship of their ancestors. The instances however that Justin alleges are signal failures, and show only that he himself was the dupe of some Christian interpolator of the Septuagint. He appeals to four passages. Of three of these there are no traces even in our MSS. of the Septuagint. The fourth occurs in all our Hebrew and Septuagint MSS. Justin himself allowed that it was found in some^t. He is not accurate also in his references to the history of the Septuagint, for he says that Ptolemy sent to Herod king of the Jews^u.

Mode of Interpretation.—Justin's method of interpreting the Old Testament is purely arbitrary. He believed, as we have seen, that the prophets were inspired by Christ, and he regarded it as their special work to foretell in a secret manner (παρακεκαλυμμένως, ἐν μυστηρίῳ^z) all that related to Christ. Accordingly he finds in every passage of Scripture some secret information with regard to Christ. Sometimes the events are distinctly foretold; sometimes they are represented by symbols^y; sometimes they are to be ascertained only by Christian feeling, for what else could find the blood of Christ in the grapes of Gen. xlix. 10^z. Sometimes also the Spirit speaks in the person of the Father, sometimes in that of the Son, and sometimes in that of the people answering the Father or Son^a. How one is to ascertain who is the speaker was a matter often to be determined by one's own feeling.

We have already given several instances of the arbitrary mode in which Justin deals with the Old Testament; as, for instance, in his interpretation of Psalm xxiv., and in his notion of the day within which Adam died. Multitudes of similar interpretations could be adduced^b, and sometimes he is ready

^t See Otto's notes on c. 72; and Semisch, vol. i. p. 337.

^u Apol. i. c. 31, p. 72 C.

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 76, p. 301 B; c. 100, p. 326 D. On Justin's use of the words μυστήριον, σύμβολον, παραβολή, τύπος, see Semisch, vol. i. p. 284.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 114, p. 341 B.

^z Apol. i. c. 32, p. 74 A.

^a Apol. i. c. 36, p. 76 D. Justin gives instances in cc. 37, 38.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 326 C. Semisch, vol. i. p. 299, gives a list of others.

to admit two interpretations^c. His ingenuity is taxed to the utmost in discovering the shape of the cross in the statements of the Old Testament.

It is remarkable that Justin regarded this power of interpreting the Old Testament, or, as he once calls it, the knowledge (*γνώσις*^d), as a special gift of God or of Christ granted to prayer, and nearly every instance in which he mentions the giving of God's grace it is in connexion with the understanding of the Scriptures^e. He also reckoned the Old Testament to contain all that man required for his salvation; the Memoirs of the Apostles^f, and even Christ Himself, being but expounders of its statements^g. "Christ revealed to us all things which also we have learned from the Scriptures through his grace^h." These things were indeed often concealed in types and symbols, which only God's grace could enable men to seeⁱ. The teachings were given in types and parables, Justin also maintained, that those might labour who sought to find and learn them^j.

Justin's mode of interpretation made light of any difficulties in the Old Testament. "There is nothing that one can justly blame of the things said or done by all the prophets without one exception, if ye have the spiritual idea (*γνώσις*) contained in them^k." Thus he thought that no one had a right to appeal to the Old Testament in proof of the rightness of polygamy, "for some dispensations of great secrets were accomplished in every such deed^l." And he shows this in the case of Jacob's wives. He illustrates it also in the case of David and Uriah's wife^m, and finds "a great secret" in the intercourse of Judah and Thamarⁿ.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 103, p. 330 D.

^d Ibid. c. 112, p. 339 C.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 225 B; c. 55, p. 274 D; c. 58, p. 280 B; c. 91, p. 319 B; c. 78, p. 305 A; c. 119, p. 346 D.

^f Apol. i. c. 52, p. 87 A; c. 61, p. 94 E.

^g Ibid. c. 32, p. 73 C.

^h Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 326 D; c. 131, p. 361 A. Apol. i. c. 52, p. 87 A; c. 61, p. 94 E.

ⁱ Dial. c. Tryph. c. 55, p. 274 D.

^j Ibid. c. 90, p. 317 C.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 112, p. 339 C.

^l Ibid. c. 134, p. 364 A.

^m Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 371 A.

ⁿ Ibid. c. 86, p. 314 A. Gen. xxxviii.

New Testament.—The only book of the New Testament which Justin refers to by name is the Revelation of the apostle John in a passage already quoted^o. Many of the peculiar phrases of Paul occur in Justin's writings, and Justin has quoted two passages from Scripture which differ from the Septuagint but agree with the quotations of Paul^p. Some have also supposed that Justin makes use of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Acts of the Apostles, but on totally unsatisfactory grounds^q.

Justin, as we have seen already, makes mention of Memoirs of the Apostles (Απομνημονεύματα τῶν Ἀποστόλων). He sometimes calls them simply Memoirs^r; generally he styles them Memoirs of the Apostles^s, and in one passage^t he calls them "his Memoirs." The reference of 'his' must either be to Peter or Christ. There is good reason, however, for supposing the text to be corrupt, and Otto therefore reads αὐτῶν for αὐτοῦ^u.

Of these Memoirs he states that they are called Gospels^v. Schleiermacher, Marsh, and others, regarded these words as an interpolation, and they look like one; but in the Dialogue with Trypho^w, a saying of Christ is quoted as being "in the gospel." Trypho mentions the "so-called gospel" in which he read the precepts of Christian life^x. But perhaps here Trypho speaks sarcastically of the "good news," and has reference more to the whole requirements of the Christian system than to any written exposition of it.

Justin states also that the Memoirs "were composed by Christ's apostles and men who followed them^y." He appeals to them as the sources of his information with regard to the

^o Dial. c. Tryph. c. 81, p. 308 A.

^p Semisch, vol. i. p. 257; Otto, De Just. Mart. Scriptis, p. 122, note 31.

^q Lardner, Credibility, part ii. c. 10.

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 105, p. 333 B; c. 107, p. 334 B.

^s Apol. i. c. 66, p. 98 B; c. 67, p. 98 D. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 100, p. 327 B; c. 101, p. 328 B; c. 102, p. 329 C; c. 103, p. 331 C; c. 104, p. 332 B.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 106, p. 333 D.

^u See Otto, in loc.

^v Apol. i. c. 66, p. 98 B.

^w c. 100, p. 326 D.

^x Dial. c. Tryph. c. 10, p. 227 C.

^y Dial. c. Tryph. c. 103, p. 331 D.

miraculous birth of Christ, the baptism of Christ, and the circumstances of his death. He quotes also several of the sayings of Christ from them. Once, in speaking of Christ's baptism, he says that the "apostles wrote that the Spirit flew on Him as a dove^z," and he mentions that Christ was named 'Son of God' in the Memoirs^a.

What were these Memoirs? There can scarcely be a doubt that they embraced the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, and we may add Mark. There is so much taken from them, that the Memoirs must either have contained what they contained, or else the Memoirs were the Gospels. That the Memoirs were the Gospels is rendered extremely probable from the circumstance that he calls them Gospels; that what he narrates of the writers of them harmonizes with the other ancient statements with regard to the writers of the Gospels^b; and that if we do not identify them, we are compelled to suppose the existence of books recognised by the Church as written by apostles, and as such read in the churches, and yet mentioned by no one but Justin. Justin indeed may have included in the term 'Memoirs' some of the Gospels, such as that of the Hebrews now lost, and he may not have included the Gospel of John. The passages which seem to indicate that Justin used other Gospels are very few. He quotes a saying of Christ, "In whatsoever I find you, in that will I judge you^c," which is not found in our Gospels. He makes the voice from heaven at the baptism say, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee^d." He also says that fire was lighted in the Jordan on that occasion. And he mentions that Christ made yokes and ploughs^e. The first passage is supposed by some to be

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 315 D.

^a Ibid. c. 100, p. 327 B.

^b It should be noticed that he says that they were written by apostles (more than one), and by followers of apostles (also more than one), so that most probably the statement was intended to include Matthew and John, Mark and Luke.

^c Dial. c. Tryph. c. 47, p. 267 A.

^d Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 316 D; c. 103, p. 331 B.

^e Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88, p. 316 C.

taken from the Gospel of the Hebrews, but it is as likely to have been handed down by tradition. The second passage is found in some manuscripts of the New Testament, though not in the oldest, and is recognised by some others of the Christian writers, as Clemens Alexandrinus and Methodius^f; and was found, according to Epiphanius, in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Of the third, Justin does not expressly say that it was in the Gospels, though if he did he may easily have mixed up in his memory a tradition with the statement of the apostles. And the last, though found in the Gospel of Thomas, may have been a true tradition handed down for some time by word of mouth, believed in the Church, and embodied in the apocryphal gospel with considerable expansion. These then are not sufficient proofs that Justin used any other Gospel^g.

Nor is there good proof that he used the Gospel of John. All that can be appealed to is the similarity of some of Justin's expressions to those of John's^h.

See Thirlby and Otto, in loc.

^f A full exhibition of the proofs in favour of the Memoirs being the Gospels, and a refutation of Bishop Marsh's objections, is given in Kaye's *Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr*, p. 132. Many have maintained that the *Ἀποκρυφηγορεύματα* was simply the Gospel of the Hebrews. See a list of them in Schwegler's *Nachapostoliches Zeitalter*, vol. i. p. 217, note. Schwegler tries to prove the same thing against Winer, Olshausen, De Wette, and Bindemann. The literature on this subject is exceedingly extensive. The more recent Baurian attempts and the works of their opponents are noticed in an ingenious but unsatisfactory *Programm* of Dr. G. Volkmar, *Ueber Justin den Märtyrer und sein Verhältniss zu unsern Evangelien*, Zürich, 1853. Dr. Robert Lee, Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh, has kindly shown me a paper in which he throws a new light on Justin Martyr's quotations, and by satisfactorily explaining the differences between them and the passages in our Gospels, cuts away the supports on which the theories of any other Gospel are built. His explanation in his own words is: "The general tendency of the alterations Justin has made on the language of the Synoptists is to soften their provincialisms, to render their style more accordant with the general idioms of the Greek tongue, and so less offensive and more intelligible to those for whom he wrote."

^h Westcott, *History of the Canon*, p. 200. Westcott discusses this question in a most masterly and satisfactory manner. All the passages that can possibly bear on the subject are adduced and thoroughly sifted, pp. 107-205.

Justin never speaks of the writings of the Apostles as inspired. In quoting from them he never uses the phrases common with regard to the Old Testament, 'the Spirit says,' 'God cries through them.' And not only so, but as he regarded Christ as simply an expounder of the Old Testamentⁱ, so Christ's work wrought in the apostles was opening their eyes to the meaning of the Old Testament. "Although," he says, "Christ had been proclaimed through the prophets in a concealed manner as going to become a sufferer and to be Lord of all after that, yet this would be understood by no one until He Himself persuaded the apostles that these things were expressly proclaimed in the writings^k." Justin goes so far in this matter as to hang his belief in the truth of the apostles' statements on their accordance with Old Testament prophecies. He mentions the appearance of the angels to Mary, and quotes the words addressed to her, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for He shall save his people from their sins." Then he adds, "As those who recorded all the things relating to our Saviour Jesus Christ have taught, whom we have believed since the prophetic Spirit through the fore-mentioned Isaiah foretold that He would appear as we pointed out^l." The apologetic character of Justin's writings may in some measure account for this appeal to prophecy, but it does not do so satisfactorily. For if he regarded the apostles as inspired and the apostles themselves to stand on a level in their writings with the prophets, why did he not adduce the proofs for the inspiration of the apostles?

Did Justin then regard the apostles as common men, only holier than most? This also cannot be asserted. Though he does not pronounce their writings to be inspired, yet he has no doubt of their divine mission. They came in close contact with Christ Himself, and had daily revelations from Him. And when He sent them out to preach his gospel, they were enabled to do their work through divine power.

ⁱ Apol. i. c. 32, p. 73 C. τῶν ἀγνοουμένων προφητειῶν ἐξηγητοῦ.

^k Dial. c. Tryph. c. 76, p. 302 A.

^l Apol. i. c. 33, p. 75 B.

And no doubt he would regard them as possessed of the power to work miracles and to foretell events, for these gifts belonged to the Church, were not extinct in his own day, and must have been plentifully bestowed on the special ambassadors of Christ. "From Jerusalem," he says, "twelve men in number went out into the world, and these uneducated persons (*ἄδωτοι*), although not able to speak, did notwithstanding, through the power of God, point out to every race of men that they were sent by Christ to teach all men the word of God^m." He finds a prophetic intimation of "this strong word which the apostles preached everywhere" in the "rod of his power" of Psalm cx. 1-3. He says also: "All Christ's acquaintances denied and forsook Him after his crucifixion, but afterwards, when He rose again from the dead and appeared to them and taught them to read the prophecies in which all these things were foretold as sure to happen, and when they had seen Him ascend into heaven, and trusted Him, and received power which was sent to them thence [from heaven] by Him and had gone into every race of men, they taught these things and were called apostlesⁿ."

The writings of men who had thus come into personal contact with Christ, and who received power from Him after He left the earth, would be of supreme value to the Church, whatever theory might be adopted with regard to inspiration. And, accordingly, though Justin sometimes speaks only of the prophets and Christ^o as the revealers of God's will to men, yet he does not hesitate to couple the prophets and apostles together. "In the same manner," he says, "we have believed the voice of God, spoken again through the apostles of Christ, and proclaimed to us through the prophets^p." And, as we have seen already, the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets were read in the assemblies of Christians^q.

Morality.—Justin evidently did not think very profoundly

^m Apol. i. c. 39, p. 78 A.

ⁿ Ibid. c. 50, p. 86 A.

^o Apol. i. c. 23, p. 68 B.

^p Dial. c. Tryph. c. 119, p. 347 D.

^q Apol. i. c. 67, p. 98 D.

on the philosophy of morals. He was content with a practical knowledge, and when he does enter into moral discussions, it is when a practical object summons him to them. Several of these we have already given, especially his ideas with regard to free-will, and the necessity for a belief in that doctrine before man could be regarded as capable of acting rightly or wrongly. In speaking of the Mosaic law he points out that it was divided into two portions, the one insisting on ceremonial observances, circumcision, the keeping of the sabbath and of the feasts; the other consisting of injunctions which were eternally and naturally right in themselves. He describes these last as τὰ φύσει καλὰ καὶ εὐσεβῆ καὶ δίκαια: and again, τὰ καθόλου καὶ φύσει καὶ αἰώνια καλὰ^r: and again, τὰς αἰωνίους καὶ φύσει δικαιοπραξίας καὶ εὐσεβείας^s. He thus believes that there are certain acts which are naturally just and pious, which are eternally such and which are everywhere such. He does not mention what acts he regards in this light, but he mentions evil deeds which he regards as the opposites, and therefore always and everywhere wrong. It is curious that these evil deeds which he mentions all relate to the body, and he makes no effort to prove on what eternal principle they are wrong. "For," he says, "God exhibits in every race of men things that are always and everywhere righteous (δίκαια), and all righteousness, and every race knows that adultery is an evil, and fornication, and the killing of man, and other suchlike things^t." He allows, indeed, that there are some whose minds have been so perverted by bad training that they have lost their natural notions; yet they are natural, and moreover he thinks that even these people have them in reality, though they are kept under^u. In insisting on the various virtues he almost invariably has recourse to the injunctions of Christ. And he appeals to his summing up as the most satisfactory of all. "Well," he says, "does our Lord and Saviour seem to me to have spoken, when He said that the whole of righteousness and

^r Dial. c. Tryph. c. 45, p. 263 D.

^s Ibid. c. 47, p. 266 B.

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 93, p. 320 C.

^u See p. 290 of this volume.

piety lay in two commandments. Now they are these: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy strength, and thy neighbour as thyself^v." And in a few sentences farther on, in explanation of these injunctions, he states that righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*) has a Godward and manward aspect. "The whole of righteousness," he says, "being divided into parts, towards God and towards man, whoever, the passage says, loves the Lord God with all his heart and with all his strength, and his neighbour as himself, would be truly righteous (*δίκαιος*)^x." Justin brings out very prominently the universal love inculcated by Christ. He says, in explanation of the term 'neighbour' in the commandment quoted, "The neighbour of a man is nothing else than the living being who has like feelings and is rational (*τὸ ὁμοιοπαθὲς γὰρ καὶ λογικὸν ζῶον*), namely man^z." He states that in obedience to a command of Christ, Christians pray for their enemies and "for all men without exception^a." And he states the great fact that "all men are naturally (*τῇ φύσει*) brothers^b."

Justin maintained that a man ought to be righteous at all hazards. "In every way must the lover of truth choose to speak and act righteously, even in preference to his life, if death should be threatened^c." And he asserts that Christians "willingly die confessing Christ rather than tell a lie or deceive their examiners^d." Willing as the Christians were to bear their testimony to Christ, there is no reason for the accusation which has been made against Justin, that he approved of Christians informing against themselves, because they desired the crown of martyrdom. There is not a word in Justin which indicates that he attached any special merit to martyrdom. On the contrary, he plainly asserts that there is no real Christian who would not willingly die

^v Dial. c. Tryph. c. 93, p. 321 A.

^x Ibid. p. 321 B.

^y Otto translates, "similibus perperessionibus obnoxium."

^z Dial. c. Tryph. c. 93, p. 321 B.

^a Ibid. c. 133, p. 363 C.

^b Dial. c. Tryph. c. 134, p. 364 D.

^c Apol. i. c. 2, p. 53 D.

^d Apol. i. c. 39, p. 78 B. See also Ibid. ii. c. 2, p. 43 A; c. 12, p. 50 B.

for Christ. And all the length he goes is the assertion that a Christian has good reason for being eager to meet death for Christ's sake, for he then goes to live with God for ever^e. The two passages to which Barbeyrac^f has appealed do not prove his point. They both occur in the second Apology. The one occurs in the narrative of Justin's reflections on seeing the constancy of Christians. He tells how he felt that no lover of pleasure could welcome death as they did. On the contrary, he would try to escape the notice of rulers, "much less would he denounce himself when the consequence was to be death," (οὐχ ὅτι γε ἑαυτὸν κατήγγειλε φονευθησόμενον^g). Now here it is to be observed that whatever be the meaning of κατήγγειλε, Justin assigns no motive for a Christian's denouncing himself, and therefore Barbeyrac has no good reason for supposing that the Christians did it out of an ill-regulated desire for martyrdom, or from the same motives which urged the Christians of Cyprian's time to do it. But, moreover, the word, though it may admit of Barbeyrac's meaning, does not demand it and is better understood in another way. All that Justin says is that Christians give information against themselves which will lead to their death. Now the very confession of Christ led to this. Justin does not say that of their own accord they rushed to give this information, but simply that they did give it. Nay, more, the words are applicable to another case still. In the narrative with which Justin commences the Second Apology, one Lucius stands forward in defence of a Christian unjustly condemned. He shows no eagerness for martyrdom, but he is determined to stand up for his fellow-Christian. Such a man might well be said to bring information against himself. If out of cowardice he had remained silent, nobody would have meddled with him, but he feels that the judge is acting unjustly and he speaks out.

The other passage appealed to runs thus: "That no one may say, 'Kill yourselves, all of you, and go to God, and don't

^e Apol. i. c. 8, p. 57 A.

^f *Traité de la Morale*, p. 18.

^g Apol. ii. c. 12, p. 50 B.

give us trouble,' I will tell for what reason we do not do this, and for what reason when examined we fearlessly confess. We are taught that God has not made the world in vain, but on account of the human race; we said before that He delights in those who imitate his attributes, and that He is displeased with those who embrace what is evil either in word or deed. If, then, we shall all kill ourselves, we shall be, as far as is in our power, the cause that no one be born or instructed in the Divine teachings, or that there even be no human race at all; thus doing ourselves what is contrary to the will of God if we should do this. But when we are examined we do not deny that we are Christians, because we are conscious to ourselves of no evil; on the one hand reckoning it impious not to speak the truth in all things, for we know this to be agreeable to God; and on the other hand hastening to set you free from an unjust prejudice^h." Now, this passage contains no proof that Christians attached any value to martyrdom. There is no mention of Christians denouncing themselves. Justin wishes to explain what seemed to heathens an anomaly in Christian conduct. When brought before magistrates they confessed that they were Christians, and showed no fear of death. If death, then, was not an object of terror to them but the commencement of a more blessed life, why did they not kill themselves? Because Justin does not reply that it was wrong to commit suicide, Barbeyrac infers that Justin did not blame the deed itself, and then identifying suicide here with voluntary devotion to martyrdom he applies the inference to thisⁱ. Now, in the first place, Justin would have acted foolishly in stating to a Stoic that suicide was a crime. He had to give a reason for his opinion, and accordingly he shows how suicide is contrary to the Divine will in his creation of the world for the benefit of man; and therefore a Christian would be acting contrary to the Divine will if he committed suicide. And, in the

^h Apol. ii. c. 4, p. 43 C D E.

ⁱ I am not sure that Barbeyrac's reasoning is as I have stated, because his words are very few and very far from precise.

second place, Justin cannot allude to Christians voluntarily informing against themselves; for what the heathens are supposed to wish is not that all Christians would inform against themselves, but that all Christians would do away with themselves without troubling the magistrates. The words "when examined we fearlessly confess," and the reasons given by Justin why Christians confess, are against Barbeyrac's supposition. Christians confess, when examined, only because they are bound to tell the truth in all things, and because their confession may do good to the heathen. There is no trace of a wish to be put to death; on the contrary, Justin's words imply that a man would be acting contrary to the Divine purpose if he in any way from his own mere wish ran the risk of losing his life. But when Christians are brought before magistrates they must speak the truth. If Justin, therefore, were true to the doctrine which he here lays down he would have condemned the man who rushed into martyrdom merely for the sake of the glory beyond death^k.

There are some particular points of Justin's morality which deserve notice. Barbeyrac has found fault with him because he condemned swearing, but Justin simply quotes the words of Christ: "With regard to not swearing at all, but always speaking the truth, He exhorted thus, 'Swear not at all!'" In what sense Justin understood the words he does not say.

Justin's opinions in regard to marriage have also been blamed more than they deserve, principally because the statements made in the *Treatise on the Resurrection* were attributed to him. Justin nowhere speaks against marriage. He does not praise virginity. In one passage, indeed, most commentators have imagined that he does praise it, but it seems to me that the context is against the meaning which they attribute to the sentence. The words are, "And many men and women, sixty and seventy years of age, who from

^k See Kaye, p. 117.

¹ *Apol. i. c. 16, p. 63 D.*

early years have been disciples of Christ, remain uncorrupted (*ἄφθοροι*), and I boast that I can point out such over the whole race of men^m. For why should we mention the innumerable multitude of those who have changed from incontinence and have learned these thingsⁿ? Everything here depends on the meaning of *ἄφθοροι*. Now *ἄφθορος* means simply 'uncorrupted,' 'chaste.' If Justin regarded marriage as a chaste connexion, then married people might be *ἄφθοροι* as well as virgins. And Justin seems to me to apply it here in this wide sense; for in the sentence immediately preceding he is speaking of adultery, and adds this sentence in proof that many had kept Christ's injunctions against adultery; and in the sentence following, which I have quoted, he evidently contrasts the 'incontinent' (*ἀκολάστους*) with the *ἄφθοροι*, but there is not the slightest reason to suppose that Justin would have reckoned married people as such to be incontinent. On the contrary, in a passage in the Dialogue with Trypho^o, resembling the one in which our sentence occurs, we have the continence of marriage distinctly alluded to: "We," he says, "who were filled with war and mutual slaughter and every wickedness, have now from every land changed each our war-like weapons, our swords into ploughs, and our spears into agricultural implements, and we cultivate (*γεωργοῦμεν*) piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith, and hope which proceeds from the Father Himself through Him that was crucified, sitting each under his own vine—that is, using each his lawfully wedded wife alone."

Justin regarded marriage simply as a means to the production of children; and no doubt he would agree with many other Christian writers in the opinion that any intercourse which had not this for its object was sin. "Either," he says of Christians generally, "we do not marry at all, unless to nourish children, or, rejecting marriage, we are perfectly con-

^m The words might mean, 'I pray that I may show such over the whole race,' but the context is against this meaning.

ⁿ *Apol. i. c. 15, p. 62 B.*

^o *c. 110, p. 337 A.*

tinent^p.” Whether Justin went so far as to denounce second marriages, or whether he in any way showed asceticism beyond what has now been mentioned, is uncertain. One passage^q has been appealed to as disclosing a peculiar rigid opinion of Justin’s on marriage, but its real meaning is matter of much doubt. It runs thus: “Ὡςπερ καὶ οἱ νόμῳ ἀνθρωπίνῳ διγαμίας ποιοῦμενοι ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ διδασκάλῳ εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ προσβλέποντες γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτῆς. The difficulty lies in the word *διγαμίας*. Suicer (in voc.) shows that the word *διγαμία* has three meanings in ecclesiastical writers. It may mean either what we call bigamy, or a second marriage, or a marriage after a divorce has taken place, the divorced person being still alive. Most commentators seem inclined to think that *διγαμία* is to be taken here in the last sense, though the other two meanings have found defenders. Placing a comma at *εἰσὶν* they translate, “As they who enter on marriage after divorce by human law are sinners with our teacher, so are they who,” &c. The meaning is: Any one who enters on a second marriage while his divorced partner is still alive is a sinner with our teacher, even though such a marriage has been sanctioned by human law. Supposing this were the meaning, we should be still left in ignorance of Justin’s opinion on a very important point. The law permitted divorces for many reasons: the Church afterwards permitted them only for one, namely adultery. It is plain when this was the state of the case that the Church looked on many marriages as still in force which had been dissolved by law, and it would therefore regard the man as a sinner who married when he had obtained a divorce for reasons allowed by law but disallowed by the Church. Now, does Justin here condemn all marriages which are entered into after a divorce, or only those in which the divorce has not been given for the proper reason? So that even if we were sure that Justin used *διγαμία* in the sense attributed, we should yet not know very well what were

^p Apol. i. c. 29, p. 71 D.

^q Ibid. c. 15, p. 62 A.

his real opinions. There is, however, very good reason for doubting whether Justin uses the word in this sense. The only reason for believing that he uses it in this sense is that he is supposed in this sentence to sum up the teaching of Christ, which he has given by quoting Matt. v. 28-32, xix. 12^r. But this supposition is not a correct one. Matt. v. 32, of which our sentence is supposed to be a resumé, states a totally different case. The man who marries a divorced woman is not in the same case as a man who marries after he has divorced his wife. Justin may have confounded the cases, but it is not fair to assume that he did. The arguments against this meaning of *διγαμία* are these: The word itself naturally means bigamy, is so used in Greek writers, and, in fact, this meaning lies at the basis of the other two ecclesiastical meanings. *Διγαμία* meant a second marriage only with those who regarded marriage as indissoluble; and thought therefore that if a man married a second time he was really married to two wives, since he never could cease to be the husband of his first wife. In like manner *διγαμία* meant a marriage after divorce, because the divorce being regarded as null the divorced wife was reckoned a real wife, and therefore the man was married to two wives. This explanation of the uses of the word seems to me to require that the opinions of the Church should be somewhat fixed before the word could come to bear the two peculiarly ecclesiastical meanings, and Suicer adduces no instance of its use in either sense from writers who are not long subsequent to Justin. Moreover, we must remember that the Apology is addressed to heathens, and they could understand by the term nothing but bigamy. Then, again, if we had a summing up here, we certainly should not have *ᾧνερ*, but, as Davis conjectured, *ᾧτε*. There is, moreover, no real point of comparison between the two clauses. Then, again, the use of the dative to express "according to a human law, or with the sanction of a human law," is strange. And lastly, the reason assigned

^r See Ritter, as quoted by Braun and Otto, in loc.

by Justin for his statement applies only to the latter point of it, and not to the clause now discussed, if *διγαμία* is to have the meaning attributed to it: "For," he says, "not only is the actual adulterer excluded by Him (Christ), but he who wishes to commit adultery, since it is not deeds only that are evident to God, but the thoughts also."

It is far more easy to say what the passage does not mean than what it does mean. If we were to read *ὡς παρὰ τῆ νόμου ἀνθρώπων*, and put a comma at *ἀμαρτωλοί*, it seems to me that we shall get what Justin had in his mind, though his text may not be exactly as I have made it. The sentence would then run, "As with the human law men who have two wives at the same time are sinners, so with our teacher are even those who look upon a woman to lust after her: for it is not only the actual adulterer that is excluded by Him, but the man who wishes to commit adultery." Or in other words, as the Roman law condemned the bigamist, so Christ condemned the man who indulged in impure thoughts.

Justin condemns the polygamy of the Jews; and his writings contain perhaps the first distinct Christian attack on the liberty which the Jews claimed—to have more than one wife. Justin, however, does not contribute in any way to the establishment of monogamy on a rational basis. He merely rails at the "senseless and blind teachers" of the Jews, "who permit you even to the present day to have four and five wives each, and another one to these, if anyone happens to see a pretty one, and desires her, recounting the deeds of Jacob, called Israel, and of the other patriarchs, and saying that those who do like them do nothing wrong, wretched and senseless as they are in this matter*." Then Justin applies his allegorical interpretations to show that great mysteries lay hid in every such deed of the patriarchs. And he appeals to David's sin in regard to the wife of Uriah as proof that the patriarchs had many wives, "not as fornicators" (*ὡς πορνεύοντες*), but

* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 134, p. 363 D.

because mysteries were accomplished through them; "since," he says, "if it were permitted to take the wife that one wishes, and in the way one wishes, and as many as one wishes, as do men of your race in every land wherever they may travel or be sent to, taking women to themselves under the name of marriage, much more would this have been granted to David^t."

Looking at all the passages in Justin relating to the connexion of the sexes, I do not think we are warranted in attributing to him ascetic opinions, unless we regard as ascetic the opinion that the only legitimate object of marriage is the production of children. No doubt, like all Christians of his and many subsequent ages, he was influenced by a strong desire to praise continence, since it was a virtue of great rarity, and its existence was a proof of Christ's power over men. Other ideas regarding matter and the body led Christian writers of a later date into an extravagant estimate of the excellence of chastity, but these notions do not make their appearance in Justin.

We gather from a statement in Justin that at least some Christians did not disapprove at this time of self-mutilation. From the way in which Justin relates the circumstance we should be inclined to think that he did not disapprove of the act. We cannot, however, be certain in this inference, because the circumstance is helpful to Justin's argument, whether he approved of it or not, and writers like him are apt to state events without giving their opinions of them. "And now," he says, "one of our people, to persuade you that indiscriminate intercourse is no secret rite of ours, gave in a petition in Alexandria to Felix the governor, requesting him to grant leave to a physician to cut off his testicles; for the physicians in that place asserted that they were prohibited from performing this operation without the permission of the governor. But since Felix would not at all grant the petition, the youth, remaining in his own power, contented

^t Dial. c. Tryph. c. 141, p. 371 A B.

himself with the consciousness of himself and those of the same mind [that he was pure ^u].”

Justin says that Christians were taught that it was wicked to expose children^x. He assigns two reasons: first, because the children exposed, both male and female, had generally to follow a career of prostitution^y; and secondly, Christians would regard themselves as murderers if any one of them happened to perish^z.

Justin brings prominently forward the willingness of Christians to serve and pay respect to their governors. He asserts that they show a special forwardness in paying their taxes^a.

Justin says nothing of slavery, but once mentions the fact that Christians had household slaves who were compelled, under the influence of extreme tortures, to accuse their masters of the imaginary crimes which vulgar report attributed to them^b.

^u Apol. i. c. 29, p. 71 D E.

^y Apol. i. c. 27, p. 70 D.

^a Apol. i. c. 17, p. 64 C.

^x Ibid. c. 27, p. 70 D.

^z Ibid. c. 29, p. 71 D.

^b Ibid. ii. c. 12, p. 50 C.



